







The absence of literature on reward measures in the European context is counterbalanced
by an immense literature on the repressive-preventive key, which bets on the necessity and
efficacy of its role mostly of neutralisation, rather than prevention. The book contains the
results of the research project “Fighter” (Fight Against International Terrorism. Discover-
ing European Models of Rewarding Measures to Prevent Terrorism), financed by the Eu-
ropean Commission (Justice Programme 2014-2020), which has involved eight European
Universities: Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (P.I.), Università degli studi
di Ferrara, Sveučilište u Zagrebu - Pravni Fakultet, Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles,
Université du Luxembourg, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Ludwig-Maximilians
Universität München, Université de Lille 2. The investigation aims at assessing whether a
“rewarding” approach – favored by Art. 16 Dir. (EU) 2017/541 – can be pursued as a
harmonized and useful tool of prevention of terrorism. The question, on the other hand, is
whether a European model of restorative and collaborative measures already exists or can
be born, or if instead there are more than one model and it is necessary to let them coex-
ist without impossible unifying pushes. More than distinct “models”, however, the re-
search shows that there are differences of “legal systems”, substantive and procedural,
which impose any general “model” to be differentiated according to those distinct norma-
tive and legal realities, or at least force to “flexible” applications because of the different
disciplines and specific preventive purposes that are necessary. At the end of the research
a European model of rewarding measures to prevent terrorism has been drafted, which
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INTRODUCTION TO A EUROPEAN PROJECT 
FOR «REWARDING MEASURES» TO PREVENT TERRORISM
MASSIMO DONINI
SUMMARY: 1. A project of prevention, rather than of fight, on the rewarding measures for ter-
rorists. – 2. First problematic aspects of art. 16 Dir. (UE) 2017/541. – 3. The tasks car-
ried out by the project research Units. – 4. Criminological aspects of Islamic terrorism
and of the “criminal out of conviction”. – 5. Some outcomes of cooperation emerged in
the most recent Italian experience. – 6. Utilitarism as the basis of Art. 16. – 7. The
problem of a facultative harmonization with imposed conditions. – 8. The results of
the comparative analysis. – 9. Critical remarks on harmonization and Art. 16. –
10. General conclusion on the concept of non-punishability as category that includes
the mitigation. – 11. De lege ferenda. The Model.
1. A project of prevention, rather than of fight, on the rewarding measures
for terrorists
In the general conception of punishment, a new vision is that the repar-
ative moment is an essential part of the penalty, not an external and eventual
aspect of mitigation and alleviation.
If there is reparation of the offence, in one of the very different possible
forms (among which procedural cooperation is only one of the many), the
punitive response, the penalty, must be different, and the State increasingly
recognises this different need for sanctioning, to the point of envisaging
reparation itself as a ‘sanction’ that replaces the traditional penalty suffered
at least for part of the penal response. Hence, reparation is already a form of
“acted punishment”. In this sense, it constitutes a sanction offered to the lib-
erty of the person responsible for the offence in order to partly settle the
score with the wrongdoing committed1.
Therefore, the conducts of cooperation and repentance are also part of
the sanction, which is not commensurate or designed only for culpability,
i.e. for the ex-ante conduct, but also in relation to the conduct subsequent to
the fact.
This has always been the case, but until now reparation programmes
had not been seen as state, public, but only private projects: a personal mat-
ter, an individual burden of the accused. Instead, restorative justice and re-
1 More details in M. DONINI, Per una concezione post-riparatoria della pena. Contro la
pena come un raddoppio del male, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen., 2013, 1162 et seq.; ID., Il delitto ri-
parato. Una disequazione che può trasformare il sistema sanzionatorio, in www.penalecontem-
poraneo.it Riv. trim., n. 2015, pp. 236-250); ID., Pena agìta e pena subìta. Il modello del delitto
riparato, in Questione giust., 2020 (on-line, 29 October).
warding measures are increasingly the subject of public criminal policy pro-
grammes.
Until now, a comparative and European-wide study on the relevance of
reward measures in the criminal law of terrorist offences has not been ad-
dressed and this research aims to fill a gap in international and european ju-
ridical production.
The research project financed by the European Commission (Justice
Programme 2014-2020), which has been titled «Fight Against International
Terrorism. Discovering European Models of Rewarding Measures to Prevent
Terrorism», and has involved eight European Universities2, was conceived
when Europe was under attack from Isis, while now Daesh has disappeared
from the European occidental scene after the fall of the Islamic State.
Decisive reasons for that defeat are not to be found in the so-called ju-
dicial fight against terrorism, if I may use the expression, which in reality
describes a logic contrasting with the position of the judge as a third party,
although it is widespread in the EU culture and in its mass media transla-
tion3, On the contrary, the military and war turn for the intervention of in-
ternational military forces in Syria has been of great and decisive impor-
tance, whereas the choice to face terrorism in a jurisdictional form, instead
of war, represents the simple expression of the rule of law of the countries
where the terrorist action has produced or is preparing conducts and of-
fenses of criminal relevance. Jurisdiction has not been chosen to militarily
win a military formation, because jurisdiction is not an instrument of war.
And even conceiving it as an instrument of fight, risks distorting its function
and constitutional role at the level of judging magistracy (rather than inves-
tigating magistracy).
The very perception of the terrorist risk in Europe cannot be said to be
alarming today, but the revival of the Arab-Israeli conflict is enough to re-
store a climate of concern, if not alarm, and an attack would in any case be
enough to summon punitive, rather than collaborative, responses.
In terms of real victims everyone knows how much greater is the num-
ber of those of road traffic, smoking, environmental pollution or the food in-
dustry.
The fact that there have been no injuries, no attacks in Italy, for in-
stance, is indicative of a situation that has always been very diverse in Eu-
rope.
In the face of these evolutions, the reconstructive task of the research
has appeared more theoretical, even if its political and technical value has
certainly not diminished.
2 FIGHTER - GA num. 831637, Justice - Action Grant. The involved research centres
are: Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (P.I.), Università degli studi di Ferrara,
Sveučilište u Zagrebu - Pravni Fakultet, Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles, Université du Lux-
embourg, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München,
Université de Lille.
3 See M. DONINI, Le statut de terroriste: entre l’ennemi et le criminel. Les droits fondamen-
taux et la juridiction pénale comme garantie contre ou comme justification pour l’usage du droit
comme arme?, in Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé, n. 1/2009, pp. 31-42.
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It is theoretical because of the lack or scarcity of significant trials and
events, of jurisdictional material and cases, even though there are many hy-
potheses of preventive action by the secret services and public security agen-
cies, of collaboration anticipated with respect to the already anticipated
criminal offences:
Indeed. As we will see, some of those offences, now close to the “crim-
inal law of the author”, rather than “of the fact”, present a legitimacy linked
to the very existence of restorative hypotheses that have a substantial value
of non-punishability.
Faced with ‘facts of crime’ of presumed danger but subjectively con-
structed, often lacking in harmfulness of the single conducts separated from
the types of author, unless they are followed by terrorist actions, the provi-
sion of subsequent forms of pre-trial collaboration becomes decisive.
This currently practical relevance must however be connected with the
overall strategy of the role of law in facing the problem of terrorism not only
in a repressive dimension, but also in a preventive and utilitarian one: for
the strategic importance of obtaining information from within groups even
no longer organized by a “center” as it was with al Qaeda, before Isis, but
also for the contextual offer of dialogic responses that present a face and a
reality of jurisdiction capable of building bridges with the majority and
healthy cultural background of the presence of Islamic populations in the
West: a bridge necessary to offer the most suitable basis for deradicalization
processes that assume a background of inclusion different from that of ter-
rorist minorities.
2. First problematic aspects of art. 16 Dir. (UE) 2017/541
The research aimed to assess whether a “rewarding” approach – appar-
ently favoured by Art. 16 Dir. (EU) 2017/5414 – can be pursued as a harmo-
nized and useful tool, of prevention of terrorism (“Rewarding Measures to
Prevent Terrorism”). A tool that, although it is also de facto functional to the
political program of counter-terrorism, cannot be conceived as an expression
of struggle through jurisdiction.
Why “apparently favored”? Because, as we shall see, art. 16 of Dir. (EU)
2017/541 introduces, but only optionally, the provision of reward measures,
and moreover, rather than really favoring their experimentation and use,
taking into account the different and multiple regulatory realities of the
Member States, “seems” to be concerned with hardening and limiting their
use, confining such legislation within strict conditions in terms of general
prevention, rather than special prevention5.
Special prevention is completely subordinate to general prevention if
the normative parameters are rigid and concerned with imposing on the col-
4 The Directive may be found on https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=
celex%3A32017L0541.
5 The lack of correspondence or harmonization between the demands of general and
special prevention is perhaps the most problematic feature of Article 16 which is the subject
of the present research.
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laborator very high conditions to his contribution. And this is the risk pre-
sent in art. 16 which, in this way, is actually weakened in its very attractive-
ness and special-prevention effectiveness.
The question, on the other hand, is whether a European model of
restorative and collaborative measures already exists or can be born, or if in-
stead there are more than one model and it is necessary to let them coexist
without impossible unifying pushes.
More than distinct “models”, however, we will see that there are differ-
ences of “legal systems”, substantive and procedural, which impose any gen-
eral “model” to be differentiated according to those distinct normative and
legal realities, or at least force to “flexible” applications because of the dif-
ferent disciplines and specific preventive purposes that are necessary.
3. The tasks carried out by the project research Units
Starting from this “open” question, in the first phase each country in-
volved has carried out a survey of the existing legislations, focusing on the
presence, or not, of reward measures against internal ideological terrorism,
as well as on their legislative structure, the existing theoretical debate and
practical use. In the second phase, the individual partners were divided into
two groups: the first (Belgium6, Luxembourg7 Croatia8 and Spain9), coordi-
nated by the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, was assigned the task
of creating a possible “general model of reward measures” exportable in each
Member State; in light of this purpose, a comparative study of the reward
models in the various legal realities (substantive and procedural) involved
was carried out, after which the socio-criminological peculiarities of the au-
thor-type and the EU competences in the matter were analyzed. The second
group (Germany10 and France11), coordinated by the University of Ferrara,
was assigned the task of assessing whether the current EU legislation already
allowed the introduction of a first set of reward measures against interna-
tional terrorism, and possibly to what extent; to do this it was decided to an-
alyze in general EU law, with specific reference to the obligations of crimi-
nalization, as well as the implications of Art. 16 Dir. (EU) 2017/54.
4. Criminological aspects of Islamic terrorism and of the “criminal out of
conviction”
At the very base of the project already laid the persuasion that it is not
punishment that defeats terrorism, and that the operative importance of the
presence of the repressive penal system in moments of major conflict is only
6 The coordinator of the Belgian Unit is Prof. Yves Cartuyvels.
7 The coordinator of the Luxembourgish Unit is Prof. Silvia Allegrezza.
8 The coordinator of the Croatian Unit is Prof. Zlata Durdevic.
9 The coordinator of the Spanish Unit is Prof. Manuel Cancio Meliá.
10 The coordinator of the German Unit is Prof. Prof. Helmut Satzger.
11 The coordinator of the French Unit is Prof. Julie Alix.
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one aspect12 of the society’s reaction and of the necessary “ideological” and
“political” reconstruction of identity relations around certain fundamental
values and a positive relationship with Islamic culture as a whole13.
12 The absence of literature on reward measures in the European context is counter-
balanced by an immense literature in a repressive-preventive key, which bets on the necessity
and efficacy of its role mostly of neutralisation, rather than prevention, which is seen at the
limit as negative, rather than general positive prevention, especially in the face of radically
“anti-system” types of terrorists such as those of religious-Islamic matrix. For instance, as
noted by J. ALIX, Radicalisation et droit pénal, RSC 2020 n° 3, p. 769, in France, we are cur-
rently experiencing a clear increase in the severity of sentences pronounced and executed in
terrorist matters, with laws that progressively restrict reductions in sentences or access to
sentence adjustments, particularly conditional release, but with a purely eliminatory objec-
tive.
For a selection of comparative contributions on terrorism legislation or criminal laws,
H. LAURENS, M. DELMAS-MARTY (dir.), Terrorismes, CNRS Editions, Paris, 2010, 189 et seq., 219
et seq.; C. BASSU, Terrorismo e costituzionalismo. Percorsi comparati, Giappichelli, Torino,
2010; F. GALLI, A. WEYEMBERGH (eds.), EU counter-terrorism offences. What impact on national
legislation and case-law?, Univ. Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2012; K. ROUDIER, Le contrôle de consti-
tutionnalité de la législation anti-terroriste. Étude comparée des expériences espagnole, française
et italienne, LGDJ, Bibliothèque constitutionnelle et de science politique, t. 140, 2012; S.
DONKIN, Preventing Terrorism and Controlling Risk. A Comparative Analysis of Control Orders
in the UK and Australia, Springer, Berlin, 2014; F. GALLI, The Law on Terrorism: The UK,
France and Italy compared, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2015; K. ROACH (ed.), Comparative Counter-
Terrorism Law, Cambridge University Press, 2015; F. FASANI, Terrorismo islamico e diritto pe-
nale, Wolters Kluwer, Cedam, Padova, 2016; J. ALIX, O. CAHN (eds.), L’hypothèse de la guerre
contre le terrorisme. Implications juridiques, Dalloz, Paris, 2017; D. CASTRONUOVO, Quale
lezione dagli anni di piombo? La legislazione dell’emergenza e sui pentiti in prospettiva storica
e comparata, in Diritto penale XXI secolo, 2019, n° 1; J. ALIX, O. CAHN, Terrorisme et infraction
politique, Mare & Martin, 2020; N. KARALIOTA, E. KOMPATSIARI, C. LAMPAKIS, M. KAIAFA-GBANDI,
The New EU Counter-Terrorism Offences and the Complementary Mechanism of Controlling
Terrorist Financing as Challenges for the Rule of Law, Leiden-Boston, 2020; S. DE COENSEL, Ter-
rorists on the Move: A Legitimacy Test of the Criminal Law Approach on Foreign Fighters in
Western Europe, in ECLR, vol. 10, Iss. 2, 2020; C. WALKER, M. CANCIO MELIÁ (eds.), Precursor
Crimes of Terrorism: The Criminalisation of Terrorism Risk in Comparative Perspective, Chel-
tenham, 2021, forthcoming.
13 The ‘cultural’ profiles of religiously-motivated terrorism are mostly present in the
historical and criminological contributions, not in the penal ones in the strict sense. See,
among a huge literature, J. RAFLIK, Terrorisme et mondialisation. Approches historiques, Galli-
mard, Paris, 2011; A. GARAPON, M. ROSENFELD, Démocraties sous stress. Les défis du terrorisme
global, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2016; T. HEGGAMMER, Jihadi Culture, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017; C. DEL PRADO HIGUERA, E. SÁNCHEZ DE ROJAS DÍAZ, Terrorismo is-
lamista: El caso de Al Gama’a al Islamiya, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2018; H. MICHERON, Le
jihadisme français. Quartiers, Syrie, Prisons, Gallimard, 2020; G. LAFREE, J.D. FREILICH (eds.),
The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, 2017; D. WEGGE-
MANS, B. DE GRAAF, Reintegrating Jihadist Extremist Detainees: Helping Extremist Offenders
Back into Society, Routledge London - New York, 2017; J.D. FREILICH, G. LAFREE (eds.), Crim-
inology Theories and Terrorism, Routledge, London and New York, 2016; see also the Nr.
1/2021 of La Comunità internazionale, on “Nuove forme di estremismo: strumenti di preven-
zione e contrasto delle minacce jihadiste transnazionali”; P. LAURANO, G. LANZERA, L’analisi so-
ciologica del nuovo terrorismo tra dinamiche di radicalizzazione e programmi di de-radicaliz-
zazione, in Quaderni di sociologia, 2017, p. 99 at 115; F. KHOSROKHAVAR, Radicalisation, Mai-
son des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, 2014; MINISTERO DELLA GIUSTIZIA. DIPARTIMENTO
DELL’AMMINISTRAZIONE PENITENZIARIA (Hrsg.), Quaderni ISSP Nr. 9, La radicalizzazione del terror-
ismo islamico, Istituto Superiore di Studi penitenziari, 2012; H. EL-SAID, J. HARRIGAN, De-rad-
icalising Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation Programs and their
Impact in Muslim Majority States, Routledge, London, New York, 2012; O. ASHOUR, The De-
Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, Routledge, New York,
2009; M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs dans le système pénal: analyse comparée et
critique, Bruylant, Brussels, 2002; S. DE COENSEL, Processual Models of Radicalization into Ter-
rorism: A Best Fit Framework Synthesis, Journal for Deradicalization 2018/19 n° 17.
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This is an important premise in order to hypothesize some chance of
success for collaborative operations that must have as their background not
only a de-radicalisation, but also a social fabric in which the person finds an
identity that is not broken but placed within the positive values of his or her
own religious culture of origin.
Not only. The belief or, if you want, the operative hypothesis from which
to move is that, with respect to a criminal out of conviction, to an “anti-sys-
tem” delinquent, the classic categories of punishment/blame do not have a re-
solving hermeneutic capacity and, above all, a preventive capacity. On the
contrary, on the criminological level, expecting from an anti-system ideology
that its members could be “blackmailed” by a reward that is viewed as trea-
son is a message culturally and politically destined to failure, as the crimino-
logical analysis of the Belgian unit (Yves Cartuyvels) persuasively explains.
The comparative final report of the Spanish unit (M. Cancio Meliá) also
attests to this underlying problem. Comparisons with the French unit (J. Alix)
also show that from a criminological point of view, the opposition we face in
France is linked to the practice of concealment (taqqiya). For counter-ter-
rorism actors, the jihadist is obliged to practice taqqiya, so even if he re-
pents, he is not trustworthy.
Obviously, if the thesis, widely discussed in the criminological research
of the Belgian unit, that the new typology of terrorists is per se refractory to
any dialogue and therefore to any collaboration, was true, the empirical ba-
sis of the legislation would be disproved and one would have to conclude for
the lack of effectiveness of the dispositions, even more if they are limited, ac-
cording to certain readings, to admitting only “mitigation of punishment” in
case of collaboration.
We should better resort to amnesty measures, rather than count on in-
dividualized solutions. As noted in the final report of the Belgian unit: «… it
seems to us, in this respect, that individualized denunciation policies are less
promising than collective amnesty or rehabilitation».
5. Some outcomes of cooperation emerged in the most recent Italian experi-
ence
On the other hand, some on-the-field experiences, even in Italy, demon-
strate the variety of persons who are susceptible to follow collaboration pro-
grams, and the possibility and space for dialogue interventions in view of de-
radicalisation and processual collaboration, from which it is possible to ori-
ent European legislation in terms of effectiveness, even more if it is
extended, rather than restricted, in its possible spaces of application.
The contribution of the Italian Nucleus Police Prevention Central Di-
rector14, for instance, displays, among the facts resulting also from the press
and as such disclosable, some cases of collaboration in advance with respect
14 See the report of V. DI PESO presented at the first Focus Group of the Italian Unit, on
24 September 2019: Collaborators of justice in the context of the countering international ter-
rorism. Italian cases. In this book Section I, Chapter 1 b.
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to the preparation of terrorist attacks or trainings abroad: see, in addition to
the most dated collaborations within the Operation Al Mouhajirun and with
Afghan Tunisians in Algeria (coordinated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of
Milan and conducted by the DIGOS of Milan and Varese in 2001), the col-
laborations (Jelassi Riadh, Tlili Lazhar) whose cognitive fruits were col-
lected in an anti-terrorism operation (Haidora) carried out in May 2005; the
operation Rakno Sadess, carried out on June 7, 2007 by the Guardia di Fi-
nanza of Milan regarding the Salafite Group for Preaching and Combat, op-
erating between various European, North African and Middle Eastern coun-
tries; the contribution of the Tunisian Zouaoui Chokri around 2005 (Opera-
tion Bazar); and more recently, the contribution of collaborator Touray
Elhagie and the information rendered in 2018 about Libyan elements, trace-
able to Daesh, and the recruitment of young extremists in countries in the
central-western band of Africa, their training in mobile camps in the Libyan
desert (the moaskars), their exfiltration towards jihad conflicts or towards
Europe via the migration routes, etc.
In addition to this, it is attested in relation to the extra-trial benefits
granted to subjects who have collaborated with investigators or with the in-
formation and security sector in the context of the fight against terrorism,
that from 2005 to September 4, 2019 there has been a total of 401 foreigners
who have obtained the residence permit provided by art. 2 of Legislative De-
cree No. 144 of July 27, 2005, converted into Law No. 155 of July 31, 2005
(s.c. residence permit for investigative purposes)15.
15 Art. 2. L. 155/2005: Residence permits for investigative purposes.
1. Also outside of the cases referred to in chapter II of the decree-law of 15 January
1991, No. 8, converted, with modifications, by the law of 15 March 1991, No. 82, and subse-
quent modifications, and referred to in article 18 of the single text of the dispositions con-
cerning the discipline of immigration and norms on the condition of the foreigner, referred
to in the legislative decree of 25 July 1998, No. 286, hereinafter referred to as: “legislative de-
cree No. 286 of 1998”, and in derogation of the provisions of article 5 of the legislative de-
cree No. 286 of 1998, when, in the course of police operations, investigations or proceedings
relative to crimes committed for purposes of terrorism, including international terrorism, or
subversion of the democratic order, there is the need to ensure the permanence in the terri-
tory of the State of the foreigner who has offered the judicial authority or the police bodies
a collaboration having the characteristics referred to in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the afore-
mentioned decree-law No. 8 of 1991, the Questore (police commissioner), autonomously or
on the recommendation of the heads of the police forces at least at a provincial level, or of
the directors of the information and security services, or when requested by the public prosecu-
tor, issues the foreigner with a special residence permit, valid for one year and renewable for
equal periods.
2. With the report referred to in paragraph 1, are communicated to the Questore the
elements that show the existence of the conditions specified therein, with particular refer-
ence to the importance of the contribution offered by the foreigner.
3. The residence permit issued under this article may be renewed for reasons of justice
or public safety. It is revoked in the event of conduct incompatible with the purposes of the
same, reported by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the other bodies referred to in paragraph 1
or otherwise established by the Questore, or when the other conditions that justified its is-
suance are no longer present.
4. For all matters not provided for in this article, the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6
of article 18 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 25 July 1998 shall apply.
5. When the collaboration offered has had extraordinary importance for the prevention
in the territory of the State of terrorist attacks on the life or safety of persons or for the con-
crete reduction of the damaging or dangerous consequences of the attacks themselves, or for
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In this framework, the collaboration of the terrorist or of his flankers,
often destined to enter the investigative area of the very anticipated criminal
offences, more anticipated than the same traditional “preparatory acts” of fi-
nal-crimes, but sometimes relevant for other crimes existing today, as they
are anchored to ways of being or becoming dangerous (enrolment and train-
ing), appears as a strategic moment both in the project of general and spe-
cial prevention. This choice has been valued and indicated in Article 16 of
the EU Directive 2017/541 as a facultative option for the States.
6. Utilitarism as the basis of Art. 16
The cultural and juridical context of this intervention strategy which is
additional and certainly not a substitute for that of punishing the crimes, ap-
peared in the course of the research inspired by clearly utilitarian criteria.
The Spanish second paper argues that “the conflict entailed in the whole
area of rewarding measures (as already pointed out in their Report II by the
Luxembourgish unit), this is, between justice to be made – normative ap-
proach – for the offenses the repentant may have committed and the need to
combat effectively terrorism – utilitarian approach –) has been solved in all
examined member states, expressly or implicitly, in principle, in favour of
the utilitarian/pragmatic approach (goals: prevention of further harm or to
bring to justice the [other] perpetrators of terrorist crimes) which is the fun-
damental ground and rationale of establishing rewarding measures (as
whereas 21 and 24 of Directive [EU] 541/2017 [the Directive] expressly state:
“combat terrorism effectively”)”.
And goes on: the main program of the Directive is to “mitigate” his
treatment, the offender/defendant has to: a) “renounce” terrorism: German:
“lossagen”, French: “renoncer”; Spanish: “abandonar”; Italian: “rinunciare”)
(Art. 16 a); and b) furnish (new/relevant) information, which can be done in
two forms: – internal (punitive) collaboration related to an offense already
committed: information to mitigate or prevent effects of the offense (Art. 16
b) I); to bring to justice other offenders (Art. 16 b) II) or to find evidence
(Art. 16 b) III); or – external (preventive) collaboration to prevent further
crimes of terrorism (Art. 16 b) IV).
We can add to these remarks that it is not the repentance that is placed
the identification of those responsible for acts of terrorism, the foreigner may be granted, with
the same modality as in paragraph 1, the residence card, also in derogation of the dispositions
of article 9 of the legislative decree No. 286 of 1998.
The aforementioned art. 9 of the d.l. 8 of 1991, in paragraph 3, states: “For the pur-
poses of the application of the special measures of protection, the collaboration or the dec-
larations made in the course of criminal proceedings are important. The collaboration and
the aforementioned declarations must be of an intrinsically reliable nature. They must also
have the character of novelty or completeness or for other elements must appear to be of
considerable importance for the development of the investigations or for the purposes of the
judgment or for the activities of investigation on the structural connotations, the endow-
ments of arms, explosives or goods, the articulations and the internal or international con-
nections of the criminal organizations of mafia or terrorist type or on the objectives, the pur-
poses and the operative modalities of said organizations”.
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at the basis of the tested experiences of anti-terrorism legislation in the
countries that have given life to this investigation, but the procedural rele-
vance of detachment from the group to which one belongs through the use
of information, revelations and confessions relevant to prevent the commis-
sion of crimes, to ascertain those committed, and to have information of im-
portance for the contrast to the activity in progress or to the ascertainment
of the responsibilities of others.
However, a very strict reading of the Directive risks leading to consider
the preventive moment of procedural collaboration as an instrument only of
contrast and general prevention, rather than special prevention.
To this impression must be added the consideration that terrorist
crimes are political-cultural oriented offences (even if depoliticized by the
1977 Convention for the purposes of jurisdiction/extradition) and, apart
from military and warlike actions of contrast, can be faced, in a legal-pre-
ventive key, only with dialogic tools which are not those of the “criminal law
of the enemy”16. The “enemy law” makes the terrorist a permanent target of
non-dialogue and mutual destruction. In contrast, the reward logic is
grounded in dialogue, although not in necessary repentance (s. below).
7. The problem of a facultative harmonization with imposed conditions
Yet there is not only the impression of a strong rigour.
Art. 16 of the Directive represents an optional entry of the EU into the
territory of mitigating/extenuating circumstances, but once broadly under-
stood – the quantum of reduction could always extend up to almost 100% of
the penalty – they certainly trespass into the territory of non-punishability.
Slowly but surely.
And the differences between legal systems, both procedural and sub-
stantive, make true European harmonization in the field of non-punishabil-
ity very difficult.
16 On this subject, within a very large bibliography, s. Derecho penal del enemigo. El dis-
curso penal de la exclusión, ed. by CANCIO MELIÁ, GÓMEZ-JARA DÍEZ, vol. I e II, Edisofer S.L., Eu-
ros Editores, B de F Ltda, Madrid-Buenos Aires-Montevideo, 2006; Diritto penale del nemico.
Un dibattito internazionale, ed. by M. DONINI e M. PAPA, Giuffrè, Milano, 2007; and the n.
1/2009 of the Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé; F. MUÑOZ CONDE, De nuevo
sobre el “Derecho penal del enemigo”, Hammurabi, Buenos Aires, 2005; E. RAÚL ZAFFARONI, El
enemigo en el derecho penal, Buenos Aires (impreso en propio), 2006; M. DONINI, Das
Strafrecht un der “Feind”, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2007. German bibliography in C. ROXIN, L.
GRECO, Strafrecht, AT, Bd. I5, Beck, München, 2020, 109 et seq. (where, moreover, the issue is
largely underestimated). S. also A. VAHLAS, Le droit de l’Union européenne et la «guerre contre
le terrorisme», in J. ALIX, O. CAHN (eds.), L’hypothèse de la guerre contre le terrorisme, cit.; F.
MUÑOZ CONDE, Derecho en la guerra contra el terrorismo: el derecho de la guerra, el derecho pe-
nal internacional y el derecho de la guerra dentro del derecho penal interno (“derecho penal del
enemigo”), in Revista Justiça e Sistema Criminal, v. 5, n. 9, 2013, p. 77 et seq.; V. MASARONE,
Politica criminale e diritto penale nel contrasto al terrorismo internazionale, tra normativs in-
terna, europea e internazionale, Esi, Napoli, 2013; M. CANCIO MELIÁ, Los delitos de terrorismo:
estructura típica e injusto, Ed. Reus, Madrid, 2010, p. 46 et seq., 138 et seq.; M. DONINI, Le
statut de terroriste: entre l’ennemi et le criminel, cit., p. 31 et seq.; R. BARTOLI, Lotta al terror-
ismo internazionale. Tra diritto penale del nemico, jus in bello del criminale e annientamento
del nemico assoluto, Giappichelli, Torino, 2008; P. FARALDO CABANA (dir.), Derecho penal de ex-
cepción. Terrorismo e inmigración, Tirant lo blanch, Valencia 2007.
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Imposing a harmonization of “non-punitive rigour” (many limits to ex-
tensive mitigation of punishment) means to violently enter those differences,
with not always manageable repercussions, as we shall see, in terms of sub-
stantial equality. In fact, the principle of equality obliges to differently treat
different situations. Among the differences, however, it is also necessary to
consider the legal systems. In the sense that if, with respect to the incrimi-
nations, harmonizing is easier, with respect already to the penalty mitiga-
tion, harmonization becomes more complex because of the differences be-
tween the national sanctioning systems.
This is the same well-known cause of difficulties in harmonising Euro-
pean penalties rather than precepts.
But then, with respect to non-punishability, it is even prohibitive, be-
cause it is not a strict alternative as it might seem: non-punishability can
also be achieved in concrete terms, not only through abstract rigid rules.
This difficulty, moreover, can be addressed in two ways:
a) prohibiting in abstracto hypotheses of non-punishability for a better
contrast strategy: but this is a rigid solution and can be circumvented in sev-
eral ways;
b) leaving such solutions to the discretion and full freedom of the
States in order to better ensure differentiated strategies that are also suited
to the logic of prevention, which as such cannot be predetermined in a fixed
or rigid manner.
A third solution appears to be that of:
c) admitting the discipline of forms of mitigation, up to almost non-
punishability in concreto, but prohibiting different forms of rigid non-pun-
ishability for the conduct of collaboration in international terrorist crimes.
At a first interpretation, the choice of art. 16 of the Directive may seem
to be linked to this model or at least be better in line with it. We will see if
this interpretation, which remains controversial within the partners of the
research, is fully satisfactory or deserves different future analysis.
We will also see that the objectives of strengthening pre-trial protection
and in the executive phase override the meaning of the rules intended for the
judgment.
The judicial finding of the reward for cooperation, only just potential in
systems of optional prosecution, and on which Article 16 of EU Directive
2017/541 seems to focus, is only an instant of evidentiary verification of a
much longer path, where the extra-trial and extra-legal reality appears deci-
sive.
8. The results of the comparative analysis
At this point we should trace a distinction between the de lege lata and
de lege ferenda analysis that have been conducted within this research.
De lege lata I shall follow in this paragraph some results of the compar-
ative paper of the Spanish Unit, literally quoting various parts out of it17.
17 Manuel CANCIO MELIÁ, Sabela OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Substantial law issues: selected prob-
lems, Section II, Chapitre 5.
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On the legislative level, “we have to distinguish first between tools lo-
cated in substantial, procedural (investigation and pre-trial proceedings) and
penitentiary law, and, perhaps more important, between overt and somehow
clandestine practices, especially, when the negotiation prior to court pro-
ceedings is located in the realm of “private” activities of the prosecutor’s of-
fice. This is especially difficult to see in the case of informal agreements on
charges or prosecution that could take place in any given procedural system
(whether there is a legality principle system or an opportunity system on
prosecution).
Most Member States establish a specific collaboration regulation for
terrorism offenses (Spain, France, Luxembourg, Croatia); in Germany, there
is a mixed model, since general rules for sentencing are combined with ter-
rorism-specific provisions (limited to selected offenses)”.
“As the example of Italy and Spain shows, certain general legal possi-
bilities in penitentiary law are used in a post-sentencing stage to counter
strong restrictions of substantial or procedural law (this happens because of
political reasons: in E, because these measures are the only way to “normal-
ize” enforcement conditions that stem from a very restrictive substantial and
procedural regulation, as any sign of some kind of “benevolence” towards
terrorist perpetrators is immediately thrown into public debate depicting the
executive that acts in this line as weak or even accomplice of the terrorists).
This implies that there will be huge differences in the Member States
depending on how the circle of specific terrorism offenses has been drawn in
the respective Code (and as long as the obligation to consider them “terror-
ist” offenses established in art. 3, 14 of the Directive has not been met yet):
from regulations as the one in Spain, where almost all severe offenses of the
special part of the code can be “terrorised”, that is, conceived as (aggra-
vated) terrorism offenses, to Member States where this legal label (“terror-
ism offense”) is restricted to organization crimes (in the German terminol-
ogy: offenses that consist of having a certain relationship to a terrorist orga-
nization, i.e., membership or collaboration offenses), as is the case in
Germany”.
“Spain only provides for mitigation (which however can imply that e.g.
in offenses of membership of or collaboration with a terrorist organization
the resulting penalty in cases of sentence reduction would not imply neces-
sarily an effective prison term); also Croatia’s regulation only covers mitiga-
tion (which is esteemed to be almost impossible in practice by the national
report).
Germany allows exemption only for the crime of membership in/col-
laboration with a terrorist organization (up to a penalty of three years of
prison term); France establishes the possibility of exemption before prose-
cution takes place (including organization offenses); Italy allows exemption
if especially high requirements on the quality and effects of the information
are met; Luxembourg’s regulation has both possibilities before and after
prosecution”.
About the “Renouncement requirement”, namely Mitigation vs. Exemp-
tion, “Germany, France, Luxembourg do not require that the repentant has
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renounced his or her terrorist activity (although for the specific exemption
rules regarding organizational offenses it is necessary that the repentant pre-
sents an effort to prevent the continued existence of the organization); Bel-
gium, Croatia establish that the repentant must not be a recividist offender;
Spain, Italy, Croatia require renouncement of the collaborator, with different
degrees of intensity (including Spain the option that the repentant con-
tributes to hinder not only the activities of the terrorist collective, but also its
“development”)”.
The Spanish conclusive report proposes that “the absence of the re-
quirement of renouncement/abandonment of the terrorist activity, as
pointed out in some national reports, seems a major failure to comply with
the standard set by Art. 16, in our opinion. It is true that we are dealing with
a facultative harmonization standard. But when engaged in introducing
such a regulation, it seems that this element – as said before: essential to the
area of terrorism because of its ideological bias – is a basic element of the
model of rewarding measures designed by the Directive. To comply with it,
national legislations need to incorporate this element (the L report offers a
different interpretation of the scope of the harmonization obligation and
holds that compliance is possible even without the renouncement element)”.
“Departing from the distinction in art. 16 Directive between internal
(punitive) and external (preventive) forms of collaboration, the reports show
that all Member States incorporate both forms.
Some Member States do not specify any requirements on this relation-
ship besides that they have to be terrorist offenses (Spain, Luxembourg,
Croatia).
Other Member States require expressly a proportionality analysis of
both offenses (Belgium), the existence of some relationship of the offense on
which the information is given to the own offense of the repentant (Ger-
many), that both offenses are “related and of the same nature” (France) and
that they were committed for the same “purpose” (Italy).
The requirements regarding the quality of the information the repen-
tant provides are different in formulation, but converge in the information
being truthful, relevant and effective: in Belgium’s regulation, the informa-
tion has to be “significant, revealing, truthful and complete”; in Germany,
that it constitutes a “substantial contribution to discovery” or leads to the
completion of the offense to be averted, and is given “voluntarily and
timely”; in Spain, “decisive”, effective and complete (as to the offenses com-
mitted by the repentant).
Most Member States establish a specific collaboration regulation for
terrorism offenses (Spain, France, Luxembourg, Croatia); in Germany, there
is a mixed model, since general rules for sentencing are combined with ter-
rorism-specific provisions (limited to selected offenses).
“Especially interesting seems in this context the problem – which has
been out of the central focus of our approach – of the coordination of re-
warding measures with the general institution of withdrawal/voluntary
abandonment in the Member States legislations, in particular regarding or-
ganization offenses (membership and collaboration; here there is a practice
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in some Member States, e.g. in Spain and Croatia, not to use this institution
in terrorism offenses; some national reports – for instance, France – stress
that the practice of withdrawal in this area is very unclear; in Italy, some
specific regulations were deemed to be special cases of withdrawal).
An important field of the current wave of terrorism, especially in the
EU, is the activity of isolated perpetrators without real organizational ties to
a terrorist organization (so-called “lone wolves”). The design of Art. 16, re-
quiring renouncement and information (or, in other words, the absence of a
substantial law approach to de-radicalization) excludes this important group
of offenders”.
The main deficit of the research concerns the “judicial” application as-
pect of the forms of reward measures concerning types of Islamic terrorists
and concerning the evolution of the phenomenon after the transition from
Al Qaeda to Isis.
The only relevant body of case law in the concerned Member States is
the one produced in Italy in the period 1980-2000, related to past terrorist
organizations. Regarding the present time there is no or very little case law.
9. Critical remarks on harmonization and Art. 16
The most relevant remark about the art. 16 is stressed in the Spanish
Report: “A general difficulty in assessing the quality of harmonization pro-
vided by Art. 16 of the Directive lies in the piecemeal approach typical of UE
criminal law harmonization: a certain criminalization standard or, as it is
here the case, the possibility of a mitigation is established, and launched on
the national legislators. But this is done without a proper prior analysis of
the situation in every jurisdiction (and without a proper follow up to the im-
plementation of the harmonization rules). This means that the house is be-
ing built beginning by the roof, as it is very difficult to grasp what the real
effects of such measures in every national system are if procedural, sentenc-
ing and penitentiary law are brushed under the carpet and there is only a
(fragmentary) focus on substantial law”18.
This awareness must guide us both in the de lege lata reading of art. 16
and in the de lege ferenda proposals.
According to the German paper on the European perspectives of the in-
terpretation and application of art. 16, ‘the Member States have to ensure
that they are only applied under national law if the offender fulfils at least
the conditions laid down in Art. 16’19. Admittedly, this poses the risk of de-
priving counterterrorism rewarding measures of their effet utile, as the com-
parative findings pointed out20.
Conversely, in principle, national rewarding legislation laying down
broader requirements or more favourable legal consequences is prohibited
18 Manuel CANCIO MELIÁ, Sabela OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Substantial law issues, cited, § 3.
19 Helmut SATZGER, Patrick BORN, Section II, Interpretations of article 16 of the Direc-
tive of 15 March 2017, Chapter 1 “B”, German Report, § 3.1.2.1
20 Manuel CANCIO MELIÁ, Sabela OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Substantial law issues: selected prob-
lems, Section II, Chapitre 5, passim.
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under Article 16. As the German unit pinpoints, the violation of fundamen-
tal principles enshrined in the national Constitutions and the internal coher-
ence of the criminal law are to be considered the only possible exceptions.
Another argument in favour of a non-absolute limitation of ‘reduction’ of
criminal sanctions under Article 16 to mitigating circumstances only would
be that ‘‘reduction’ does not preclude reduction to ‘zero’’21.
The point of view of the French Unit is different22.
Like the German unit did23, the French unit maintained, more gener-
ally, that transposing in an overly narrower manner the EU minimum rules
on rewarding measures to counter terrorism ‘would reduce the possibility of
being granted the status of collaborator of justice’ and that this ‘would risk
running counter to the logic of the minimum rules’24. However, unlike the
German unit, the French unit argued that whichever additional require-
ments or rewarding measure complies with Directive 2017/541/EU, ‘as long
as the conditions envisaged by the Directive are at least provided for’ at the
national level25.
This interpretation acknowledges that harmonisation in the field at
hand is unsatisfactory26 and that mutual trust and mutual recognition are
jeopardised27. Arguably, the French unit based its argument on a bottom-up
approach to the extent that the state of play across Europe, which is deemed
unsatisfactory with a view to EU harmonisation and judicial cooperation, is
said to mirror long standing ‘legal and cultural choices to offer wider bene-
fits to the collaborator of justice’28.
Be that as it may, the French unit acknowledges that “if the Member
State did not comply with the minimum conditions [set forth under Article
16], this would run counter to the principle of primacy and would not be in
21 Albeit hardly, as it is confirmed by the translations of the text of Article 16 in lan-
guages other than English: with reference to the German version, Helmut SATZGER, Patrick
BORN, op. cit., § 3.2.2. The same holds, for instance, to the Italian translation, in that the title
‘Circostanze attenuanti’ (mitigating circumstances) refers to reduction of criminal sanctions
at the sentencing phase, whereas the non-punishment at hand belongs to the legal category
of ‘cause di non punibilità’ (also known as ‘cause di esclusione della punibilità’). Furthermore,
in the absence of any soft or hard principle or rule of general criminal law at the EU level,
to infer that waiving punishment as a rewarding measure complies with Article 16 by read-
ing other clearer EU criminal law texts adopted in other areas of cross-border serious crime
does not seem unquestionable. To this end, the German unit mentions Framework Decision
2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime and the Proposal for
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA in the field of illicit drug trafficking (ivi, §§ 3.2.1, 3.2.2).
22 C. QUENTIN, J.-Y. MARÉCHAL, J. ALIX, Interpretations of Article 16 of the Directive of 15
March 2017.
23 With respect to the prognosis of the impossibility to gather the information other-
wise (laid down by Article 16 (b)), but also to the interpretative issue regarding the compat-
ibility of non-punishment of terrorist offenders as rewarding measure with EU law: Helmut
SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 3.2.2.
24 C. QUENTIN, J.-Y. MARÉCHAL, J. ALIX, op. cit., § 1.1.1.1.
25 C. QUENTIN, J.-Y. MARÉCHAL, J. ALIX, op. cit., § 1.1.1.1.
26 Arguably, the point upon which the French and the German unit agree (albeit with
different arguments) is that national non-specific beneficial provisions that apply to other le-
gal situations are not affected.
27 C. QUENTIN, J.-Y. MARÉCHAL, J. ALIX, op. cit., § 1.2.2. See also H. SATZGER, P. BORN, op.
cit., § 3.2.2.
28 C. QUENTIN, J.-Y. MARÉCHAL, J. ALIX, op. cit., § 1.2.2.
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conformity with European legislation. The Member State would then risk an
action for failure to fulfil obligations before the CJEU”29.
In the contributions of the units of the universities of Ferrara and Mod-
ena and Reggio Emilia30, these differences are amply illustrated and dis-
cussed. In view of the de lege ferenda solution that the research envisages for
a model of reward measures in terrorism, it is now important to make some
considerations on the limits and the vitality of a regulation such as the cur-
rent Art. 16 of the Directive.
10. General conclusion on the concept of non-punishability as category that
includes the mitigation
A point of connection between the moments of analysis and observa-
tion, de lege lata and ferenda, seems to me to be the link between reduction
of punishment and exclusion of punishability: mitigation vs. exemption.
The difference between legal systems and the various political-criminal
needs suggests a flexible and ductile reading of the distinction between mit-
igating circumstances and non-punishability.
The category of non-punishability, on the other hand, has long been
known in literature to include various forms of degradation of punishment
that, in practice, can lead to exemption from punishment.
These categories (mitigation of punishment/non-punishability) are not
alternative, because mitigation is a way of declining the various forms of
non-punishability, that is, of reducing, up to the exclusion in concreto, of the
punishment31.
This means that, instead of being alternative or excluding categories,
they are one included within the other, like the smaller circle of a larger one:
non-punishability includes various forms of reduction of the penalty, within
a framework of special prevention and subsidiarity.
The fact that this should also apply to the EU Directive on terrorism,
beyond the conception of some of its compilers, depends:
a) on an objective interpretation of the text of art. 16;
b) on a teleological consideration.
Sub a)
When the European Parliament issued Directive 2017/541 and its Arti-
cle 16, it knew perfectly well that among the Member States, some (in par-
ticular, France) do not have minimum penalty limits, except for the general
29 Ivi, § 1.2.2.
30 Infra, Section III, Chapter 2 (Ludovico Bin, Francesco Rossi) and 1 (Ludovico Bin).
31 For a general overview of this theme in the italian literature, M. DONINI, Non puni-
bilità e idea negoziale, in Indice pen., 2001, 1035 et seq.; ID., Le tecniche di degradazione fra
sussidiarietà e non punibilità, ibidem, 2003, 75 et seq., 89 et seq.; ID., Il volto attuale dell’il-
lecito penale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2004, 259 et seq. F. PALAZZO, La non-punibilità: una buona carta
da giocare oculatamente, in Sistema penale, 19 dicembre 2019; G. COCCO, La punibilità.
Quarto elemento del reato, Wolters Kluwer-Cedam, 2018. S. also P. CAROLI, Non punibilità e in-
dirizzo politico-criminale, in Sistema penale, 29 settembre 2019.
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limits, which are however very low, for crimes: to provide for a decrease of
penalty in a system that does not have minimum sentencing limits, or that
has very low ones even for the most serious crimes, has a profoundly differ-
ent meaning compared to systems that do possess actual minimum limits.
This implies that it is possible to pursue a result of actual non-punishability
in concrete terms, but also in abstracto, because already at the abstract level
the system allows this in the ordinary way. The mitigation becomes pure
commensuration because the penalty is completely individualized.
Not only. Various systems provide for non-punishment as a conse-
quence of general institutions such as active withdrawal, or active repen-
tance, from the crime. Applying this rule to terrorist offences becomes pos-
sible because the directive does not neutralize the general rules.
The question is: what if for terrorism those rules were adapted in a
more restrictive direction, would it make sense to prohibit them in the name
of the Directive? And this just because the Directive does not provide for
non-punishability in an explicit way, not even under the strict conditions it
establishes for the mitigation of the punishment?
Frankly, it does not seem reasonable to reach such a conclusion, also
considering another profile.
Various incriminations introduced after the events of 2005 in various
European legal systems, and which anticipate the offences envisaged by Di-
rective 2017/541 (in particular the provisions of Articles 6 to 11), can be
traced back to forms of “criminal law of the author” (Täterstrafrecht) rather
than to “criminal law of the fact” (Tatstrafrecht).
Punishing the organization of trips abroad or the self-training or enrol-
ment of persons with the “purpose” of terrorism (indicated in art. 3, par. 2 of
the Directive), before an act of adhesion to terrorist associations has been
committed, and punishing the preparation of purpose-crimes, means ex-
tending the criminal law area to very anticipated fields with respect to
preparatory acts of concretely offensive conducts, which are never required
to be committed (see art. 13 of the Directive).
Now, even if this has appeared and still seems legitimate in constitu-
tional terms, the limit is to verify firstly the concrete dangerousness of the
‘facts’, not of the persons. But do these facts remain offensive if the persons,
who have never committed the final crimes, have abandoned those generic
programs and cooperate with the justice system?
The non-dangerousness of the person renders harmless the acts already
committed, because they in fact only appeared so in an “author” perspective.
The relevant fact for us is that in these cases the very provision of non-
punishability for collaboration becomes a requirement for the legitimacy of
those incriminations. There is, in other words, a constitutional constraint of
offensiveness or social harmfulness of the facts that would make the pun-
ishment of dissociated authors be evaluated as linked only to a concretely in-
offensive program apart from the terrorist goal. It is true that the dissociation
is subsequent to those “facts”, but these are only facts presumed to be dan-
gerous due to the subjective orientation of the person or of other unidentified
persons. A presumption which is not absolute but can be overcome by a con-
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trary proof: if we move from this preparatory area to collaboration, we un-
derstand that what was already a criminal law based only or mainly on the
author, is now also without the author.
Sub b)
From these considerations it emerges how functional to such antici-
pated offences is the prevision of non-punishability in order to justify their
effective application.
In fact, in this so markedly subjectivized criminal law area, it is neither
reasonable nor functional to the objectives of real prevention to separate
non-punishability from mitigation of the penalty. Because the criminal of-
fence is subjectivized, and therefore the sanctioning treatment must remain
firmly anchored to special prevention, not only general prevention, and
therefore also of real enhancement, and not of depowerment, of the forms of
collaboration.
The special prevention is itself oriented to a better implementation of
the general-preventive purposes: to think of renouncing one of these objec-
tives, or to unify these two purposes (political the general prevention, legal-
individualising the special one) is contrary to a realistic understanding of the
discipline.
This reinforces the reading of art. 16 of the French and German units
which, although theoretically opposed – s. above, § 9 –, converge in practical
terms in considering the possibility that the reduction of punishment al-
ready de lege lata can reach 100%.
11. De lege ferenda. The Model
On this basis, it is possible to face with greater serenity the construc-
tion of a European model of rewarding measures against terrorism, because
it is better anchored to an analysis which takes into account the differences
between the consolidated policies of the States in the European context.
The model32 has been structured keeping in mind the necessity to facil-
itate judicial cooperation between authorities of different Member States,
aimed at overcoming the many differences that inevitably characterize the
different national legal systems.
On this perspective, while at the sentencing stage the differences be-
tween legal orders are less marked, as the types of measures are generally
twofold (an extenuating circumstance or a ground for exclusion of the
penalty), the most relevant issues for judicial cooperation would evidently
derive from the profound differences currently existing in the pre-trial
phase, for what concerns mandatory or discretionary prosecution. Given
these irreducible disparities, the search for a minimum set of measures that
could be implemented in all Member State has been pursued keeping in
32 Ludovico BIN, A Model of Reward Measures, infra, Section III, Chapter 1; Francesco
ROSSI, Exploiting art. 16 of Directive 2017/541/EU, ivi, Chapter 2.
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mind the “substantial goal” of approximating the reward system, at the ex-
pense of the “formal equality” between the measures which grant such re-
wards.
This substantial equality has been traced in the use of a cause of non-
punishability, as such tool would not only imply an acquittal in the trial
phase but also already a case dismissal in the pre-trial phase. When a cause
of exclusion of the penalty applies, indeed, the proceeding generally stops
and the case is dismissed, even – and foremost – in those legal systems in
which prosecution is mandatory. On the other hand, in those Member States
in which prosecution is discretionary, the very existence of such measures in
the written legislation would have an indisputable ‘communicative’ effect,
inasmuch as it would let perpetrators know of the possibility to benefit of
such measures in case they decide to cooperate, even prior to being arrested
and approached by the investigators.
As for the shape of such measure, firstly the traditional condition of
“dissociation” or “disengagement” has not been inserted. Requesting for
such condition would in fact probably prove to be counter effective: one of
the most relevant factors for radicalisation is the perception of western
states as trying to oppress other cultures; in this perspective, requiring dis-
sociation as a legal condition for the application of the reward would most
probably be seen as a “blackmail” perfectly in line with the terrorist narra-
tive and thus enhance this perception while it would not grant any tangible
result: dissociation means betraying the “cause”, but this is already shown
by the simple fact that cooperation is carried out. Moreover, disengage-
ment/dissociation is the initial part of a possible deradicalization process,
which is a complex and medium/long-term process, likely to take years. Re-
quiring such a significant part of the process to happen already during the
trial or even at the pre-trial stage would therefore most likely prove to be un-
realistic and useless. At this regard, a “full disclosure” of the facts commit-
ted or known is instead likely to produce more tangible advantages at least
for a first evaluation on the reliability of the repentant and of the informa-
tion provided.
Secondly, for what concerns the “minimum” indefectible element that
shall be requested for the concession of the reward, i.e. the supply of rele-
vant information, the ‘usefulness’ of the information has been structured fol-
lowing art. 16 of Directive 2017/541/EU, which draws the possible types of
suppliable information. In this perspective, helping authorities to find evi-
dence and/or identify or bring to justice other offenders seems to be of such
relevance as to justify only a mitigation of the penalty, while only preventing
or mitigating the effects of the offence or the commission of other offences
(referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14, i.e. terrorism-related) could imply the
highest reward, according to their concrete relevance. Of course, the choice
between mitigation and exemption will have to be evaluated in concreto, by
the prosecutor and/or the judge; however, a sort of internal limit to the mea-
sure at stake should be displace already at the abstract level in order to avoid
possible “blackmails” from the offender and grant a minimum proportional-
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ity: hence it is provided that the information provided should regard of-
fences much severe than that for which the proceeding is brought on.
Thirdly, considering that usually the proceeding brought against the
collaborator comes to an end before those against the persons regarded by
the information provided, in order to prevent the risks that false or useless
information in this phase will provoke an unjust acquittal or reduced sen-
tence without any further possibility to reopen the case (due to the ne bis in
idem principle), the necessity to provide for a mechanism of suspension of
the proceeding aimed at consenting the judge to evaluate if the information
was as true and relevant as promised, in order to avoid the possible back-
drops connected to the exemption in the trial stage, has been inserted. On
the other hand, in order to prevent the offender from ‘waiting’ the initiation
of the trial in order to benefit of an actual acquittal instead of a case dis-
missal, the applicability of the penalty exemption in this phase has been sub-
ordinated to the proof that the offender could not provide the authorities
with it in the pre-trial phase.
As for the post-sentencing phase, a residual strategy for those who did
not decide to walk the path of de-radicalization – whose structure falls out-
side the scope of this research – has been shaped: reward logic would be
here brought to its fullest potential, which means not proposing an advan-
tage in exchange for cooperation, but removing a disadvantage: in other
words, if the terrorist still does not want to cooperate, he/she will not be al-
lowed to access the normal penitentiary benefits that the other convicted do
access such as parole institutes, external work permits and so on, as both
Spanish and Italian disciplines already provide.
Such measure aims at an aggressive induction to cooperate, trying to
break the convicted resistance through the enhanced heaviness of the
penalty. Exclusion from parole institutes and work permits, as well as the
possibility to harden detention conditions, do represent the other face of re-
ward legislation: if the promise of an actual reward did not convince the of-
fender, the State tries to promise the removal of a disadvantage that all other
prisoners are not subjected to. This way, reward legislation is exploited to its
very end.
As already illustrated (§ 10), this legislative “model” brings together the
needs of special and general prevention, without abandoning the logic of re-
ward to forms of pure contrast or legislative warfare to which an effective di-
alogue with the persons subjected to such measures would be extraneous, if
the mitigation of punishment, with respect to any crime of terrorism, were
interpreted in a rigid or inflexible way.
Indeed, a delicate aspect is that of the cases to which this model should
be applied and those from which hypotheses of non-punishability in the
strict sense should be excluded. It is in this specific area that European
criminal policy should and could most usefully provide exhaustive indica-
tions: something that has certainly not yet happened with art. 16 of the di-
rective.







FRANCESCO DIAMANTI, FRANCESCO ROSSI, GIULIA DUCOLI
SUMMARY: 1. Historical background of rewarding legislation (where existing). – 1.1. Socio-po-
litical reasons. – 1.2. Legislative evolution. – 1.3. Case-law evolution. Substantive crim-
inal law profiles: an overview of the temporal validity, the scope and the requirements
of rewarding measures. – 1.3.1. The sequence of rewarding laws with different tempo-
ral effects and the issue regarding the validity of the “Cossiga Law”. – 1.3.2. The scope
of application. – 1.3.3. Collaboration – 1.3.4. The concepts of “disengagement” and
“outstanding relevance”: objective vs subjective interpretation. – 1.3.5. The post-con-
viction phase: the special regime of conditional release. – 1.3.5.1. Objective and sub-
jective meanings of “repentant”; protection of victims of terrorist crimes; seriousness
of the offence, dangerousness and criminal attitude of the offender. – 2. Current re-
warding legislation (where existing). – 2.1. Applicability conditions. – 2.2. Types of re-
warding measures. – 2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, ini-
tiated at the post-sentencing stage. – 2.4. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the
obligations of the repentant – 2.5. Revocation of rewarding measures. – 2.6. Conditions
for the application of the measures (procedural aspects). – 2.7. Conditions for the use
of the declarations obtained (probative value of declarations). – 2.8. Measures for the
protection of the repentant. – 2.9. Evaluation and control of the measure. – 2.10. Re-
vocation of rewarding measures. – 3. Current relevant case law (where existing). –
4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU.
1. Historical background of rewarding legislation (where existing)
Italy has a long and rich tradition of rewarding measures put in place
to tackle more or less general criminal phenomena (or perceived as such), as
well as to resolve more or less emergency situations (or perceived as such).
Let us begin, however, by saying that “reward measures” and “emer-
gency” are not always superimposable terms, at least if observed from a his-
torical point of view: from a broader look, in fact, it emerges that this was so
only in the last period of the “fight” against banditry and then in the fight
against the internal political-ideological terrorism. Without going too far
back in time, legal historians point out that the rewarding logic has long
been the sign of the privatisation of the medieval ius terribile and, at least in
the pre-enlightenment era, of the advancement of a utilitarian method that
* § 1-1.2, 2-2.5 and 3 written by Francesco Diamanti. § 1-1.3.5.1 and 4 written by
Francesco Rossi. § 2.6-2.9 written by Giulia Ducoli. This national report was finalised after
the first Italian Focus Group “Terrorismo e misure premiali”, which took place at the Law
Department of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE). The authors would
like to thank all the speakers and participants for their valuable insights.
differs from and is older than the English method, more oriented to the en-
forcement of the timeless reason of State. All this, in fact, can be seen rather
well in the development of the legislation of the pre-unitary liberal states
against banditry; this is a problem that is typical of our pre-industrial soci-
ety and, at least in part, a direct product of criminal law. Terminologically,
banditry indicates the existence of bandits, i.e., human beings “banned” due
to either a political decision made by a small community or by choice of a
court “…vested with the authority to ban”.
Effectively described as “… a catalyst of different and even opposing in-
stances […] a container of various humanity […] a witness of serious con-
tradictions within society, in impatience, discomfort, rebellion or common
criminal routine”, this is a problem “Italian” society only began to become
(more or less) aware of in the 15th century. Of course: crime and bandits,
even though they arouse fear amongst the population, became real objects of
the criminal policy of the States of the Ancien Régime only in so far as they
knocked on the doors of the cities, given that “… the great fragmentation of
“public opinion” (and, more precisely, its non-existence) did not allow for
the formation of fully defined criminal stereotypes”. Law historians speak of
“bandits” and “banditry” (as a “general” criminal phenomenon) only due to
the specific routes of enlistment and the control they were able to exercise
over the rural population, not because they were so perceived by those pop-
ulations.
The characteristic traits of the first bandits – among the most recent
ones, that will become the bandits of the 19th century – only began to be
studied in the 16th century. Against those criminals, “bounties” and im-
punity, subsidies, rewards and attenuations, designed to induce the citizen
(or the criminal him/herself) to find the latrones, with good peace of mind of
the first disquisitions of Cesare Beccaria on the immorality of bounties, con-
centrated on the idea that “… those who have the strength to defend them-
selves do not try to buy it […]. Now the laws invite betrayal, and now they
punish it”. The rewards created mistrust amongst accomplices, who could
no longer trust each other: as was effectively written, in the Ancien Régime
“… the fight against banditry becomes a fight between bandits; the spring
that triggers the mechanisms, that lubricates the devices, is the reward”. At
the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, the reward tools often recur: in the
Republic of Genoa, for example, the De premio occidentis rebellem became
the first legislative instrument to combat criminals; just as the “reward” was
fundamental to counter the activity of very dangerous and very famous ban-
dits such as Marco Sciarra, who was betrayed by his lieutenant Battistella in
exchange for a pardon.
Although central, in the Italian states of that time, the expedients in mi-
tius did not only have positive reflections, but rather the opposite; the major
problems (although not the only ones, of course) for example, were raised at
a theoretical level. The prevalence of retribution and the incessant need in
the Old Regime to do justice clashed with the need to derogate by reward-
ing: however, politicians were overcompensated and jurists ignored the
problem. “At the basis was the contrast: between politics and law, legal logic
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and exercise of power, criminal geometry and quies publica. Politicians must
know how to swallow the bitter chalice of unworthiness, jurists cannot ad-
mit too striking antinomies and then be silent or almost silent”. The search
for public peace, however, flattened the contrasts and managed the embar-
rassments only from a theoretical point of view, whilst in the trials every-
thing changed and the rewards became expedients to hit the criminal hard,
whether collaborating or not. It will suffice to recall the long-existing dis-
cussion and the frankly disconcerting results for observers of our time, on
the existence, or not, for the court, of a legal obligation to keep the (reward-
ing) promise made to the whistleblower.
With the exception of certain types of reward measures structurally
linked to the offence (such as, for example, those contained in Article 56 of
the Criminal Code), in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, reward measures were generally not used for the prevention of criminal
phenomena. For their mass diffusion, it would be necessary to await the ide-
ological (“red” and “black”) terrorism of the 1970’s1.
1.1. Socio-political reasons
From a socio-political point of view and without pushing the analysis
beyond the 20th century, “reward measures” were introduced in a very spe-
cific period, which became known as the “years of disquiet”. The 1950s were
characterised by political and economic changes of immense importance: in
addition to the abrupt transition from fascist dictatorship to republican
democracy, Italy at that time was faced, for the first time, with a market
economy open to international competition. Italy’s growth (economic and
cultural) was too rapid; it did not leave time for society to adapt to all these
great changes: it suffices to reflect on the fact that, from 1955 to 1963, Ital-
ian society went from mainly agricultural to mainly industrial politics, all
this without trade union experience, often without education, etc. The logic
of competition infiltrated all aspects of society. Individualism attempted, for
the first time (albeit slowly), to spread to the population, with consequent
erosion of traditional values and ties. In the same way, serious and pressing
migratory flows from the south to the north of Italy began and the exploita-
tion of the weak social groups (amongst them, especially workers) almost
immediately took over, generating great outrage amongst politicians and
young people growing up. It is certainly no coincidence that perhaps the
most significant terrorist organisation – the Red Brigades – was formed
within the Emilian Communist Party, within the University of Trento and
amongst the workers of some factories in the north. As it has already been
mentioned, in 20th Century the (re)birth of the reward measures is indissol-
ubly tied to internal ideological terrorism; or rather, to internal ideological
terrorisms. The plural is a must, given that, alongside the terrorism of the
extreme left, there was that of the extreme right and both sides contained
1 For more details, see A. SPATARO, Judiciary and institutions during the “years of lead”: a
virtuous model, in this Volume.
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within them various different criminal organisations. In turn, ideological
terrorism, at least at an internal level, can be explained by the changes
(above all, political and economic) that are typical of the aforementioned
decade.
1.2. Legislative evolution
With the exception of some more classic provisions (e.g., the already
mentioned Article 56 of the Italian Criminal Code), the Italian legislator has
experimented with the reward logic in the Special Section, on kidnapping
for extortion (Article 630 of the Italian Criminal Code). It must be antici-
pated that, originally, this provision imposed a very severe penalty for kid-
napping for the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or others, an unjust profit
as the price of release (aggravated by the achievement of the criminal in-
tent). As a result of sadly known events, in 1974, a reward consisting of the
reduction of the legal margin (on the “model” of art. 605) following the re-
lease of the victim without redemption was included.
“Rewards” are dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 630 of the
Italian Criminal Code and dissociation is a must (only the dissociated, even
all, can be rewarded, others cannot), but it is not enough. It is also necessary
(i) to ensure that the person is bought back his freedom without ransom; (ii)
to ensure that the criminal activity does not lead to further consequences;
(iii) to provide practical assistance to the judicial or police authorities in
gathering evidence that is decisive for the detection or capture of accom-
plices.
In addition to the individual case-law developments resulting from
these changes, one characteristic immediately comes to mind: in the first
two cases, the conduct that the perpetrator must maintain has a correlation
with the harmfulness expressed by the offence committed. The third case,
being completely “eccentric and uneven with respect to the plan of the
harmfulness”, is not placed in protection of the legal interest of “personal
freedom”, but finalised to the repression of the single offence, at least if
multi-subjective. However, it is still mainly oriented to the single fact, not to
dismantle a hypothetical criminal association, red or black terrorism, mafia,
etc., nor against a general phenomenon (organised crime, terrorism, corrup-
tion, etc.).
On the “model” of reward introduced in the kidnapping of a person for
the purpose of extortion or terrorism (Article 630, paragraphs 3 and 4 and
289-bis, paragraph 4, of the Italian Criminal Code), in the middle of a social
situation that was quite unstable and characterised by tragic attacks, the
Legislator then intervened (also) with expedients in mitius finalised to the
promotion of the “dissociation” and “collaboration” of the terrorist type.
The first discipline to analyse, in this context, is the one contained in
the “Cossiga Law” (1980). The significant tightening of sanctions (the
“stick”, Article 1, 2 and 3 of Decree Law No. 625 dated 15 December 1979)
and very important procedural interventions (Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 thereof)
were accompanied by favourable treatments (the “carrot”, Articles 4 and 5).
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Some insights. The purpose of these last two articles, of a reward nature and
structure, is very clear: to avoid the naturalistic event and to clarify the fact
by ensuring impunity to those who prevent the event and collaborate with
the authorities to reconstruct it, as well as to track down any accomplices.
The saving on the disvalue of the result (having prevented the event) is cen-
tral, but by itself rightly insufficient for the non punishability. It should
therefore be noted that the structure of the provision-reward referred to in
Article 5 of the Decree Law under analysis begins by excluding the cases of
active withdrawal: if the perpetrator, even without dissociating himself, vol-
untarily withdraws from any intentional crime (preventing the event), he ob-
tains a mitigation, even very significant, of the punishment; if a terrorist
does so, he obtains impunity, provided that he collaborates to reconstruct
the facts and to ensure that any accomplices are brought to justice. To un-
derstand the relationship between these two provisions, a general provision
(Article 56 Criminal Code) and a special provision (Article 5 of Decree Law
No. 8 of 1991), it is necessary to specify the following: on the one hand,
upon first reading, it seems that this non-punishability-reward can only
work in the case of terrorism-related criminal offences which contemplate
events that do not coincide with the “typical” one (e.g., in case of crimes ag-
gravated by the event), whilst in all the other cases (also unrelated to terror-
ism, and not excluding a balancing with other circumstances) Article 56,
paragraph 4, of the Italian Criminal Code would apply. From a systematic
point of view, to all intents and purposes, this seems to work, but legitimate
results are not well balanced from a political-criminal point of view: it would
be better, instead, to identify the scope of application of the withdrawal-re-
ward (non-punishability) only to crimes attempted in matters of terrorism
and subversion.
Another problem (significant for the reward logic as a whole and also
related to the formulation of Article 5) touches on the understanding of the
adjective “determined”, referring to the evidence that the author, after hav-
ing voluntarily prevented the event (even without dissociating), must provide
to the authority to reconstruct the fact and to identify any accomplices. Ra-
tionally, there is no doubt that a “decisive” evidence is only the “indispens-
able” evidence for achieving the goal; if this is the case, the task of the col-
laborator is to be rather punctual: if the accomplice voluntarily prevents the
event and collaborates by providing indispensable information, but (shortly
before) already provided by others without his knowledge, he is in trouble
and can only hope that the information given will complement each other.
This is not the place to discuss all these problems in depth, but to re-
port their existence is more than enough. Lastly, it should be noted that the
two provisions discussed above have been included in the Italian Criminal
Code in Article 270-bis 1 of the Italian Criminal Code, by Article 5 of Leg-
islative Decree No. 21 dated 1 March 2018, No. 21 concerning “Provisions
implementing the principle of delegation of the code reserve in criminal
matters pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 85, section q) of Law No. 103 dated
23 June 2017”.
We shall now move on.
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Also, worth noting is the well-known “law on penitents” (especially Ar-
ticles 1, 2, 3 and 5); a legislative intervention in which the “rewards” have
been prepared in defence of the constitutional order and when the stakes (at
least on paper) are so high there are no limits to the do ut des. Radical “non-
punishability” for the terrorist who dissolves or contributes to the dissolu-
tion of the association, or withdraws from the agreement or surrenders
without resistance or abandoning his weapons and provides (in any case) all
the information he has on the structure and organisation of the association.
Timing is important: everything must take place before the final sentence is
pronounced. If this happens, except as provided for in Article 289-bis of the
Italian Criminal Code, the penalty of life imprisonment is replaced by im-
prisonment from fifteen to twenty-one years and the other penalties are re-
duced by a third. For the individual accused of one or more crimes commit-
ted for the purposes of terrorism or subversion of the constitutional system
that maintain one of the collaborative conducts described above and that
make, at any stage or degree of the trial, full confession of all the crimes
committed, effectively working to elude or mitigate the harmful or danger-
ous consequences of the crime, or to prevent the commission of related
crimes pursuant to Article 61, No. 2 of the Italian Criminal Code, the penalty
cannot in any case exceed fifteen years of imprisonment. Even the rigidity of
the irreducible can give way: to obtain the attenuation-reward they must
confess and activate in various ways; there is no alternative.
It is clear that the structure of the discipline under analysis derives in
part from Article 62 No. 6 of the Italian Criminal Code and in part from Ar-
ticle 4 of Legislative Decree No. 625 dated 15 December 1979 (converted by
Law No. 15 dated 6 February 1980). Here repentance is broad; the choice
that the perpetrator has before him to reach the reward is full of practicable
ways: avoid harmful or dangerous consequences, avoid future crimes, etc.
There is a hindrance of choice, but the fluidity and the few obstacles to the
reward must be compensated for by the effectiveness of the alleged conduct.
A “seriousness of intent capable of achieving the goal” is barely enough.
Moving on to Article 3 of the law under discussion, we note some miti-
gating circumstances for those who, also before the final sentence of convic-
tion, behave in one of the ways provided for in Article 1, paragraphs 1 and
2, as well as making a full confession of all the crimes committed, helping
the police or the judicial authority in the collection of evidence that is “deci-
sive” for the identification or capture of one or more perpetrators of crimes
committed “… for the same purpose”, or provides evidence relevant to the
exact reconstruction of the fact and the discovery of the perpetrators.
The formulas, here also, more or less repeat themselves; there are some
peculiarities, however.
The first, which is highly significant, is the use of the concept of “per-
petrators of crimes committed for the same purpose” instead of “accom-
plices”. In this way, it is possible to benefit from the reward by providing aid
(not precisely described and free from the requirement of concreteness) in
the identification or capture of other terrorists, even if it does not necessar-
ily strictly an accomplice of the cooperator. This time, therefore, the reward
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is intended to eradicate the terrorist organisation as a whole; it is freed from
obligatory connections with the crime, or with the crimes, for which pro-
ceedings are instituted.
Under Article 3, in order to benefit from the reward, the terrorist de-
fendant may (alternatively) provide evidence relevant to the exact recon-
struction of the fact and the discovery of the perpetrators. Something does
not add up: the effort, in this second case, is much less than that previously
analysed, but the reward is the same. However, if so, why should the defen-
dant choose the longest and most complex route to the same place? This, in
fact, is not the case. A careful reading of the provision reveals that the legis-
lator has contemplated the two conducts not as alternatives, but as sub-
sidiary and with spatially diversified effects: only if the defendant cannot
carry out the first conduct (which would mitigate all the contested offences)
can he gain access to the same reward; only in that case can he limit himself
to providing evidence relevant to the exact reconstruction of the fact and the
discovery of the perpetrators.
Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 304 dated 29 May 1982 provide (both) for
full confession of all crimes committed as an essential requirement for the
awarding of the “reward”. However, what are “all crimes committed”? Is it
also necessary to confess an old theft or sexual assault that is completely un-
related to terrorism and subversion? In our opinion, absolutely not, because
if the reward follows the purpose of combating terrorism, then only the ter-
rorist experience of the offender can be considered pertinent and relevant.
The reward does not mitigate the position of the accused on the basis of the
existence of a confession-sacrifice, but on the basis of important help in
combating a serious and highly dangerous criminal phenomenon. Other-
wise, very trivially, it would suffice to confess some old mischief, some crim-
inally relevant fact, perhaps prescribed or non-existent; this, of course,
would not be serious.
Domestic terrorism was not only composed of obstinate leaders and
perpetrators, endowed with marked criminal resistance, but also of a more
or less vast number of young men and women, who, fascinated by the idea
of the armed revolution, had fallen into the quicksand of crime and had
managed to get out of it definitively and, in some rare cases, even deeply un-
derstanding the gravity of what they had done, the pain they had caused to
other human beings. In addition to irreducible individuals, in other words,
there were also dissociated individuals and Law No. 34 dated February 18,
1987 was designed (mostly) for them. According to the letter of the law un-
der discussion, the dissociated terrorist, in fact, is the one who “accused or
condemned for crimes of terrorism or subversion of the constitutional order,
has definitively abandoned the terrorist or subversive organisation or move-
ment to which he belonged, jointly holding the following conduct: admission
of the activities effectively carried out, behaviour objectively and univocally
inconsistent with the persistence of the associative bond, repudiation of vio-
lence as a method of political struggle”. The dissociated person enjoys bene-
fits, at least until he or she reoffends or engages in conduct that is not con-
sistent with dissociation (Article 5 Law No. 34 dated 18 February 1987).
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Lastly, it is specified that the legislation in question was applicable only
to crimes committed, or the permanence of which ceased, by 31 December
1983 (Article 8, Law No. 34 dated 18 February 1987).
1.3. Case-law evolution. Substantive criminal law profiles: an overview of the
temporal validity, the scope and the requirements of rewarding measures
An overview of the Italian case law shows a gradual decrease in the im-
plementation of counterterrorism rewarding measures. The following sec-
tions will sum up the judgments delivered from the 1980s until the 2000s. By
showing a certain similarity with other fields (e.g., illicit production and
trafficking of drugs, organised crime, etc.), Italian case law on rewarding
measures firstly clarifies their scope and the kind of cooperation required.
1.3.1. The sequence of rewarding laws with different temporal effects and the
issue regarding the validity of the “Cossiga Law”
The rapid succession of both permanent and time-limited rewarding
laws required to ascertain whether the laws adopted in 1982 and 1987 im-
plicitly repealed all or part of the “Cossiga Law”.
The first Court of Cassation’s rulings acknowledged that the “Cossiga
Law” had been repealed. In the Algranati case2, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Law No. 304 of 25 May 1982 had done so implicitly, as it ruled the
same subject matter as Article 4 of the Law No. 15 of 6February 1980. Ac-
cording to the Court, the 1982 law had regulated entirely ex novo the matter
of the rewards to be granted to those who dissociate themselves from ter-
rorist and subversive organisations and cooperate, in various forms, with the
investigating authorities.
Afterwards, the Court of Cassation overruled Algranati3. The Sixth Sec-
tion of the Supreme Court ruled that notwithstanding the “Cossiga Law” of
1980 and the “law on repentants” of 1982 rule the same subject matter, they
do not overlap with regard to crimes committed after 31 December 19824.
1.3.2. The scope of application
With regard to Article 4 of the “Cossiga Law”, the Court of Cassation
ruled that the mitigating circumstance provided for therein applied to any
terrorist or subversive crime “committed by the defendant who dissociates
himself from an organised group and fully collaborates with judicial author-
ities”5. Evidence of an established and consistent criminal plan, as well as
the existence of a connection between the crime the defendant is prosecuted
for and those he or she is cooperating for, are mandatory6.
2 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 10 May 1993; CP, 1995, 53.
3 Judgment of 17 June 2007, No. 38260, B.; CP, 2008, 1327.
4 Court of Cassation, B, cit., p. 30-31.
5 Court of Cassation, B., cit.
6 Court of Cassation, B., cit.
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The Court of Cassation has ruled that rewarding mitigating circum-
stances also apply when collaboration concerns other suspects who have
nothing to do with the crime the collaborating defendant is charged for. The
collaborator can be rewarded also for helping to identify or capture individ-
uals who were not involved in the crimes committed7.
Conversely, if the collaborator is charged for more than one crime and
provides truthful, complete, decisive, or useful information to the judicial
authority, the issue concerning the applicability of rewarding measures to
crimes connected with those collaboration is provided for is controversial.
In a case regarding the murder of Marco Biagi, the Court of Appeal of
Bologna ruled out that the mitigating circumstance provided for by Article 4
of the “Cossiga Law” could include all the crimes the defendant was being
prosecuted for. Arguably, the wording of Article 4 grants the special mitigat-
ing circumstance provided for therein with respect exclusively to the specific
crime (or crimes) for which cooperation is provided. The Court of Appeal
ruled that the rewarding mitigating circumstance does not apply to other of-
fences, albeit connected.
Admittedly, the Court of Cassation overruled the latter decision, in that
not applying rewarding mitigating circumstances to connected offences in-
fringes the rationale of the law. The goal of rewarding legislations is to dis-
rupt terrorist activities. Against this background, the connection amongst
crimes committed is within a unitary criminal plan expands the mitigating
effects of collaboration on criminal sentences8.
1.3.3. Collaboration
In order to apply rewarding measures, the Italian case law requires co-
operation to be decisive, complete, and truthful.
The Court of Cassation has clarified the meaning of “decisive”. This cri-
terion intends to restrictive the application of rewarding measures. Cooper-
ation is decisive insofar as not just useful, but rather conclusive contribution
to achieve the goals pursued by the criminal investigation, is provided. Ac-
cording to such a restrictive interpretation, cooperation with a view to col-
lecting further evidence and ascertaining criminal responsibilities is not to
be qualified as decisive, to the extent that accomplices are already identi-
fied9.
In other cases, the Court of Cassation has interpreted the “law on re-
pentants” No. 304 of 29 May 1982 more broadly with respect to the required
efficacy of collaboration. The information provided shall be complete, rele-
vant and useful (rather than decisive).
Undoubtedly, the relevance and usefulness of collaboration varies de-
pending upon manifold objective and subjective circumstances. That is to
7 Court of Cassation., judgment of 14 November 1985, Andriani; CP, 1987, 1109.
8 Court of Cassation, B., cit., in particular p. 26 and 34. Formerly, among the District
Courts’ case law, see Court of Padua, judgment of 26 July 1980, Rigami; Assise Court of
Genoa, judgment of 3 October 1985, Faranda.
9 Court of Cassation, judgment of 18 March 1994, Bernardoni, CP 1996, 119; judgment
of 14 April 1993, Soave, CP 1995, 71.
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say, case by case, each defendant is able to provide information of different
procedural relevance. Against this background, the Italian case law ac-
knowledged that the burden to provide adequate information is fulfilled
even if the defendant who knew little, due to his or her marginal role, dis-
closed all the other information without reticence10. Therefore, arguably, the
minimum threshold to apply rewarding legislation to cases of useful cooper-
ation varies case-by-case.
However, the Italian case law does not grant relevance to “merely as-
sertive contributions” or “subjective states”11: for instance, if the statements
only reaffirm or add details to other statements that have already been ob-
tained aliunde. Conversely, if the actual efficacy of collaboration is dimin-
ished by causes that do not depend on the collaborator, a broad interpreta-
tion acknowledged that rewarding legislation applies to contributions that
are objectively suitable to produce foreseeable and desirable investigative
and procedural results. According to this interpretation, the reward applies
even if such result is not eventually produced in case external factors that
did not depend upon the post delictum behaviour of the defendant occurred.
A different and strict interpretation maintains the opposite and applies re-
warding measures only insofar as the expected results are met12.
Over time, the broad interpretation has prevailed. With reference to
preventing the criminal activity from having further consequences, the Court
of Cassation assessed the “potential suitability” of cooperation “to achieve a
tangible result”13.
Lastly, the statements and information must be truthful. Considering
the aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court on the Marco Biagi case14,
one might infer that truthful, absolutely loyal and complete collaboration is
needed to prove the disengagement of the accomplice from the criminal net-
work and activities15.
The judgement at hand also defines disengagement itself16 as the fact of
breaking with the criminal environment and abandoning terrorist goals17.
Ten years earlier, the Court of Cassation found the “joint conditions for […]
disengagement” in the “disclosure of the activities” and in the clear and ex-
plicit “rejection of violence as a method of political struggle”18.
In presence of the requirements described in the previous sections,
Courts must grant the rewarding measure19 even if aggravating circum-
10 Assise Court of Genoa, judgment 5 January 1987, Revello, in RP, 1987, 341; Court of
Cassation, judgment of 21 January 1986, Sovente, in RP, 1987, 487; Court of Cassation, judg-
ment of 11 March 1985, Solimeno, in RP, 1986, 429; Court of Cassation, judgment of 17
March 1986, Cattaneo, in RP, 1987, 877.
11 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 35.
12 Court of Cassation, Algranati, cit.
13 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 35.
14 Court of Cassation, B., cit.
15 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 27.
16 See paragraph 1.3.3.
17 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 34.
18 Section V, judgment No. 1801 of 22 January 1997, Bompressi e altri.
19 See Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment No. 4906 of 27 October 1988, Atzeni.
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stances apply20. With reference to Article 2 of Law No. 34 of 18 February
1987, the Supreme Court argued that cooperation triggers a rebuttable pre-
sumption of disengagement. Moreover, if all the objective requirements es-
tablished by the law are met, rewarding measures shall apply at the sen-
tencing phase automatically21.
1.3.4. The concepts of “disengagement” and “outstanding relevance”: objective
vs subjective interpretation
Notably, as regards the meaning of “disengagement”, the case law of the
Court of Cassation has adopted dissenting objective and subjective interpre-
tations. According to the objective, disengagement means usefully contribut-
ing in such a way that is logically antithetical to the collaborator’s member-
ship in the terrorist organisation and his or her engagement in its criminal
activity.
According to the subjective, disengagement necessarily implies also an
inner repentance. The latter must arise concretely and unequivocally from
the conduct of the collaborator, considering notably the subjective post fac-
tum criteria set out by Article 133 of the Italian Criminal Code to assess the
criminal attitude of the convicted.
The clash between objective and subjective interpretations emerges also
with reference to the contributions of outstanding relevance. Notwithstand-
ing, arguably, the objective standpoint prevails. To assess the outstanding im-
portance of the contribution, the Court considers the procedural result that
the statements and information produced or at least their concrete suitabil-
ity to achieve the goals pursued by the law22. The subjective standpoint23
does not comply with the material nature of the contribution of exceptional
relevance nor with the rationale of rewarding legislation in the rule of law.
1.3.5. The post-conviction phase: the special regime of conditional release
As for the post-conviction phase, the Italian case law addressed inter-
pretative issues concerning the granting of conditional release.
In the judgment No. 189 of 23 May 1995 (Mallardo), the Constitutional
Court found a discrepancy between the purpose of ordinary conditional re-
lease and that of special conditional release for terrorist offences, which is
treated as a reward for cooperation with judicial authorities (law of 29 May
1982, No. 304, Articles 8 and 9). The latter Article granted the power to re-
voke conditional release sine die, thus preventing ancillary criminal sanc-
tions and other effects provided for by law to be extinguished. The Constitu-
tional Court acknowledged that the special conditional release regime un-
reasonably distinguished between two different categories of offenders
(notably, ordinary criminals and terrorists) and pursued mere deterrence,
20 See Court of Cassation, judgment of 18 December 1987, Berardi.
21 See Court of Cassation, Atzeni, cit.
22 See Court of Cassation, Solimeno, cit.
23 See the Bettini case: Court of Cassation, judgment of 26 February 1985.
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rather than also social rehabilitation. However, the Court rejected the appli-
cation. Although the breach of Articles 3 (equal treatment) and 27 (social re-
habilitation) of the Constitution could be maintained in abstracto, the Con-
stitutional Court argued that the exceptional nature of special conditional
release could not allow to compare its rules to those on ordinary conditional
release, in the absence of an adequate tertium comparationis24.
1.3.5.1. Objective and subjective meanings of “repentant”; protection of victims
of terrorist crimes; seriousness of the offence, dangerousness and crim-
inal attitude of the offender
With respect to the post-sentencing phase, the most relevant case law
concerns the meaning of “repentance” for granting special parole. In the
Acanfora case25, the Court of Cassation ruled that unequivocal proof of a
shown repentance, as a “change of life resulting from the acknowledgement
of errors or faults” on the ethical-moral level, is required. In other words, the
“repentant” must internally assume the “collective values” that had been
breached. According to Acanfora, the offender cannot have repented and be
dangerous at the same time. Such inner root of repentance is to be ascer-
tained regarding both prison and non-prison conduct.
Against this background, differences between objective and subjective
meanings of repentance reappear.
According to the objective meaning, the inner sphere of the “repentant”
and the adherence to the values expressed by the institutional and legal
framework is irrelevant for the purposes of granting special parole. Such
principle also applies with respect to the facts the offender is sentenced
for26. “Repentance” is matched with social rehabilitation: its evidence shall
be inferred from the overall conduct, and the latter shall enable to predict
that the individual will not reoffend27. In other rulings, the Court of Cassa-
tion requires to verify an evolution of the personality of the offender towards
socially adequate models of life28.
The case law takes also into account the need to protect victims of ter-
rorism. The Court of Cassation attempted to strike a balance between objec-
tive and subjective understandings of “repentance” by requiring: i) adher-
ence to the ethical and social values that have been breached by the crime
committed; ii) satisfaction of the needs of the victims, notably restoration of
the damages and other consequences of the crime, as well as assistance and
24 Constitutional Court, Mallardo, cit., § 2.
25 Section I, judgment of October 8 1990, No. 3235.
26 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 11 March 1997; Court of Cassation, Sec-
tion I, judgment of 10 December 2004.
27 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 25 September 2015, No. 486; Section I,
judgment of 10 December 2004, cit.; Section I, judgment of 11 March 1997, cit.; Section I,
judgment of 26 June 1995; Section I, judgment of 26 March 1992; Section V, judgment of 18
December 1991.
28 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 21 June 2001; Section I, judgment of 6
November 1989; Section I, judgment of 7 April 1993; Section I, judgment of 13 May 1991;
judgment of 19 November 1990.
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other means of solidarity29. Notwithstanding, victims’ failure to forgive the
offender is not an obstacle to granting special conditional release30.
As regards the assessment carried out to grant conditional release, the
Court of Cassation considered the mere absence of signs of dangerousness to
be insufficient. To this effect, positive and tangible markers towards social re-
habilitation are necessary31. Likewise, in some cases the Supreme Court ar-
gued that the mere regular prison conduct of the offender does not suffice32.
According to the subjective meaning, in order to grant special condi-
tional release, evidence of moral redemption, a critical review of the of-
fender’s past life and an aspiration to social reintegration are necessary33.
Likewise, some rulings of the Supreme Court required markers of the ac-
knowledgement of moral blame34. Moreover, according to some rulings
which combined objective and subjective understandings of “repentance”,
dedication to work and voluntary activities and the critical review of past
criminal conducts do not suffice in the absence of a both moral (including
by means of requests for forgiveness) and material interest in restoring vic-
tims of the crime committed.
The case law of the Court of Cassation in the field of special conditional
release displays dissenting interpretations regarding the relevance of the
crime the “repentant” committed and his or her criminal attitude35. The
Supreme Court resolved this divergence by means of an intermediate inter-
pretation, according to which the seriousness of the offence and the crimi-
nal attitude of the offender are relevant in the initial phase of the assess-
ment. The latter must be integrated with the rigorous verification of repen-
tance considering all the other markers available during the enforcement of
the sentence36.
2. Current rewarding legislation (where existing)
From an experiential rather than normative point of view, we have at
least two “rules”, which are well known in the Italian doctrinal and judicial
panorama. The first is that to defeat internal political-ideological terrorism –
29 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 16 January 2007; Section I, judgment of
15 February 2008.
30 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 18 May 2005; Section I, judgment of 11
May 1993.
31 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 23 November 1990.
32 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 9 March 2005; Section I, judgment of 4
October 1991.
33 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 11 July 2014, No. 45042; Section I, judg-
ment of 17 July 2012, No. 34946; Section I, judgment of 4 February 2009; Section I, judg-
ment of 26 March 1992; judgment of 3 December 1990; Section I, judgment of 19 February
2009; Section I, judgment of 26 September 2007; Court of Turin, judgment of 10 June 2009.
34 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 29 May 2009; Section I, judgment of 9
March 2005.
35 See Court of Cassation, judgment of 9 May 1988; Section I, judgment of 11 January
1985; judgment of 24 February 1983; Section I, judgment of 29 May 1978; contra, Section I,
judgment of 11 May 1993; Section I, judgment of 5 July 1982; judgment of 27 April 1982.
36 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 28 April 2005; Section I, judgment of 7
October 1992; judgment of 27 June 1990.
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therefore, a series of criminal organisations that use pseudonyms or pass-
words to communicate, as well as paramilitary techniques to act – repres-
sion, however essential, is not enough. Either there were informers ready to
cooperate with the judicial authority or the jurisdiction must, sooner or
later, lay down its arms. The difference in information characterising the re-
lations between the State, on the one side, and the members of terrorist as-
sociations of an ideological matrix, on the other, increases the likelihood of
the former to fail; but to be informed, penitents are needed. The second
“rule” is that reward measures, if used temporarily and for the sole purpose
of countering truly emergency phenomena, could be the right antidote to
moderate the cognitive gap we have just mentioned, without giving up too
much of some essential guarantees of the weaker party in the proceedings
(the defendant)37. The most serious problem is that the “reward measures”
that Italy has experienced over time of ideological terrorism have remained
largely operational, contributing to the sad phenomenon (widespread not
only in Italy) of the normalisation of the emergency.
From a regulatory point of view, in extreme summary, it can be said
that, out of the reward measures against terrorism, the profile of reduction
(and in some cases, extinction) of the penalty granted pursuant to Articles 4
and 5 of the so-called “Cossiga Law” (Law No. 15 of 1980) primarily re-
mained, being applicable only to the repentant terrorist who intends to co-
operate. This is, as has been properly specified, the “cornerstone of the
counter-terrorism reward strategy”.
The extenuating circumstances referred to in Article 4 are excluded
from the logic of balancing with the aggravating circumstances pursuant to
Article 69 of the Italian Criminal Code and there is no discretion: if the con-
ditions are met, the court must grant them. From a strictly systematic point
of view, however, it remains complicated to frame them: given that their sub-
stantial content results in an active dissociation that affects the sanction but
does not touch the “fact”, nor does it really help to understand it, some
scholars have spoken of improper circumstances or have even come to deny
their circumstantial nature altogether.
Article 5, on the other hand, is nothing more than a special case of
withdrawal-reward (case of non-punishability), the operation of which must
be limited only to the context of the attempted crime.
Once convicted, the possibility of obtaining prison benefits and alter-
native measures to imprisonment remains despite the presence of Article 4-
bis of the Italian Prison System (which denies them, as a “general rule”, also
to terrorists): also in this case, if the offender dissociates and cooperates, he
can access the benefits during the enforcement of the sentence, otherwise he
is foreclosed. Let us recall that Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System has
been reformed by Article 3 of Law No. 38 dated 13 April 2009, on the “Con-
version into law, with amendments, of Decree-Law No. 11 dated 23 February
2009 on urgent measures concerning public safety and the fight against sex-
ual violence, as well as persecutory acts”.
37 Voir A. SPATARO, Magistratura ed Istituzioni negli “anni di piombo”: un modello virtu-
oso, cit.
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This law has divided the article into four paragraphs, which we can
summarise as follows. Assignment to outside work, reward permits and al-
ternative measures to imprisonment provided for in Chapter VI, excluding
early release, may be granted to detainees and prisoners for certain serious
crimes – including those of terrorism – only and exclusively if they have
taken action to prevent the crime from causing further consequences, to se-
cure evidence of the crimes, to identify any accomplices or to seize the sums
or other benefits transferred.
There is a “shock absorber”, a mechanism capable of attenuating, in
some cases, the system of foreclosures described above. This happens in the
event in which elements are acquired such as to rule out a connection of the
perpetrator with the terrorist association or if the limited participation in
the criminal act (ascertained in the sentence of conviction) renders a useful
collaboration with the justice impossible; or, in conclusion, if the collabora-
tion offered was irrelevant, or if the mitigating circumstances provided for
in Article 62, No. 6, of the Italian Criminal Code, 114 and 116, paragraph 2,
of the Italian Criminal Code have been granted (in the sentence).
The absence of evidence regarding the existence of current connections
with a certain type of crime (e.g., terrorism), is decisive for the granting of
benefits also to detainees or prisoners for other crimes expressly provided
for by Article 1-ter of the provision, as well as for some crimes against the
person, specifically against individual personality (e.g., Articles 600-bis, 600-
ter of the Italian Criminal Code, etc.) and personal freedom (e.g., Articles
609-bis, 609-ter of the Italian Criminal Code, etc.). In the latter cases dictated
in paragraph 1-quater, however, prison benefits may be granted to detainees
and prisoners also on the basis of the results of scientific observation of the
individual conducted collectively for at least one year, including with the
participation of experts (pursuant to Article 80 paragraph 4 of the Italian
Prison System).
The rewarding nature of the system, of course, does not end here: al-
though it is off topic here, it should be remembered that the Italian legal sys-
tem also proceeds in this sense by other means, such as administrative
means (e.g., protection measures granted to informants) pursuant to Article
9, paragraph 3, of Law Decree No. 8 dated 15 January 1991, (converted in
Law No. 82 dated 15 March 1991 and subsequent amendments).
2.1. Applicability conditions
For crimes committed for the purposes of terrorism or subversion of
the democratic order, Article 4 of the “Cossiga law” allows the perpetrator to
take advantage of various “rewards” (not punishability and serious reduction
of the penalty).
The reduction in sentence (mitigating circumstances: life imprisonment
is replaced by imprisonment from twelve to twenty years and other sen-




– the activation to prevent the criminal activity leading to further conse-
quences;
– the concrete help provided to the judicial authority in gathering decisive
evidence to identify or capture accomplices.
“Non punishability”, on the other hand, requires:
– having prevented the damaging event;
– the provision of decisive evidence for the exact reconstruction of the
event and to identify any accomplices.
As regards the reward profile during enforcement, Article 4-bis of the
Italian Prison System subjects the granting of prison benefits in the event of
a crime for the purposes of terrorism or subversion to the presence of the
conditions specified either by Article 58-ter of the Italian Prison System or
by Article 323-bis of the Italian Criminal Code. The alternative conditions
are as follows:
– having taken action (even after conviction) to prevent the criminal ac-
tivity from leading to further consequences;
– having concretely assisted the police or judicial authority in the collec-
tion of decisive elements for the reconstruction of the events and for the identi-
fication or capture of the perpetrators.
2.2. Types of rewarding measures
The classification of rewarding measures is not easy.
A possible macro-breakdown could be made between “rewards” that
follow conduct capable of affecting the offence (even in part) and “rewards”
that are awarded as a result of conduct that does not interfere in any way
with it.
In the first group, it is possible to include the more classic cases re-
ferred to in Article 56 of the Italian Criminal Code. When an action, or a
“typical” omission, has begun at least in the form of an attempt, it is in the
common interest to let the offender know that if he voluntarily desists, no
one will be able to punish him, because this information will likely stimulate
his attachment to freedom, directing – even at a rather advanced stage – his
will away from the commission of the criminal offence. Similarly, it is ap-
propriate to ensure the perpetrator of the discounts subject to a sufficient ac-
tive withdrawal to avoid commitment. Those just described, as far as it is
possible to discuss the obligatory nature and quantum of the reward (de-
pending on the “weight” that each person gives to the “disvalue of the ac-
tion”), are nothing more than the graduated reward logic of the personal and
supervened cause of non-punishment of voluntary desistance (Article 56,
paragraph 3, of the Italian Criminal Code) and the extenuating circumstance
of active withdrawal (Article 56, paragraph 4, of the Italian Criminal Code).
In addition, of course, it is not only a matter of political-criminal choices
that are free from scientific evidence: in front of the same (only attempted)
crime, in the fact of those who desist, there remains an undoubtedly lower
“disvalue of action” than that (integral) embodied by a mere withdrawal. On
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the one hand, the perpetrator almost does not materialise the work com-
pletely, on the other hand, the “fact” is almost complete (certainly the action
or omission is), even if later, if fate gives him time, he recedes by preventing
the event.
On the other hand, the second group includes reward measures that
make the reward conditional on the mere cooperation of the accused or the
offender with the judicial authorities in order to obtain useful information.
It suffices to mention, for example, the reward that for cooperation during
the enforcement of the penalty (see § 2.3???).
2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
post-sentencing stage
Reward logic is not a specific feature of substantive criminal law in the
strict sense, but also (and sometimes above all) operates in the post-sen-
tencing phase. In this way, the enforcement becomes a de facto favourable
context also for useful and efficient investigative activities, defined by some
agreeable inquisitions. Well, if we understand reward in general terms we
must also (and above all) talk about licences, reward permits, semi-freedom,
parole, etc., whilst what we want to discuss is something else. Many reward
provisions in the strict sense of the term have entered into our legal system,
mainly with Law Decree No. 152 of 1991 (converted in Law No. 203 of 1991)
and with Law Decree No. 306 of 1992 (converted in Law No. 306 of 1992).
356/1992).5
The basic logic has always been that of the “control” of the granting of
prison benefits and the worsening of the prison regime of those convicted
for mafia or terrorist crimes. If the offender cooperates, the prison system is
not differentiated (benefits are accessible), or at most can be softly differen-
tiated (benefits are partially accessible); if, on the other hand, the offender
does not cooperate (benefits are not accessible).
One such example is Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System; a central
article for the understanding of many other cases in the prison system that
allow for the differentiation mentioned above. Well, in its first formulation,
this article differentiated the granting of benefits according to whether or
not the offender had received a conviction that was in some way related to a
certain crime. In the case of serious criminal offences, the benefits were con-
ditional on the acquisition of clear evidence of the offender’s dissociation;
evidence was needed to rule out links to that specific criminality.
A few weeks after the murder of Giovanni Falcone, Law Decree No. 306
dated 8 June 1992, amended Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System, re-
quiring that, for crimes relating to organised crime, the granting of benefits
should also be subject to collaboration with the legal process pursuant to Ar-
ticle 58-ter of the Italian Prison System. The social significance of this small-
to-large legislative change was very clear; according to id quod plerumque ac-
cidit, the perpetrator-mafioso maintains firm contact with the criminal asso-
ciation; therefore, the benefit must be granted only after the incontrovertible
proof of his dissociation: tipping off. There is no turning back from betrayal:
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the legislator knows very well that “whistleblower” and “associate” are mu-
tually exclusive concepts, either one is a mafioso/terrorist or one is (forever)
a repentant whistleblower. In this way, Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison Sys-
tem, although largely unchanged from a technical point of view, is culturally
distorted or, at least, revised in its deepest meaning: from a basis for the con-
struction of a reinforced testing regime for the verification of the absence of
connections with organised crime to a disposition-incubation of informers,
collaborators, repentants.
Not to be forgotten, therefore, is Article 10 of Law No. 663 dated 10 Oc-
tober 1986, containing “Amendments to the law on the penitentiary system
and on the enforcement of custodial and liberty-restrictive measures” (the
so-called “Gozzini” law), which introduced another specific “differentiated”
regime: the events of Article 41-bis of the Italian Prison System (the so-called
hard prison) are tangible and clear evidence of this. This is, as is well known,
a model of “prison life” aimed at preventing (almost entirely) the prisoner’s
contact with the community inside and outside the institution. We then
specify that Article 41-bis of the Italian Criminal Code was subsequently
amended, with the addition of the second paragraph, by Article 19 of Law
Decree No. 306 of 1992 (converted into Law No. 356 dated 7 August 1992).
In any case, the offender subjected to such a prison regime is induced to
cooperate with the judicial authorities to discontinue that awfully hard ex-
perience. With Law Decree No. 152 dated 13 May 1991 (converted in Law
No. 203 dated 12 July 1991) Article 58-ter, which provides that the limita-
tions to the granting of benefits provided for, such as outside work, reward
permits, etc. and which we will discuss later (see § 3) was, in fact, added to
the Italian prison system. It will suffice to point out here that it is the Su-
pervisory Court, in agreement with the Public Prosecutor, that decides on
the existence of collaborative conduct.
A perhaps interesting point is the detention arrangements offered to the
collaborator. In this regard, Article 13-bis of Law No. 82 of 1991 introduced
a (not too concise) protection procedure. If the sentence is already being car-
ried out (or if it has been carried out but its enforcement has not yet begun),
in the presence of serious and urgent reasons, the Chief Appeal Court Pros-
ecutor of the Republic at the Court of Appeal in the district of which the
prison institution is located, at the request of the Chief of Police (who will
inform the Minister of the Interior), may authorise the custody of the col-
laborator in a place other than the institution where the enforcement is in
progress, for the time necessary to draw up the protection programme. If the
person is subject to an alternative measure to imprisonment (other than
early release), the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in
the district of which the person is detained or has his residence or domicile
may authorise specific methods of enforcement of the alternative measures.
Article 13-ter, on the other hand, establishes that, for collaborators included
in a protection programme, the benefits can be arranged only after having
heard the authority that deliberated the “programme”, which must contact
the Public Prosecutor at the competent court to acquire the necessary infor-
mation on the collaboration carried out. These benefits can be provided even
beyond the penalty limits set out in the prison system.
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2.4. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant
See § 2.1.
2.5. Revocation of rewarding measures
Generally, “rewards” granted are subject to revocation. Take, by way of
example, Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 304 dated 29 May 1982, which provide
for the full confession of all offences committed as an essential requirement
for the application of the “reward”. A very central point is that in the reali-
sation of the alleged conduct required for the granting of mitigation or non-
punishment it is better not to lie nor omit what is known. Article 10 of Law
No. 304/1982, for example, specifies that “when it appears that the cases of
non-punishability provided for in Articles 1 and 5 and the mitigating cir-
cumstances provided for in Articles 2 and 3 have been applied as a result of
false or reticent declarations, the judgement may be revised at the request of
the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in the district of
which the judgement was passed, or of the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at
the Court of Cassation, ex officio or at the request of the Minister of Justice
[…] the court may impose a more serious penalty by specific case or quan-
tity and withdraw the benefits granted”.
2.6. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
In examining the procedure for the application of reward measures in
favour of those who decide to cooperate with the legal process, a distinction
must be made according to the case in point.
In the case of measures capable of affecting the an and the quantum of
the penalty such as, for example, those provided for in Article 270-bis.1 of
the Italian Criminal Code (see § 1.2), it is simply up to the court on the mer-
its, at the outcome of the proceedings, to assess the applicability of the ben-
efit according to the requirements of the law in each case.
The same will happen with reference to mitigating circumstances and
cases of non-punishability provided for in special laws and described in the
preceding paragraphs.
As regards the conditions for the applicability of such measures, it
should be noted, incidentally, that, under Article 16-quinquies of Law Decree
No. 8 of 1991, certain mitigating circumstances may be granted only to
those who – within the terms and in the manner provided for in Article 16-
quater of said decree – have signed the minutes describing the contents of
the collaboration, in which the content of the statements made by the col-
laborator is reported in detail. The descriptive report represents an instru-
ment to control the reliability of what reported by the collaborator, clarify-
ing the cognitive contribution of the declarant and outlining the boundaries
of the collaboration made38. It must be signed within a certain period to con-
38 Confirming the fact that this is a document aimed at obtaining reliable statements
are also the provisions of Article 13 of Legislative Decree No. 8 of 1991 concerning the need
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tain the phenomenon of the so-called “instalment” declarations39 and its reg-
ular formation is a prerequisite for the procedural usability of the collabora-
tor’s statements.
By subjecting the recognition of the reward to the valid formation of
the minutes, the law therefore intends to limit the discounts to the existence
of a tangible, reliable and usefully expendable collaboration in court.
Specific conditions are set out for reward measures that can be applied
during the enforcement of a possible conviction. The reference standards are
to be found in Law No. 354 dated 27 July 197540 (the so-called prison sys-
tem, hereinafter the Italian Prison System) and in Law Decree No. 8 dated
15 January 199141.
Specifically, Article 4-bis of L. No. 354 of 1975 identifies, in general
terms, certain crimes that prevent people from enjoying the benefits pro-
vided for by the law. The original text of the standard has been amended sev-
eral times over the years and most recently (in the field of terrorism) by Law
Decree No. 7 dated 18 February 201542 and (with reference, however, to
crimes against the public administration and the protection of victims of
gender-based violence respectively) by Law No. 3 dated 9 January 201943 and
by Law No. 69 dated 19 July 201944.
Firstly, it must be noted that, as regards those convicted of one of the
crimes referred to in Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System (which in-
cludes terrorist offences) does not operate, pursuant to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 656, paragraph 9, section a) of the Italian Criminal Code, the mecha-
nism of suspension of enforcement. As a general rule, the latter rule makes
it possible to suspend the enforcement of the detention order for short
prison sentences pending a decision on the applicability of any alternative
measures to detention. However, the seriousness of terrorist offences justi-
fies, from the legislator’s point of view, the immediate imprisonment of the
for the collaborator detained or subjected to special protection measures to be guaranteed
the absence of contact with other persons who have made the same procedural choice, pre-
cisely in order to avoid any form of conditioning or breach. The sanction due to failure to
comply with these precautions shall be that the statements made after the date on which the
breach occurred cannot be used in court. R.A. RUGGIERO, L’attendibilità delle dichiarazioni dei
collaboratori di giustizia nella chiamata in correità (Giappichelli 2012) 173.
39 Ibid., 172.
40 Law No. 354 of 26 July 1975, ‘Norme sull’ordinamento penitenziario e sull’esecuzione
delle misure privative e limitative della libertà’.
41 Decree Law No. 8 of 15 January 1991, ’Nuove norme in materia di sequestri di per-
sona a scopo di estorsione e per la protezione dei testimoni di giustizia, nonché per la protezione
e il trattamento sanzionatorio di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia’, converted, with
amendments, by Law No. 82 of 15 March 1991.
42 Decree Law No. 7 of 18 February 2015, ‘Misure urgenti per il contrasto del terror-
ismo, anche di matrice internazionale, nonché proroga delle missioni internazionali delle
Forze armate e di polizia, iniziative di cooperazione allo sviluppo e sostegno ai processi di ri-
costruzione e partecipazione alle iniziative delle Organizzazioni internazionali per il consol-
idamento dei processi di pace e di stabilizzazione’, converted, with amendments, by Law No.
43 of 17 April 2015.
43 Law No. 3 of 9 January 2019, ‘Misure per il contrasto dei reati contro la pubblica am-
ministrazione, nonché in materia di prescrizione del reato e in materia di trasparenza dei partiti
e movimenti politici’.
44 Law No. 69 of 19 July 2019, ‘Modifiche al codice penale, al codice di procedura penale
e altre disposizioni in materia di tutela delle vittime di violenza domestica e di genere’.
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convicted person regardless of the future applicability of an alternative mea-
sure to imprisonment.
With reference to the scope of application of the provision in question,
although Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System is unequivocally aimed at
regulating access to prison benefits, case law has stated that the discipline is
to be considered applicable – where possible – also to persons in custody45.
Such an extension of application is, however, to be criticised given the ex-
ceptional nature of this forecast.
The first paragraph of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System sets out
that detainees and prisoners who have been detained for crimes committed
for the purposes of terrorism, including international terrorism, or subver-
sion through the commission of acts of violence can access the benefits pro-
vided for therein and alternative measures to detention, except for early re-
lease, only if they cooperate with the legal process in accordance with Arti-
cle 58-ter of the Italian Prison System Specifically, the prison benefits
subject to the requirements examined are the assignment to outside work
pursuant to Article 21 of the Italian Prison System, the reward permits pur-
suant to Article 30-ter of the Italian Prison System46 and the alternative mea-
sures to detention provided for in Chapter VI (excluding early release), i.e.,
probation with the social service pursuant to Article 47 of the Italian Prison
System, the various forms of home detention pursuant to Article 47-ter of
the Italian Prison System and semi-freedom pursuant to Article 50 of the
Italian Prison System. Access to parole for persons convicted of the crimes
referred to in Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System is also subject to the
existence of the requirements provided for therein in accordance with the
provisions of Article 2, paragraph 1 of Law Decree No. 152 dated 13.5.1991.
Paragraph 1-bis of Article 4-bis specifies, however, that the above bene-
fits may also be granted in cases where:
a) collaboration is “impossible” due to limited participation in the crim-
inal act, ascertained in the conviction or, in any case, in light of the ascer-
tainment of the facts and responsibilities established by irrevocable judge-
ment;
45 Court of Cassation, judgment of 23 April 2004, Virga, in C.e.d. No. 230807; Id., 14
March 03, Ganci, in C.e.d. No. 226629; Id., 27 November 1996, Piarulli, in C.e.d., 206447.
46 On the subject of reward permits, the Constitutional Court recently issued a ruling
with sentence No. 253/2019 in relation to life imprisonment for mafia offences. A question
had been raised as to the constitutional legitimacy of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison Sys-
tem insofar as it prevents the crimes specified therein from being allowed to reward convicts
who do not cooperate with the legal process.
The Constitutional Court has declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 4-bis,
paragraph 1, of the Italian Prison System in the part in which it does not provide for the
granting of reward permits in the absence of collaboration with the legal process, even if el-
ements have been acquired such as to rule out both the topicality of participation in the
criminal association and, more generally, the danger of re-establishing links with organised
crime.
The presumption of “social dangerousness” of the non-cooperative prisoner with refer-
ence to the granting of reward permits is no longer to be considered absolute, but relative.
This “may be passed by the supervising magistrate, whose assessment on a case-by-case ba-
sis must be based on prison reports and information and opinions from various authorities,
from the Anti-Mafia or Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office to the competent Provincial Com-
mittee for Public Order and Security”.
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b) the cooperation offered is “objectively irrelevant”, but one of the mit-
igating circumstances provided for in Article 62 No. 6 (compensation for
damages) has been applied to said detainees or prisoners, even if the com-
pensation for damages was paid after the conviction, in Article 114 (minor
criminal participation) or in Article 116, paragraph 2 (event more serious
than that intended) of the Italian Criminal Code.
However, no benefit can be granted to detainees and prisoners for ma-
licious crimes “when the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor or the District
Prosecutor communicates, on his own initiative or on the recommendation
of the Provincial Committee for Public Order and Security competent in re-
lation to the place of detention or imprisonment, the topicality of connec-
tions with organised crime” (Article 4-bis paragraph 3-bis of the Italian
Prison System).
Again, it is not difficult to grasp the rationale of the forecasts under
consideration. Given the seriousness of the crimes listed in Article 4-bis of
the Italian Prison System, the Legislator intends to avoid the application of
favourable treatment during the enforcement of the sentence in the absence
of indices of penitents by the offender, amongst which there is also conduct
of collaboration indicative of the discontinuation of the ties with the crimi-
nal environment. Essentially, there is an absolute presumption of social dan-
gerousness for those convicted of terrorist crimes, a presumption that can
only be overcome if such persons decide to cooperate pursuant to Article 58-
ter of the Italian Prison System.
A central element in the governance referred to in Article 4-bis of the
Italian Prison System is therefore that of the collaboration described in Arti-
cle 58-ter of the Italian Prison System. It takes the form of the conduct of
“those who, even after conviction, have taken steps to prevent the criminal
activity from leading to further consequences or who have specifically
helped the police or judicial authorities in the collection of decisive elements
for the reconstruction of the events and for the identification or capture of
the perpetrators of the crimes” and whose assessment is up to them, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of the Article 58-ter of
the Italian Prison System to the “supervisory court, having obtained the nec-
essary information and consulted the public prosecutor with the court com-
petent for the crimes for which cooperation has been provided”.
As mentioned above, the hard-preclusive logic of the double track is
partially rebalanced by the provisions of paragraph 1-bis of Article 4-bis of
the Italian Prison System, which governs cases of so-called irrelevant collab-
oration and the so-called impossible or unreasonable collaboration. In both
of these situations, in fact, the final effect is that of breaking down the bar-
rier to access to benefits.
As regards irrelevant cooperation, it would be unfair to prevent the ap-
plication of prison benefits to a person who is unable to report useful ele-
ments only due to the fact that he himself lacks such knowledge. Prerequi-
sites for the application of the governance as regards irrelevant collaboration
are as follows: 1) the acquisition of elements such as to suggest that there is
no connection with terrorist crime (see below); 2) the recognition – in the
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sentence of conviction – of one of the mitigating circumstances referred to
in Articles 62, No. 6), 114 or 116, paragraph 2 of the Italian Criminal Code.
The criterion that distinguishes so-called irrelevant collaboration from
collaboration pursuant to Article 58-ter of the Italian Prison System is a
purely quantitative criterion. In this context, there are no elements of a sub-
jective nature such as the reasons that led the condemned person to collab-
orate, the spontaneity of the collaboration or the possible penitents. Collab-
oration must in any case be full and the willingness to cooperate must be as-
certained in practice. In any case, deliberately limited or partial cooperation
are not permitted.
The other case considered by paragraph 1-bis of Article 4-bis of the Ital-
ian Prison System is that of so-called impossible collaboration. On this
point, the contribution made by the case law of the Constitutional Court,
which extended the concept of irrelevant collaboration – already present in
the formulation of the rule under the terms described above – to all those
cases in which the convicted person finds himself in the objective impossi-
bility of collaborating is essential. This can happen for two reasons: a) the
convicted person had such a marginal role that he could not have known
anything useful for the judicial authorities47 or b) because the conviction
had already fully established the facts and responsibilities48. Also in this
case, it would clearly be unfair to exclude the applicability of prison benefits
to a convicted person who is unable to make a useful contribution to the ju-
dicial authorities for reasons beyond his control, such as limited participa-
tion in the facts of the crime, the secondary role he plays, or in cases in
which the judgement on the merits of the case has proved suitable to clarify
every aspect both in terms of ascertaining the facts and in terms of the per-
sons to whom they should be attributed.
Currently, when the path of collaboration is completely impracticable,
in order to remove the foreclosures, set forth in Article 4-bis of the Italian
Prison System, the existence of elements suitable to exclude connections be-
tween the condemned person and terrorist activity must be considered suffi-
cient.
With reference to the marginality of the role played by the convicted
person, the supervisory court will have to ascertain its existence on the basis
of what has been ascertained with the conviction, with any difference as-
sessment being foreclosed, due to the intangibility of the judged person. It
must clearly emerge from the sentence of conviction that, regardless of the
acknowledgement of the mitigating circumstance of Article 114 of the Italian
Criminal Code, the convicted person has played a marginal and negligible
role in relation to the criminal act and that this has foreclosed him from
having access to information expendable for collaborative purposes49. To
this end, the grounds for the judgement applying the penalty at the request
of the parties50.
47 Constitutional Court No. 357 of 1994.
48 Constitutional Court No. 68 of 1995.
49 Court of Cassation, judgment of 15 May 1995, Enea (1996) 2 GP 250.
50 Court of Cassation, judgment of 12 July 1995 (1996) RP 518.
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The Constitutional Court51 specified that, in any event, the assessment
as to impossible cooperation could not be based on the condemned person’s
protest of innocence which, it stated, could not be relevant at the enforce-
ment stage to the outcome of a final judgement.
The moment to which reference must be made as regards the ascer-
tainment of the impossibility and unreasonableness of collaboration coin-
cides, according to case law, with the moment in which the application for
access to benefits is submitted. In this way, the silence kept by the defendant
during his proceedings should not adversely affect the assessment made by
the supervisory court.
According to the prevailing case law, it is for the defendant to attach to
the application for access to the benefit the documentation capable of prov-
ing the circumstances, objective and subjective, which make it impossible to
cooperate usefully, circumstances which will then be ascertained by the
competent court. However, it should be noted that the court is not foreclosed
from making an ex officio finding of its own motion as to the existence of
further elements capable of establishing a finding of impossibility of coop-
eration.
The order by which the supervisory court rejects the sentenced person’s
request must in any event be reasoned52.
A recent ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation has intervened on
the subject of collaboration pursuant to paragraph 1-ter of Article 4-bis of
the Italian Prison System stating that, for the purposes of granting the
prison benefits referred to therein, the doubt as to the existence of the pre-
supposition of the impossibility or irrelevance of the collaboration of the
person concerned with the judiciary due to the limited participation in the
fact or the complete ascertainment of the facts and responsibilities, condi-
tions equated by the regulatory provision to the requirement of collabora-
tion with the judiciary which must necessarily concur with that of the lack
of current links with organised crime, cannot be to the detriment of the ap-
plicant, given that the rule of judgement according to which, if two mean-
ings can equally be attributed to a given evidence, the one most favourable
to the person concerned must be preferred, which can be set aside only
where it is irreconcilable with other unambiguous elements of the opposite
sign. The maximum constitutes shareable projection of the scope of the rule
of in dubio pro reo operating with knowledge of the facts.
In any case – as anticipated – in both situations (irrelevant collabora-
tion and impossible collaboration), there must be elements such as to ex-
clude the actuality of connections with terrorist criminality and, therefore,
sufficient to corroborate the case of an effective detachment from the crim-
inal organisation.
The problems in relation to such an assessment arise, in the first place,
with reference to all those cases in which the commission of the crime does
not depend on the existence of an organised criminal structure since what is
51 Constitutional Court No. 306 of 1993.
52 Court of Cassation, judgment of 9 June 1998, Di Quarto (1999) CP 2284.
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required to prove is, essentially, the dissolution of an associative bond which
has never existed. With specific reference to the terrorism phenomenon, it
suffices to consider, for example, how the conviction for a crime with the
purpose of terrorism committed by means of violence against the person,
which in itself is an obstacle to the granting of the benefits, could well dis-
regard the protest of an associative crime53.
If it is not possible to ascertain the detachment from the criminal or-
ganisation, nor if, however, there are any indications of continuing member-
ship of the bond, the only solution consistent with the Italian trial system
seems to be that of in dubio pro reo: if two meanings can equally be attrib-
uted to a given evidence, the one most favourable to the person concerned
must be given priority, which can be set aside only where it is irreconcilable
with other unambiguous elements of the opposite sign.
In line with this conclusion, the most recent case law of the Court of
Cassation seems to be in line with this conclusion, which states that the ex-
istence of elements that exclude the topicality of links with crime constitutes
a condition that is concurrent but independent from that of the so-called im-
possible or irrelevant collaboration54. Given that this is an independent as-
sessment, all the rules laid down in the Code concerning the investigating
and assessing powers of the supervisory judiciary will have to be applied, in-
cluding precisely that which prevents decisions unfavourable to the con-
victed person in the absence of positive evidence of the circumstances justi-
fying them.
As regards the procedure, Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System im-
poses on the supervisory magistrate the obligation to decide on the granting
of the benefit requested after obtaining detailed information through the
provincial committee for public order and safety (so-called “Comitato
provinciale per l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica”, “Provincial Committee for
Public Order and Security”, hereinafter C.P.O.S.), which is competent in re-
lation to the convicted person’s place of detention.
The C.P.O.S. was established under Law No. 121 of 1981, with the aim
of improving police coordination. These are bodies with consultative func-
tions, set up at each Prefecture. They are presided over by the Prefect and
are composed, by law, of the Chief of Police, the Mayor of the municipality
of the capital and the President of the province, the Provincial Commanders
of the Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza (Italian Finance Police), as
well as by the exponents of the public administrations, of the judiciary, of
the structures of public security, which the Prefect may invite to participate
(Article 20 Law No. 212 of 1981).
The choice to include a typically preventive body that is dependent on
the executive body (specifically, the Ministry of the Interior) in a delicate
phase such as that of enforcement, has raised several perplexities in doc-
trine55. The composition and the (public security) functions attributed to
53 See, also for further references, L. CARACENI, ‘sub Art. 4-bis’, in F. DALLA CASA, G. GIOS-
TRA, Ordinamento penitenziario commentato (Cedam 2019) 73-76.
54 Court of Cassation, judgment of 7 April 2017, Cataldo, in C.e.d. n. 270864.
55 Ibid., 80-83.
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these bodies, in fact, condition the impartiality that should characterise a ju-
dicial procedure, given that the C.P.O.S. is able to form, through indepen-
dently acquired sources, a large part of the cognitive platform on which the
court will rely for the decision.
In any event, it should be noted that, although the request for informa-
tion is a due act by the supervisory judiciary, such information is not bind-
ing on the decision. On the contrary, the court is in any case obliged to de-
cide after thirty days from the request (this term can be extended by a fur-
ther thirty days if the C.P.O.S. communicates that there are “specific security
needs or that connections could be maintained with organisations operating
in non-local or non-national areas”).
Lastly, the governance described so far does not apply, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 3-bis of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison
System, in the event that the National or District Anti-Mafia Prosecutor
(and, as of, 2015, also Anti-Terrorism) should communicate, on his own ini-
tiative or upon notification of the provincial committee for public order and
security competent in relation to the place of detention or internment, the
topicality of connections with the organised crime of the offender.
The rule, which is much criticised by the doctrine, ends up attributing
a real power of veto to an investigative body, capable of preventing access to
benefits for those convicted of terrorist crimes56. On this point, case law has
attempted to trace these communications back to the same parameters elab-
orated for the information of the C.P.S.O. and, therefore, has affirmed that
the opinion of the Public Prosecutor cannot be considered binding and that
the court, which must decide on the possibility of access to the benefit is in
any case under an obligation to verify the validity of the information trans-
mitted by the Public Prosecutor, since it cannot be uncritically accepted57.
Turning to the special governance dictated in matters of terrorism by
Article 16-nonies of Law Decree No. 8 of 1991 – as last amended by Law De-
cree No. 7 of 2015 – it is established in paragraph 1 that as regards the con-
victed persons who have provided, also after the conviction, some of the con-
duct of collaboration which allows the granting of the mitigating circum-
stances provided for by the Criminal Code or by special provisions, the
parole, the granting of the reward permits and the admission to the measure
of home detention provided for by Article 47-ter of Law No. 354 dated 26
July 1975, and subsequent amendments, are ordered upon proposal or after
hearing the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor.
Given the characteristics and the social alarm caused by terrorist of-
fences, it is therefore intended to make the granting of certain measures sub-
ject to a further opinion by the authority specifically responsible for the re-
pression of the phenomenon.
The proposal or the opinion of the national prosecutor must contain
the assessment of the convicted person’s conduct and social dangerousness,
taking into account the conduct of the convicted person in the course of the
56 Ibid., 85-87.
57 Court of cassation, judgment of 15 March 1994, Meles, (1995) CP 3069; Court of cas-
sation, judgment of 11 January 1994, Bellavia, (1995) CP 703.
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criminal proceedings (specifically, it is required to specify whether the con-
victed person has ever refused to submit to questioning or examination or
other act of investigation in the course of the criminal proceedings for which
he has cooperated), as well as any element considered relevant “for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the convicted person’s penitents, also with reference to
the relevance of the links with organised or subversive crime” (paragraph 3).
As regards the requirement of penitents, the case law has specified that
the existence of penitents cannot be inferred from the mere fact of collabo-
ration.
The sentenced person, in accordance with the second paragraph, must
provide the judicial authority competent to decide on the granting of the
benefit with any useful information on the characteristics of the collabora-
tion provided, attaching to the proposal or opinion, if requested by the court
or the supervisory magistrate, a copy of the report explaining the contents of
the collaboration and, if he is a person subject to protection measures, the
relevant implementing measure.
The competent court, once it has obtained the proposal or the opinion
of the national prosecutor, will have to decide on the grant of the benefit
having regard to the importance of cooperation and provided that there is
penitents and no evidence to suggest links with organised or subversive
crime. The granting measure may be adopted by the court or by the super-
visory magistrate also in derogation of the provisions in force, including
those relating to the penalty limits set out in Article 176 of the Italian Crim-
inal Code and Articles 30-ter and 47-ter of Law No. 354 dated 26 July 1975
and subsequent amendments. The measure – specifies paragraph 4 of Article
16-nonies – must be “specifically reasoned” if the national prosecutor has ex-
pressed an unfavourable opinion.
If the convicted person decides to cooperate as regards facts other than
those for which the conviction was given, the fifth paragraph specifies that
the benefits referred to above may be “granted by way of derogation from
the provisions in force only after the judgement at first instance concerning
the facts which are the subject of the cooperation”. Case law has intervened
to clarify the scope of this provision, which differs from the cases referred to
in the preceding paragraphs in relation to the subject matter of the cooper-
ation. In the case referred to in the fifth paragraph, the convicted person
makes statements only with reference to facts other than those for which he
has been convicted and, therefore, the collaboration has, as its object, state-
ments exclusively incriminating third parties; in other cases, on the other
hand, the convicted person makes statements concerning the facts for which
he has been convicted, as well as, possibly, statements on the fact of others.
In the presence of statements exclusively incriminating third parties, there-
fore, the granting of benefits is subject to the issue of a sentence – even if not
final – that confirms that what has been declared by the convicted person
during the collaboration meets the requirements of Article 9, paragraph 3 of
Law Decree No. 8 of 1991, i.e., the intrinsic reliability and considerable im-
portance of it in terms of novelty, completeness or other elements, as regards
the structural connotations, equipment of weapons, explosives or goods, ar-
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ticulations and internal or international connections of mafia-type or terror-
ist-subversive criminal organisations, or as regards the objectives, aims and
operating methods of the same organisations. Also in this case, the
favourable treatment is therefore subordinate to the effectiveness and im-
portance of the collaboration offered.
From a different point of view, the characteristics of the cooperation
may also be relevant for the withdrawal or replacement of any precautionary
measures applied to the declarant. Article 16-octies of Decree-Law No. 8 of
1991 provides, however, that the amendment in melius cannot constitute an
automatic consequence of the collaborative conduct. The measure of pre-
trial detention may also be revoked or replaced only in the event that, in the
context of the investigations carried out as regards the existence of pre-trial
detention, the proceeding court has not acquired elements from which it is
possible to deduce the topicality of the links with terrorist crime. To this
end, it will in any case be necessary to hear the National Anti-Mafia and
Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, as well as the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutors at
the relevant courts of appeal and to verify that the collaborator, where sub-
ject to protection measures, has complied with the commitments made un-
der Article 12.
2.7. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations)
The question arises as to how statements made by those who decide to
cooperate can be brought in and used in other criminal proceedings.
The reference legislation is dictated by Legislative Decree No. 8 of
199158 as amended by Law No. 45 of 200159 and, specifically, by the provi-
sions contained in Chapter II-ter, concerning the sanctioning treatment of
those who cooperate with the justice system.
Article 16-quater of Legislative Decree No. 8 of 1991 establishes, firstly,
that whoever intends to cooperate with the judiciary for the purpose of
granting special protection measures, recognition of mitigating circum-
stances or access to prison benefits must make his or her statements to the
Public Prosecutor’s Office within one hundred and eighty days of the afore-
mentioned manifestation of will.
The deadline of one hundred and eighty days is important in two re-
spects: firstly, failure to comply with the deadline makes it impossible to
grant the protective measures provided for informants by the same Legisla-
tive Decree No. 8 of 1991 (if they have been granted, they must be revoked).
Furthermore, declarations made outside that period may not be currencies
58 Decree Law No. 8 of 15 January 1991, ‘Nuove norme in materia di sequestri di per-
sona a scopo di estorsione e per la protezione dei testimoni di giustizia, nonché per la protezione
e il trattamento sanzionatorio di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia’, converted, with
amendments, by Law No. 82 of 15 March 1991.
59 Law No. 45 of 13 February 2001, ‘Modifica della disciplina della protezione e del trat-
tamento sanzionatorio di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia nonché disposizioni a favore
delle persone che prestano testimonianza’.
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for the purposes of proving the facts stated in them against persons other
than the declarant, unless they are unrepeatable (see below). This is in-
tended to oblige the registrant to immediately share all information in his
possession, avoiding reticent, partial and, therefore, unreliable stories.
The content of the statements made must be transcribed – in accor-
dance with the procedures set out in Article 141-bis of the Italian Criminal
Code – in the so-called minutes explaining the contents of the statement.
The descriptive minutes are included in their entirety in a special file
held by the Public Prosecutor who received the statements. In addition, an
extract from the minutes is included in the file provided for by Article 416,
paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., in the file sent to the
court at the preliminary hearing, relating to the proceedings “to which the
statements respectively and directly refer”.
The minutes are covered by secrecy as long as the acts contained in the
file of the Public Prosecutor responsible for the proceedings to which the
statements refer are secret and, in any case, their publication is prohibited
pursuant to Article 114 of the Italian Criminal Code. The provision is clearly
intended to protect the functionality of the investigations and also to protect
the registrant himself.
As to the content of the minutes, the convicted person must declare to
the Public Prosecutor, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 16-
quater, all the information in his possession useful for the reconstruction of
the facts and circumstances on which he is interrogated, as well as the other
facts of greater gravity and social alarm of which he is aware, in addition to
the identification and capture of their authors and also the information nec-
essary so that it may proceed to the identification, seizure and confiscation
of the money, goods and any other usefulness of which it itself or, with ref-
erence to the data available to it, others belonging to the criminal groups di-
rectly or indirectly dispose.
It has already been said that it must be a full cooperation, as partial or
limited cooperation cannot be considered sufficient in certain circum-
stances. In fact, the fourth paragraph of Article 16-quater specifies that the
person who makes the declarations must certify, in the descriptive report,
that he “is not in possession of news and information that can be used in
court on other facts or situations, also not connected or connected to those
reported, of specific seriousness or in any case such as to highlight the social
dangerousness of individuals or criminal groups”. This statement is of par-
ticular importance as regards the granting of protection measures: if the
statement proves to be “untrue”, the protection measures cannot be granted
or, if they have already been applied, must be revoked.
All the statements and information that are included in the descriptive
minutes are those “that can be used in court and which, pursuant to Article
194 of the Italian Criminal Code, may be the subject of testimony”.
The rule specifies – similarly to what is generally provided for by the
Code of Criminal Procedure – that the statements in the descriptive minutes
cannot be the subject of testimony if the convicted person has “inferred from
current rumours or similar situations”. Similar to what is generally pre-
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scribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, such information could not be
adequately verified in contradictory manner, thus lacking a minimum relia-
bility coefficient.
In addition, they may not be used in proceedings to which statements
made after the 180-day period referred to above relate. This is a subjectively
relative physiological unusability, which needs to be addressed.
Firstly, with reference to the dies a quo of the term in question, the case
law of the Court of Cassation has intervened by specifying that “for the pur-
poses of the usability of the declarations made by the so called “informants”,
the moment from which the term of one hundred and eighty days starts to
run within which the person who has expressed the willingness to cooperate
must make known to the Public Prosecutor all the information in his pos-
session, coincides with the drafting of the minutes describing the contents of
the cooperation and not with that when such will was only generically ex-
pressed” (C 25.3.2011, No. 14556).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court specified that the unusability of the
statements made by “informants”, beyond the term of one hundred and
eighty days from the beginning of the collaboration, does not fall within the
categories of “pathological unusability”, from which the evidentiary acts
taken “contra legem” are affected and cannot, therefore, be deduced nor de-
tected in the abridged judgement. This conclusion is currently confirmed by
the text of Article 438, paragraph 6-bis, of the Italian Criminal Code, as
amended by Law 103 of 2017. In fact, according to the rules currently in
force, the request for an abbreviated judgement entails the non-detectability
of the unusability other than that resulting from the breach of an evidentiary
prohibition.
The statements made by the collaborator outside of the term referred to
in paragraph 1 of Article 16-quater, therefore, can be used in the preliminary
investigation phase, specifically for the purpose of issuing the personal and
real precautionary measures, as well as in the preliminary hearing and in the
abbreviated trial60.
As regards the tangible modalities of acquisition of what has been de-
clared by the collaborator, the governance is dictated by Article 16-sexies of
Law Decree No. 8 of 1991, the content of which must necessarily be coordi-
nated with the governance of the code of ritual.
The aforementioned statement states that, when the collaborator is to
be interrogated or examined as a witness or accused person in a related pro-
ceeding or of an offence connected with the case provided for in Article 371,
paragraph 2, section b) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, the court,
at the request of the party, shall order that the minutes illustrating the con-
tents of the cooperation referred to in Article 16-quater be obtained from the
Public Prosecutor’s Office’s file, limited to those parts of it which concern the
liability of the accused in the proceedings.
Due to the specific qualification held, some special rules are dictated
for the assessment of the statements made by the collaborator. He could in
60 Court of Cassation, judgment of 25 September 2008. Magistris, in C.e.d. No. 241882.
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fact be led to report untrue circumstances for the sole purpose of profiting
from the benefits of the cooperation and is, therefore, subject to a relative
presumption of unreliability.
In general terms, Article 192, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Italian Crimi-
nal Code establishes that statements made by any defendant for the same of-
fence for which proceedings are being carried out or for related or con-
nected offences are assessed together with other evidence confirming their
reliability. The provision, evidently applicable also to the collaborator who is
also accused, therefore introduces a special rule of assessment that prevents
the statements coming from the perpetrator from being considered in the
absence of further and autonomous elements capable of confirming their
genuineness.
The case law has further reaffirmed the need for an in-depth delibera-
tion of the personal reliability of the collaborators, consisting of a preventive,
general and unfailing examination, without which the subsequent ones of in-
trinsic credibility of internal coherence and logic and the search for external
feedback appear incomplete and not self-sufficient as well as secondary.
The court must therefore firstly assess the reliability of the collaborator
in relation to his personality, his social-family conditions, his delinquent
past, his relationships with the accused of complicity and the remote and
imminent genesis of his resolution to the confession or accusation of the co-
perpetrators or accomplices. Only in a second step will the intrinsic coher-
ence of what is referred to have to be verified in the light of the criteria of
precision, coherence, constancy, spontaneity. Lastly, the statements made
must be considered in relation to external elements capable of confirming
their genuineness.
2.8. Measures for the protection of the repentant
The Italian law provides an articulated system of protection for the so-
called informants. The reference framework is contained in Chapter II of De-
cree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The system is divided into three levels, due to the increasing danger for
the safety of the collaborator. The existing measures are in as follows:
1) ordinary protection measures, which are taken by the public security
authority or, in the case of detained or imprisoned persons, by the prison ad-
ministration;
2) the provisional protection plan referred to in Article 13, paragraph 1
of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991;
3) the special protection measures referred to in Article 13, paragraph
4 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991;
4) the special protection programme referred to in Article 13, para-
graph 5 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The instruments of protection referred to in points 2), 3) and 4) are the
responsibility of the Commission under Article 10 of Decree Law No. 8 of
1991.
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The bodies involved in the procedure for applying, amending or with-
drawing the special protection measures and the special protection pro-
gramme are the Commission referred to in Article 10 and the Central Pro-
tection Service referred to in Article 14 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice also play an im-
portant role. Specifically, with reference to the time before the enforcement
of the measures, it is up to them to appoint the Commission referred to
above.
For the application of special protection measures, cooperation or
statements made in the course of criminal proceedings are relevant. They
must have the character of “intrinsic reliability”, as well as of “novelty”,
“completeness” and, in any case, must “appear of considerable importance
for the development of the investigations or for the purposes of the judge-
ment or for the activities of investigation on the structural connotations, the
endowment of arms, explosives or goods, the articulations and the internal
or international connections of the criminal organisations of mafia or ter-
rorist-subversive type or on the objectives, purposes and operative modali-
ties of said organisations”.
In any case, these measures can only be applied if “the inadequacy of
the ordinary protection measures adopted by the public security authorities
or, in the case of persons detained or interned, by the Ministry of Justice –
Department of Prison Administration” is apparent. In addition, it must ap-
pear that these persons are in serious and current danger due to the collab-
orative conduct described above in relation to certain crimes, including
those committed for the purposes of terrorism.
The protection measures must be appropriate to ensure the safety of
the recipients, including, where necessary, their assistance.
Article 9 paragraph 4 specifies that in the event that the special protec-
tion measures are not appropriate to the seriousness and topicality of the
danger, they may also be “applied through the definition of a special protec-
tion programme”. Paragraph 5 specifies that the measures identified in this
way may also be applied to those who live permanently with those who de-
cide to collaborate, as well as, in the presence of specific situations, also to
those who are exposed to serious, current and tangible danger due to rela-
tions with the same persons. With reference to the latter category of persons,
the need to apply the protection measure will have to be assessed from time
to time in relation to the specific needs of the case: the rule, in fact, specifies
that the relationship of kinship, affinity or marriage alone, does not deter-
mine, in the absence of stable cohabitation, the application of the measures.
With reference to the assessment as regards the situations of danger,
paragraph 6 establishes that “in addition to the depth of the conduct of col-
laboration or the relevance and quality of the declarations made, also the re-
action characteristics of the criminal group in relation to which the collabo-
ration or declarations are made are taken into account, assessed with specific
reference to the intimidating force which the group is locally able to use”.
As regards the procedure for the application of those measures, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 11 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991, the
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proposal for admission to the special protection measures is, as a rule, made
by the public prosecutor whose office proceeds or has proceeded with the
facts set out in the statements made by the collaborator who is assumed to
be in serious and current danger. If the District Anti-Mafia Directorate is
proceeding or has proceeded and a district attorney has not been appointed
to the latter, but rather a representative of the district attorney has been ap-
pointed, the proposal is made by the latter.
In the event that the statements made relate to proceedings for crimes
committed for the purposes of terrorism in relation to which it appears that
several offices of the Public Prosecutor proceed with investigations con-
nected pursuant to Article 371 of the Italian Criminal Code, the proposal is
formulated by one of the proceeding offices in agreement with the others
and communicated to the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecu-
tor, who is also competent to decide on any disputes between prosecutors.
The Chief of Police also has the power to make proposals, in agreement
with the other legitimate authorities or after obtaining their opinion.
As regards the content of the proposal, information and elements use-
ful for assessing the seriousness and topicality of the danger to which the
persons concerned may be exposed as a result of the choice to cooperate
with justice, the characteristics of the contribution made and any protective
measures already taken, together with the reasons why they are not consid-
ered adequate, must be specified.
On receipt of the proposal, the Commission will have to decide whether
or not to apply the security measures. In carrying out this task, the Com-
mission has extensive investigative powers: pursuant to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 13, the Commission may acquire specific and detailed information on
the prevention or protection measures already adopted or to be adopted by
the public security authority, the Prison Administration or other bodies, as
well as any other element that may be necessary to define the seriousness
and topicality of the danger in relation to the characteristics of the conduct
of collaboration. It is also provided that, in order to assess the existence of
the conditions for the application of the measures, the Commission may also
proceed to the hearing of the authorities that formulated the proposal or
opinion and of other judicial, investigative and security bodies, being able to
use for the purposes of its decision also acts covered by secrecy pursuant to
Article 329 of the Italian Criminal Code and obtained by the Minister of the
Interior pursuant to the provisions of Article 118 of the Italian Criminal
Code.
When signing the special protection measures granted, the collaborator
is required to provide all the documentation indicated in paragraph 1 of Ar-
ticle 12 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 (relating to the living conditions of him-
self and his family, marital status, family status, pending criminal, civil and
administrative proceedings, educational qualifications, etc.), to elect domi-
cile in the place where the Commission has its headquarters, as well as to
personally undertake a series of commitments. This is a step of fundamental
importance, given that the breach of the same involves the activation of the
mechanisms for replacing and revoking protective measures. Specifically,
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the collaborator personally undertakes to: a) comply with the required safety
standards and actively cooperate in the enforcement of the measures; b) un-
dergo interrogation, examination or other investigative measures, including
the drawing up of a report explaining the contents of the cooperation;
c) comply with the obligations set out by law and the obligations contracted;
d) not to make statements to persons other than the judicial authorities, the
police and their defence counsel concerning facts of interest for the pro-
ceedings in relation to which they have cooperated or are cooperating and
not to meet or contact, by any means or through any means, any person in-
volved in the crime or, except with the authorisation of the judicial authori-
ties when there are serious needs inherent in family life, any person cooper-
ating with the justice system; e) to specify in detail all property owned or
controlled, directly or through a third party, and other benefits available to
them directly or indirectly, and, immediately after admission to the special
protection measures, to pay the money resulting from illegal activities. The
judicial authority shall ensure the immediate seizure of the aforementioned
money and assets and utilities.
Article 13 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 sets out the manner in which
the Commission decides on the granting of protection measures and defines,
in part, the content of the special protection measures which may be
adopted, with reference to the implementing decree for detailed rules.
It should be noted, firstly, that provision is made for provisional mea-
sures to be taken in cases of urgency. Paragraph 1 empowers the Commis-
sion to decide on the application of a provisional protection plan in cases of
urgency and where there is a request from the proposing authority on the
matter. The decision can also be taken without formalities and, in any case,
within the first session following the request, if necessary, information from
the Central Protection Service as per Article 14 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The request for application of the provisional measure must contain: 1)
the information and elements useful for assessing of the seriousness and
topicality of the danger to which the persons concerned are or may be ex-
posed as a result of the choice to cooperate with justice made by the person
who made the declarations; 2) any protective measures adopted or made to
be adopted and the reasons why they do not appear adequate; 3) at least a
brief indication of the facts on which the person concerned has expressed
the willingness to cooperate and the reasons why the cooperation is consid-
ered reliable and of considerable importance; 4) the circumstances from
which the specific seriousness of the danger and the urgency of providing it
result.
The measure by which the Commission applies the provisional protec-
tion plan ceases to be effective if, after one hundred and eighty days (which
may be extended by the President of the Commission), the authority em-
powered to formulate the proposal for admission under Article 11 of Decree
Law No. 8 of 1991 has not forwarded it and the Commission has not decided
on the application of the special protection measures in accordance with the
ordinary forms and procedures of the procedure.
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During the ordinary procedure, it must generally be observed that the
Commission referred to in Article 10 decides on the proposal for admission
to the special protection measures by a majority of its members and pro-
vided that at least five of them are present at the meeting. The rule gives
precedence, in the event of a tie, to the vote of the President. The intention
to give more weight to the positions of the executive appears evident, the
President being an Undersecretary of State for the Interior.
In order to decide on the application of the special protection mea-
sures, the Commission has a broad investigative power, being entitled to ob-
tain information both from the relevant administrative bodies and from the
authorities entitled to submit the proposal.
With specific reference to the content of the special protection mea-
sures and the provisional plan, this is determined by a ministerial decree61.
It can be represented by the preparation of protection measures to be car-
ried out by the competent territorial police bodies, the preparation of tech-
nical security measures, the adoption of the necessary measures for trans-
fers to municipalities other than those of residence, the provision of contin-
gent interventions aimed at facilitating social reintegration as well as the
use, in compliance with the rules of the prison system, of special methods of
custody in institutions or the enforcement of translations and planting.
If these measures do not prove sufficient to ensure the protection of the
collaborator, a special programme may be adopted by the Commission. This
will have to be elaborated and modulated from time to time in relation to
the needs and situations concretely proposed and may include, in addition
to the protection measures mentioned above, also the “transfer of persons
not detained in protected places, special methods of keeping documentation
and communications to the computer service, personal and economic assis-
tance measures, change of personal details, measures to promote the social
reintegration of collaborators and other persons under protection as well as
extraordinary measures that may be necessary”. There is also a specific
framework for economic assistance measures, to be assessed also in relation
to the working capacity of the person under protection, as well as the possi-
bility of using cover documents.
When, on the other hand, detainees or prisoners are in need of protec-
tion, it is up to the Department of Prison Administration to assign them to
institutions or sections of institutions that guarantee the specific security
needs. In the case of detained persons, there is the possibility that forms of
protection may also be applied in view of the formulation of the proposal, at
the request of the Public Prosecutor who has collected or is about to collect
the statements of collaboration or the minutes describing the contents of the
collaboration.
Also in this case, for the definition of the specific methods of protec-
tion, reference should be made to the provisions of the relative implement-
61 Ministerial Decree No. 161 of 23 April 2004, ‘Regolamento ministeriale concernente le
speciali misure di protezione previste per i collaboratori di giustizia e i testimoni, ai sensi del-
l’articolo 17-bis del decreto-legge 15 gennaio 1991, n. 8, convertito, con modificazioni, dalla
legge 15 marzo 1991, n. 82, introdotto dall’articolo 19 della legge 13 febbraio 2001, n. 45’.
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ing decree; in any case, it will be necessary to ensure that the collaborator is
“subjected to prison treatment measures, especially organisational mea-
sures, aimed at preventing him from meeting other people who already ap-
pear to be collaborating with the legal process and aimed at ensuring that
the genuineness of the declarations cannot be compromised”. During the
drafting of the minutes and, in any case, until the drafting of the descriptive
minutes, it is forbidden “to submit the person making the statements to the
investigative interviews referred to in Article 18-bis, paragraphs 1 and 5, of
Law No. 354 dated 26 July 1975 and subsequent amendments”, as well as “to
have correspondence by letter, telegraph or telephone” and “to meet other
persons who collaborate with the legal process, unless authorised by the ju-
dicial authorities for purposes connected with protection needs or when se-
rious needs relating to family life occur”.
Failure to comply with these requirements shall result in the sanction
of unusable statements made to the public prosecutor’s office and the judi-
cial police after the date on which the breach took place unless they are un-
repeatable.
Lastly, it should be noted that the enforcement and specification of the
implementing rules of the special protection programme decided upon by
the Commission is carried out by the Central Protection Service. This
arrangement is established within the Department of Public Security by de-
cree of the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of Econ-
omy and Finance.
2.9. Evaluation and control of the measure
As regards the assessment of the conditions for access to prison bene-
fits under Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System, it has been mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs that the Provincial Committee for Public Order
and Security plays a fundamental role. It is a body with prevention functions
and is dependent on the Ministry of the Interior which is assigned, by Arti-
cle 4-bis of the Italian Prison System, the task of providing the supervisory
judiciary with any elements relating to the existence, or not, of current links
between the convicted person and crime. On this point, case law has, from
the outset, made it clear that the task of assessing the existence of such ele-
ments is, in any case, a matter for the supervisory judiciary, whose powers
of appreciation as regards the granting of benefits cannot be considered lim-
ited by the opinion of the C.P.O.S. Specifically, it was stated that the infor-
mation provided for by Article 4-bis of Law No. 354 of 1975 (the so-called
Italian Prison System) is mandatory but not binding, given that the Supervi-
sory Court can draw aliunde upon useful elements for the purposes of the
judgement it must formulate, with the sole obligation, if it disagrees with the
conclusions of the provincial committee for public order and security, to
provide a suitable, rigorous and detailed explanation62. It is, therefore, an
obligatory but not binding act for the judiciary to decide.
62 Court of cassation, judgment of 20 January 1992, in C.e.d. No. 189278.
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Also as regards the so-called veto power of the National Anti-Mafia
Prosecutor referred to in paragraph 3-bis of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison
System, the case law of legitimacy has intervened in order to specify that the
communications provided by the latter constitute the premise for the ascer-
tainment of a situation of preclusion to the granting of the benefit: a situa-
tion which, therefore, must be ascertained, in tangible terms, by the Super-
visory Court, with the – autonomous – assessment of the elements on which
the assertion object of the communication is based63.
With reference to the collaborative conduct referred to in Article 58-ter
of the Italian Prison System, suitable to make the foreclosure of access to
the benefits referred to in Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System fall, the
assessment thereof is entrusted to the Supervisory Court, which decides af-
ter obtaining the necessary information and consulting the Public Prosecu-
tor with the court competent for the crimes for which the collaboration was
provided (Article 58-ter paragraph 2).
As noted above, the Commission, acting under Article 10 of Decree Law
No. 8 of 1991, decides on the granting, amendment and withdrawal of the
protective measures and their content. It is a body with a mixed composi-
tion: it is formed by a Undersecretary of State for the Interior (who takes on,
by law, the duties of President), a Lawyer of the State, two magistrates, five
officials and officers. Article 10 specifies that the members of the Commis-
sion, other than the President and the Lawyer of the State, shall preferably
be chosen from amongst those who have specific experience in the field and
who have knowledge of current trends in organised crime, but who are not
employed in offices carrying out investigations or preliminary investigations
into facts or proceedings relating to organised mafia crime or terrorist-sub-
versive type crime.
Paragraph 2-quinquies of Article 10 establishes that “the protection
against the measures of the Central Commission with which the special pro-
tection measures are applied, modified or revoked, even if of an urgent or
provisional nature in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 1, is governed
by the Code of Administrative Procedure.
2.10. Revocation of rewarding measures
In general, all benefits granted to perpetrators of crimes committed for
terrorist purposes are revocable if they have been granted on the basis of
non-genuine cooperation. This is clearly intended to ensure that someone
can unjustly benefit from the advantages of cooperation.
Firstly, there are mechanisms for reviewing the sentences with which
mitigating circumstances and special causes of non-punishability have been
applied. In view of what has just been said, this is clearly a vastly different
institution from the “traditional” review, which is designed to obtain the re-
vocation of the sentence in the presence of elements likely to lead to the ac-
quittal of the convicted person.
63 Court of cassation, judgment of 3 February 1993.
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More specifically, Article 10 of Law No. 304 of 1982 establishes that
when it turns out that the causes of non-punishability or mitigating circum-
stances provided for by the same law “have been applied as a result of false
or reticent statements, the revision of the sentence is permitted”. Entitled to
the request for review, ex officio or at the request of the Minister of Justice,
are both the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in the dis-
trict of which the judgement was delivered and the Chief Appeal Court Pros-
ecutor at the Court of Cassation. In this case, there is no limit to the deci-
sion-making powers of the court, which may either impose a more serious
penalty by case or quantity, or withdraw the benefits granted.
The rule specifies, however, that in the event that elements concerning
the falsehood and reticence of the statements should come to light before
the judgement has become final, the documents must be forwarded to the
public prosecutor’s office at the court of first instance for renewal of the pro-
ceedings.
Similar mechanisms are also provided for by Article 16-septies of De-
cree Law No. 8 of 1991 in relation to sentences issued, also for crimes other
than those covered by Law No. 304 of 1982. Specifically, the rule establishes
what the consequences should be if 1) the mitigating circumstances pro-
vided for in the Italian Criminal Code or in special laws on cooperation with
the judiciary are found to have been applied as a result of false or reticent
statements; 2) the person who has benefited from it commits, within ten
years of the judgement becoming final, a crime for which there is provision
for mandatory arrest in flagrante delicto, indicative of his permanence in the
criminal circuit.
In the event that the situations described above emerge before the
judgement has become irrevocable, the Public Prosecutor is entitled to re-
quest restitution by the deadline for lodging an appeal pursuant to Article
175 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, limited to the point in the de-
cision relating to the application of the mitigating circumstances.
If, on the other hand, the nova emerges once the sentence has become
final, it may be subject to review. This is, again, a special case of revision in
peius64. The Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor is entitled to submit the request
to the Court of Appeal in the district in which the sentence was given. For
the rest, the provisions set out in Title IV of Book IV of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, which governs the extraordinary means of appeal
against the revision, are observed “insofar as they are applicable”.
During the review proceedings, the court, at the request of the public
prosecutor, may order the application of the precautionary measures pro-
vided for by law.
64 The instrument of revision in malam partem is, as a rule, extraneous to the Italian
Code of Criminal Procedure. Articles 630 et seq. constitute revision as a means of appeal
prior to the removal of an irrevocable conviction (or a criminal decree of conviction) that
should be issued against those who should have been acquitted. To put it another way, it
means that the legislator intended, as a rule, to make the judged person reviewable only
when an unjust sentence was given and for the sole purpose of exonerating him. On the con-
sistency of the revision in peius with the Italian procedural system, please see R.A. RUGGIERO
(n. 26) 283 ff.
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Similarly to what has just been seen in relation to the benefits pertain-
ing to the sanctioning treatment of the convicted person, the protection
measures applied to the informant (even if not imputed) under Chapter II of
Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 may be revoked or modified both for reasons re-
lating to the actuality of the danger, its seriousness and the suitability of the
measures themselves to protect the collaborator and in relation to the con-
duct of the collaborator.
Specifically, under Article 13-quater, they entail the withdrawal of pro-
tective measures:
1) non-compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to Arti-
cle 12, paragraph 2, sections b) and e);
2) the commission of crimes indicative of the subject’s reintegration
into the criminal circuit.
They also constitute conduct that can be assessed for the purposes of
amending or revoking the measures:
1) non-compliance with other commitments undertaken pursuant to
Article 12;
2) the commission of offences indicative of the change or cessation of
the danger resulting from the collaboration;
3) the express waiver of the measures;
4) refusal to accept the offer of appropriate employment or business
opportunities;
5) unauthorised return to the places from which he/she has been
moved;
6) any action involving detection or disclosure of the identity assumed,
the place of residence and other measures applied.
More generally, the special protective measures are, in addition, not de-
finitive measures which are, in any event, subject to continuous monitoring
by the Commission under Article 10 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991. The Com-
mission shall verify whether the conditions are met at the express request of
the authority that proposed the application of the special protection mea-
sures or, by its own motion, within the period of time set by the Commission
when it admitted the person concerned to the special protection measures,
which may not be less than six months nor more than five years. In the ab-
sence of such an assessment, the legislator shall set the deadline for such an
assessment at one year from the date on which the measure was applied.
Another reason for revocation of the protection measures is provided
for in Article 16-quater, paragraph 7, of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991. The rule,
in fact, provides that these must be revoked if, within the period of one hun-
dred and eighty days provided for therein, the statements are not made and
are not documented in the minutes explaining the contents of the coopera-
tion. Furthermore, paragraph 8 below establishes that the protection mea-
sure may be revoked even if the declaration referred to in paragraph 4 of
said rule, in which the collaborator certifies that he has provided all the in-
formation in his possession, is untrue.
The benefits obtained by the sentenced person during the enforcement
of the sentence are also revocable. Specifically, paragraph 7 of Article 16-
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nonies of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 provides that the modification or revo-
cation of prison benefits is ordered ex officio or upon proposal or opinion of
the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor. In cases of urgency,
the supervisory magistrate is given the power to order suspension by rea-
soned decree; however, such suspension ceases to be effective if, given that it
is a decision of the supervisory court, it does not take action within sixty
days of receipt of the documents.
The same rule specifies which conduct of the convicted person must be
taken into account when deciding on the modification, revocation or pre-
cautionary suspension of prison benefits. Specifically, conduct which, in ac-
cordance with Articles 13-quater, may lead to the modification or revocation
of the special protection measures, as well as conduct which, in accordance
with Article 17-septies, may lead to the revision of the judgements which
have granted, such mitigating circumstances as regards cooperation, must
be assessed.
3. Current relevant case law (where existing)
There are currently no reports of proceedings for religiously motivated
international terrorism offences in which reward measures have been ap-
plied. However, the first national discussion group and the roundtable held
there listed a few cases that have led to significant investigative and judicial
results. As reported in Vincenzo Di Peso’s contribution65, in addition to the
hundreds of non-criminal administrative reward measures – namely resi-
dence permits66 – applied to migrants who cooperate with the police and ju-
dicial bodies from 2005 to date, information provided by three disengaged
terrorist offenders67 has enabled the Italian authorities to identify active re-
cruitment cells and to gain insight into the growing network of unofficial
channels disseminating online terrorist propaganda.
However, we have highly accurate and meaningful data: we now have
valuable documents, including Europol’s famous annual “Terrorism Situa-
tion and Trend Report”, which can help us to understand different dynam-
ics, which are not always clear in the scientific (and public) debate on these
sensitive issues. We shall now look at some of them.
From a general point of view, in the three-year period 2016-2018, in Eu-
rope, there was a significant increase in the number of persons prosecuted
for crimes related to the various aforementioned terrorism offences;
since2015, the most numerous sentences have been those against the mem-
bers of Jihadist terrorism and the trials, in general, are more frequent in
France, Belgium and Spain. It should be noted that, excluding non-prison
penalties, the highest number of convictions in 2018 is held by Greece (16),
65 Collaborators of justice in the context of the countering international terrorism italian
cases, in this Volume.
66 L’art. 2 de la d.l. 27 juillet 2005, n° 144, actuellement en vigueur en vertu de la loi n°
155 du 31 juillet 2005.
67 Tlili Lazhar, Jelassi Rihad et Zouaoui Chokri.
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followed by Spain (8), the United Kingdom (7) and Italy (6). The sanctions
imposed in practice, as is easy to imagine, still continue to increase in the
quantum: the “average” prison sentence for crimes related to terrorism is
generally seven years, compared with five in the previous two years.
As regards religious (Jihadist) terrorism, data show, from 2014 to 2018,
a high number of arrested suspects: in the last year, following seven Jihadist
attacks carried out, thirteen people were killed and forty-six wounded (none
in our country), France (273), Holland (45) and Italy (40) stand out for the
number of arrests.
With reference to the (different) political-ideological terrorism (anar-
chist or extreme left and extreme right), in Europe, in the last year, there
have been nineteen attacks (not all of them carried out) of the left-wing; a
slight decrease compared with the previous two years. Almost all the attacks
mentioned above come from Greece, Spain and Italy, “… the three countries
continued to be the epicentre of left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity in
the EU”. On the other hand, although the policies of the extreme right are
spreading like wildfire in the European Union, black terrorism (right-wing)
is no longer a relevant phenomenon: neither the number of suspects arrested
(44) nor that of the attacks (1) denote a growing trend. Among other things,
the only terrorist attack reported in 2018 was that of Luca Trani, which took
place in Macerata.
Other data is certainly of interest: one of the most accurate (wide-rang-
ing) studies of recent decades on internal and international ideological ter-
rorism of a religious matrix, highlights that, in our continent, the ideological
attacks from 1970 to 1990 were infinitely superior, from a numerical point of
view (inter alia), to those with religious background occurred in the new mil-
lennium. Furthermore, all this, if it were not for the enormous media cover-
age of the sad events that have occurred since 2001, would, to some extent,
clash with the perception that one normally has of “new” terrorism, often
described as “… danger to common life, a threat that brings disorder and de-
nies the most elementary values of human coexistence […], absolute evil,
that negative pole of the ordinary order of the world that was once symbol-
ised by the figure of the devil”.
4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to Art. 16 of Directive
541/2017/EU
Article 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU has not had any top-down effect on
the Italian counter-terrorism legislation68. From a wider perspective, the in-
terplay between Article 16 of the Directive and national rewarding measures
will be analysed in Section II.
68 From a comparative perspective, about the influence of Italian counter-terrorism re-
warding legislations Europe wide, see D. CASTRONUOVO, Quale lezione dagli “anni di piombo”?
La legislazione dell’emergenza e sui pentiti in prospettiva storica e comparata, in Diritto penale
XXI secolo, 1, 143-168; C. RUGA RIVA, Il premio per la collaborazione processuale, cit., 5; F. DIA-
MANTI, Misure premiali e terrorismi. Dall’esperienza italiana all’ultima evoluzione del terrorismo




JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONS DURING THE “YEARS OF LEAD”:
A VIRTUOUS MODEL1
ARMANDO SPATARO
SUMMARY: 1. Judiciary and Judicial Police in the years of lead: the importance of self-organi-
sation and close cooperation. – 2. Minister Rognoni, the so-called emergency legisla-
tion and the cooperation of the “repentant”. – 3. The end of the “years of lead” and the
positive balance of institutional action. – 4. From the anti-terrorism of the years of lead
to the anti-mafia and the fight against international terrorism: brief notes.
1. Judiciary and Judicial Police in the years of lead: the importance of self-
organisation and close cooperation
The role of the Italian judiciary in the fight against domestic terrorism
during the so-called “anni di piombo” (“years of lead”) has been – and still is
– the object of analysis and comments, sometimes of which opposing. Some
critical judgements, however, have also been formulated in Italy without the
necessary historical and scientific investigation, almost as happened in
France on the basis of false stories sold by those who had taken refuge there,
“with the same technique with which fraudsters sold defective goods in the
1950s”2. It is intended to specifically refer to those who claimed that, be-
tween the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the Italian mag-
istrates would have followed the logic of the “laws of emergency”, paying lit-
tle attention to the breach of the rights and guarantees of the defendants,
which would have been the natural consequence of those laws. Interestingly,
in recent years, Italian prosecutors and judges have instead been “accused”
of not being able to face the tragic phenomenon of international terrorism
1 Armando Spataro. The author has always acted as a magistrate in the role of public
prosecutor: since 1977, he has worked in the field of domestic and – since 2003 – interna-
tional terrorism, long coordinating the work of the specialised groups of the Public Prosecu-
tor’s Office of Milan and, since 30.6.2014, of Turin, where he exercised the functions of Pub-
lic Prosecutor. He has also been a member of the Milan DDA (Anti-Mafia District Direc-
torate) since 1991, dealing with the mafia and organised crime. From 1998 to 2002, he was
a member of the CSM (High Council of the Judiciary). The text published here contains ex-
tensive passages from his book “Ne valeva la pena. Storie di terrorismi e mafie, di segreti di
Stato e di giustizia offesa” (Laterza, 2010), from his contribution to “Il libro degli anni di pi-
ombo. Storia e memoria del terrorismo italiano” (Rizzoli, 2010, edited by Marc Lazar and
Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci), as well as from his reports held in training courses at the
Scuola Superiore della Magistratura or from several of his articles published in legal jour-
nals, specifically “Questione Giustizia”.
2 Barbara SPINELLI, La Stampa, 7 March 2004.
with the necessary firmness, exceeding in guaranteeism and not realising
that “this terrorism cannot be countered with the code in hand”3. For the past,
therefore, an accusation of insensitivity to the principles on which every
democracy is based; for the present, the opposite, that is, ignoring that the
rules have now changed and that, more than the trial and the judicial re-
sponse, intelligence and borderline methods are currently relevant.
We shall see how things really are, starting from a summarised recon-
struction of what happened between the end of the 1970s and the 1980s,
years during which, in full respect of the rules, the Italian magistrates faced
terrorist criminality, seeking highly professional specialisation, “inventing”
the group work amongst the judicial offices involved in the investigations
and enhancing the relationship with the judicial police bodies.
The situation of these bodies, before the Moro kidnapping (16 March,
1978), was substantially as follows: in 1974, after the kidnapping of Judge
Sossi and the Piazza della Loggia bombing, the Inspectorate for Action
against Terrorism (entrusted to the Vice-Chief of Police, Emilio Santillo) and
the Special Judicial Police Unit of the Carabinieri (headed by General Carlo
Alberto dalla Chiesa and different from that to be established in 1978) were
constituted, partly to give support to the judicial authorities of Turin in the
first investigations on the Red Brigades, but both these departments,
notwithstanding the excellent results achieved, were then dissolved, most
likely on the basis of the erroneous conviction that the Red Brigades had
been defeated with the arresting of Curcio and other historical members of
that organisation. This choice had not, however, produced an effective weak-
ening of the investigative apparatus, determining rather a different struc-
ture, with the loss of centralised guidance and the ability to move easily
throughout the territory of the State. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1978,
the regional nuclei and the political offices of the State Police were replaced
by the Digos (General Investigations and Special Operations Directorates) –
established at the police headquarters of the regional capitals as well as in
Padua and Catania – to which the competence for investigations in matters
of terrorism was attributed.
However, whilst the Judicial Police Force had already undertaken the
path towards a more widespread knowledge of this subject, the Judiciary, ex-
cept in Turin, was decidedly behind: the culture of reciprocal exchange of in-
formation between judicial offices and the capacity to coordinate those of
the Judicial Police was still lacking. It then is explained why the kidnapping
of Aldo Moro caught the institutions unprepared: fragmented investigations,
sometimes approximate and, in any case, lacking effective coordination,
constituted the norm almost everywhere.
However, it was precisely that tragic event which determined the au-
tonomous initiative of investigating prosecutors and judges who, in the ab-
sence of legislative interventions or political directives, gave rise to sponta-
neous coordination between the judicial offices concerned by the phenome-
3 Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister, December 2005.
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non, until the creation, within them, of groups specialising in the field of ter-
rorism. Yet the legal system of the time did not provide for any rules on co-
ordination, but rather rules that hindered the exchange of news.
Those magistrates (who worked in the cities most affected by terrorism,
such as Turin, Milan, Genoa, Padua, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Rome and
Naples), did not exceed the number of twenty-five units and, during their
frequent meetings, exchanged information on the investigations in real time
and prepared jurisprudential guidelines to be applied uniformly. For exam-
ple, the technical requirements of the crime of armed gangs (provided for by
a now obsolete provision of the Italian Criminal Code), of the “external” par-
ticipation in this crime of association and of the “moral” participation of the
leaders of terrorist associations in the murders and wounds committed and
claimed. Case law identifiers confirmed by the Court of Cassation.
When, between the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, the collabo-
ration of the first “repentant” terrorists was formed, those magistrates im-
mediately circulated amongst themselves the minutes of the declarations ac-
quired, agreeing on the division of responsibilities “to do” and on the times
and methods of eventual and consequent operative outlets (searches and ar-
rests). Also, the evolution of the strategies of the armed groups, their “strate-
gic resolutions” and the handouts of claim were analysed by those magis-
trates, some of whom had the task of comparing and summarising the doc-
uments of interest: in the absence of computers and databases, they became
the historical data storage of the ideological production of the terrorist
groups.
That kind of specialisation and self-organisation – it is not superfluous
to recall it – saw, as protagonists, only the prosecutors and investigating
judges operating at the time, without any political directives or other forms
of conditioning and without anybody invoking the creation of special Courts
or a single Public Prosecutor’s Office competent throughout the national ter-
ritory for the investigation of that kind of crime. Bodies which did not exist
at the time and which, unlike the systems of many other European states, do
not exist in Italy even now, as the National Public Prosecutor’s Office is re-
sponsible only in cases of critical issues, tasks of coordination and not of di-
rection of investigations which remain the responsibility of the District Pub-
lic Prosecutors’ Offices.
In short, those meetings were also attended by those in charge of the
investigative bodies of the Judicial Police who were further increasing their
specialisation (the new special inter-force nucleus commanded by the Gen-
eral Dalla Chiesa was established on 10 August 1978): precisely due to this
close relationship between magistrates and police forces it was possible, not
only to fully implement the constitutional principle (Article 109) and proce-
dural principle of the functional subordination of the Judicial Police to the
directives of the Public Prosecutor and, at the time, of the investigating
judges, but also to reciprocally promote, through the comparison of the re-
spective experiences, a consistent growth of professionalism and of the ca-
pacity of coordination of all the institutions involved in the judicial investi-
gations on terrorism.
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This happened without any need to resort to the intervention of the In-
formation Services, the competence of which – according to the Italian sys-
tem – concerns the prevention of risks for national security, without the pos-
sibility of interference or functional relations with the judiciary.
It is no coincidence that the reformed Services, in 1977, were obliged,
confirmed by Reform Law No. 124/2007, to report the news of crime to the
Judicial Police, through their respective summits. The police, as is known,
must also immediately inform the Public Prosecutor. The final law legit-
imises only a delay in the transmission of the news to the Judicial Authority
on the justified measure of the Prime Minister, but no legislation has ever al-
lowed, in Italy, not even in the fight against international terrorism, the im-
proper use of the information services for the purposes of judicial investiga-
tions, as is the case in other States.
Therefore, neither confusion nor short cuts in the fight against terror-
ism, but, essentially, the creation of a sort of task force comprising magis-
trates and Judicial Police, capable of jointly assessing the procedures and
times of the investigative developments with the attention paid to the rules
and necessities of the future trial, as well as prudent in analysing the real
pertinence or otherwise of the phenomena of so-called social antagonism
(physiological in any advanced democracy) to the practice of real terrorism.
2. Minister Rognoni, the so-called emergency legislation and the cooperation
of the “repentant”
It was precisely in 1978, specifically in the period following the kidnap-
ping of Moro, that the situation recorded a further positive development:
alongside the described capacity of self-organisation of the judiciary, was the
positive boost given to the Institutions by the Minister of the Interior, Vir-
ginio Rognoni (allocated to this role after the discovery of Moro’s body in
Via Caetani in Rome and the resignation of Francesco Cossiga) and a leg-
islative production resulting from a political climate which, at least in the ef-
fort to fight terrorism, promoted initiatives shared by the majority and the
opposition.
The appointment of Rognoni, an academic and man of great political
experience, gave vigour to the fight against terrorism. He was always at the
side of the forces of law and order and attentive to the needs and technical
proposals that the judiciary represented but, at the same time, he was
guardian and guarantor of the competences of the executive power, which
were exercised in a framework of consultation with every sensitive and re-
sponsible political force.
It is worth immediately recalling the – entirely uncontroversial – judge-
ment of the late Professor Vittorio Grevi on the legislation of the “years of
lead”, that is, the years between the end of the 1970s and the first half of the
1980s: essentially, he affirmed, some legislative interventions were approved
in that period, which sometimes resulting in the risk of breaching individual
rights, also with regard to the personal freedom of the defendants but, in the
end, the institutions had held up and if terrorism had been defeated, this
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had not only depended on the capacity of the police forces and the judiciary,
but had also been determined by a legislative body which, as a whole, had
continued to ensure the protection of those rights. In short, if special mea-
sures were adopted, the term should be understood in the sense of measures
that had promoted specialisation in the fight against terrorism, making it
more effective, not of rules that were detrimental to the system of subjective
rights.
The trend of the legislative line during those years was, however, oscil-
lating: between 1968 and 1972, there was an expansion of individual guar-
antees in Italy. That is, a line that was anything but an emergency line pre-
vailed. Precisely during those years, for example, in Italy, the extension to
the investigations of the Judicial Police of the defensive guarantees provided
for the corresponding investigative acts of prosecutors and examining mag-
istrates was recorded: judgement No. 190 of 1970 of the Constitutional Court
recognised, in fact, the right of the defender to attend the interrogation of
the defendant by the Legal Entity. Furthermore, later, between 1975 and
1976, the law reforming the prison4 system and its implementing5 regula-
tions were introduced: on the whole, legislation inspired by the humanisa-
tion of prison treatment. More or less at the same time, however, there was
a reversal of the trend, due to an increase in the delinquency indices, which
first occurred in 1974 with a legislative decree6 which was significantly enti-
tled “Urgent measures on criminal justice” (recalled, above all, due to amend-
ments made to the discipline of the maximum terms of preventive custody)
and then, six months later, with another law entitled “New regulations
against crime”7, mainly concerning the offences of robbery, extortion and
kidnapping
Then, in May 1975, the so-called legge Reale8 arrived, by various schol-
ars mistakenly considered the first of the emergency anti-terrorism laws,
whilst it was a law on public order. On its contents, beyond the obvious pos-
sibility of criticising them, there are still free statements, such as that – for
example – according to which the police would have been authorised to
shoot in the square (whilst it is true that a favourable procedural regime was
provided for in the case of crimes committed in service related to the use of
weapons) or to make arrests and detentions of suspects without warning
magistrates and lawyers. In fact, even then, as now, the police had to make
those arrested in act of committing an offence or those arrested within 48
hours available to the judiciary and could not question them, unlike in other
jurisdictions9. The legge Reale had, rather, introduced certain prohibitions to
4 Law No. 354 dated 26 July 1975: Rules on the prison system and the enforcement of
custodial and restrictive measures.
5 Presidential Decree No. 431 dated 29 April 1976: Approval of the Regulation imple-
menting Law No. 354 dated 26 July 1975 on the rules governing prisons and the enforcement
of custodial and restrictive measures.
6 Decree Law No. 99 dated 11 April 1974, converted into Law No. 220 dated 7 June
1974: Urgent measures on criminal justice.
7 Law No. 497 dated 14 October 1974.
8 Law No. 152 dated 22 May 1975: “Provisions for the protection of public order”.
9 Reference should be made to the provisions in force in France and the United King-
dom.
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the granting of bail, the possibility of arrest by the Police for certain serious
crimes and those concerning arms, the punishment of crimes concerning the
reorganisation of the Fascist Party, as well as the possibility of a wider re-
course to personal “on the spot” searches without the authorisation of the
Judicial Authority. It was, however, a law dating back to a period in which
terrorism – at least, that of the “extreme left” – had not yet manifested itself
in its most bloody forms: that law sought to confront, above all, the effects
of the violent demonstrations in the streets of the early 1970s. It was, for this
reason, a law little used for the fight against terrorism, which, due to some
of its questionable features, was also submitted, but with a negative result,
to a repealing referendum (11 and 12 June 1978).
However, it was in 1977 that laws were passed which, for the first time,
contained specific responses to the spread of terrorism: this first happened
with Decree Law No. 151 dated 30 April 1977, later converted into Law No.
29610. dated 7 June 1977, which intended to achieve a precise objective in
the aftermath of the murder of lawyer Fulvio Croce (28 April in Turin): to
avoid the release of the defendants detained for the commencement of the
terms of pre-trial detention (as it was referred to at the time). In fact, the
long duration of trials for terrorism resulted in this risk both due to the
number of defendants and the crimes for which they were put on trial (the
definition of “maxi trials” was created at the time) and due to the “rite” of
the members of the Red Brigades who, at the beginning of the trials which
involved them as defendants, revoked the appointment of their trusted de-
fenders, affirming that they had nothing to defend themselves with, like the
“Stato imperialista delle multinazionali” (S.I.M.) (Imperialist State of the
multinationals). However, this forced judges to lose days or weeks in the
necessary search and appointment of public defenders11. whilst popular ju-
rors sometimes called in sick with the consequence of having to replace
them with new ones. For this reason, the decree law in question established
the suspension of the period of pre-trial detention during the time in which
the trial was postponed “for reasons of force majeure which prevented the for-
mation of judicial panels or the exercise of the defence”.
Fortunately, however, the hypothesis of introducing the self-defence of
defendants into our trial system, which would have recognised the dignity
and value of the “rite” described, was rejected.
With another law, that of 8 August, 1977, No. 533, containing “Provi-
sions on public order”, the hypotheses of prohibition of the granting of bail
were further extended, the penalties for theft and robbery of arms were in-
creased and the obligatory seizure of real estate premises of organisations,
groups in which explosives and weapons (so-called hideouts) had been
found.
10 “Causes of suspension of custody”.
11 Lawyer F. Croce was killed precisely because, before the beginning of the trial of the
historical nucleus of the Red Brigades, he had communicated to the President of the Court
of Assizes in Turin, the willingness of himself and his colleagues of the Bar Association to as-
sume the defence of the members of the Red Brigades ex officio in the case of revocation –
later intervened – of the appointments of trust.
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1978 saw the massacre of Via Fani, with the kidnapping and, later, the
murder of Aldo Moro. A very few days after the massacre, the legislator in-
tervened with a decree law, that of 21 March, 1978, No. 59, converted with
Law No. 191 dated 18 May 197812. exclusively aimed at the fight against ter-
rorism. Some particular criminal figures were introduced into the system,
such as kidnapping for the purpose of terrorism (Article 289-bis of the Ital-
ian Criminal Code) and the attack on public utility plants (Article 420 of the
Italian Criminal Code); on a trial level, with Articles 165-bis and 165-ter of
the Italian Criminal Code, on the one side, the possibility of exchange of
documents between judicial authorities and, on the other, the power of the
Minister of the Interior to request and obtain them, even if covered by a se-
cret investigation. With the first rule, the possibility of spontaneous coordi-
nation and exchange of documents between magistrates, which was previ-
ously unforeseen and even hindered, was finally introduced into the proce-
dural system. On a trial level, other important regulations were introduced,
such as, for example, the possibility for the Judicial Police to collect the
summary information of the arrested and detained person, including in the
absence of the defendants, for the sole purpose of continuing the investiga-
tion (Article 225-bis of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure): a choice that
could certainly be criticised, but the regulation, which effectively risked
damaging the rights of the defendants and the suspected terrorist, was, in
fact, breached due to the position of the Judiciary and Judicial Police, evi-
dently, well aware of the importance of acquiring solid elements from a trial
point of view. In fact, in Italy, we have never come to tears of legality like
those still in force in other very civilised European States to combat inter-
national terrorism. In France, for example, the “garde à vue” institution al-
lows any person suspected of terrorism to be detained for four days, inter-
rogating them without a lawyer, without notifying the judicial authorities
and with the further serious outcome of being able to use the statements
made by the suspect as evidence. In Britain, even the detention of suspected
terrorists can be extended for 28 days13.
Having amended and extended the system of telephone interceptions
(with the introduction of the preventive systems pursuant to Article 226-sex-
ies of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure), it was provided, again with Law
No. 191/1978, for the obligation for the owners of buildings to denounce the
lease agreements thereof: this rule disoriented many terrorists, at least those
of the “Prima Linea” (“Front Line”), the leaders of which – as various collab-
orators later recounted – decided to prudently abandon, but with positive ef-
fects in various investigations, many apartments which they had used as
bases of the organisation for fear of being discovered.
It is appropriate now to move on to the examination of what can be de-
fined as the most effective of the laws against terrorism: Decree Law No.
12 “Criminal and procedural rules for the prevention and suppression of serious
crime”.
13 Prime Minister Gordon Brown wanted to extend the deadline from 28 to 42 days:
the bill, approved in June 2008 by the House of Commons, was later overwhelmingly rejected
the following October by the House of Lords.
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625, approved on 15 December 1979 and later converted into Law No. 15
dated 6 February 1980, specifically containing two important reward regula-
tions, as well as the aggravating circumstance (not comparable with the ex-
tenuating circumstances) of having committed the crimes for the purposes
of terrorism and subversion with consequent obligatory “arrest warrant” (as
the order of pre-trial detention in prison was referred to at the time) and ex-
tension of the terms of pre-trial detention. New forms of crime were also in-
troduced into the criminal code: association for the purposes of terrorism and
subversion of the democratic order (Article 270-bis of the Italian Criminal
Code, a provision which, with the amendments made in 200114, now also
punishes membership of groups operating in the field of so-called interna-
tional terrorism) and the attack for terrorist purposes or subversion (Article
280 of the Italian Criminal Code).
It is worth considering, however, the extenuating circumstances pro-
vided for in Article 4 of that law for terrorists who, by disassociating them-
selves, had cooperated with the investigators15.
For the second time – given that, already with the decree law of March
1978, consequent to the Moro kidnapping, a reduction in punishment was
foreseen for those who, by collaborating, had helped the investigators in
identifying those responsible for the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of
terrorism – in a very incisive manner, a reward regulation approved on the
wave of emotion entered into the system which had provoked, a few days ear-
lier, on 11 December 1979, the execution of ten by “kneecappings” by Prima
Linea terrorists, inside a company training school in Via Ventimiglia in Turin.
The reward regulation was even more successful than expected and was
the real distinguishing feature of that law. The magistrates who dealt with
terrorism were not aware of the development of that project in the political
sphere: the approval of the Decree Law in December, 1979, which occurred
precisely as the first former terrorist collaborator in judicial history, Carlo
Fioroni was interrogated in the prison of Matera by the Public Prosecutor’s
Office of Milan. Very soon after, when the floodgates opened, the statements
of the so-called “repentant” began to pour into the trial documents, chan-
nelled in the right direction, that – one would currently say – of the right
trial, causing hundreds and hundreds of arrests, as well as the discovery of
bases and the seizure of deadly weapons and explosives.
The reward measures, which also included the provision of Article 5 of
the law (exclusion of punishability for those who voluntarily prevented crim-
inal offences by providing information useful for identifying those responsi-
ble for those offences), certainly had delicate application aspects.
14 The standard was amended with Decree Law No. 374 dated 18.10.2011, converted
into Law No. 438 dated 15.12.2011 and is now entitled: “Association for the purpose of ter-
rorism, including international terrorism or subversion of the democratic order”.
15 The extenuating circumstance (penalty from 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for
crimes punishable by life imprisonment; penalty reduced from one third to two thirds in
other cases) still applies to those who “strive to prevent the criminal activity from leading to
further consequences, i.e., to concretely help the police and judicial authorities in gathering de-
cisive evidence for the identification or capture of accessories to crimes”.
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It is still possible to discuss the opportunity of such important reduc-
tions in sentences for perpetrators of serious crimes, but, beyond the fact
that these possibilities are practised in every part of the world, moreover
through less guaranteed procedures than in Italy, it should be remembered
that the Italian system provides for a mechanism entirely controlled by the
judge: collaborators who aspire to a substantial reduction in sentence must
earn it in public hearing, before those they accuse, subjecting themselves to
the cross-examination of their defence counsel. Essentially, reductions in
sentences only result from a very thorough examination of the credibility of
the statements made by so-called “repentant”, which must be corroborated
by identifying precise objective evidence of their content. This is a guarantee
of the correct application of the institute.
This reward regulation is still in force: it is not, therefore, an excep-
tional law, but an ordinary instrument introduced into the system, which
proved so useful that it was then extended to combat many other criminal
phenomena, such as the mafia, drug trafficking, people trafficking and in-
ternational terrorism.
One regret remains: had this law been approved before December 1979,
several murders would perhaps have been avoided, amongst which the very
dear Vittorio Bachelet, killed by the “Brigate Rosse” in Rome on 12 February
1980 when he was Vice-President of the “Consiglio Superiore della Magis-
tratura”.
However, the temporary nature of its effectiveness, characterised, about
two and a half years later, a further law in favour of collaborators, i.e., Law
No. 304 dated 29 May 1982, which provided for even greater16 reductions in
punishment, in addition to cases of non-punishability (Article 1). This pre-
diction was also the result of an intercourse between political power and the
judiciary, but it was precisely the magistrates with expertise in terrorism,
aware of the exceptionality of the time and of that choice, who declared
themselves against a further and permanent extension of the possibilities of
such a high reduction of the sentence, but in favour of its temporary nature.
In this way, the rule in question was passed, which applied only to crimes
committed before 31 January 1982 and provided that the collaboration took
place within a strict and short period (120 days, then extended only once
more by a further 120 days), starting from the entry into force of the law: in
this way, it was intended to avoid the predisposition of an infinite passepa-
rtout towards the reductions of punishment of which even terrorists, still in
activity, could take advantage, convinced that, in the event of arrest, they
would be able to collaborate and obtain said reductions.
Also with Law No. 34 dated 18 February 1987 (Measures in favour of
those who dissociate themselves from terrorism), approved when the season
of terrorism was about to close, good results were obtained by rewarding
those who, even if definitively condemned, had definitively abandoned the
16 The extenuating circumstance (penalty from 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment for of-
fences punishable by life imprisonment; penalty reduced by half in other cases; penalty re-
duced by a further third in cases of collaboration of exceptional importance) was provided
for by Article 3 of the law, which is no longer in force
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organisation of which they were part, behaving in a manner incompatible
with the continuation of the associative bond, admitting the activities effec-
tively carried out without the need to accuse accomplices and repudiating vi-
olence as a method of political struggle.
It is worth remembering that, even trials in absentia, i.e., against fugi-
tives, were held in those years in full respect of their rights and with the ef-
fective participation of the defenders, as the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg recognised in December 2006 by defining the appeal of
a fugitive like Cesare Battisti, one of the worst assassins in the history of
Italian terrorism, however, much loved by the French intellò, as “manifestly
unfounded”, at least until, finally extradited to Italy, he admitted his own re-
sponsibility for all the murders and other crimes that he was accused of.
3. The end of the “years of lead” and the positive balance of institutional ac-
tion
In short, it can be said that, as a result of the professionalism of the po-
lice forces and of the Italian magistracy, together with the described legisla-
tive production (specifically, the reward regulation), terrorism – both right-
wing and left-wing – headed its definitive defeat in the second half of the
1980s: the end of the years of lead can be placed – in the writer’s opinion –
in 1988, the year of the murder of Christian Democrat Senator Roberto Ruf-
filli.
Between this murder (the last of those years) and that of Massimo
D’Antona in Rome on 20 May 1999, which broke the long silence of the Red
Brigades after eleven years. It is true that the Red Brigades killed again: on
19 March 2002, in Bologna, labour law expert Marco Biagi and on 2 March
2003, in Castiglion Fiorentino, State Police Superintendent Emanuele Petri,
but, considering the time that has elapsed since this latest tragedy, it is pos-
sible to say that even those defined as the “new Red Brigades”, responsible
for these latest tragic events, have been disrupted: the last militants of the
Red Brigades (about twenty in all) were arrested between 2006 and 2009 in
Milan, Turin, Padua and Rome.
In any case, it is not possible to lower one’s guard even now, given that,
since 2003, even though only one wound has been suffered (on 7.5.2012, ter-
rorists of the Informal Anarchist Federation - F.A.I.), Roberto Adinolfi, di-
rector of Ansaldo Nucleare, was shot in Genoa with a gunshot in one leg.
Two perpetrators have been definitively condemned. Other forms of politi-
cally motivated violence have developed in Italy, even during public demon-
strations: the events of groups characterised by anarchist ideology or the so-
called “No-Tav” or “antagonistic” movements should also be referred to. It is
obvious that these are crimes which must be prosecuted and punished with
the maximum determination, as Italian magistracy and police bodies know
how, but it is equally evident that these are crimes committed by groups and
sometimes by criminal associations the extension, structure and danger of
which for the Institutions are in no way comparable to those of the Red
Brigades, Prima Linea and other groups operating in the “years of lead”.
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Vittorio Grevi’s words on the legislation of those years (“The institutions
have therefore upheld”) come to mind, as do those of historical importance of
President Sandro Pertini who, at the end of the years of lead, recalled that
Italy could proudly claim to have defeated terrorism in the courtrooms and
not in the stadiums, alluding to torture, breach of fundamental human
rights and South American practices during the years of dictatorial regimes.
Yet those years have not even left us with unsolved mysteries, as some
people still insist, inevitably citing the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro
and his escort in Via Fani. One member of the last parliamentary committee
which dealt with the case described it as a massacre that was devised and or-
ganised by the American, Russian and Israeli secret services, by diverted
pieces of Italian intelligence, with the complicity of the Italian mafias and
freemasonry: the Red Brigades almost become, according to the theories of
those who love such false mysteries, occasional appearances of a story yet to
be revealed. The truth is that there are certainly still unknown circumstances
relating to some of the tragedies that took place during those years, but they
are in any case marginal compared with the general and reliable knowledge
that we have gained on those facts as a result of the synergistic institutional
efforts that have been described so far.
Those who state the opposite do not hurt so much those who were the
protagonists of that “fight”, but rather the truth and the memory of those
who no longer have the possibility of rebuttal, amongst whom are the mag-
istrates and the men of the institutions vilely killed by the terrorists, only be-
cause they applied the law, it being absolutely false that justice was admin-
istered in Italy, on the side of the fight against terrorism, by special Courts
and in a summary manner against thousands of convicted militants, without
proof, only due to their political ideas and on the basis of false statements of
the paid “repentant”: all those proceedings, instead, always and only con-
cerned concrete facts, of organisation or execution of violent actions.
Another “master forgery” circulating is the narration of those who
maintain that, during those years, a civil war was going on in Italy, terrorism
being a mass phenomenon. It was, if anything, a war declared by only one
side, the elitist side and, with a few exceptions, that of the petite bourgeoisie.
Its action, without effective rootedness in the country itself, has even hin-
dered the development of democracy in Italy, resulting in widespread atti-
tudes of social defence, forced homogeneity amongst the political sides and
the consequent slowing down of political dialectics.
This also refers to other more topical considerations: when such trends
take shape, legislation, especially when fragmented and dictated by contin-
gencies and the emphasis on security, is always full of risks to the rights of
citizens, which the judiciary is responsible for protecting, including through
the telling of the truth.
That is exactly what the magistrates did, right in the heat of the “years
of lead”, when they felt the duty to get out of their buildings to discuss le-
gality in schools and universities, in neighbourhood clubs and factories, in
cultural associations and wherever possible: then, to spread the knowledge
of the perverse terrorist ideology and thus to firmly oppose the words of
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those who theorised neutrality (“neither with the State, nor with the Red
Brigades”), in the following years – and still today – against the logic of the
mafia and corruption, as well as to defend the constitutional principles and
the principle of solidarity.
4. From the anti-terrorism of the years of lead to the anti-mafia and the fight
against international terrorism: brief notes
It is not out of place, at this point, to cite what happened in the final
period of the years of lead, when a group of Sicilian magistrates (including
Giovanni Falcone) who dealt with the mafia participated in various meetings
of colleagues who dealt with terrorism: this was certainly not because there
were connections between the Red Brigades, Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta and
Camorra, but to become aware of the methods of the spontaneous coordi-
nation which they had realised and to share the legal guidelines on the sub-
ject of crimes of association. For example, of historical importance, were the
aforementioned guidelines drawn up with regard to external participation in
the crime of armed gangs (Article 306 of the Italian Criminal Code), which
were then implemented in relation to the crime of mafia-type association
(Article 416-bis of the Italian Criminal Code)
It was also understandable, given the excellent results that the working
method described so far had led to, that it was codified and applied to the
fight against the mafia.
In fact, in terms of anti-mafia, the Parliament gave rise to a specific leg-
islation which – as far as it is concerned – led to, in 1991, the introduction,
into the Italian system, of the National Anti-Mafia Directorate (DNA, with
tasks involving merely the coordination of investigations) and of the Anti-
Mafia District Directorate (DDA), one for each of the 26 districts of the
Country (with tasks involving the direction of investigations for Mafia-type
crimes and for other specifically indicated crimes), i.e., of Offices previously
and unnecessarily invoked by the magistrates who had dealt with anti-ter-
rorism.
In 1991, benefits were also introduced for mafia collaborators, similar,
as regards possible reductions in punishment, to those provided for repen-
tant terrorists. The results were immediately exceptional and the trial col-
laborators proved decisive in bringing the Mafia gangs to their knees.
The specialisation of the police forces in terms of anti-Mafia was also
increased with the creation, within each of the three traditional judicial po-
lice corps, of ad hoc bodies and with the formation, also, of a further inter-
force body, the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate.
Lastly, moving on to the most recent fight against international terror-
ism, it is easy to say that the positive action of our institutions has been
guided, even in this area, according to the same principles that have been
described so far. Firstly, it must be recalled that, since the second half of the
1990s, the first investigations into international terrorism have taken place
in Italy, with the first arrests and convictions of the militants of the groups
under investigation. On the threshold of the year 2000 and even before 11
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September, these investigations were extended and progressively involved
numerous judicial venues in the North, Centre and South of Italy.
Meanwhile, the tragedy of 11 September dramatically brought to the
world’s attention the issue of international terrorism (or so-called Islamic
terrorism) and how to combat it. Many years have passed since those events,
during which philosophies that can be traced back to two main “strands of
thought” “clashed”: on the one hand, that of the Anglo-Saxon countries (the
United States, Great Britain, Canada and, to some extent, Australia) and, on
the other, that of the countries of continental Europe, within which, how-
ever, especially in the period immediately after 11 September, there was no
lack of yielding to Anglo-Saxon theories and practices. Fortunately, not in
Italy, where the theorisation of the War on Terror (W.O.T.) was rejected by the
Bush Administration and supported by overseas academic circles capable of
arguing that the principles can be flexible and that “grey areas” in which
rights exist in a mitigated form and in which, in the name of security, activi-
ties normally considered contra legem17 become lawful. The Italian Judiciary
has also rejected the practice of the “extraordinary renditions” of terrorist
suspects (i.e., real kidnappings of persons to be transported to secret prisons
in complicit countries where they can be tortured): in terms of torture, that
of waterboarding (practised by the French in the 1950s against members of
the Algerian National Liberation Front and later in Vietnam, as well as by the
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, between 1975 and February 1979) was consid-
ered by the US Administration as a mere “interrogation technique”18.
Other techniques used for the fight against terrorism have also been
deemed unreliable in Italy, such as secret interceptions, or “the digital
tsunami” relating to the indiscriminate and useless collection of millions of
data relating to the movements of people in the world (collection of P.N.R.-
Passenger Name Records), banking transactions of black lists, which are in-
effective for the purposes of countering terrorism financing, as also consid-
ered by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in September
200819 and by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which
examined the compatibility between the black list system and the principles
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms20.
Therefore, also in the fight against international terrorism, the Italian
judiciary has given priority attention to the due respect for the rights of the
17 Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz, for example, has argued that it would be
acceptable to torture a captured terrorist who refused to reveal where a bomb is about to ex-
plode that will cause death and destruction. From this hypothesis, Dershowitz concludes that
it would be better, in such cases, for torture to be regulated by some legal authorisation to
“reduce the incidence of abuse”.
18 Thus, in the August 2002 memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee,
whose theories were also supported by President Bush in October 2007 before the US Senate
Justice Commission.
19 The “Kadi-Al Barakaat”, 3 September 2008 judgement stated that the fundamental
rights protected by the European Community, specifically the right of defence, the right to a
fair trial and the right to property, must also be respected in the fight against terrorist fi-
nancing.
20 “Resolution No. 1597” and “Recommendation No. 1824” of the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe dated 23.1.2008.
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persons under investigation, rejecting the worldwide tendency to believe that
the prevention of risks, to be carried out with the use of every possible
means, must prevail over the freedoms and the reason of the laws.
In fact, the District Attorneys’ Offices competent in matters of terrorism
and subversion21 since early 2003 and on the initiative of some magistrates
with expertise in that sector, have again chosen to organise and intensify
spontaneously – as occurred as of 1978 and with the same procedure – their
coordination and that to be carried out in the international field (given the
not always satisfactory level of cooperation between the judicial authorities
and the judicial police of different States22), refreshing themselves on the in-
vestigations in progress in each office and preparing strategic and jurispru-
dential guidelines on the subject. For this purpose, the Italian member of
Eurojust was also invited to take part in coordination meetings to which li-
aison magistrates from Spain, France and the United Kingdom operating in
Italy were sometimes also invited.
These meetings, from a certain point on, were also held permanently at
the Superior Council of the Magistracy, in a room specially equipped and
provided therefor.
The attendees at the meetings in question often made IT supports for
their colleagues in other Prosecutors’ Offices in order to facilitate the ex-
change of information: no different from what was carried out in the late
1970s and early 1980s through the exchange of photocopies. In this case,
however, the exchange of information on IT support also served to feed the
system of databases that, always spontaneously, some of the 26 District At-
torneys’ Offices had developed.
This “culture” of coordination and respect for rights has certainly and
positively influenced the Italian Legislator, who has been able to say “no!” to
the inadmissible strategies mentioned above (including, for the reasons al-
ready set out as regards the content of Law No. 124/2007, that of the priori-
ties in the tasks of investigation which in many other countries are attributed
to the Information Services), notwithstanding the fact that the three principal
laws specifically intended to counter this phenomenon have been approved in
the aftermath of real tragedies, that is, during times of true crisis.
The intention is to refer to the legislative interventions of 2001 (Decree
Law No. 374 dated 18.10.2001, converted into Law No. 438 dated 15.12.2001),
21 Following Decree Law No. 374 dated 18.10.2001, converted into Law No. 438 dated
15.12.2001 (Urgent provisions to counter international terrorism), paragraph 3-quater was
added to Article 51 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure and, with it, the competence of
the 26 Public Prosecutor’s Offices at the district offices to conduct investigations in matters
of domestic and international terrorism.
22 In this regard, it must be said that the international community does not need to
tear up the rules, but only common strategies based on the adoption of an intelligent spe-
cialist legislation, the strengthening of collaboration (which too often does not work) and the
refinement of investigation techniques (i.e., strategies far from the much-lauded and useless
collection of millions of data that evokes a worrying future of “big data”). Specifically, it is
necessary that all governments work to extend the competences of the newly established Eu-
ropean Public Prosecutor’s Office to the field of international terrorism: but this choice is im-
peded for political reasons, the same that suggest to many European States to prioritise, in
the fight against terrorism, the intelligence agencies that answer to governments and cer-
tainly not to an independent judiciary.
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which, subsequent to 11 September, introduced the crime of “association
with the purpose of international terrorism” (Article 270-bis of the Italian
Criminal Code) and provided for the district jurisdiction for crimes with the
purpose of terrorism; of 2005 (Decree Law No. 144 dated 27.7.2005, con-
verted into Law No. 438 dated 31 July 2005), approved after the London at-
tacks of 7 July 2005, which, inter alia, provides for the definition of “conduct
with the purpose of terrorism”; and, lastly, that of 2015 (Decree Law No. 7
dated 18 February 2015, later converted into Law No. 43 dated 17.4.2015),
shortly after the massacre of Paris on the 7 January 2015, at the headquar-
ters of the satirical magazine, “Charlie Hebdo”, with which the competence
of the National Anti-Mafia Directorate, now known as the National Anti-
Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate (D.N.A.A.), was extended, thus realis-
ing the intention formulated by the italian magistrates who dealt with ter-
rorism. A tightening of the web propaganda, a key tool of the IS and other
terrorist formations, has also been envisaged.
In these cases, also, as in the years of lead, the laws passed have intro-
duced procedural and substantive innovations such as to promote greater ef-
fectiveness in the fight against international terrorism and the specialisation
of the bodies of the judiciary and judicial police responsible23 for this, re-
jecting decisions that are detrimental to individual rights.
Only an independent judiciary, extraneous to any political logic, that is,
operating according to the model dear to Vittorio Bachelet, can guide the ef-
fective fight against all criminal phenomena – including terrorism of any
kind – with absolute respect for the fundamental rights of the people.
It is to be hoped that other European judiciaries also – regardless of the
diversity of their respective legal systems – will be able to play a balancing
role in view of emergency pressures that have proved incompatible with the
rules of our democracies: as the former President of the Supreme Court of
Israel, Aharon Barak, wrote in a historic judgement in 2004, democracies
are forced to fight terrorism with one hand tied behind their backs, but it is
precisely this apparent factor of weakness that ultimately proves to be the
reason for the resilience and success of democratic systems. There is no
more effective display for explaining our duties in democracy than that
which the Italian judiciary has shown to be well aware of in its action
against all terrorism and all forms of criminal activity.
23 In summary, the special legislation on international terrorism covered the areas of
criminal law, criminal procedure, execution of sentences, security measures, prevention ac-
tivities, expulsions of foreigners, organisation of the judiciary and police forces, as well as
the administrative governance of a number of activities considered worthy of attention in or-
der to prevent the risk of attacks. The regulations briefly cited herein enable us to state that,
in the Italian system, we have efficient and well-regulated tools to investigate in various
criminal sectors, including that of terrorism, using the data that interceptions (telephone and
environmental, judicial and preventive), intrusions into the web, mobile phone records and
traces and undercover activities enable us to find out and gather: tools that our specialist po-
lice forces know how to use well, as excellent results in many delicate investigations have
shown.
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“B”
COLLABORATORS OF JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
ITALIAN CASES
VINCENZO DI PESO
SUMMARY: 1. Tlili Lazhar and Jelassi Rihad: the reference context. – 2. Tlili Lazhar’s collabo-
ration. – 3. The collaboration of Jelassi Riadh. – 4. The collaboration of Zouaoui
Chokri. – 5. Recent collaboration cases. – 6. Managing the protection programme. –
7. Conclusions.
1. Tlili Lazhar and Jelassi Rihad: the reference context
In Italy, the Judicial and Anti-Terrorism Authorities have consistently
opposed the phenomenon of religious extremism since the first half of the
1990s.
Investigations have concerned the spread, throughout Italy (especially
in Lombardy and Emilia Romagna), firstly, of several Algerian and Egyptian
cells and, subsequently, of Tunisians and Moroccans, operating under the so-
called “relocation strategy” of segments of terrorist organisations of jihadist
origin that have arisen in North Africa.
Tunisians Tlili Lazhar and Jelassi Rihad – to date, the two main collab-
orators of justice in the context of countering Islamist terrorism – both
emerged as part of the investigations conducted in Lombardy between the
late 1990s and early 2000s.
In addition, Tunisian Zouaoui Chokri should also be mentioned, whom
we shall discuss later.
The parables of Tlili Lazhar and Jelassi Rihad are closely interconnected
and are both linked to Operation Al Moruhajirun – coordinated by the Public
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Milan and conducted by the DIGOS
(General Investigations and Special Operations Division) of Milan and Varese
– divided into three tranches (4 April, 10 October and 29 November 2001)
and which intervened during a very specific stage of militant Islamism.
In order to understand the importance of those counter-terrorism in-
vestigations, it is worth recalling, with brief mentions, the international con-
text relating to those few years, from 1998 to 2001, during which the events
we are talking about took place.
In fact, during those years, we witnessed, firstly, a profound shuffling of
the structures of the various jihadist formations as a result of the repressive
actions carried out by the security agencies in the Arab countries, namely
the processes of internal pacification, as was the case of Algeria.
Secondly, in the context of Al Moruhajirun there was a progressive dis-
integration of certain major signs of North African terrorism (consider, for
instance, Al Jihad and Al Jama’a al Islamiya in Egypt, the Tunisian Combat-
ant Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) and a simultaneous re-
alignment of their militants amongst the ranks of new and more ambitious
Islamist organisations, such as the Algerian organisation known as the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and the transnational organisation
Al Qaeda.
Specifically, in the summer of 2000, it emerged that the European Is-
lamist networks, notably the Algerian network headed by Abu Doha1 and the
Tunisian network led by Seifallah Ben Hassine, both residing in London,
converged from abroad to support the activities of the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat in Algeria and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
In February 1998, the dissemination of Al Qaeda’s programmatic mani-
festo, namely, the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Christians,
contributed to accelerating these transformations.
With this document and with striking terrorist acts that followed
shortly thereafter – on 7 August 1998 two bomb attacks simultaneously hit
the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and injuring 4,000; on
12 October 2000, in the Bay of Aden, a suicide attack was carried out on the
cruiser USS Cole, killing 17 sailors – Bin Laden aspired to gather, under a
single leader, the various jihadist energies scattered around the world, which
were still responding to local dynamics.
Based on this analysis, Italian Anti-Terrorism realized during those
years that Italy, like other European countries, no longer constituted a “neu-
tral ground” (assuming it ever was), sheltered from the reverberations of
crises that shook the Islamic world.
Italy, on the other hand, had become one of the possible direct targets
of terrorist actions that responded to distant logics that were incomprehen-
sible to most, but no less dangerous to the security of the state.
That said, the polar star of Italian Anti-Terrorism has always been the
prevention of the threat that comes from violent extremism. In other words,
we have always tried to think ahead, to steer our efforts mainly towards the
early protection of good security.
It goes without saying that the success of prevention activities is closely
linked to the gathering of information to prevent the carrying out of terror-
ist acts.
With this in mind, the tools that provide for forms of reward for those
who, with their disclosures, have contributed, in both in-court and out-of-
court contexts, to ensure a security framework for Italy (to date, not com-
promised by shocking acts) are viewed with extreme favour by the police
and security agencies.
Furthermore, the need for the early obtaining of information related to
the security of the state is all the more felt when the terrorist threat comes
from afar – and I am not only referring to a geographical distance, but also
1 Alias Amar Makhlulif, born on 11.8.1964 in Algeria, also known as Abu Doha, Samir
Al Haidera, Rachid Keffous, Rachid Boukhalfa, Dr Heider.
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to a cultural remoteness that makes the process of gathering, analysing and
contextualising this news problematic and cumbersome.
2. Tlili Lazhar’s collaboration
Tlili Lazhar arrived in Italy in 1996, settling immediately in Milan
where he made a living dealing hashish. In the Lombard city, he met his
compatriot, Riabi Zouheir, who later died in Tunisia in January 2007, during
a large counter-terrorism operation.
Riabi Zouheir convinced him to go to Afghanistan to train in the use of
weapons and explosives.
Riabi Zouheir’s brother, Riabi Zied, handed Tlili his employment con-
tract. The latter, with no job, used it to renew his residence permit in Italy.
Riabi Zied also died a few years later in a firefight in Algeria whilst fighting
in the ranks of the GSPC.
In 1997, he met Riadh Jelassi in Milan, who was also, at the time, a
small-scale drug dealer.
In 1998, he moved closer to the Islamic religion. At that time, the Riabi
brothers and others convinced him to attend the Islamic Cultural Institute
on Viale Jenner, one of the most important centres for the spread of Salafi
Islam in Europe.
It was at the ICI that Tlili began – with the blessing of Imam, Egyptian
Abu Imad2 – viewing jihadist propaganda videos. Images obsessively show-
ing the violence suffered by Muslims, especially in Chechnya, but also the
“value” on the ground of the mujaheddin, their victories against the infidels,
the hurried executions of captured Russian soldiers. The videos are artfully
edited to ester the desire for vengeance against the kuffars, the infidels and,
at the same time, to exalt the actions of fighters for jihad and, ultimately, en-
tice believers to emulate them.
At the mosque annexed to the ICI, Tlili first met Essid Sami Ben Khe-
mais, who called himself Saber. The latter, residing in Gallarate and admin-
istrator of a service cooperative based in Legnano (MI), was, in fact, the
main contact in Italy of the Tunisian network. Essid – Tlili later recalled –
from the first meeting, told him of the misery and exploitation suffered by
Muslims worldwide, especially in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and asked him
for money “for the cause”.
Upon his return from Afghanistan, Tlili Lazhar became one of Essid
Sami’s lieutenants and was mainly involved in obtaining stolen phones and
identity documents that are used by Afghan camp veterans or would-be
fighters to cover their travels.
In those circumstances, he learned that Essid Sami was in direct con-
tact with Hassan Hattab, the emir of the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat, who urged him to send “Afghan Tunisians”, i.e., Tunisians already
trained in combat, to Algeria. The transfer from Italy to Algeria took place
through a short stay in Spain, so as not to leave traces of direct passages.
2 Motion name Egyptian Arman Ahmed El Hissiny Helmy, born in Kena (Egypt)
14.1.1961.
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Essid Sami’s Italian cell, however, was in operational and strategic con-
tact with counterparts in London, Brussels and Frankfurt. In this regard, it
is recalled that, in December 2000, a joint Franco-German operation enabled
the so-called “Frankfurt Group”, also known as the “Meliani Group”3 to dis-
mantle, before it carried out a terrorist plot against the cathedral and Christ-
mas markets in Strasbourg.
In April 2001, the Public Prosecutors of Milan and Busto Arstizio is-
sued a detention order against Essid Sami, Tlili himself, and six other for-
eigners all being investigated for crimes of conspiracy to traffic weapons,
forgery of documents and receiving of stolen goods (Operation Al Mouha-
jirun 1). Among the recipients of the restraining order were also Maaroufi
Tarek, a resident of Belgium and co-founder of the Tunisian Fighting Group
and Iraqi Thaer Mansour, who lived in Munich and who was also involved in
the aforementioned “Meliani Group”.
Tlili escaped capture. In fact, French counter terrorism tracked him
down in Marseille on 10 October 2002, arresting him as part of the investi-
gation of the “Meliani Group”.
Tlili’s collaboration with justice began in France immediately after his
arrest.
When questioned by French investigators, Tlili Lahzar identified Essid
Sami as the emir of the “Afghan Tunisians” in Italy and admitted that he had
also been in Afghanistan in 1998, for about seven months.
Firstly, in the Khalden camp and later in Jalalabad he had been trained
in the use of several firearms, grenade launchers and explosives. In these
places, he met several other extremists who he later met again in Milan
amongst Essid Sami’s trusted men. Amongst others, in training camps, he
met the leader of the Algerians in Europe, Abu Doha (alias boukhalfa
Rachid) and Algerian Meliani, leader of the group of the same name, which
was dismantled in Frankfurt in December 2000.
The statements made in France by Tlili later merged in Italian criminal
proceedings through international rogatory4.
Once extradited to Italy5, Tlili began a journey of collaboration with the
Public Prosecutor’s Office in Milan in the autumn of 2006. His statements
found a specific investigative outcome, especially (but not only) in the con-
text of Operation Rakno Sadess, conducted on 7 June 2007 by the Milan
Guardia di Finanza.
In fact, in that context, the Investigating Judge of Milan issued a pre-
trial detention order against nine Islamic extremists, investigated for the
crime of conspiracy to commit, for terrorism purposes, more crimes of ille-
gal immigration, receipt of stolen goods, forgery of identity documents, per-
3 From the nickname used by its leader, later identified as Algerian Mohamed Ben-
sakhria, born on 16.10.1966 in Beni Louna (Algeria). Sentenced in France for terrorism to 10
years in prison, he was deported on 24 January 2009 to his country.
4 This is the case with criminal proceedings No. 5236/02 of the Criminal Records Reg-
istry of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Milan, focused on the so-called Rete Mera’i.
5 Inter alia, in Italy Tlili, was also wanted because he was the recipient of a pre-trial de-
tention measure issued by the Examining Judge in Milan on 18 May 2005 at the end of an
investigation conducted by DIGOS in Milan. (Operation Haidora) that we shall discuss later.
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sonal violence, purchasing and spending of fake coins, within a cell consti-
tuting a national articulation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,
operating in direct connection with a network of similar and related groups
operating in Germany, England, Spain, Belgium, France and other countries
outside of Europe, including Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tunisia.
It is worth pointing out that the stack of statements made by Tlili
showed the role of absolute depth played in the supply chains of recruitment
to Afghanistan by two other Tunisians, protagonists to this day of jihadist
activism in international contexts.
Namely, Fezzani Moez and Nasri Riadh.
Between 1997 and 2001, Fezzani was responsible for the logistics of the
Tunisian mujaheddin from Italy, including Tlili himself, who was settled in
Peshawar, in Pakistan and then went to the training camps of Farouk and
Kaldem in Afghanistan where they received training in the use of weapons
and explosives. Fezzani also organised the return of the mujaheddin to Italy,
especially in Milan, obtaining travel documents, identity documents and
promoting the collection of funds for their travels.
Nasri Riadh – who lived in Bologna and was already a fugitive in con-
nection with a pre-trial detention order issued against him in 1998 by the In-
vestigating Judge in Bologna, as he considered himself a participant in an at-
tested Algerian GIA cell in Emilia Romagna. He had previously become the
head of the Tunisians in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he was responsible
for the logistics of his would-be mujaheddin compatriots from abroad.
Fezzani Moez and Nasri Riadh met them the following year in the
Guantanamo Delta Camp. The Americans handed Nasri over to Italy in No-
vember 2009 and Fezzani in December of that year, as part of President
Obama’s efforts to dismantle the Guantanamo detention facility.
Both were convicted in Milan of terrorism6 offences and expelled from
Italy to Tunisia. Fezzani and Nasri are currently included in the list of for-
eign fighters linked to Italy for having joined the Daesh militias operating in
Derna7, Libya, and in Syria, respectively.
6 In March 2012, the Court of Assise in Milan acquitted Fezzani on 7 July 2013. The
Court of Appeal overturned the judgement at first instance, sentencing him to 5 years, 8
months and 27 days’ imprisonment for association with terrorism purposes, in connection
with his role as organiser of the Tunisian supply chain from Italy to the camps of Al Qaeda
in Afghanistan (a judgement which became final in November 2013).
As regards Nasri Riadh, his court case is a little more complex. On 31 January 2011,
the Investigating Judge of Milan, in the summary judgement, sentenced him to the penalty
of 6 years’ imprisonment, as he pleaded guilty for the offence referred to in Article 416 of the
Italian Criminal Code aggravated by terrorism purposes pursuant to Article 1 of Law 15/80,
for his conduct committed until 18.10.2001 and pursuant to Article 270-bis of the Italian
Criminal Code for subsequent conduct. In February 2012, The Milan Court of Appeal ac-
quitted him. The foreigner was then released and sent off to Tunisia. In April 2013, the Court
of Cassation annulled the judgement ordering the renewal of the trial. On 7 January 2014,
the Milan Court of Appeal, deciding on the renewed trial ordered by the Court of Cassation,
upheld the Examining Judge’s conviction. In 2015, his presence was detected in Syria and he
had then become part of the Daesh. Since then, his traces have been lost and it cannot be
ruled out, indeed it is likely, that he had also been killed in that conflict.
7 The rise, in 2012, of several Islamist formations in both post-Ben Ali Tunisia and
Gaddafi-free Libya was an irresistible temptation to Fezzani, who moved to Libya and be-
came the manager of a training camp set up in the parts of Derna, where the levers of new
generations of moujahedin to be sent into the Syrian-Iraqi conflict were being trained.
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Ultimately, the information contribution made by Tlili Lazhar ap-
peared, following rigorous investigative findings, of enormous importance
because, as the Investigating Judge of Milan noted in 2007, in the pre-trial
detention order relating to the anti-terrorist operation known as Radko Sad-
dess, for the first time in Italy, a justice worker had reported his direct expe-
rience in the training and indoctrination camps in Afghanistan.
Said Investigating Judge also noted that Tlili’s statements, whilst con-
taining numerous novelty elements relating to his stay in Afghanistan, com-
pletely overlapped the statements made by Jelassi Riadh.
3. The collaboration of Jelassi Riadh
It must be noted that, although Jelassi Riadh’s collaboration began af-
ter that of Tlili Lazhar, the results of his important contributions were gath-
ered in the anti-terrorism operation (Haidora) carried out in May 2005, two
years before that of which we have now explained the outcomes.
The operation known as Haidora (from the “code” name that the defen-
dants attributed to Afghanistan) was the logical continuation of the Al
Mouhajirun investigation mentioned several times above, which resulted, be-
tween April and November 2001, in three restrictive measures that led to the
arrest, in total, of around fifteen Islamic extremists, including Jelassi Riadh
himself (as part of the second tranche of the operation, carried out on 10 Oc-
tober 2001).
Some suspects within Al Mouhajirun, however, remained fugitive – this
was the case, for example, of Es Sayed Abdelkader, who likely died in
Afghanistan at the end of 2001, and Waddani Habib, who died in a suicide
attack Iraq in 2003 – while others belonging to the same network of extrem-
ists remained unknown.
A fundamental contribution to bring to light the entire – or a good part
– of the supply chain came from the statements of Jelassi, who initiated his
collaboration with the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Milan in September
2003, which resulted in the arrest, in May 2005, of 12 Islamist extremists
plus others investigated in state of freedom8.
His statements covered a rather large period of time from 1997 to the
end of 2001. In this regard, I recall that Jelassi was arrested in October 2001
and then sentenced to 4 years and 6 months by the Court of Milan (for the
offence referred to in Article 416 of the Italian Criminal Code and other of-
fences).
Having arrived in Italy in the mid-nineties and settled in Milan, Jelassi
also made a living by the small-scale dealing of drugs and false banknotes,
as well as car thefts. His experience as a car thief would come in handy
when he became an Islamic extremist.
He converted to radical Islam mainly through the speeches he repeat-
edly heard from some of his compatriots with whom he shared his accom-
8 The most important of which was Arman Ahmed El Hissiny Helmy the Egyptian
Imam of the ICI in Viale Jenner, better known as Abu Imad.
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modation. For Jelassi, as had been the case for Tlili, brothers Riabi Zouheir
and Zied also contributed decisively to his radicalisation. In fact, Jelassi had
arrived in Italy with the latter, of whom he was a childhood friend.
I think it is important to point out that, in the summer of 1997, Jelassi,
at an early stage of his radicalisation, was sent to the province of Caserta to
carry out inspections of an American base. Riabi Zouheir confided to him
that he was testing the possibility of hitting the military facility with a truck
filled with explosives.
Moreover, Jelassi reiterated that the main purpose of the cells he had
joined was to recruit would-be fighters to be sent to Al Qaeda camps in
Afghanistan to train in the use of weapons and explosives. Once trained in
combat, the militants were transferred mainly to Algeria where they joined
the GSPC.
Jelassi, on the other hand, never went to Afghanistan or other jihad ter-
ritories, most likely because he spent much of 1998 in prison for drug deal-
ing. He was also considered more useful in Milan because he was able to
procure fake money and passports for the cell thanks to his activities as a
petty criminal. Amongst other things, his militancy was unknown to most,
even to the Police Forces, so he was free to move to carry out investigations
on possible targets of attacks.
In this regard, his compatriot, Maaoui Lotfi, had told him, shortly after
his return from Afghanistan, that Italy had to be hit also, because a well-
known television journalist had spoken ill of Muslims.
At that time (June 2000), he was entrusted with the task of carrying out
a series of inspections inside the Carabinieri Barracks in Via Moscova (he
had been stopped by the Carabinieri, staging a fight near the facility volun-
tarily) and at the Milan Police Headquarters (which he had accessed under
the guise of reporting the false loss of his driving license).
Other targets taken into account by his cell were a nightclub (consid-
ered a sacrilegious place because it was believed that the dance floor had the
inscription “Allah”, which was later found to be untrue), Linate airport, Mi-
lan Central Station and the Tunisian Consulate.
At a time of despondency, Jelassi had also accepted the proposal to die
in a suicide bombing that had successively been cancelled. He also said that,
in 2001, when he was arrested, he was ready to strike, either in Italy or in
another country.
Jelassi’s statements also served to understand the encrypted languages
used by his former associates (sweet/cake for explosives, Haidora for
Afghanistan, brushing hair backwards meant carrying weapons, crossing
and extending arms was a reference to the explosive).
4. The collaboration of Zouaoui Chokri
Tunisian Zouaoui Chokri was a collaborator of justice characterised by
an abnormal path compared with that of Tlili Lazhar and Jelassi Riadh.
He, in fact, unlike his two compatriots, had never joined Islamist cells
and, although he knew several other foreigners who had joined, he had re-
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mained in that underworld of small-scale drug dealers and procurers of
forged documents from which Tlili and Jelassi originated.
In the autumn of 2002, Zouaoui Chokri, whilst detained in Milan for
drug offences, reported that he was aware of a planned attack on the Milan
metro and Cremona Cathedral.
The investigations carried out at the time showed that the news was un-
founded or, in any case, the impossibility of obtaining any evidence to the
statements made by Zouaoui.
At the same time, it emerged that Zouaoui had real knowledge of
Tunisians and Moroccans based in Cremona and Milan who were already
known for having joined Islamist groups. Some had already emerged in
1998, as they were detained in Cremona in 1998 (Operation Atlas), following
a search that led to the seizure of the largest number of documents from ji-
hadist organisations ever in Italy.
They ranged from the founding act of the Moroccan Islamic Fighting
Group, with notes and corrections in the margins, to operating manuals for
the use of weapons, explosives, communication techniques etc., used in Al
Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. A letter with Bin Laden’s handwritten signa-
ture was also found.
The extremists identified by Zouaoui were later arrested in February
2004 by DIGOS in Brescia and convicted of terrorism offences, following a
trial in which the evidence obtained in 1998 (inter alia, not valued before
their rediscovery in 2002) converged.
The Tunisian national subsequently collaborated with the Carabinieri
Special Operations Group and the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Milan as part
of the third tranche of Operation Bazar, which ended in May 2005 with the
capture of 10 Islamic extremists.
In 2005, Zouaoui assumed the status of collaborator of justice, which he
later lost in 2011, partly due to the various crimes for which he has since
been held responsible.
Lastly, in April 2015, Zouaoui, from the prison in Padua where he was
being held in connection with an apartment burglary, sent a letter to an In-
spector at the Police Headquarters in Bari in which he claimed to be aware
of unspecified terrorist plans that a group of Tunisian extremists intended to
carry out in Rome.
5. Recent collaboration cases
However, all of this happened over 15 years ago.
Meanwhile, there have been Arab Springs. Some regimes in North
Africa fell. Conflict broke out in Syria, then extended to Iraq. The old oppo-
sition in the Islamic world between Sunnis and Shiites further increased,
leading to further negative reverberations on the security framework in the
Middle East. New jihadist groups have emerged. In the same jihadist world,
new doctrines and strategies have been developed to strike the West.
But, above all, there has been an advent of social networks that has
profoundly affected the way in which jihadist propaganda is transmitted and
the means of communication between extremists.
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For example, it went from the group viewing of VHS cassettes in a se-
cluded room of a mosque or in an apartment, to Telegram, Facebook, What-
sApp, Twitter etc., through which each extremist, in complete (apparent) soli-
tude, can interact with an obscure series of Internet users.
The recent information provided to justice by a young Gambian asylum
seeker, against whom the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Naples requested the
application of the law on the collaborators of justice must be viewed in this
context.
Whilst we remember 2018 for the immediate collapse, at least on the
military and territorial level, of the Islamic State in the Middle Eastern
chessboard, the same year is also relevant due to the disclosures made by 21-
year-old Touray Elhagie to the investigators and detectives of Naples.
Accusatory self- and external declarations that turned into vivid and
tangible images those indications that, for some time now had moved the
origin of the most serious and direct risks to the security of Europe and our
country from Syria, to Libya and to the Central African quadrant.
The young Gambian was arrested on 20 April 2018 in Naples, in a joint
operation of the DIGOS and Special Operations Group, as soon as we got
aware in an intelligence context, that, via Telegram, the same foreigner had
taken the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakri al Baghdadi in view of an attack
soon to be carried out.
Also via Telegram, Touray had received general instructions on the ob-
jective of the attack and how to carry it out.
A few days after his arrest, Touray decided to collaborate with the Ju-
dicial Authority. Initially, in a recalcitrant way, especially due to the possible
consequences of his collaboration on the family members who remined in
the country of origin and, later, in a convinced manner.
The evidence that emerged from Touray’s statements made it possible
to trace the existence of a more extensive “drawing” of Libyan elements,
which are to date unknown, attributable to Daesh, which involves the re-
cruitment of young extremists in the countries of the central-western belt of
Africa, their training in mobile camps in the Libyan desert (the Moaskar),
their exfiltration to the jihad conflicts or to Europe via migration routes. In
the latter case, their “activation” is planned, even months later, via a series of
communications via Telegram, as had been the case for Touray.
The difficulties encountered by investigators and detectives in the case
of Touray are essentially attributable to the geographical origin of the de-
clarant. In fact, if Anti-Terrorism has, over time, developed a good knowl-
edge of the culture, the mentality and the customs linked to the Middle East-
ern and North African countries, with the extremist originating from Gam-
bia, it has found itself having to face a world that has remained substantially
outside, at least until a few years ago, the sphere of influence of radical Is-
lam and, consequently, of the investigations.
One only needs to think of the difficulties encountered in finding reli-
able interpreters, given that Touray spoke a mixture of Mandinko, Wolof and
Gambian English.
It should also be borne in mind that the Republic of Gambia is a very
small country, an enclave with fewer than 2 million inhabitants within Sene-
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gal, the extremely small size of which means that its inhabitants have a very
extensive relationship of mutual knowledge and kinship.
This made Touray particularly concerned about the possibility that his
recruiters in Gambia could get in touch with his many family members in
order to retaliate against them once news of his collaboration with the Ital-
ian judiciary had come out in the media (as actually happened later).
In this regard, the case in question should make us reflect, amongst
other things, also on the specific possibility of implementing a protection
programme for the relatives of the collaborator who remained in his or her
country of origin. It should also be noted that critical issues can already be
encountered only in having to identify these family members, given that, of-
ten – just as in the case of Touray – there are households comprising of
dozens of brothers and sisters, with different mothers, often not even regis-
tered by a government office.
Similar difficulties were encountered in the case of Jelassi Riadh, given
that, amongst other things, he could not identify all the members of his
household, whose dates of birth and actual domiciles, for instance, he was
unaware of.
6. Managing the protection programme
The first three collaborators mentioned enjoyed penalty benefits and
were subjected to a protection programme once they had been released.
Whilst for Tlili, the programme continued linearly and smoothly until
its recent consensual termination. The programme prepared for Jelassi,
which was terminated early, was punctuated by a series of critical episodes
stemming mainly from violent conduct committed by the Tunisian citizen
against his cohabitant, a Romanian citizen who did not want to convert to
Islam, and his under-age son, whom he had stopped attending school given
that it would inculcate precepts contrary to Islam.
In particular, Jelassi, after a period in which he reported having con-
verted to Christianity, specifically to the worship of Jehovah’s Witnesses, re-
turned to radical Islam and poured his frustrations firstly onto his family
and then against the Italian authorities who, due to violence against his fam-
ily, had arrested him and convicted him of the crimes referred to in Articles
572 and 582 of the Italian Criminal Code and, at the same time, had ordered
him to be banned from approaching his family, who had been transferred to
a protected location.
The protection programme offered to Zouaoui was also terminated
early due to the repeated offences for which he was responsible, having con-
tinued to make a living from petty theft and drug dealing.
As can be seen from the above, the reward measures adopted in favour
of Tlili and Jelassi have had a very different outcome, despite the two sub-
jects coming from the same backgrounds and having gained very similar ex-
periences.
This contrast is likely the consequence of the different psychological
profiles shown by the two Tunisians.
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Tlili decided to collaborate a few days after his arrest in France and
showed that he was an extroverted subject, not fully convinced of the
jihadist message and that – at least in his words – had never agreed to “sac-
rifice himself” in a suicide bombing. Indeed, the hard training carried out in
the camps in Afghanistan also contributed towards increasing his existing
uncertainties.
Jelassi, on the other hand, made the decision to collaborate when he
was detained in Milan for several years and appeared immediately charac-
terised by an introverted, despondent and tormented personality.
7. Conclusions
Ultimately, it is not often that a jihadist agrees to collaborate with jus-
tice, on the grounds that Islamist formations are characterised by an ideo-
logical-religious bond and by a clan culture.
In fact, terrorist networks are frequently involved with subjects that en-
gage with family ties or friendships that date back to childhood, that frequent
the same neighbourhood and the same mosque in the country of origin.
It is, in other words, a double chain – the ideological and the relational-
affective chain – that keeps the militias in the organisation.
At least that is how it was until a decade ago. For some time now, the
threat posed by the traditional networks and cells of Islamic extremists has
been accompanied, to an increasingly dominant extent, by that originating
from individuals, that is, from extremists acting in the absence of training
characterised by minimal structure and direct relations between associates.
Often, cells made up of flesh-and-blood subjects have been replaced by
Telegram groups, in which Internet users participate, whose mutual knowl-
edge is based solely on a nickname and whose relationship is fuelled only by
the sharing of an ideology.
This aspect leads to critical profiles for the establishment of a collabo-
rative relationship with justice by the terrorist/extremist, but also opens up
new perspectives with a view to strict prevention.
From a critical point of view, it is noted that the contribution to the col-
laboration of the so-called lone wolf is inevitably very limited, given that it is
based on extremely fragmented knowledge. In other words, said lone wolf
rarely has information that builds a broader picture than his own personal
path of radicalisation.
However, at the same time, the lone wolf’s collaboration can prove to be
of fundamental importance to lead the investigator to lands that are very dif-
ficult to penetrate, such as those representative of cyber-terrorism, from the
dark web and from specific social networks (see Telegram).
In this scenario, the reward measures in favour, for example, of a so-
called “Islamonaut”, can contribute significantly to push him towards a path
of de-radicalisation and, in parallel, through his collaboration, to open gaps
in the wide audience of active users in the so-called unofficial online jihadist
propaganda that, by quantity, has now largely surpassed that coming directly
from the media houses of Daesh or Al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations.
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Allow me to say that, in such cases, we will, in fact, witness an activity
of intelligence-gathering in a manner typical of intelligence and with a
heightened prevention purpose, but conducted under the direct control of
the Judicial Authority.
Therefore, in the general framework of countering terrorism and vio-
lent extremism, all initiatives aimed at implementing and improving the use
of reward measures, in order to overcome the exclusively securitarian and
repressive approach, are welcome.
On the contrary, reward measures, in this context, support and
strengthen all the tools that, as a function of special prevention, are aimed
to recover, de-radicalize and reintegrate extremists.
On the other hand, starting from the countries of Northern Europe, a
new culture is becoming increasingly assertive in the fight against violent ex-
tremism, which sees the perpetrator (or the potential perpetrator) of crimes
inspired by ideological or religious motives as a subject that needs encour-
agement and support in view of his or her recovery, or rather, of his or her
de-radicalization.
Furthermore, the issue of re-socialisation is becoming very pressing in
light of the emergency of the dozens of Daesh prisoners currently held in
camps run by the Kurdish Forces. Many of them are European and are
women, wives or widows of militiamen, who have with them children taken
away from their countries of origin or born in Syria.
This is a humanitarian crisis on an incalculable scale. Or rather, data
already exist: the Al Hol “refugee” camp (in north-eastern Syria, on the bor-
der with Iraq), for example, where only women and children are detained,
currently hosts between 70,000 and 75,000 human beings. A recent press re-
port by the Washington Post (published on 3 September) documented that,
within said camp, a militia of women in fact exercised religious police func-
tions has been reconstituted and there have also been cases of murders of
women deemed “unholy” and three cases of stabbings by Kurdish guards.
However, the most fanatical, as reported by the guards, were the European
women – often converted – as well as Eurasian women.
Sooner or later we will have to deal with the return to Europe of at
least some of these individuals. Considering dealing with this crisis only us-
ing the usual tools of the punitive system is, at best, merely deceptive.
Lastly, and only as a mere statistical fact, to get an idea of the extent of
the phenomenon, in relation to the non-procedural benefits granted to those
who have collaborated with investigators or with the information and secu-
rity sector in the context of counter-terrorism, I would point out that, from
2005 to the present day (specifically to 4 September 2019), a total of 401 for-
eigners have obtained the residence permit provided for by Article 2 of De-
cree Law No. 144 dated 27 July 2005, converted into Law No. 155 dated 31
July 2005 (the so-called residence permit for investigative purposes).
The period of time during which the majority of this type of document
was released was between 2008 and 2011, with the peak reached in 2010
(121 permits). Subsequently, foreigners who have benefited from this reward
tool are on average 12 units per year.
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General introduction
When referring to “repentants” in Belgium, what is generally meant is
the perpetrator of a criminal offence who, in exchange for collaboration
with the legal authorities, is rewarded with some type of penal measure such
as having their sentence reduced or waived. These “deals” are made with the
aim of improving the efficiency of criminal justice in discovering crimes and
prosecuting and punishing their perpetrators, and as a result the suspect, de-
fendant or convicted person becomes a “collaborator of justice”.
This term can, however, cause confusion. Although repentants are in-
deed “collaborators of justice”, this is not the only case where the term can
apply. At police level, other “collaborators of justice” exist such as “indica-
tors” or “informants” who may also obtain certain personal benefits in ex-
change for assistance provided to the police. However, although these two
types of collaboration can overlap and are sometimes quite similar, there are
important differences between them. The criminal status of the person con-
cerned may not be the same, the negotiations do not take place between the
same parties, they do not always have the same aim and the rewards system
does not work in the same way.
This paper is concerned with the particular type of collaborator em-
bodied by the repentant. There has been a certain level of interest surround-
ing this concept for some time in the United States, where there is a tradi-
tionally utilitarian conception of criminal justice and therefore a greater
openness to forms of bargaining, but in Europe it was not transposed into
legal regulations until much later.
In Belgium, legal provisions for repentants were not truly envisaged un-
til the end of the 1990s, at a time of growing awareness of their usefulness
in the fight against organised crime and terrorism. However, no law existed
on collaborators of justice or repentants until 22nd July 2018, when legal pro-
visions on negotiation practices were adopted. It is difficult to determine
whether these already existed informally within other mecanisms (closing of
cases by the Public Prosecutor, penal transaction, suspension, etc.) before
this law.
We will now examine the socio-historical context which led to the cre-
ation of this “law on repentants” (1), and then analyse the law of 22nd July
2018 which enshrines it (2), consider the few instances in which it has been
used as case law (3), and examine the compliance of Belgian law with arti-
cle 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU (4).
1. History: the emergence of law on collaborators of justice or “repentants”
in Belgium
1.1. Legislative developments and their historical context
1.1.1. From informal practices to the first partial formal recognition
1.1.1.1. The informal power of negotiation between the Public Prosecutor and
perpetrators of crimes
In Belgian criminal law, the Public Prosecutor has the power of the
principle of expediency of prosecution, “taking into account the directives
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on criminal policy” (Criminal Code, art. 28-quater, 1st subparagraph). Pur-
suant to this power, the Public Prosecutor can decide to close a case without
further action for technical reasons or with regard to the principle of expe-
diency, giving reasons for this choice. In theory, the Public Prosecutor could
close a case with no further action on expediency grounds as a “reward” for
information given by the alleged offender1. However, no published directive
on criminal policy has included this type of praetorian practice, which
would be risky for the “collaborator”, who would be at the mercy of the pro-
visional nature of the closing of the case, as well as the possibility of public
legal action launched by parties other than the Public Prosecutor2.
Furthermore, the Public Prosecutor also has the possibility of ending le-
gal proceedings by using the penal transaction or mediation procedure. In
the case of penal transactions, (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216-bis), the
Public Prosecutor suggests, in certain cases and subject to certain conditions,
that the alleged offender settle the proceedings through payment of a sum of
money. Here again, the settlement could, in theory, be accompanied by an in-
formal request for information and negotiation with the alleged offender. The
mediation procedure also allows the Public Prosecutor to suggest, in certain
cases and subject to certain conditions3, that legal proceedings could be
dropped if the alleged offender agrees to certain measures which constitute
an alternative to a sentence (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216-ter). Here
again, even though nothing to this effect is stated in the legal text, there is
nothing to stop the Public Prosecutor from making an informal proposal that
the mediation procedure could be used on the condition that the alleged of-
fender supplies information; using mediation as a “reward” for collaboration
with the law. However, in practice, there is nothing to suggest that prosecu-
tors do use this type of bargaining when proposing a penal transaction or me-
diation4. In its final report submitted in December 1998, the parliamentary
committee in charge of studying organised crime in Belgium highlighted that
prosecutors deny using such tactics, except the Liège Public Prosecutor
which admitted “sometimes having overlooked certain minor offences”5.
1.1.1.2. Grounds for mitigation, the first type of reward under Belgian criminal
law
The first formal enshrinement of a penal reward for collaborating with
the judiciary was incorporated in Belgian criminal law through the grounds
1 Doc., Ch., 2001-2002, n° 1645/1, p. 17.
2 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs de justice dans le système pénal: analyse
comparée et critique, Brussels, Bruylant, 2002, p. 61.
3 C. GUILLAIN, «Les mesures ‘alternatives’ au stade présentenciel: un quasi monopole du
ministère public», in Y. CARTUYVELS, C. GUILLAIN et T. SLINGENEYER, Les alternatives à la déten-
tion en Belgique: un état des lieux, à l’aune du Conseil de l’Europe, Bruxelles, la Charte, 2017,
p. 59-77; Y. CARTUYVELS, C. GUILLAIN et T. SLINGENEYER, «Belgium», in A. BERNARDI, Prison Over-
crowding and alternatives to detention. European sources and national legal systems, Napoli,
Jovene, 2016, p. 125-142.
4 It could still be imagined that the prosecutor could negotiate with the perpetrator of
a crime at the stage of the closing arguments on sentencing or at the stage of the opinion
which is often given on sentence enforcement, although this hypothesis seems highly specu-
lative (M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 63-65).
5 Doc., Sén., 1998-1999, n° 1-326/9, p. 427.
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for mitigation mechanism. Grounds for mitigation are circumstances under
which the judge may reduce a sentence (extenuating circumstance), al-
though the offence still stands, or acquit the defendant (grounds for absolu-
tion). Under Belgian criminal law, extenuating circumstances are legal (that
is to say, provided for by law). Some of these allow an offender to be acquit-
ted or have their sentence reduced in exchange for information which either
allows all perpetrators and accomplices to be punished for a crime commit-
ted, or to prevent future crimes from being committed. When applied to
crimes which may involve more than one perpetrator, the use of grounds for
mitigation as a reward for collaboration with the law is prescribed in article
136 of the Criminal Code (state security offences), article 192 of the Crimi-
nal Code (offences against public trust), article 300 of the Criminal Code
(publication and distribution of written materials without indicating the
name and domicile of the author or printer), article 304 of the Criminal
Code (violations of laws and regulations on lotteries, gambling establish-
ments and pawnbrokers) and article 326 of the Criminal Code (offences
linked to criminal organisations or crime syndicates established with the
aim of causing harm to persons or property). Furthermore, under article 6 of
the Law of 24th February 1921 on trafficking of narcotics, as amended by the
Law of 9th July 1975, informing on another offender (before or after the
launch of legal action) can constitute an extenuating circumstance or
grounds for absolution, depending on the severity of the crime or offence
committed by the informant6. The Law of 11th July 1994 amending the Law
of 15th July 1985 on the use of substances having a hormonal or antihor-
monal action in animals also introduced a provision for grounds for mitiga-
tion (extenuating circumstance or grounds for absolution), as does as article
5 of the Law of 12th March 1858 on crimes and offences against interna-
tional institutions. In these different cases, providing information to the law
enforcement authorities or “informing” may be rewarded with absolution,
subject to certain conditions being met7.
It is thus these different grounds for mitigation which represent the
first signs, albeit partial and limited, of “law on repentants”8. Although the
mechanism is debatable from a moral point of view, “informing”9 or “an in-
centive for impunity”10 is encouraged in these cases, with the aim of in-
creasing efficiency in punishing crimes considered particularly serious for
6 On these specific grounds for mitigation, see M. PREUMONT, “Un exemple de politique
criminelle: la dénonciation, cause d’excuse prévue par l’article 6 de la loi du 24 février 1921
concernant le trafic des substances vénéneuses, soporifiques, stupéfiantes, désinfectantes ou
antiseptiques”, in Mélanges offerts à Robert Legros, Brussels, ULB, 1985, p. 499-516; Ch. GUIL-
LAIN, “La cause d’excuse en matière de drogues: symptôme de l’ambivalence du système pé-
nal”, in Fr. KUTY and A. WEYENBERGH (dir.), La science pénale dans tous ses états. Liber amico-
rum Patrick Mandoux et Marc Preumont, Larcier, Brussels, 2019, p. 271-290.
7 See M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 41-50.
8 Fr. TULKENS, M. VAN DE KERCHOVE, Y. CARTUYVELS, Ch. GUILLAIN, Introduction au droit pé-
nal. Aspects juridiques et criminologiques, Diegem, Kluwer, 2014, p. 644.
9 G.-H. BEAUTHIER, “La délation: l’impunité dénoncée”, Déviance & Société, 1998, n° 4,
p. 427-433.
10 Fr. TULKENS, M. VAN DE KERCHOVE, Y. CARTUYVELS, Ch. GUILLAIN, op. cit., p. 644.
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society, tracking down all perpetrators and accomplices, and preventing sim-
ilar crimes from being committed in the future.
1.1.2. The emergence of a true “law on repentants” the catalyst of the “Brabant
killings”
From 1982 to 1985, Belgium was rocked by a wave of indiscriminate
and deadly crimes and attacks. It is still unknown whether these stemmed
from organised crime or terrorism11. Over the same period, numerous at-
tacks were attributed to an extreme-left movement, the CCC (Communist
Combatant Cells). There was an atmosphere of tension and the fight against
organised crime and terrorism became part of the political agenda. In this
context, the issue of a “law on repentants” gradually emerged from the 1990s
onwards.
In June 1995, the Dehaene II government proposed in its political pro-
gramme that legislation should be drawn up “in order to allow a reduced
sentence or negotiation in exchange for valuable information” as part of the
fight against organised crime12. In an “action plan against organised crime”,
filed a few months later, the government made clear that it wished to set up
a system of “exemption from prosecution” or “grounds for mitigation in
court” for repentant offenders. The action plan also prescribed “witness pro-
tection programmes” for repentants, as well as “measures to make them
more difficult to identify”13. Finally, in 1996 and under the scope of this “ac-
tion plan”, the Ministry of Justice asked Ghent University to carry out re-
search on the issue of repentants (see below).
Parliament also got involved in the subject. A first parliamentary inves-
tigation committee on “the way the fight against crime and terrorism is or-
ganised”, in relation to the “Brabant killings” submitted its report in April
199014, and a new parliamentary investigation committee was established in
June 1996, to study “the changes necessary to the organisation and operat-
ing of the police and judicial system, based on the difficulties encountered
during the investigation into the “Brabant killers”. The report written by this
committee proposed legalising the practice of using repentants (see below).
In July 1996, another parliamentary investigation committee on organised
crime was created at the Senate. During its work, the committee also stud-
ied the issue of repentants and came to the conclusion that establishing a
system for reducing the sentences of repentants can be useful in fighting or-
ganised crime15.
From this point on, scientific and official reports and legislative pro-
posals all contributed to a cumulative process which lasted until the begin-
ning of the 2000s. On 5th August 1996 a first draft law was tabled by senator
11 The two hypotheses have successively been investigated, to date without success. On
the Brabant killings, see e.a., P. PONSAERS, Loden jaren. De Bende van Nijvel gekaderd, Gompel
& Svacina, 2019.
12 Doc., Ch., 1995, n° 23/1, p. 45.
13 Doc., Sén., 1995-1996, n° 1-326/5, p. 30.
14 Doc., Ch., 1989-1990, n° 59/8.
15 Doc., Sen., 1998-1999, n° 1-326/9, p. 525.
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E. Boutmans, which aimed to “provide repentants with a temporary and
one-time exemption from sentencing”16. The aim of this draft law was to in-
corporate extenuating circumstances into the Criminal Code for perpetra-
tors of offences who “reveal the identity of perpetrators, associates, accom-
plices or receivers to the authorities” or otherwise, who share with the au-
thorities “the information they have, to allow these individuals to be
identified and tracked down” (art. 2). Grounds for mitigation could become
grounds for absolution if the information concerned “the organisers of the
crimes or ringleaders of the groups responsible for organising the crimes”
on the condition that the individuals disclosing the information “are not the
organisers or ringleaders themselves” (art. 3). The conditions for the appli-
cation of this clause are such that these grounds for mitigation were in fact
limited to potential “repentants” who committed crimes ten years earlier
linked to the “Brabant killings”17. Like in Italy and Germany, law on repen-
tants and collaborators of justice became part of the political agenda due to
events linked to organised crime and terrorism.
A few months later, in January 1997, a draft law “with the aim of
strengthening the fight against organised crime and terrorism”18 was tabled
at the Chamber of Representatives. According to the author of the proposal,
MP J.-P. Moerman, the state of affairs in the judicial system (including the
Brabant killings) underlined the growing threat posed by organised crime,
as well as the emergence of terrorist groups. The MP posited that “a state of
necessity” therefore justified the adoption of an “emergency law” in the fight
against organised crime and terrorism. The aim of this law would be to en-
courage collaboration with the legal authorities in the areas concerned, pro-
viding a protection system for collaborators, whether repentant or not, and
waiving their sentence “regardless of their role in the offences on which they
inform (art. 3), as long as they provide key information without which crim-
inal cases linked to organised crime or terrorism could not be solved (art. 2
and 3) or which may spare human lives (art. 10)”.
In October 1997 the “parliamentary investigation committee on the
changes necessary to the organisation and operating of the police and judi-
cial system, based on the difficulties encountered during the investigation
into the Brabant killers” filed its report. The committee proposed that there
should be a “definitive, general law to regulate the reduction of sentences”
which repentants could obtain in exchange for “complete and useful infor-
mation”19. The report set out the first guidelines for a law on repentants
based on the following principles: firstly the principle of subsidiarity, under
which using a repentant for information can only be justified when there are
no other means of obtaining results, and secondly proportionality between
the seriousness of the offence committed by the repentant and the offence
16 Doc., Sen., 1995-1996, n° 1-403/1.
17 The system was designed for informants to reveal crimes which, alone or in con-
junction with other linked crimes, caused the death of at least five people and were impossi-
ble to solve after ten or more years.
18 Doc., Ch., 1996-1997, n° 880/1.
19 Doc., Ch., 1997-1998, n° 573/7, p. 67.
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on which information is provided, and between the incentives granted to the
repentant and the information provided. The report also highlights the im-
portance of considering the “protection of the repentant and their family”, as
well as guaranteeing the rights of the defence of the individuals accused by
repentants, which means that particular attention must be paid to how cred-
ible the repentant and their accusations are. Finally, the committee consid-
ered that negotiation with the repentant must be possible in terms of the
criminal act, sentencing and sentence enforcement20.
During the same period, at the end of 1997, the report on the research
carried out on repentants at Ghent University a year earlier was sent to the
Ministry of Justice21, and was presented and debated at a conference at the
Senate on 8th and 9th October 1998. This report also proposed adopting a le-
gal framework for repentants, by means of an exceptional procedure based
around three principles which were very similar to those put forward by the
above-mentioned parliamentary committee: a principle of subsidiarity,
meaning that a repentant can only be used for information when the con-
ventional search and prosecution methods are insufficient; a principle of
proportionality between the seriousness of the crime committed by the re-
pentant and the crime on which they provide information22 and between the
crime committed by the repentant and the incentives they receive23; checks
carried out as far as possible by the judicial authorities on compliance with
the legal conditions for rewarding repentants and on the reliability of the
statements they make24, and finally, a law on repentants which is clear and
precise enough to comply with the requirements of the substantial legality
principle25.
More specifically, both the report and the parliamentary committee
propose establishing a mechanism for negotiation with the future repentant.
The repentant’s case could be closed26, or their sentence could be reduced
via new grounds for mitigation for informants27, or they could receive pref-
erential treatment in the enforcement of the sentence (possibly even going as
far as non-enforcement of the sentence) in exchange for complete and truth-
ful information28. The report underlines the importance of protective mea-
20 Ibid., p. 67 and 68.
21 T. DE MEESTER, Ph. TRAEST, Rapport de recherche concernant les repentis, l’encourage-
ment et la facilitation du témoignage dans le cadre de la procédure pénale et le renversement de
la charge de la preuve concernant l’origine de biens dont on soupçonne qu’ils sont le produit
d’une activité liée au crime organisé, drafted at the request of the Ministry of Justice, 1996-
1997; unpublished.
22 This relationship of proportionality implies that a reward is only granted to repen-
tants when they inform on, or shed light on, serious crimes and/or crimes which are at least
as serious as those committed by the informant Colloque réforme droit pénal, Sénat, 8-9 octo-
bre 1998, Antwerpen, Maklu, 1998, p. 130 and 131.
23 Colloque réforme droit pénal, Sénat, 8-9 octobre 1998, op. cit., p. 131. M.-A. BEERNAERT
considers that the authors were in fact aiming more for a relationship of proportionality be-
tween the importance of the information provided by the informant and the benefits granted
to him/her in exchange for this (M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 87).
24 Colloque réforme droit pénal, Sénat, 8-9 octobre 1998, op. cit., p. 132.
25 Ibid., p. 132.
26 Ibid., p. 133-138.
27 Ibid., p. 140 and 141.
28 Ibid., p. 140 and 141.
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sures for repentants and their families to ensure the efficiency of the sys-
tem29. and of the rights of the defence to ensure that the criminal law judge
cannot convict a defendant solely on the basis of information provided by
the repentant30.
In November 1998 two MPs, A. Dusquennes and J.-P. Moerman, tabled
a draft law with the aim of “granting repentants immunity from criminal
proceedings as part of the fight against organised crime”31. Acknowledging
the failure of traditional investigation methods in fighting organised crime
and terrorism32, the draft law proposed establishing a system for repentants
in the context of the fight against organised crime, through granting immu-
nity from criminal proceedings to the perpetrators of serious offences in ex-
change for useful information, depending on the importance of this infor-
mation. The proposal put forward a two-pronged approach: if the repentant
provides information before their appearance in trial court, prosecution
could be terminated for all or some of the offences committed, depending on
the importance of the information disclosed. If information is provided after
the repentant faces trial, they could be granted advantages related to sen-
tence enforcement33. The text sets the condition of compliance with the prin-
ciple of proportionality between the offences committed by the repentant
and those which they divulge34, and prescribes various measures in order to
uphold the rights of the defence of those concerned by the revelations (in-
cluding non-anonymity of the repentant and not allowing sentencing solely
based on information provided by repentants). The proposal remains classic
on these points, but includes a more innovative section on witness protec-
tion for repentants, with a non-exhaustive list of non-penal protective mea-
sures (new identity, financial assistance, etc.) and suggests creating a “pro-
tection mechanism for repentants at European level, as the limited size of
the country makes relocating (repentants) difficult”35.
On 8th December 1998 the parliamentary committee “in charge of
studying organised crime” submitted its report36. On the issue of repentants,
the committee observed that as things stood, there was nothing to prevent
the Public Prosecutor from making agreements with repentants in exchange
for various types of advantage, from closing the case without further action
to delivering more lenient closing arguments before the trial judge37, The
committee was critical of the use of special investigation techniques outside
of any specific legal framework38, and argued that such agreements made in
29 Ibid., p. 140 and 141.
30 Ibid., p. 137 and 138.
31 Doc., Ch., 1998-1999, n° 1813/1.
32 Ibid., p. 1.
33 Ibid., p. 3, 4 and 8.
34 The degree of severity of the offence committed by the repentant must be lower than
that of the offence which may be brought to trial following the repentant’s accusations (art.
4,3º) and certain particularly serious crimes committed by the repentant are not subject to
negotiation.
35 Doc., Ch., 1998-1999, n° 1813/1, p. 13.
36 Doc., Sén., 1998-1999, n° 1-326/9.
37 Ibid., p. 427.
38 Doc., Sén., n° 1-326/8, p. 129.
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a praetorian manner in the prosecution system undermine the transparency
of (criminal) policy39. Citing case law on drug and hormone trafficking, the
committee argued that it would be preferable to opt for a legal grounds for
mitigation system applied “openly, under the supervision of the judiciary”40
in order to combat organised crime.
1.1.3. Draft legislation “establishing a system for collaborators of justice”
(2001) or the foundations of the future system
1.1.3.1. The basic principles: legality, subsidiarity, proportionality and review
In 1999, under the leadership of the Liberal Minister of Justice M. Ver-
wilghen, a “Federal plan for security and prison policy (31st May 1999) con-
taining a certain draft 34 “Study on the establishment of a system for repen-
tants – witness protection – anonymous witnesses”, was published in the
context of the fight against organised crime. Draft legislation “establishing a
system for collaborators of justice” was then drawn up, broadly based on the
research carried out at Ghent University and also on the studies undertaken
by a Working Group on organised crime set up within the Ministry of Jus-
tice. However, this text did not receive universal support from the governing
majority and raised a barrage of questions from the opposition41. Some of
the concerns which the draft raised were the risk of abuse (false testimony),
the worry that the promise of receiving an advantage may encourage reof-
fending, the potential cost of system for collaborators of justice and the im-
morality of a reward system based on informing42. The government there-
fore commissioned additional research at Ghent University43, following
which the draft text was reworked and submitted on 21st February 2002 in
the form of a draft law by two MPs from the governing party, H. Coveliers
and J. Herzet44.
The main ideas outlined in this draft law, and presented below, repre-
sented a significant step forward in establishing a law on repentants. Taking
into account the ethical objections to the creation of a system for repentants,
the proposers of the draft law considered that it was “possible to set up a
system for individuals who collaborate with the legal authorities, in certain
circumstances and under certain strict conditions”, “as an exceptional mea-
sure”45. This exceptional nature is reflected in the limitation of the measure
only to collaborators of justice who have committed offences as part of a
criminal organisation, on the basis of article 324-bis of the Criminal Code, or
have been involved in breaches of international humanitarian law46. The fol-
39 Ibid., p. 73.
40 Doc., Sén., 1998-1999, n° 1-326/9, p. 428, 429 and 525.
41 See M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 102, notes 65 and 66.
42 Doc., Ch., 2001-2002, n° 1645/1, p. 7.
43 This research was also followed by a complementary study carried out by the Uni-
versity of Ghent (N. SIRON, G. VERMEULEN, B. DE RUYVER, P. TRAEST, A. VAN CAUWENBERGHE,
Bescherming van en samenwerking met getuigen, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2000.
44 Doc., Ch., 2001-2002, n° 1645/1.
45 Ibid., p. 8.
46 Ibid., p. 13.
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lowing four principles for the organisation of the system for collaborators of
justice, having become somewhat standard, surfaced again in this draft law:
The principle of legality entails refusing praetorian forms of agreement
“which deviate from the rules generally applicable to criminal procedure”
and regulating the system for repentants in a clear, precise and accessible
manner, in a senso strictu law. The application of this law must uphold the
“rights of the defence and the fundamental rights of all parties concerned,
and the dignity of justice”, whilst ensuring “the credibility of the information
provided by collaborators” and guarding against the risk of miscarriage of
justice47.
The principle of subsidiarity means, in the areas in which it applies, that
collaboration between criminals and the legal authorities is only possible “as
a last resort, when the same objective cannot be achieved in another reason-
able manner”; that is to say, when traditional investigation techniques are in-
sufficient, subject to evaluation by the Prosecutor. The principle of sub-
sidiarity also means that the Prosecutor must make a balanced choice be-
tween the different advantages which may be granted, avoiding promising
the most favourable measure in advance if in the end this proves to be un-
necessary48.
The principle of proportionality contains three aspects. Firstly, there
must be proportionality between the offence committed by the collaborator
and the offence which they disclose. When the offence committed by the col-
laborator is as or more serious than that which they disclose, or when the
collaborator is suspected of “certain extremely serious crimes” – crimes
which cannot be correctionalised (reclassified as delicts on the basis of Arti-
cle 2 of the Law of 4 October 1867 on extenuating circumstances)49, the re-
ward system cannot be used. There must also be proportionality between the
advantage granted to the collaborator and the seriousness of the offence on
which they provide information (this is to avoid a huge reward being given
to the perpetrator of a serious crime for information concerning minor of-
fences). Finally, there must be proportionality between the crime committed
by the collaborator and the advantages granted to him or her50.
Lastly, there is a principle of review which means that “to avoid the risk
of abuse and miscarriage of justice”, the judiciary oversees the legitimacy of
the proceedings, to check that the crime in question is indeed defined as
such by law and that the collaborator’s assertions are “reliable” enough to
justify a reward51.
1.1.3.2. Practical aspects and “miscellaneous provisions”
On a practical level, the proposition puts forward three different ad-
vantages for collaborators, which come as no surprise. The agreement made
according to the rules with the Public Prosecutor or the Federal Prosecutor
47 Ibid., p. 10.
48 Ibid., p. 11.
49 Ibid., p. 14.
50 Ibid., p. 11-13.
51 Ibid., p. 14 and 15.
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should allow the legal proceedings to be ended, as long as the repentant hon-
ours their commitments. Their compliance will be evaluated by the inves-
tigative or trial bodies. The Public Prosecutor must ask for an opinion from
the Federal Prosecutor before making any commitment to the repentant,
and the agreement must be signed by the Federal Prosecutor (art. 5, § 2).
The Federal Prosecutor plays a coordinating role, keeping a list of memo-
randa of agreements made (art. 17, § 3), to avoid different decisions coming
into conflict or several promises being made in different judicial districts for
the same case, and to ensure that there is consistency between the criteria
and conditions for granting a particular promise52. The trial courts, when
processing a case in which an agreement has been made, will evaluate legal-
ity but not expediency: if the trial judge observes that the required condi-
tions for ending legal proceedings are present, that the memorandum has
been adequately drafted and the agreement set out within it has been re-
spected, then he/she must end the legal proceedings (art. 9). Collaboration
with the legal authorities thus constitutes legal grounds for mitigation (exten-
uation or absolution), taking into account the principle of proportionality
and its many implications. Accordingly, as long as the disclosures are “re-
vealing, truthful and complete”, whether they are made before or after legal
proceedings commence, or whether or not they lead to positive results, the
Prosecutor will draft a written memorandum requiring the application of
grounds for mitigation53. Here again, the role of the Public Prosecutor is
particularly important; although it is not guaranteed that the grounds for
mitigation which he/she calls for will be granted, the agreement which
he/she signs with the collaborator nevertheless limits the trial courts to as-
sessing legality, i.e. checking “if the legal conditions are fulfilled for exemp-
tion from punishment or sentence reduction”54. Lastly, the proposal states
that the Public Prosecutor or Federal Prosecutor can also promise favourable
treatment concerning sentence enforcement55.
Finally, in the “miscellaneous provisions” at the end of the text, three
important issues are addressed which concern, directly or indirectly, the
rights of the defence. Article 20 firstly stipulates that the statements made by
a collaborator of justice can be used to bring legal proceedings for other of-
fences than those mentioned under the draft law but cannot be used as evi-
dence in these proceedings. Article 21 establishes a “legal minimum evi-
dence” system which precludes the use of statements made by collaborators
of justice as evidence for one of the offences concerned if they are not “cor-
roborated to a great extent by other forms of evidence”56. The statements
made by repentants are considered weak, and the aim here is to avoid these
statements alone being used as proof of a crime. Furthermore, article 22
states that partial or total anonymity cannot be granted to collaborators of
justice, to “guarantee as far as possible that these statements (made by col-
52 Ibid., p. 20.
53 Ibid., p. 27-29.
54 Ibid., p. 37.
55 Ibid., p. 29 and 30.
56 Ibid., p. 50.
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laborators) can be refuted”, which makes it impossible to “combine the sta-
tus of collaborator of justice and that of anonymous witness, (…) a combi-
nation which is considered to limit the rights of the defence too drasti-
cally”57. However, collaborators of justice can benefit from protective mea-
sures created for witnesses with a criminal record.
1.1.3.3. Opinions of the Council of Europe expert committee and the Council
of Public Prosecutors
It should be noted that the text of the government’s 2001 draft legisla-
tion, identical to that discussed above, was submitted by Minister of Justice
M. Verwilghen for an opinion from an independent expert committee of the
Council of Europe. In their report submitted in January 200258, the experts
broadly endorsed the main lines of the draft. They wondered, however, if in
the light of the events of 11th September 2001 crimes linked to terrorism
should fall under the scope of the crimes covered in the draft. They recom-
mended that the collaborator should receive assistance from a lawyer during
discussion of the memorandum. As regards the rest, the experts commended
the “transparency” of the agreements concluded in relation to the rights of
the defence and the adversarial principle. However, they queried the prohi-
bition of the use of collaborators who have committed serious crimes, if
their truthful and complete testimony brings to light information on other
serious crimes59.
During the same period, in January 2002, the Council of Public Prose-
cutors submitted an opinion at the request of the Minister of Justice. The
main elements of this were that the Council emphasised the need to protect
collaborators, and unlike the experts from the Council of Europe, argued in
favour of the possibility of providing information anonymously, stating that
anonymity was “the most effective means of protection for the collabora-
tor”60.
1.1.4. From 2001 to 2014: variations on a theme…
1.1.4.1. The flurry of draft laws continues
On 10th August 2001, faced with the stagnation of the government’s
draft law, a legislative proposal “establishing a system for repentants” was
tabled by T. Van Parys, J. Vanderzeuren, S. Verherstraeten et G. Bourgeois61.
The text only differed significantly from the draft law (in Covelier and
Herzet’s proposal) on two points: firstly, the substantive scope of the law is
reserved for offences under article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure and those committed in the context of a criminal organisation, cov-
ered in article 324-bis of the Criminal Code; secondly, article 22 of the draft
law/initial proposal which states that repentants cannot provide anonymous
57 Ibid., p. 41.
58 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 100 and 101.
59 Ibid., p. 100 and 101.
60 Ibid., p. 101.
61 Doc., Ch., 2000-2001, n° 1384/1.
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testimony is omitted. On this point, the authors of the proposal are therefore
closer to the position of the Council of Public Prosecutors.
Following this, a number of proposals were tabled up until 2014. They
were often submitted by the same MPs, and were frequently a literal or very
slightly amended “copy-paste” of the draft law. On 29th October 2003, a new
draft law establishing a system for repentants, an exact copy of the one sub-
mitted on 10th August 200162, was tabled by T. Van Parys and J. Van-
derzeuren. The two amendments to the government’s draft law of 2001 men-
tioned above were included in this text. A few days later, on 6th November
2003, a draft law “establishing a system for collaborators with justice” was
tabled by M. Taelman, F. Borginon and C. Marinowe63. Unlike the two previ-
ous proposals, it extended the substantive scope of the system for collabora-
tors to offences under article 324-bis of the Criminal Code and offences un-
der articles 136-bis, 136-ter and 136-quater of the Criminal Code (crimes of
international humanitarian law). Furthermore, article 22 of the initial draft
law (refusal of anonymity for collaborators of justice) was reincorporated.
On 16th January 2008, a new draft law establishing a system for repen-
tants was submitted by S. Verherstraeten and associates. In this text the idea
of limiting the scope of the system to offences under article 90-ter, § 2-4 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and article 324-bis of the Criminal Code
resurfaced again. Article 22 on the refusal of anonymity for collaborators of
justice is also retained. This draft law was re-submitted on 27th June 201164.
Later, on 17th November 2014, a new draft law was tabled by S. Becq, S. Ver-
herstraeten and R. Terwingen65, with a similar text to the previous proposal.
It should be noted that when Framework Agreement 2002/475/JAI of
13th June 2002 was transposed by the Law of 19th December 2003 on terror-
ist offences66, certain MPs made an unfinalised proposal to incorporate an
extenuating circumstance for specific denunciations concerning terrorist of-
fences67.
1.1.4.2. A helping hand from the judicial authorities
The same year, in an address made on the occasion of the ceremonial
reconvening of the Cour d’Appel de Liège on 1st September 2014, the General
Prosecutor Ch. De Valkeneer, like his colleague in Brussels, J. Delmulle,
launched an appeal for the adoption of a law governing the system for re-
pentants or collaborators of justice. The General Prosecutor expressed his
preference for the term “collaborator of justice” rather than “repentant”, due
to the implication of “regret” or “atonement” that the second term holds,
when in fact it is more a case of exchanging reciprocal advantages as a form
of settlement68.
62 Doc., Ch., 2003-2004, n° 358/1.
63 Doc., Ch., 2003-2004, n° 399/1.
64 Doc., Ch., 2010-2011, n° 1631/1.
65 Doc., Ch., 2014-2015, n° 629/1.
66 M.B., 29th December 2003.
67 Doc., Ch., 2003-2004, n° 258/3, p. 1; Doc., Sén., 2003-2004, n° 3-332/2, p. 1.
68 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Quelques réflexions à propos de la prescription de l’action
publique et des ‘repentis’ ou collaborateurs de justice”, Rev. dr. pén. crim., 2014, p. 1083-1102.
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He pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights was not op-
posed to the adoption of such a system in the fight against serious crime, al-
though the Court highlighted the risk of undermining the fairness of pro-
ceedings, due to the possibility of false or dubious testimony being provided
by “repentants” interested in the advantages offered by the system or acting
out of a desire for revenge69. However, as long as transparency is guaranteed
and the testimony of collaborators is corroborated by other evidence, case
law from the Court seems to support the principle of the system70. The Gen-
eral Prosecutor acknowledged that using the procedure can pose ethical
questions, but maintained that the “defence of the foundations of society”
which are endangered by crime justifies the use of a sort of “a posteriori state
of necessity”, as long as a principle of transparency and legal minimum evi-
dence is respected, preventing legal decisions from being taken solely on the
basis of the repentant’s testimony71.
1.2. Case law developments before the Law of 2018
1.2.1. Case law on informing as grounds for mitigation in the context of nar-
cotics
A form of collaboration with the legal authorities appears mainly in
case law decisions in the area of drug trafficking. The Law of 9th July 1975,
amending the law of 24th February 1921 on narcotics72 established grounds
for mitigation, drawing on articles 300 and 304 of the Criminal Code, with
the aim not of preventing future offences but of arresting the perpetrators
and participants in offences already committed. The authorities’ objective in
incorporating grounds for mitigation for informants was clear: “in this area
where, as proved by experience, the most serious crimes are committed by
members of well-organised associations (…), there was a need to find an ef-
fective way of aiding the discovery of all guilty parties”73.
In order to constitute grounds for mitigation (extenuating circumstance
or grounds for absolution), the information provided must comply with sev-
eral conditions74:
1°) The information provided to the legal authorities must concern the
identity of perpetrators of offences, or if this is not known, the existence of
these offences (Law of 24th February 1921, art. 6, subparagraphs 2 and 3).
2°) The information must not be known to the authorities. Case law stip-
ulates here that “the legislator’s intention is for the accused to “reveal” in-
formation to the legal authorities, in other words, shed light on facts previ-
69 ECHR., Cornelis c. the Netherlands, 25 May 2004, p. 15.
70 For an analysis of the case law quoted by the author, see M.-A. BEERNAERT, “La re-
cevabilité des preuves en matière pénale dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme”, Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2007, p. 88 and 89.
71 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Quelques réflexions…”, op. cit., p. 1101.
72 Law of 24th February 1921 on trafficking of poisonous, soporific, narcotic, psy-
chotropic, disinfectant and antiseptic substances and substances which could be used for the
illicit manufacture of narcotic and psychotropic substances.
73 Doc., Sén., 1970-1971, n° 290, p. 5.
74 Ch. GUILLAIN, op. cit., p. 285-288.
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ously unknown to the legal authorities”75. It is also considered that there is
no “revelation” when the information shared is already known to the au-
thorities, due to investigations carried out by the authorities or testimony
provided by other individuals76 for example, and in this case, the accused
may not invoke the advantage of grounds for mitigation77. It should be noted
that this is particularly hazardous for the accused, who risks retaliation
from the person who their information concerns, to check if the content of
their deposition is already known to the authorities.
3°) Although this is not prescribed by law, case law deems that the in-
formation revealed must be truthful and complete, to the extent of the infor-
mant’s knowledge78. Case law is strict on the evaluation of this criteria, and
judges require informants to “reveal not only their own role, but also all in-
formation they hold on the circumstances and perpetrators of the crime”79.
This means that the information is not considered truthful and complete if
the statements made are vague and general, if they do not allow the perpe-
trators to be identified and prosecuted80, if they are unreliable81 or if selec-
tively given information causes the police to be misled82. The same applies if
informants do not supply the identity of all persons with whom they have
come into contact83, if they conceal their own role in drug-related offences84,
or if they refuse to say where they have hidden the drugs in their posses-
sion85. Although the requirement for a clear and complete declaration is un-
derstandable with regard to the “reward” granted to the informant, it can
sometimes seem excessive. Thus, the criminal court did not hesitate to grant
the reduction in sentence to an accused who admitted only at the court hear-
ing that he was smuggling drugs, whereas he had previously claimed the op-
posite86. Similarly, defence lawyers have also argued that “the aforemen-
tioned article 6 does not state that the guilty party who reveals information
may not, at that moment, forget anything or anyone; as in this case, this can
easily happen when the information disclosed spans a certain amount of
time and distance”87, and that “it can never be verified if a person has re-
vealed the identity of all unknown perpetrators”88.
In legal literature, many authors cast doubt on the appropriateness and
75 Ghent, 31st January 1994, quoted by Cass., 26th April 1994, Pas., 1994, I, p. 408.
76 Cass., 20th June 1977, Pas., 1977, I, p. 1070; Antwerp, 2nd December 1977, Pas.,
1978, II, p. 46, Cass., 26th April 1994, Pas. 1994, I, p. 408.
77 Cass., 7th March 1978, Pas., 1978, I, p. 765.
78 Antwerp, 2nd December 1977, Pas., 1978, II, p. 46.
79 Cass., 18th January 2017, n° P.16.1128., concl. av. gén. N. DE BRAUWERE (available on
Juridat).
80 Brussels, 14th October 2008, T. Strafr., 2009, p. 318 and note; Cass., 8th September
1987, Pas., 1988, I, p. 25; Cass., 8th December 1992, Pas., 1992, I, p. 1354.
81 Cass., 8th February 1984, Rev. dr. pén., 1984, p. 598.
82 Antwerp, 7th February 2001, Vigiles, 2001, p. 190 and note F. VERSPEELT, “Les ex-
ploitants de dancing et les stupéfiants”.
83 Cass., 7th March 1978, Pas., 1978, I, p. 766.
84 Cass., 24th February 1998, Pas., 1998, I, p. 106.
85 Corr. Liège, 13th November 1981, J.L., 1982, p. 317.
86 Brussels, 16th April 1997, R.W., 1997-1998, p. 1506 and note W. MAHIEU.
87 Cass., 14th September 1982, Rev. dr. pén., 1983, p. 385.
88 Cass., 7th March 1978, Pas., 1978, I, p. 766.
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effectiveness of the system. Three main criticisms are cited: 1º) The system
fails to reach its objectives: the information provided generally concerns
consumers, never major traffickers89. In practice, article 6 has not “served to
curb the spread of drug trafficking and consumption in any way”90; 2º) The
application of article 6 of the law, a special scheme in the midst of a range
of provisions applying harsh sentences for a broad spectrum of behaviours,
has without doubt encouraged more arbitrary police conduct”91; 3º) In prac-
tice, the use of informants seems extremely rare – “either judges recoil from
rewarding the disclosure of information or pardoning offences which they
consider too serious, or the criminals themselves are reluctant to use the in-
formant system to improve their outcome”92.
1.2.2. The “Habran” affair, or the validity of evidence collected anonymously or
not subject to the adversarial principle
1.2.2.1. A few principles of the law of evidence in Belgian criminal procedure
Another important question raised by negotiations with collaborators
or “repentants” is to what extent the information they provide can be con-
sidered as evidence. To delve further into this issue, which no doubt had an
impact on the regulation on “testimony” set out in the Law of 22nd July 2018,
it is necessary to revisit several principles governing the law of evidence in
Belgian criminal procedure.
Under Belgian law, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution
(usually the Public Prosecutor), under the supervision of the judge. The ac-
cused is not obliged to collaborate in the submission of evidence and has the
right to remain silent, and can adopt a strictly passive attitude if he/she so
wishes93. Belgian law also includes the principle of evidence by all means
and there is no hierarchy applied to the different forms of evidence94, which
means that all evidence is admissible95, in theory. However, the non-hierar-
chical principle is not absolute and there are two aspects which should be
noted.
89 R. LALLEMAND, “Les aspects légaux et idéologiques de la problématique des drogues.
‘La drogue contre le droit moderne?’”, in Drogues et Prisons, Les Dossiers de la Revue de droit
pénal et de criminologie, La Charte, 1995, p. 10; Ch. GUILLAIN, op. cit., p. 288-290.
90 M. PREUMONT, op. cit., p. 514.
91 M. NÈVE, note under Corr. Liège, 13th December 1989, J.L.M.B., 1991, p. 247. In the
same vein, see E. BOUTMANS, “The situation in Belgium”, in e.a. H.-J. ALBRECHT (ed.), Drugs
Policies in Western Europe, Freiburg, Max Planck Institut, 1989, p. 96: “The latter clause has
contributed very little to the dismantlement of major narcotic gangs, but it certainly has
allowed the police to arrest lots of drug users and street pushers”.
92 M. PREUMONT, op. cit., p. 514. The preparatory work for the Law of 22nd July 2018
explains the infrequent use of grounds for mitigation differently, in part: the lack of prior
negotiation between the Public Prosecutor and the repentant, insufficient guarantees for
repentants that they will actually obtain the privileges granted, conditions for informing
which are sometimes too strict, absence of sufficient protective measures to ensure the safety
of repentants and their family (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 12).
93 Cass., 9th October 1990, Pas., 1991, I, p. 139.
94 As opposed to the legal proof system, in which the probative value of evidence is
established by law.
95 Cass., 30th March 2011, J.L.M.B., 2011, n° 31, p. 1508 and s. and note A. MASSET.
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Firstly, the testimony given before the trial judge under complete
anonymity can only be taken into consideration as evidence in the case of of-
fences for which it has been authorised (namely, offences mentioned under
article 90-ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure or those committed in the
context of a criminal organisation referred to in article 324-bis of the Crim-
inal Code)96. Also, in accordance with article 189-bis, subparagraph 3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the sentencing of an individual can never be ex-
clusively, or to a significant extent, based on testimony given under complete
anonymity. This type of testimony must always be corroborated to a signifi-
cant extent by other forms of evidence.
Secondly, judges can base their conclusions only on evidence which has
been the subject of adversarial debate between the parties. The consequence
of this rule is that evidence which the parties to the proceedings have not
had the opportunity to freely refute cannot be used97.
1.2.2.2. The “Habran” affair
These different principles were enshrined in Belgian and European
case law to a great extent due to the “Habran” affair, which takes its name
from one of the accused involved in organised crime activities (fatal robbery
of an armoured car). This case involved several criminal trials and several
Court of Cassation judgements98.
During one of the criminal trials, the jury convicted Mr Habran and
other accused on the basis of accusations made against him by a witness
who was a member of the criminal organisation run by Mr Habran. This
witness firstly had the status of indicator, and received rewards under this
status, and later became a witness, for which he received financial assistance
within the scope of protective measures for at-risk witnesses (Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, art. 102-111).
At the Court of Cassation, Mr Habran and other accused questioned the
validity of the testimony from the perspective of the right to a fair trial99.
The Court of Cassation examined the action from three points of view100.
From the angle of ensuring a fair trial, the Court considers that “it is
the responsibility of the trial judge to assess how far the venality of the mo-
tives for providing testimony affect the probative value of evidence, as wit-
nesses’ reasons for testifying may raise doubts about their credibility, with-
96 See article 86-quinquies of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “les témoignages qui ont
été obtenus en application des articles 86-bis et 86-ter, ne peuvent être pris en considération
que comme preuves d’une infraction visée à l’article 90-ter, §§ 2 a 4, ou d’une infraction com-
mise dans le cadre d’une organisation criminelle, visée à l’article 324-bis du Code penal”.
97 Cass., 25th September 2002, Pas., 2002, p. 1740; Cass., 6th November 2002, Pas.,
2002, p. 2120.
98 Brussels Assize Court, 28th September 2010 and 30th September 2010; Cass., 19th
March 2008, 30th September 2009, and 30th March 2011.
99 The accused argued that “testimony can only be taken into consideration, in a fair
trial, if it is given by a citizen wishing to assist in the workings of the justice system and not
by a person testifying out of personal interest” (Cass., 30th March 2011, J.L.M.B., 2011, n° 31,
p. 1508 and 1509).
100 Cass., 30th March 2011, J.L.M.B., 2011, n° 31, p. 1508, note A. MASSET.
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out making it impossible to hold a fair trial”101. It adds that article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights “does not (…) prevent the judge
from taking evidence from the statement made by a protected witness (…),
even if the witness in question is an indicator who has decided after having
provided information under this status to testify officially”102.
From the angle of the rights of the defence, the Court considers that
“official testimony by a person who has previously provided information un-
der the status of indicator is not contrary to the general principle of law on
the respect of the rights of the defence, as the effect of this is to submit the
testimony to adversarial public debate between the parties”103.
Finally, regarding the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evi-
dence, the Court stipulates that “taking into account statements from a for-
mer indicator does not, in itself, undermine the general principle of law on
the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence in the area of law
enforcement”, even if “the person who was in danger due to statements they
have made or are about to make has consequently benefitted from protective
measures and financial assistance prescribed by law”104.
The case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights105.
Mr Habran and other accused asserted that these contentious witness state-
ments had no probative value as they had been obtained outside of the rules
of law and came from “repentant” indicators whose collaboration with the
legal authorities had been confidentially negotiated in exchange for benefits
granted by the prosecuting authorities. They considered that the non-disclo-
sure of discussions between the prosecuting and investigating authorities
and the contentious witnesses before they gave their official statements had
prevented the Criminal Court from assessing the credibility and reliability of
the evidence against them. This also prevented acknowledgement of the fact
that the evidence had been negotiated by the abovementioned authorities in
exchange for advantages106. The applicants therefore deemed that there had
been a violation of article 6 of the Convention (right to a fair trial).
The European Court of Human Rights began by highlighting that the
“the use of statements given by witnesses in return for immunity or other
advantages may cast doubt on the fairness of the proceedings”, due the risk
of manipulation stemming from statements which may have been made
“purely in order to obtain the advantages offered in exchange, or for per-
sonal revenge”107. The Court continued by stating that “the applicants might
legitimately have wondered whether their indictment and conviction had
been based on allegations that had not been fully verified”108.
However, the Court also pointed out that “the Convention does not pre-
clude reliance, at the preliminary investigation stage and where the nature
101 Ibid., p. 1509.
102 Ibid., p. 1509.
103 Ibid., p. 1509.
104 Ibid., p. 1510.
105 ECHR., 17th January 2017, Habran et Dalem c. Belgique.
106 Ibid., § 105.
107 Ibid., § 100.
108 Ibid., § 103.
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of the offence may warrant it, on sources such as anonymous informants”,
but that the use of these sources at a later stage by the trial judge as a basis
for sentencing “is acceptable only if adequate and sufficient safeguards
against abuse are in place, in particular a clear and foreseeable procedure
for authorising, implementing and supervising the investigative measures in
question”109. In this case, the Court raised the points that the witness state-
ments in question had not been given anonymously, that the applicants were
aware of their identity and that their official statements were part of the ev-
idence in the enforcement record which the defence was able to access (§
104), that during the debates at the Criminal Court one of the witnesses who
was present was given a hearing and cross-examined by the defence (§ 107),
that although it was not possible to cross-examine the other witness, who
was deceased, his statements were nonetheless read out to the jurors by the
president (§ 108), that the statements of the two witnesses were consistent,
even though they came from different sources (§ 110) and that the appli-
cants were not prevented from contesting the reliability of the witnesses, nor
the content and credibility of their statements, throughout the whole pro-
ceedings (§ 113). Finally, the Court noted that other evidence such as the bal-
listics and other “non-suspect” witness statements which were consistent
with those of the witnesses in question were taken into account in sentenc-
ing the applicants (§ 105).
The Court concluded that the proceedings as a whole had been sup-
ported by sufficiently solid guarantees and had not undermined the right to
a fair trial.
1.3. Conclusion
Since 1995, in view of the deadlock facing the Belgian legal system in
its attempts to solve the case of the Brabant killings which had taken place
around ten years earlier, there has been a slow but “unstoppable rise of re-
pentants and/or collaborators of justice in the criminal justice system”110. As
regards legislation, the turning point was the government’s draft law, finally
presented in the form of a legislative draft on 21st February 2002 by H. Cov-
eliers and J. Herzet. This draft set out the main principles of the system, and
all subsequent draft laws were very slight variations on the theme. From one
text to the next, the main differences were of a terminological nature (“re-
pentants” or “collaborators of justice”) or regarded the substantive scope of
the law and the issue of repentants’ anonymity when providing evidence.
On a political level, it is striking to note that most of the draft laws
came from Flemish-speaking MPs, going beyond political party boundaries
in the North of the country. Similarly, although each proposal raised objec-
tions due to the ethical questions posed by the legal adoption of a system
based on informants, the argument was quickly put to one side in the light
109 Ibid., § 101.
110 We have borrowed this phrase from an old contribution from M.-A. BEERNAERT (“De
l’irrésistible ascension des ‘repentis’ et ‘collaborateurs de justice’ dans le système penal”, Dé-
viance & Société, 2003, n° 1, p. 77-91).
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of the need for efficient law enforcement on organised crime. French-speak-
ing MPs seemed much less enthusiastic and possibly more sensitive to the
ethical aspect. This cultural difference no doubt explains why despite the nu-
merous proposals, a law on the subject was not approved until 2018. This
vote was certainly facilitated by the position of the judicial authorities and
the endorsement of European case law.
The drafting of this law was partially influenced by case law on in-
forming as grounds for mitigation in the area of narcotics and the “Habran”
case law regarding the admissibility of evidence taken from statements made
in exchange for advantages granted to witnesses.
2. Current legislation
Belgium has recently incorporated into its body of legislation the possi-
bility for an offender to collaborate with the legal authorities in exchange for
a reward of penal nature111, through the Law of 22nd July 2018. Before pre-
senting this legislation, a few points of terminology must be explained.
We will use the term “collaborator of justice” rather than “repentant”,
even though the first term may cause some confusion insofar as it could po-
tentially cover a broader range of situations in which collaboration occurs
than that envisaged by the Law of 22nd July 2018. However, the term “repen-
tant” implies “a form of regret” on the part of the collaborator, a hypothesis
which in many situations seems highly dubious.
Also, to specify the type of assistance provided by the collaborator, we
will refer to this collaboration as “procedural”112. The adjective “procedural”
refers to the practicalities of the collaboration: what is expected from col-
laborators of justice and what they contribute “to the administration of
criminal justice through assisting the authorities in their investigation and
evidence-gathering work”113. Procedural collaboration can be governed by a
law, or not, can give entitlement to a reward or a simple favour (subject to
the discretion of the Public Prosecutor) and the reward in question can be
granted irrevocably or temporarily114.
A procedural collaboration can be “punitive”, “preservative” or “limita-
tive”115. Collaboration is deemed “punitive” when the contribution concerns
an offence which is definitively in the past. It can have “preservative” aspects
when it eliminates a danger linked to acts which “constitute one of the first
signs of a wider criminal plan”116. The offences targeted here can be “either
111 The Law of 22nd July 2018 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding
promises on prosecution, sentence enforcement or detention made following testimony in
the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism (M.B., 7th August 2018) incor-
porated articles 216/1-216/8 into the Code of Criminal Procedure.
112 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs dans le système pénal: analyse comparée
et critique, Brussels, Bruylant, 2002, p. 22 and 23.
113 Ibid., p. 23.
114 Ibid., p. 398 and 399.
115 Ibid., p. 395-397.
116 R. MERLE and A. VITU, Traité de droit criminel, t. I, 7 éd., Paris, Cujas, 1997, p. 606,
quoted by M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 10.
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a simple expression of criminal intentions, or preparatory actions for a new
crime”117. Lastly, collaboration has a “limitative” scope when it allows pre-
vention of new damage arising from a previously committed crime. The aim
is to use collaboration to prevent damaging consequences stemming from a
criminal activity118.
Finally, procedural collaboration can be “internal” or “external”. It is
“internal” when the offences on which the collaborator provides information
are part of the same set of offences for which the collaborator is being pros-
ecuted or has been convicted. It is “external” when there is no such link: the
collaborator makes statements regarding another case than that for which
he or she is being prosecuted or has been convicted.
2.1. The conditions for application of the system
To be able to use procedural collaboration, an offence mentioned in ar-
ticle 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2.1.1) must have been
committed. A set of principles must also be respected: the principles of ade-
quacy and relevance (2.1.2), necessity and subsidiarity (2.1.3), proportional-
ity (2.1.4) and in certain cases, absence of danger (2.1.5).
2.1.1. Offences under article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Belgian law stipulates that the third party named by the informant
must have committed or tried to commit a crime belonging to the list of of-
fences in article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (art. 216/1).
This list of offences stemmed from a very different approach from that fol-
lowed in the Law of 22nd July 2018, due to the fact that this article 90-ter, §
2-4 originally aimed to determine offences for which phone tapping was au-
thorised. The adaption of this list to provide guidance on the scope of the
use of collaboration was justified in the preparatory work by the severity of
“the crimes which most disrupt society” which the list included119. The list
has become longer and longer over the years, which puts the “severity” cri-
terion into perspective120. As we will see, using this list has led to certain dif-
ficulties (see 2.1.2 - 2.1.4 below). It should be noted that terrorist offences
are part of this list (Criminal Code, art. 137-141-ter).
117 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 396. Certain provisions in
Belgian law criminalise these types of actions in the context of terrorism (structured associ-
ations with a view to committing terrorist offences, financing terrorist groups, spreading
messages inciting people to commit terrorist offences, recruitment, etc.). In this sort of
preservative collaboration, “collaborators do more than simply cooperating in giving evi-
dence, as they prevent further damages from occurring” (M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collab-
orateurs…, op. cit., p. 537).
118 Certain terrorist offences under Belgian law fall into this category of offences
(hostage taking, kidnap of minors, etc.).
119 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 24.
120 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 10. During the focus group organised on 23rd
October 2019 at USL-B, some parties (lawyers, magistrates and professors) criticised the
scope of the law as being too wide. During this same meeting, other parties (police officer
and magistrate) defended the use of article 90-ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This
Focus Group was conducted as part of this research and allowed us to hear the opinion and
comments of magistrates, police officers and academics.
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The scope of the system was even broader in the draft law, as collabo-
ration was also possible for offences committed as part of a criminal organ-
isation121. The official title of the Law of 22nd July 2018 (“combatting organ-
ised crime and terrorism”) could mislead the inattentive reader as to the real
scope of use of collaboration in Belgium.
2.1.2. The principles of adequacy and relevance
The principle of adequacy means that collaboration must be suitable in
order to achieve “disclosure of the truth” (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/1). Therefore, criminal law should only authorise collaboration for types
of crime where this type of collaboration is effective. As collaboration is pos-
sible for all offences mentioned in article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, including attempted offences, the law does not seem to com-
ply with this principle. Collaboration therefore becomes possible for tele-
phone harassment: although we can understand why this is on the list of
offences for which phone tapping can be used, it is harder to understand in
what way it respects the principle of adequacy122.
The principle of adequacy is often hard to demonstrate123. However,
with regard to terrorism, collaboration is presented as more effective (and
therefore complies better with the principle of adequacy) than in other liti-
gation124.
The principle of relevance relates to this same idea of the effectiveness
of collaboration, but this time not with regard to the scope set out by law,
but to its use by the police and legal authorities in a particular case.
2.1.3. The principles of necessity and subsidiarity
The principle of necessity stipulates that collaboration must be indis-
pensable, that is to say that without the use of collaboration, it would be im-
possible to impart criminal justice. This principle of necessity is once again
difficult to demonstrate125. It involves periodically checking if, for the of-
fence concerned, criminal justice is indeed impossible without collabora-
tion. Under this principle, it follows that the legislator must from time to
time modify the scope of the law; there is nothing to say that criminal jus-
tice, which today finds itself powerless faced with a criminal phenomenon,
should remain so tomorrow, thanks to new investigation methods which
would mean that collaboration would no longer be “indispensable”126.
This principle of necessity, which regards the legislative definition of
the scope, in this case blends seamlessly with the principle of subsidiarity.
The police and legal authorities should only use collaboration if, in the case
at hand, “prosecution of the offence cannot be carried out in any other rea-
121 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 62.
122 It seems to us that collaboration will not be particularly “effective” in demonstrat-
ing the guilt of a “harasser”. (Also see Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 10 and 80).
123 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 442.
124 Ibid., p. 564.
125 Ibid., p. 442.
126 Ibid., p. 444.
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sonable way”127 due to the insufficiency of the traditional investigation and
prosecution methods128. This principle of subsidiarity should be evaluated in
abstracto129 (without the need to have tried other techniques and found them
lacking) and at the time of authorisation of use of collaboration130.
These principles of necessity and subsidiarity are formally set out un-
der Belgian law, as collaboration is only possible if “the needs of the investi-
gation demand this and if other investigatory measures seem insufficient
(…)” (Code of Criminal Procedure art. 216/1). However, as we have just seen,
using a list of offences (Code of Criminal Procedure art. 90-ter, § 2-4) which
was originally drawn up for a different purpose (phone tapping) and their
evaluation in abstracto, shows that consideration of these principles is highly
theoretical131. Despite all this, it seems that it is not in the area of terrorism
that the principles of necessity and subsidiarity pose the biggest problems132.
2.1.4. The principle of proportionality
The criterion of proportionality is sometimes understood as demanding
a balance between “the principle itself of using collaborators of justice and
the type of crime being tackled (the idea being that this type of measure
should be reserved for particularly serious crimes)”133. Using this interpreta-
tion, the aim would be to limit the use of collaboration to certain litigations
(see above 2.1.1).
Here, however, the criterion of proportionality134 will be interpreted dif-
ferently: it involves the “relationship of proportionality which should exist
between the crimes committed by collaborators of justice and the crimes
which they are helping to solve (the idea being (…) that a collaborator who
has committed more serious crimes than that which he or she is helping to
investigate should not be rewarded)135. This criterion applies to the legisla-
tor (when determining the scope of the system) and to the police and legal
authorities (when checking if this proportionality can be said to apply to the
case at hand).
The Belgian legislator does not rule out collaboration in cases where
the collaborator has committed a certain type of (particularly serious) of-
127 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 26.
128 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 86 and 263; Doc., Ch.,
2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 59.
129 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure dans le paysage pénal belge: le repenti.
Analyse de la loi du 22 juillet 2018 concernant les promesses relatives à l’action publique, à
l’exécution de la peine ou à la détention consenties à la suite d’une déclaration et considéra-
tions critiques concernant le régime des repentis”, La Science pénale dans tous ses États. Liber
amicorum Patrick Mandoux and Marc Preumont, p. 380; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4,
p. 58.
130 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 283.
131 Viewpoint of a magistrate and several lawyers during the Focus Group of 23rd Oc-
tober 2019.
132 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 443 and 444.
133 Ibid., p. 24.
134 In places we write “external” proportionality, to avoid confusion with the principle
of “internal” proportionality; see below: 2.2.1.
135 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 24.
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fence. However, the legislator imposes the requirement of proportionality
between “the offence committed [by the collaborator]” and “the offence on
which information is provided” (Code of Criminal Procedure art. 216/5 -
216/7)136. To clarify this question of proportionality, Ch. De Valkeneer pro-
poses the use of the criterion of the level of penalties137.
The preparatory work on the interpretation of this principle of propor-
tionality makes it very clear that collaboration is not possible if the offence
committed by the collaborator is “as serious or more serious than the crime
on which information is provided with an end to discovering or investigating
said crime”138. It seems to us that this prohibition of collaboration for
crimes which are “as serious” as the crime on which information is provided
risks regularly preventing the use of the collaboration system139 and is not
clearly expressed in the legal text itself.
The legislator indicates that to respect this principle of proportionality,
“the level of severity of the possible consequences” resulting from the of-
fence on which information is provided (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/5 and 216/6)140 should particularly be taken into account. The prepara-
tory work indicates the importance of considering the nature of the conse-
quences of the crime disclosed and how current these are: “Declarations
which allow crimes to be stopped, (…) and allow lives to be saved and seri-
ous injuries to be prevented are particularly important”141. The legislator
therefore recommends that the principle of proportionality should consider
not only the degree of severity of the offences committed, but also the inter-
ests and values which are safeguarded or sacrificed by collaboration142.
In the evaluation of proportionality, the Belgian legislator seems to en-
courage the police and judiciary authorities to stick to “values which could
plausibly be compromised in the case at hand”143. To evaluate the degree of
plausibility of the threat, it seems very useful to distinguish between the
“punitive”, “preservative” and “limitative” types of collaboration (see Intro-
duction above). In the case of “preservative” and “limitative” collaboration,
the threat to values seems “much more current and tangible” than in cases
136 During his hearing in the Chamber, Ch. DE VALKENEER illustrated this principle of
proportionality by stating that it should not be possible for a candidate for collaboration who
has committed a rape to give testimony regarding money laundering (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018,
n° 3016/4, p. 59).
137 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 380.
138 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 28, emphasis added.
139 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 380.
140 Thus, a repeat offender collaborator being prosecuted for forgery (maximum sen-
tence 15 years) could give testimony on a robbery (maximum sentence 10 years) due to the
“severity of the consequences of the offence” (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 46 and 47).
141 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 27, emphasis added. “Particular attention must
be paid to the severity of the consequences of the offence revealed by the repentant, rather
than to the penalty itself” (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 46, emphasis added).
142 In terms of values, collaboration raises questions on the moral prohibition on in-
forming (and the values of loyalty and solidarity; see below: 2.8.2.1). It can put great pressure
on individuals to waive the right to silence. It can also lead to innocent parties being sen-
tenced (if the fact that the information is not reliable goes unnoticed; see below: 2.8.2.3). Re-
garding the values protected owing to procedural collaboration, it seems that those related to
human dignity and moral and physical safety are key.
143 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 441.
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of purely “punitive” collaboration144. This type of threat should therefore
have a greater impact on the operationalisation of the principle of propor-
tionality: “in the case of declarations which concern an ongoing offence or an
offence (…) which could cause serious physical injuries, death or significant
damage, or which could prevent more serious crimes, the promise of a re-
ward is particularly justifiable”145.
2.1.5. The principle of absence of danger
When a promise of a reward concerns sentence enforcement (see below
2.2.2), there is an extra condition for the use of collaboration: the collabora-
tor “must not represent a danger to public safety” (Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 216/6). This extra condition is justified by the fact that the “conse-
quence of the promise is that the prisoner may be released”146. The use of
the system is therefore not only dependent upon the objective degree of
severity of the act (see above: 2.1.1 and 2.1.4), but also upon the “repen-
tant’s” personality and his or her presumed “dangerousness”.
How can this criterion of absence of danger be operationalised? Should
the criterion of reoffending be used? The preparatory work does not touch
upon these issues. It should be noted that the status of reoffender does not
rule out use of collaboration.
2.2. The types of promise
Three types of promise of reward are prescribed by the Belgian system.
The “deal” can concern the conduction of prosecution (2.2.1), sentence en-
forcement (2.2.2) and the place of detention (2.2.3). We will subsequently ad-
dress the possibility of combining one or more promises (2.2.4).
2.2.1. Promises relating to the conduction of prosecution
2.2.1.1. Promising closure of the case
The Law of 22nd July 2018 leaves intact the prerogative of the Public
Prosecutor to close a case with no further action147. There is nothing to pre-
vent the decision to close a case, after informal negotiation between the
prosecution and the presumed offender, in exchange for information148. Of
course, closing a case in this way provides no legal certainty for the collabo-
rator and the promise is therefore “fragile”149. Furthermore, the situation of
the third party concerned by the revelations is also problematic: “individuals
concerned by the repentant’s declarations [could] be sentenced on the basis
144 Ibid., p. 565.
145 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 46.
146 Ibid., p. 36.
147 Ibid., p. 32, 33 and 39.
148 This possibility has regularly been raised by the authors of previous draft laws (see
above: 1).
149 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 60.
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(and where applicable, on the sole basis) of declarations which stem from
interests hidden from the judge and the defence”150.
2.2.1.2. The promise of a reduced sentence: the case of terrorist offences
If the collaborator, whether a natural or legal person, is being prose-
cuted by the Public Prosecutor, the latter can promise a reward consisting of
a reduction of the sentence151. A specific – and less generous – sentence re-
duction system is in place for terrorist offences. We will focus on this spe-
cific system.
For serious terrorist crimes152 (as for crimes committed with violence or
threats), the reward takes the form of a promise of “a lower-level sentence
with the application of sentence reduction pursuant to articles 80 and 81153 of
the Criminal Code” (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 1, 1°). For ex-
ample, in the case of murder, the reasoning is as follows: 1) article 393 of the
Criminal Code punishes murder (outside of the context of terrorism) with 20
to 30 years of imprisonment; 2) pursuant to article 138 of the Criminal Code,
if the murder is a terrorist offence, the sentence becomes life imprisonment;
3) if a terrorist collaborator benefits from article 80 of the Criminal Code, the
sentence can range from three to thirty years of imprisonment.
For lower-level terrorist crimes154 (as for lower-level crimes committed
with violence or threats), the reward takes the form of a “lower-level sen-
tence with the application of sentence reduction pursuant to article 85155 of
the Criminal Code” (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 1, 2°). Lower-
level terrorist crimes are thus punished by one day to five years of impris-
onment.
For all terrorist crimes (serious and lower-level), a reduction of the fine
and criminal confiscation measures is possible. Regarding fines, the reduc-
tion can lead to an amount “lower than the legal minimum” (Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 1, 4°). Regarding criminal confiscation, the re-
duction can concern optional confiscation and compulsory confiscation, but
cannot apply to confiscation of “substances and objects which endanger
public or individual safety” (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 1, 4º).
In this case, confiscation is not a penalty but a safety measure (for example,
confiscation of weapons, explosives, narcotic substances, etc.)156.
150 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 16.
151 The preparatory work states that the collaboration system is accessible to legal en-
tities (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 37) but neither this work, nor the law, mentions
sentence reduction in the context of the specific penalties applicable to legal entities.
152 Under Belgian law, custodial sentences for serious crimes range from five years to
life imprisonment (Criminal Code., art. 8-11).
153 These are the articles on admissibility of extenuating circumstances for serious
crimes.
154 Under Belgian law, custodial sentences for “lower-level offences” range from eight
days minimum to five years maximum, except for serious crimes which have been reclassi-
fied as lower-level offences, for which sentences can be up to twenty years of imprisonment
(Criminal Code, art. 25).
155 This is the article on the admissibility of extenuating circumstances for lower-level
offences.
156 F. LUGENTZ et D. VANDERMEERSCH, Saisie et confiscation en matière pénale, Bruxelles,
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For serious and lower-level crimes (crimes and delicts) committed
“without violence or threat”, the Public Prosecutor can promise an even
more attractive reward, such as a simple admission of guilt, a lighter sen-
tence157 than the legal minimum sentence, a sentence under electronic sur-
veillance, a community service sentence or a probation sentence (Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 1, 3º). However, these options are formally
prohibited for terrorist offences. The legislator also deems that perpetrators
of terrorist offences “without violence or threat” (for example, it is possible
to finance a terrorist activity “without violence or threat”) cannot benefit
from these more attractive rewards.
As we have seen (see above: 1), before the Law of 22nd July 2018, some
grounds for mitigation did exist for informants in specific litigation in Bel-
gium. The Law of 22nd July 2018 did not repeal these grounds for mitigation.
The question therefore arises of the interaction between these grounds for
mitigation and the system implemented by the Law of 22nd July 2018. Ch. De
Valkeneer proposes using the “most favourable system for the benefi-
ciary”158.
2.2.1.3. Consideration of the weighting principle in sentence reduction
In negotiating the sentence reductions promised, the legislator imposes
compliance with a weighting principle (also referred to as the “internal”
principle of proportionality”)159. This principle justifies a personalisation of
the collaborator’s sentence for two reasons: firstly, the behaviour of collabo-
rating in itself reduces the severity of the offence committed or the “danger-
ousness” of the perpetrator, and secondly, collaboration allows punishment
of behaviours which would otherwise have escaped penalty160. To determine
how far the sentence can be reduced, the Public Prosecutor must take three
criteria into account.
Firstly, the Public Prosecutor must consider the degree of severity of the
acts committed by the collaborator: the more serious the offences are, the
more sentence reduction must be limited. This criterion, which seems obvi-
ous at first glance, nevertheless raises questions. In principle, the law pre-
scribes harsher sentences for serious offences. The criterion of degree of
severity is therefore used firstly to determine, in abstracto, the level of the
sentence (which seems obvious under modern penal rationality). Is it legiti-
mate to use this criterion a second time to limit the reduction of a sentence
in the case of collaboration? Secondly, the Public Prosecutor must take into
account the degree of severity of the offences mentioned in the informant’s ac-
Bruylant, 2015, p. 17. M. TÖLLER, «Un régime des repentis, enfin?», Actualités de droit pénal
et de procédure pénale, V. FRANSSEN et A. MASSET (dir.), Liège, Anthemis, 2019, p. 222.
157 The law does not provide further details but we believe that the legislator is refer-
ring to custodial sentences.
158 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 384; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n°
3016/1, p. 32 and 33.
159 Here we have borrowed the concept of the “weighting principle” from M.-A. BEER-
NAERT. This author justifies her choice of terminology as follows: it is not a “strict case of pro-
portionality (…) insofar as there is no balancing to be carried out between the different val-
ues present” (M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 26).
160 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 514 and 515.
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cusations: the more serious these offences are, the greater the reduction of
the sentence can be. Thirdly, the Public Prosecutor must consider the degree
of severity of the possible consequences of the offences mentioned in the accu-
sation: the more serious the consequences of these offences are, the greater
the reduction of the sentence can be. Does the concept of “possible conse-
quences” (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/6) mean that only conse-
quences which have not yet occurred should be taken into account? If this is
the case, then this last criterion should only apply to limitative and preserv-
ative collaboration, in principle161.
One may wonder if other criteria should be taken into account in the
operationalisation of the weighting principle. It could be envisaged, and in-
deed is in the preparatory work, that if a collaborator is a reoffender this
could limit the reduction of the sentence162. It might also be thought that the
level of risk of retaliatory action should influence how far a sentence is re-
duced. Indeed, the risk of retaliatory action (and the courage necessary to
face this) no doubt differs between a person informing on a homicide in the
context of a terrorist organisation and a person informing on a homicide
committed as a crime of passion. It also stands to reason that greater sen-
tence reduction could be applied when the collaborator would probably not
have been prosecuted and sentenced without their self-incrimination (lack of
evidence)163. Finally (although this list is not exhaustive), one might consider
that the circumstances responsible for the collaborator’s knowledge of the
useful information could influence how far their sentence is reduced: have
they taken proactive (and risky) steps to obtain information to share with
the legal authorities or were they simply a passive witness?
2.2.2. Promises relating to sentence enforcement
With regard to sentence enforcement, the Public Prosecutor can
promise two things. He or she can promise to give a favourable opinion to a
method of sentence enforcement prescribed by the Law of 17th May 2006
(Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/6, 1º). This favourable opinion can
concern for example sentencing to limited detention164, electronic surveil-
lance or conditional release.
161 There is a paradoxical element to this reasoning – in cases where an informant re-
veals offences for which criminalisation has been criticised or even contested (as there are
only “preparatory actions” or “expression of criminal intent” present; see above: 2.1.4), they
can receive a greater sentence reduction. We consider that this paradox disappears when
seen against the backdrop of the shift in approach in criminal justice towards prevention and
intelligence (even though the preparatory work states that “the objective is (…) strictly judi-
cial in nature”; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 38).
162 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 49. Is this statement, which is not justified in the
preparatory work, linked to the greater ease of accessing information (the easier it is, the less
there is to be gained!) or more classically linked to the aim of compounding the criminal sta-
tus of reoffenders (as they bear more guilt from a moral point of view)?
163 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 266.
164 This corresponds to “a means of custodial sentence enforcement in which the pris-
oner is allowed to leave the prison establishment on a regular basis for a maximum of six-
teen hours per day” (Law of 17th May 2006, art. 21).
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Many questions surrounding this opinion of the Public Prosecutor do
not seem to have been clarified by the legislator. The law includes the
promise “to give a favourable opinion” (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/6, 1º), but lists a series of arrangements. Should it be understood that
the promise of a favourable opinion can only concern one arrangement and
is only valid once? Let us take the example of a collaborator who requests to
be sentenced to electronic surveillance measures during sentence enforce-
ment. The Public Prosecutor gives a favourable opinion, but the Sentence
Enforcement Court refuses the measure. The collaborator can resubmit the
request within the time limit set by law (Law of 17th May 2006, art. 57). Is
the Public Prosecutor’s promise still valid? Furthermore, can an internee ob-
tain this type of promise? It seems not, as article 216/6 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure only mentions the Law of 17th May 2006 (without referring to
that of 5th May 2014). Is this systematic exclusion of internees justified?
The Public Prosecutor can also promise, within the limit of their pow-
ers, to “make a favourable decision relating to sentence enforcement” (Code
of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/6, 2º). The preparatory work illustrates this
possibility in the following manner: making a “decision not to enforce the
sentence or to postpone the enforcement of the sentence, subject to certain
conditions”165, “refraining from immediately enforcing the sentence”166.
However, can “prosecutors – under the supervision of their hierarchy and
the Minister of Justice – who bears political responsibility before the legisla-
tive chambers – refrain from enforcing the sentence and decide to allow sen-
tencing to lapse”167? This controversial issue in legal literature elicited a neg-
ative response from M. Verdussen: there is no “principle of expediency of
sentence enforcement” which can be compared to the principle of expedi-
ency of prosecution168. This critical position seems consistent with the Coun-
cil of Europe Recommendation on the role of the Public Prosecutor in the
criminal justice system: “Public Prosecutors (…) shall neither cast doubts on
judicial decisions nor hinder their execution, save where exercising theirs
rights of appeal or invoking some other declaratory procedure”169. Regard-
less of how legitimate this favourable decision may be, its effectiveness
seems to be compromised by the fact that the Public Prosecutor is not the
only party involved in sentence enforcement170.
The three legal criteria of the weighting principle (degree of severity of
offences committed by the collaborator, degree of severity of the offences
165 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 53.
166 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 6.
167 See M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 65.
168 M. VERDUSSEN, Contours et enjeux du droit constitutionnel pénal, Brussels, Bruylant,
1995, p. 469. In the same vein, see the stance taken by Fr. Verbruggen during the hearing in
the Chamber (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 78).
169 Rec(2000)19, art. 19.
170 For example, enforcement of the sentence of electronic surveillance is delegated to
the “competent department for electronic surveillance” (which is informed of the final judge-
ment by the court clerk) (Criminal Code, art. 37-quater). It is only when the electronic sur-
veillance sentence is not served in compliance with the law that the Public Prosecutor can
“decide to enforce the terms of imprisonment agreed in the court decision” (Criminal Code,
art. 37quater, § 3).
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mentioned in the informant’s accusation and degree of severity of the possi-
ble consequences of the offences mentioned in the informant’s accusation,
see above: 2.2.1) must also be respected in promises linked to sentence en-
forcement. For this type of promise, the operationalisation of the weighting
principle seems more limited than for promises linked to prosecution. The
only variables are the number of favourable opinions, the type of favourable
decision made, the presence or absence of the conditions to be respected in
the case of a favourable decision, etc.
For these promises regarding sentence enforcement, it should again be
noted that there are no specific provisions for collaborators who have com-
mitted terrorist offences.
2.2.3. Promises regarding place of detention
With regard to the place of detention, the Public Prosecutor can make
two promises: a promise on the placement and a promise on transfer of the
collaborator to a specific prison establishment (preferred by the collabora-
tor). These rewards can be granted to collaborators “in pre-trial detention or
serving their sentence in a prison facility”171. The preparatory work shows
the interests of the collaborator in being placed or transferred to a specific
prison establishment: to be closer to family or to seek “better conditions
with more facilities available”172. A collaborator may also prefer not to stay
in a certain prison facility alongside certain individuals in pre-trial detention
or inmates.
Certain issues regarding this third type of promise seem not to have
been clarified by the legislator. Can the promise of “a transfer” (Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 216/7, subparagraph 1) be understood more
broadly and concern several transfers? It seems to us that the promise could
concern several transfers, as long as the weighting principle is respected.
Can an internee seek this type of promise? The answer seems to be no, as ar-
ticle 216/7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only mentions the Law of 12th
January 2005 (without referring to that of 5th May 2014). Is this systematic
exclusion of internees justifiable?
The implementation of these promises on the place of detention also
risks being made more complicated by the government’s action plan against
radicalisation in prisons. Under this plan, radicalised prisoners (there will
undoubtedly be prisoners sentenced for terrorism offences amongst these)
will be gathered in specific wings of certain prisons. What happens if a col-
laborator asks to be placed or transferred to a prison which does not have
such a wing? Could the situation lead to the Director-General of Correctional
Facilities refusing to approve the memorandum (see below: 2.4.2.2)?
The weighting principle must also apply to this third type of promise. It
should be noted, however, that the third criterion of this principle regarding
“the degree of severity of possible consequences” is not mentioned in the law,
with no explanation provided in the preparatory work (Code of Criminal Pro-
171 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 36.
172 Ibid., p. 55.
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cedure, art. 216/7, subparagraph 1). The operationalisation of this principle
seems to be very limited here; as we see it, the only variables are the number
of transfers and the time period during which transfers can be requested.
For these promises on the place of detention, there are no specific
points on collaborators who have committed terrorist offences.
2.2.4. Can several promises be combined?
What we mean by “combining several promises” is the possibility of the
collaborator and their lawyer to negotiate several different types of reward,
within the same memorandum. What would the Public Prosecutor’s attitude
be towards a lawyer negotiating a sentence reduction for their client at the
stage of prosecution, as well as a favourable opinion for future conditional
release and a place in a certain prison establishment? Will a bulletin from
the College of General Prosecutors (Judicial Code, art. 143-bis, § 2) shed any
light on this type of situation (which complicates the issue of which Public
Prosecutor’s Office is competent for the drafting of the memorandum; see
below: 2.4.1)173? It seems that the question over combining promises is not
purely theoretical, as is can arise when defence lawyers make particularly
bold proposals. Furthermore, it seems that an example of a combination can
be deduced from the preparatory work, where it is indicated that a promise
regarding the place of detention can be made to collaborators who are “in
pre-trial detention or serving their sentence in a prison”174. Indeed, there is
no doubt that an individual in pre-trial detention is also likely to be inter-
ested in a promise concerning prosecution.
2.3. The trade-off for promised rewards: the collaborator’s obligations
Collaborators have several obligations: to submit a statement (2.3.1), to
be willing to compensate for damages caused (2.3.2), to refrain from com-
mitting new offences (2.3.3), to comply with the conditions set out in the
memorandum (2.3.4) and not to obstruct criminal justice (2.3.5).
2.3.1. Submitting a statement
A collaborator’s main obligation is of course to “make significant, re-
vealing, truthful and complete statements concerning the role of third par-
ties and, if applicable, their own participation” in an offence (committed or
attempted) mentioned under article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/7, subparagraph 1). The col-
laborator must “respond to each summons by the Public Prosecutor, the in-
vestigating judge and the investigative and trial bodies”, in order to make the
required statements (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/4, § 1)175.
173 During the Focus Group of 23rd October 2019, a magistrate said that a bulletin is
being prepared but will be confidential.
174 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 36.
175 During the Focus Group of 23rd October 2019, a magistrate said that if testimony
concerns an offence listed in article 90-ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then it can also
cover “related offences” even if these are not included in the list (without which the state-
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A collaborator’s statements must fulfil four requirements. They must 1)
concern “useful and relevant information” (significant), 2) relate to “new” in-
formation, which is “not yet known or confirmed by the Public Prosecutor”
(revealing), 3) “correspond to the truth” (truthful) and, 4) contain all infor-
mation which is known to the repentant” (complete)176.
The requirement for “significant” evidence is likely to lead to legal un-
certainty for collaborators, as it is not always easy to determine whether the
information they possess will be evaluated as useful and relevant by the Pub-
lic Prosecutor. This makes the promise fragile.
The same occurs with the requirement for “revealing” information, as
the collaborator only rarely knows precisely what information the Public
Prosecutor already has (it would be worrying, were this not the case…) Fur-
thermore, if collaborators provide information without knowing whether the
Public Prosecutor is already aware of it but their initiative shows a desire to
move away from their criminal past, does this not merit a reward? This is,
in any case, the stance taken by the Italian Constitutional Court, which has
declared the condition of “necessarily revealing statements” to be “unconsti-
tutional”177.
Regarding the requirement of “completeness”, the preparatory work
seems to distinguish between internal and external collaboration. In the case
of external collaboration, the statement “does not necessarily have to con-
cern the offences for which the individual in question is being prosecuted or
has been sentenced”178. Is there a limit here linked to the right to silence (see
below: conclusion)? On the other hand, in the case of internal collaboration,
the requirement of completeness demands “complete declarations with re-
gard to the collaborator’s own criminal participation in these offences”179.
On this requirement of completeness, the preparatory work stipulates
that it only concerns offences mentioned in the memorandum and not all
the offences of which the collaborator is aware180. This limited scope of the
requirement of completeness is preferable.
As the statement must be about “the participation of third parties”, the
law does not allow the use of the collaboration system when the collabora-
tor is providing “non-inculpatory information” which, however, could be
useful “to close a wrong line of enquiry”181. Collaboration is authorised to
prove guilt, not innocence.
With regard to the format of the statement, the legislator rules out
anonymity for the collaborator (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/4, § 3).
ments of the candidate for collaboration would not be considered honest and complete). The
lawyers and certain magistrates did not share this view.
176 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 24 and 38.
177 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 66.
178 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 39.
179 Ibid., p. 39. During the Focus Group of 23rd October 2019, a magistrate emphasised
that both statements on offences committed by the third party under accusation and those on
offences committed by the collaborator must be complete. However, another magistrate and
a professor considered that the requirement of completeness and truthfulness should be lim-
ited to the offences committed by the third party (in order to maintain the right to silence).
180 Ibid., p. 86.
181 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 76.
124 SECTION I – CHAPTER 2
In line with case law on the admissibility of types of evidence (see above:
1.2), this transparency requirement is considered essential to ensure compli-
ance with the rights of the defence and in particular with the adversarial
principle182 (see below: conclusion).
2.3.2. Willingness to compensate for damages caused
What the law precisely demands of collaborators is open to debate. Al-
though article 216/2 of the Code of Criminal procedure mentions the “will-
ingness to compensate”, article 216/3 stipulates that the promise made to an
individual who “does not compensate for damages” can be revoked (see be-
low: 2.5.1).
The legislator does not specify which damages are concerned by this
willingness to compensate. It could be imagined that it only refers to the
damages linked to the offences committed by the collaborator and which are
stated in the memorandum (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 1).
2.3.3. Not committing an offence (of a certain severity)
Collaborators cannot be given a prison sentence of more than six
months for offences committed after the conclusion of the memorandum
(Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/3, 2º).
2.3.4. Respecting the conditions set out in the memorandum
To benefit from the promise, the collaborator commits to respecting
certain conditions. There are general conditions which are systematically
presented and specific conditions which vary from case to case (Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 1 and 216/3, § 1, 1º; see below: 2.4.2.1).
2.3.5. Not obstructing criminal justice
The collaborator cannot attempt to hide evidence or reach an agree-
ment with third parties (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/3, § 1, 6º).
2.4. Conditions for using procedural collaboration and its procedural aspects
The collaboration system gives rise to an agreement between the Public
Prosecutor and the candidate for collaboration (2.4.1). This agreement is
formalised in a memorandum (2.4.2) and when it concerns a promise re-
garding prosecution, is approved by a judge (2.4.3).
2.4.1. An agreement between the Public Prosecutor and the candidate for col-
laboration
The candidate for collaboration has no subjective right to a reward if
they wish to make statements. The Public Prosecutor makes a decision
182 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 58.
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based on expediency on whether negotiation should be undertaken with the
candidate for collaboration183.
It is important to be attentive to whether the potential collaborator is in
fact asking for this, and to avoid so much pressure being put on individuals
that doubt is cast on whether their statements are given freely (see below:
conclusion).
2.4.2. Formalisation of the agreement: drafting and approval of the memoran-
dum
2.4.2.1. Content and formal requirements of the memorandum
The memorandum is dated and must contain the following information
(Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 1 and § 5):
– the identity of the collaborator (cannot be anonymous; see above:
2.3.1)
– the name of the collaborator’s lawyer
– the Public Prosecutor184 of the judicial district in which the accused
third party’s offences were committed
– the Public Prosecutor185 of the judicial district in which the collabo-
rator is being prosecuted or has been sentenced
– the offences for which the collaborator is being prosecuted or has
been sentenced (if the latter applies, the sentence issued must also be stated)
– the offences on which the collaborator is going to make a statement
– the content of the promise made by the Public Prosecutor
– the conditions (general and specific) associated with the promise
– the conditions and methods of the statement
– the willingness to compensate for damages186.
The law does not stipulate what is meant by the “content” of the
promise, although it requires it to be “precise and detailed”. One could won-
der if a promise relating to prosecution should specify the level of the sen-
tence, rather than only the sentencing range187. Similarly, promises on sen-
tence enforcement should specify what method(s) of sentence enforcement
is/are concerned by the favourable opinion, the number of favourable opin-
ions which will be granted, and which favourable decision(s) can be granted
183 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 28; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 81.
184 As highlighted by the College of General Prosecutors in their opinion, the term
“procureur du Roi” (public prosecutor of the King) should be replaced with the term “mag-
istrat du ministère public” (magistrate of the Public Prosecutor’s Office) as “the use of re-
pentants could be envisaged within all bodies of the Public Prosecutor’s Office” (Doc., Ch.,
2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 151). Furthermore, many magistrates of the Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice could be involved (if the collaborators reveals several offences committed by different
people and in different places).
185 Many magistrates of the Public Prosecutor’s Office could be involved (if the collab-
orator has committed different offences in different places).
186 Article 216/2, § 1, 4º of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that the last six
points should be explained in a more “precise and detailed” manner.
187 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 391.
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(see above: 2.2.2). Finally, promises regarding the place of detention should
specify the number of transfers promised (see above: 2.2.3)188. 
The concept of “conditions associated with the promise” seems unclear.
There appear to be two types of condition: general conditions which are al-
ways present and specific conditions which pertain to the case at hand.
There are four general conditions189:
– inadmissibility of a principal sentence of more than six months im-
prisonment for offences committed after the conclusion of the memoran-
dum.
– obligation to submit statements
– obligation to compensate for damages
– forbidden to knowingly make incomplete, untruthful or non-revealing
statements.
Regarding the specific conditions, the legislator has not taken into ac-
count the Council of State’s criticism that the concept required further clar-
ification190. It is therefore not clear what is involved here. Could these con-
ditions be, for example, a ban on carrying weapons, or a ban on living in a
certain area?
Similarly, the Council of State’s request for clarification of the “condi-
tions and methods of the statement” has not been acted upon by the legisla-
tor191. However, the preparatory work provides some useful information: the
memorandum should indicate the “date”, “time” and “place” of the state-
ment, the “method” used to give the statement, and the “persons it con-
cerns”192. The memorandum must specify if the statement will be given dur-
ing “a police hearing or as an appearance before the investigating or trial
judge, if necessary in audio-visual format if the repentant obtains the status
of protected witness”193. It seems to us that stating the “persons” the decla-
ration concerns goes beyond the legal requirement. Also, one could imagine
situations (however uncommon these may be) in which collaborators may
make useful statements for the criminal justice proceedings, even if they are
not capable of providing the name of the persons involved (for example, a
statement on the place of burial of a body).
The memorandum is signed by the Public Prosecutor and the collabo-
rator (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 1). If several magistrates are
concerned, the College of General Prosecutors is of the opinion that the
memorandum “should be signed by the magistrates of both entities con-
cerned, rather than only one”194. A bulletin should perhaps be published on
188 For greater precision and detail on the content of promises, it would have been use-
ful to specify the establishment concerned for placement or transfer. However, it should not
be forgotten that the third party under accusation has access to the memorandum (see
below: 2.6). This information could therefore increase the likelihood of retaliatory action.
189 For the determination of these four general conditions, article 216/2, § 1, 4º, d) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure links back to article 216/3, § 1, 2º - 5º of the same code.
190 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 40 and 87.
191 Ibid., p. 92.
192 Ibid., p. 43 and 44.
193 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 392.
194 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 151. It appears to us that in certain situations,
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this topic (for each of the three types of promise) to determine which mag-
istrate of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in particular should negotiate the
content of a promise with the candidate for collaboration and his or her
lawyer, and indicate the roles of the other magistrates involved in the sys-
tem.
The reasons for a promise concerning prosecution made by the Public
Prosecutor must be explained (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 3).
Curiously, the law does not require an explanation of the reasons for
promises on sentence enforcement and place of detention.
In practice, drafting a memorandum could be complicated in view of
the conflicting interests of the parties concerned: the lawyer of the candidate
for collaboration will want to say as little as possible before the memoran-
dum is signed, whilst the magistrate will want to obtain as much informa-
tion as possible, as quickly as possible, so as not to make “futile”
promises195. One solution envisaged could be to ensure that statements
made before the signature of the memorandum are protected by the princi-
ples of good faith and confidentiality between the lawyer and the magistrate.
This would mean that these statements would not be used by the magistrate
if the memorandum was not successfully drafted (confidentiality clause)196.
2.4.2.2. Approval of the memorandum
The memorandum must receive the prior agreement of the General
Prosecutor (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 2, 1º). If there are sev-
eral competent General Prosecutors, a decision is taken “by consensus”
(Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 3), which means that they must all
approve the memorandum for the promise to be valid197. If the promise was
made by the Federal Prosecutor, no General Prosecutor has competency and
no agreement is necessary198.
The memorandum must receive a prior opinion of the Federal Prosecu-
tor (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 2, 3º). The Federal Prosecutor
has a register of all memoranda signed in the country (Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, art. 216/2, § 6), and is therefore certainly the party most able to “en-
courage uniformity in the implementation of legislation”199. The Federal
Prosecutor is also able to “prevent repentants from obtaining several
promises in different districts in exchange for their testimony on certain of-
more than two magistrates could be involved (if the collaborator has committed several of-
fences and informs on several third parties who have committed several offences them-
selves).
195 Viewpoints of participants in the Focus Group of 23rd October 2019.
196 Viewpoints of the lawyers and magistrates of the Focus Group of 23rd October
2019. However, a magistrate considered that if the memorandum was not signed, magistrates
could use the information gathered.
197 The College of General Prosecutors considers that in the case of external collabo-
ration, the negative opinions will mainly come from the “General Prosecutor of the jurisdic-
tion in which the promise will be implemented” (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 52). The
requirement for consensus avoids the promise being implemented by a Public Prosecutor
who is opposed to it, which would have been problematic for criminal policy in the jurisdic-
tion concerned.
198 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 389.
199 Ibid., p. 389; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 29.
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fences”200. It should be noted that under this hypothesis, the statements
would not be classed as revealing (see above 2.3.1).
A prior opinion from the Witness Protection Commission is also neces-
sary (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 2, 2º). This commission ex-
amines the scale and feasibility of protective measures which could be pro-
vided for certain collaborators. A negative opinion from this commission
could compromise the agreement, as the risk of retaliatory action would be
too high201.
If the collaborator is under investigation or if his/her statements are
submitted as part of an investigation, a prior opinion from the investigating
judge is required (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 2, 4º). This opin-
ion concerns the “progress of the investigation” on determining “the expedi-
ency or need for the use of the repentant as part of the investigation”202. It is
therefore to be expected that the investigating judge will decide on the ca-
pacity of the candidate for collaboration to produce significant and revealing
statements. However, it seems “difficult to ask an investigating judge, who is
independent and impartial, to give an opinion on the relevance of granting
the status of repentant to a witness as part of an ongoing case, when this
judge cannot speculate on the guilt or innocence of either the repentant or
any other suspects (…) on whom a statement could be made203.
Regarding promises on the place of detention, a “prior agreement of
the Director-General of Correctional Facilities” is necessary (Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, art. 216/6, subparagraph 1). It is this Director-General who
has authority over the placement and transfer of prisoners (Law of 12th Jan-
uary 2005, art. 18). These types of promise “could have an impact on prison
functioning”204, but they cannot “undermine the authority of the prison gov-
ernor over discipline, order and security within the prison” (Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, art. 216/7, subparagraph 1). If, due to a disciplinary, order or
security problem, the promise cannot be implemented, “the prison governor
informs the Public Prosecutor of this”205, but it is not known what the Pub-
lic Prosecutor can do about such information. This makes the promise frag-
ile. In addition, we have seen that the government’s plan to combat radicali-
sation in prisons could make certain placements or transfers impossible (see
above: 2.2.3).
To be valid, the memorandum must be agreed and signed in the pres-
ence of the collaborator’s lawyer. The collaborator can confer confidentially
with his/her lawyer at any point, without the Public Prosecutor being pre-
sent (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 4).
200 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 29.
201 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 389 and 390.
202 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 23 and 36. This opinion from an investigating
judge would be useful if the weighting principle were to allow for a greater reduction of the
sentence in cases where, without the collaborator’s self-incrimination, he or she would prob-
ably not have been prosecuted or convicted due to a lack of evidence.
203 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 12.
204 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 56.
205 Ibid., p. 56.
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The memorandum is drawn up in three copies, signed by the Public
Prosecutor and the collaborator. One is given to the collaborator, a second is
placed in the enforcement record on the offence committed by the collabo-
rator and the third is kept by the Public Prosecutor (Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, art. 216/2, § 5).
2.4.3. Approval of the agreement
2.4.3.1. Scope
The requirement of approval of the agreement only concern promises
on prosecution206. Because the legislator gives authority to the Public Prose-
cutor to end prosecution, judicial review is necessary207.
Regarding promises on sentence enforcement, the absence of approval
makes sense when the Public Prosecutor has given a “favourable opinion”
(as the final decision to grant the modality of execution of the custodial sen-
tence will be taken by the Sentence Enforcement Court). However, this could
pose a problem when the Public Prosecutor has made a “favourable deci-
sion” (as in this case, no legal body will be able to check if the principle of
proportionality and the weighting principle are respected).
As for promises on detention, these must be accepted by the Director-
General of Correctional Facilities. However, this individual is not a jurisdic-
tional body and his decision will be linked to other criteria than compliance
with the principle of proportionality and the weighting principle (which will
therefore not be checked in any way).
2.4.3.2. The competent courts
Approval is the responsibility of the court “at which the prosecution of
the repentant takes place”208. This can be the Police Court, Criminal Court,
Court of Appeal, Assize Court or investigating courts209.
The law does not stipulate the Assize Court’s composition (with or with-
out jury) for this approval. As the memorandum contains aspects linked to
the penalty, it seems preferable to have a jury present210. Regarding the in-
vestigating courts, when these are acting as the trial court, they can decide
on an internment or a suspension of sentencing. The legislator has not stip-
206 During the Focus Group of 23rd October 2019, a magistrate stated that if the Pub-
lic Prosecutor realises that the conditions set out in the memorandum are not respected, he
or she will not request approval of the memorandum. This viewpoint was criticised by other
magistrates, lawyers and professors, as in this case the prosecution would be both judge and
jury.
207 The preparatory work refers to the Constitutional Court decision on penal transac-
tion to justify the need for judicial review (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 35; C.C., 2nd
June 2016, n° 83/2016, cons. B.11. and B.12.4.).
208 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 393. The Law of 22nd July is
modelled on the approval procedure for penal transaction, penal mediation and plea bar-
gaining.
209 In practice, it seems that the Council Chamber will be called upon to approve the
majority of agreements (viewpoint of several magistrates during the Focus Group of 23rd Oc-
tober 2019).
210 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 393; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n°
3016/4, p. 83.
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ulated that a internee can obtain a promise211 (see above: 2.2). Regarding
suspension of sentencing, the law states that the question of approval is to
be dealt with during resolution of proceedings (Code of Criminal Procedure,
216/5, § 3). Waiting until this stage of proceedings risk having a dissuasive
effect on the collaborator, “who may be reluctant to provide their testi-
mony”212. In the case of approval by a investigating court, this court sends
the case to the competent court for an alternative sanction to be applied
(Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 3).
2.4.3.3. The purpose of the evaluation
The competent tribunal, court or investigating court assesses whether
(Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 3):
– the principle of proportionality and the weighting principle are re-
spected
– the legal conditions are fulfilled
– the collaborator has freely and knowingly accepted the memorandum
– the offences correspond to their correct legal classification
– the offences for which the collaborator is being prosecuted and the of-
fences mentioned in the informant’s accusation correspond to reality
– no reasons for ending prosecution are present
– the willingness to compensate for damages is present.
The law does not clarify if this covers the concept of “legal conditions”.
The preparatory work suggests that the tribunal, court or investigating court
does not have to check whether the principles of relevance and subsidiarity
are respected213. It seems to us that this concept of “legal conditions” con-
cerns, amongst other things, ensuring that the offence revealed by the infor-
mant is indeed mentioned in article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure and checking whether there are any prior opinions and agreements,
whether a lawyer is present, whether the required signatures are present, etc.
2.4.3.4. The proceedings
The tribunal, court or investigating court gives a hearing to the collab-
orator or their lawyer on the memorandum and the offences which the pros-
ecution concerns (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 4, subparagraph
1). If necessary, the victim or their lawyer is also given a hearing on the of-
fences and the compensation to be provided for damages. The victim can
bring civil proceedings before the criminal courts and in this case, the col-
laborator is given a hearing in the context of these civil proceedings (Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 4, subparagraph 2).
2.4.3.5. The decision
The tribunal, court or investigating court decides whether to approve or
211 With regard to promises on prosecution, it is difficult to envisage a “lower level”
than an indeterminate sanction.
212 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 394.
213 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 35 and 50.
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reject the promise, providing reasons for this decision and with no penal ap-
peal possible (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 3).
If the promise is approved, the tribunal or court214 decides on the sen-
tence which could be applied if one of the reasons for revocation set out un-
der article 216/3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure arises (see below 2.5.1).
The Council of State has criticised the fact that appeal is not possible, as “at
the time of signing the memorandum, the individual concerned does not yet
know the level of the substitude sanction”215. This means that there is no
“waiver of the right to appeal, voluntarily and in full knowledge of the facts”
on the part of the collaborator216. In response to this comment from the
Council of State, the preparatory work states that “all means permitted by
law are available against a substitude penalty”217. Unfortunately, the law it-
self is less clear. In practice, it seems that the collaborator will appear before
the trial judge before the other co-defendants218.
If approval is not granted, the legislator sets out two hypotheses. Either
a new memorandum can be drawn up and be submitted to a differently con-
stituted chamber for approval, or no new memorandum is drawn up and the
offences committed by the collaborator can be assigned to a differently con-
stituted chamber. In the second hypothesis, the memorandum and all docu-
ments, materials and communications linked to this procedure are excluded
from discussions. They cannot “be used against [the collaborator] in any
other criminal, civil, administrative, arbitral or other proceedings, and can-
not be used as evidence, even as an out-of-court confession” (Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 3). As M.-A. Beernaert highlighted during her
hearing at the Chamber, the law should have stipulated that in this hypothe-
sis, all evidence is unusable not only against the collaborator but against the
third party whom the accusations concern219. The law is not sufficiently
clear on the fate of this third party when “the case against [the collaborator]
is assigned to a differently constituted chamber” (Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, art. 216/5, § 3). When this third party is a co-perpetrator or accom-
plice, the Minister of Justice states “that both the repentant rejected by the
judge and the co-perpetrators must appear before the same court”220.
2.5. Revoking the promise
The grounds for revoking the promise (2.5.1), the competent authorities
to make the decision on revocation (2.5.2) and the consequences of this
(2.5.3) are addressed here:
214 If the promise has been approved by the investigating court, this court refers the
case to the competent tribunal or court (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 3, sub-
paragraph 2). If applicable, the tribunal or court rules on civil interests (Code of Criminal
Procedure, art. 216/5, § 4).
215 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 85.
216 Ibid., p. 85.
217 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 51.
218 Viewpoint of a magistrate, criticised by a lawyer during the Focus Group of 23rd
October 2019.
219 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 83.
220 Ibid., p. 29 and 43.
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2.5.1. Grounds for revoking the promise
Revocation of the promise is never compulsory, and is only possible if
the collaborator (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/3)221:
– does not respect the conditions (general and specific; see above
2.4.2.1) which had been accepted in the memorandum.
– is sentenced to a principal penalty of more than six months’ impris-
onment under a ruling or judgement which has acquired the force of res ju-
dicata for offences committed after the date of conclusion of the memoran-
dum.
– does not make statements as stipulated in the memorandum.
– does not compensate for damages.
– has knowingly made incomplete, untruthful or non-revealing state-
ments on the offences concerned (by the memorandum).
– has tried to hide evidence or make an arrangement with third parties.
The law is ambiguous on the grounds for revocation with regard to
compensation for damages: it stipulates that only “the willingness to com-
pensate for damages” should be mentioned in the memorandum (Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 216/2, § 1, 4º, f) but lists failure to compensate for
damages as grounds for revocation (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/3,
4º). This raises questions on the severity of the sanction prescribed in article
216/3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: this revocation seems a dispropor-
tionate sanction, as it has the potential to prioritise the financial situation of
the victim and the State over the freedom and security of the collaborator.
Similarly, the College of General Prosecutors considers that revocation
should only stem from “a deliberate intention not to provide compensation,
[as] the absence of compensation could result from circumstances outside
the convict’s control (illness, social situation, etc.)”222.
The fifth grounds for revocation regards the quality of the declarations
“on the offences concerned”. In the memorandum two types of offences are
stated: the offences committed by the collaborator (Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, art. 216/2, § 1, 4º, a) and the offences committed by the third party
concerned by the informant’s statements (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/2, § 1, 4º, b). It seems to us that it should only be possible to revoke the
promise when the problem with the statement concerns the offences com-
mitted by the third party (as the statement on these offences is the key as-
pect of this system). Also, making “non-significant” statements is not stated
as a possible cause for revocation, whilst making incomplete, untruthful or
non-revealing statements is. The preparatory work seems to indicate that it
is not easy to determine whether a non-significant statement has been pro-
vided intentionally and maliciously223. It seems to us that the same reason-
ing could apply to non-revealing declarations.
221 According to the preparatory work, the promise is always accompanied by a “reso-
lutive condition” (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 33).
222 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 53. If the absence of compensation is due to one
of these circumstances, it could be envisaged that the Special Fund for aid to victims of in-
tentional violence could intervene (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 77).
223 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 91.
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2.5.2. The competent authorities for revocation
For promises concerning prosecution, the Public Prosecutor asks the
tribunal or court to note this non-compliance with the conditions, take a de-
cision on whether the promise should be revoked and decide on the en-
forcement of the substitude sanction (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/5, § 5)224. To do this, the body which approved the promise gives the col-
laborator225, their lawyer and the Public Prosecutor (as well as the victim if
conditions in their interests have been imposed226) a hearing. This revoca-
tion can take place within a period equal to the duration of the substitude
sanction227. This period is a minimum of five years if the collaborator has
not made statements as stipulated or has not provided compensation for
damages (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, § 5).
For promises regarding sentence enforcement and the place of deten-
tion, the law does not state which party has the authority to revoke a
promise. The preparatory work seems to provide a simple answer to this
question: “The Public Prosecutor notes that the conditions have not been re-
spected and is no longer bound by his/her promises”228. It seems curious that
the Public Prosecutor is responsible for both negotiating the promise and
potentially revoking it. Should there not be a transfer of authority for revo-
cation to the Sentence Enforcement Judge? For these two types of promise,
the law does not stipulate the time period within which a revocation can
take place.
2.5.3. Consequences of the revocation
If the promise on prosecution is revoked, the tribunal or the court “in-
dependently delivers a fully explained ruling on the enforcement” of the
sanction planned for the eventuality of the collaborator not respecting the
contents of the memorandum (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/5, §
5)229. This raises a question: when the tribunal or court rules on the en-
forcement of the sanction in question, should it automatically correspond to
the level decided on at the approval stage? Or can (should?) this sanction be
reduced, taking into account the sentence already served by the collaborator,
or even the efforts made by the collaborator to respect the conditions im-
posed (the latter is taken into account by the Sentence Enforcement Court
when determining the proportion of the custodial sentence that the individ-
ual must serve after revocation of conditional release)? We believe that re-
224 Ibid., p. 52.
225 Is it appropriate that if the promise was made by an investigating court, this same
court will conduct the hearings of the parties but that the decision on revocation will be
taken by other court or tribunal? Should the hearings of the parties not have taken place in
this court or tribunal?
226 It would be preferable to conduct a hearing of the victim only if the conditions im-
posed in his or her interests have been violated.
227 We imagine that this period begins on the date of signature of the memorandum.
228 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 44, emphasis added.
229 If the approval was given by a Court of Assize, this “court, without a jury, rules on
the application (providing reasons for this)” of the alternative sanction (Code of Criminal
Procedure, art. 346/1).
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ducing the sentence in this way is possible, as the law does not require the
court or tribunal to impose a set penalty, but to rule on the enforcement of
this penalty.
The consequences of revoking promises on sentence enforcement and
place of detention are not mentioned in the law.
According to certain hypotheses (see below 2.7), the protective mea-
sures implemented for collaborators and members of their family can be
withdrawn. It seems to us that revoking a promise should not automatically
be accompanied by withdrawal of these protective measures. In the case that
the decision only concerns the collaborator, it can, it seems, be entirely dri-
ven by a punitive approach, however if the decision does not only concern
the collaborator (as his or her family may be affected) a combination of
punitive and protective approaches seems necessary.
2.6. Conditions for use of statements
A collaborator’s statements “can only be taken into account as evidence
if they are decisively corroborated by other evidence” (Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, art. 216/4, § 2). As this corroborating evidence must be “decisive”,
this means that “the judge cannot largely or mostly”230 base their decision on
the collaborator’s statement. The “other evidence” can be obtained prior to,
or thanks to, the collaborator’s statement231.
The preparatory work stipulates that the statement must be “corrobo-
rated (…) by a different type of evidence”232. As we see it, this means that the
requirement of corroboration is not respected if the “other evidence” takes
the form of a statement made by another collaborator. It is regrettable that
the law does not specify this.
The lower probative value of the statement is justified by the fact that
the collaborator’s statements could be influenced by the prospect of a
promise, or a desire for revenge.
A copy of the memorandum is included in all enforcement records in
which the collaborator’s statement is used (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/2, § 5). Also, the minutes of each of the collaborator’s hearings must
mention the memorandum (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 216/4, § 2). In
this way, the trial judge is “informed of the fact that this statement has not
been made in a disinterested manner, [which allows the judge to] determine
its reliability”233. Including the memorandum in the enforcement record of
the third party concerned by the informant’s accusations “allows adversarial
debate between the parties concerned”234.
230 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 46.
231 Ibid., p. 45.
232 Ibid., p. 45; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 23. In the same vein, see Ch. DE
VALKENEER, “Quelques réflexions à propos de la prescription de l’action publique et des ‘re-
pentis’ ou collaborateurs de justice”, Rev. dr. pén. crim., 2014, p. 1102.
233 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 31 and 42.
234 Ibid., p. 31. During the Focus Group of 23rd October 2019, certain lawyers stated
that the fact that the contents of the memorandum is accessible to the third party under ac-
cusation will reduce the number of candidates for collaboration. On the same occasion, a
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2.7. Protective measures for collaborators
Protective measures for at-risk witnesses can be accessed by collabora-
tors (2.7.1). These measures are of several types (2.7.2). They can also be
withdrawn (2.7.3).
2.7.1. Accessibility of protective measures
Before the Law of 22nd July 2018, the Belgian protection system for at-
risk witnesses (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 102 - 111) was not applica-
ble to witnesses making “statements regarding cases in which they are being
prosecuted”235. The Law of 22nd July 2018 did not amend the definition of at-
risk witness set out in article 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
clearly include collaborators in the protection system. However, the prepara-
tory work unambiguously show that collaborators and their families can use
this protection system236.
2.7.2. Types of protective measures
Protective measures can consist of (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
104):
– ordinary protective measures (data protection in the civil registry, pre-
ventative technical equipment, psychological assistance, organisation of po-
lice patrols, recording of incoming and outgoing calls, secret telephone num-
ber, protected vehicle licence plate, close physical protection, relocation for
45 days maximum, placement in a protected section of the prison, etc.)
– special protective measures237 (relocation for more than 45 days, new
identity, temporary protective identity)
– financial assistance measures
– measures to preserve the collaborator’s social and administrative
rights238
– measures obliging all persons who, by virtue of their position, have
knowledge of or assist in the protective measures, to maintain confidentiality
– preventative surveillance measures.
These preventative surveillance measures are the major innovation of
the Law of 22nd July 2018 on witness protection. Article 104, § 5 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure does not specify what these preventative surveillance
measures cover. The preparatory work is clearer on this matter. The “physi-
magistrate said that the memorandum would be filed as soon as it is signed (without wait-
ing for approval).
235 Ch. DE VALKENEER, “Une nouvelle figure…”, op. cit., p. 399.
236 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 40 and 56-61. The extension of protective mea-
sures to the collaborator’s lawyer was defended by Fr. Verbruggen during the hearing in the
Chamber (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 77).
237 These special measures are possible when the statements concern an offence under
article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or an offence committed in the con-
text of a criminal organisation. They can therefore be applied to collaborators.
238 These measures are justifiable as “it can currently be observed (…) that when a wit-
ness receives a new identity, innumerable administrative problems arise with regard to pay-
ment of salaries (…), pensions, benefits” (Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 57).
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cal and virtual world” of the collaborator and their family will be monitored
through “discreet interception of mail”, monitoring of “information technol-
ogy (…) (standard telephone communications, VoIP, email traffic, social me-
dia, internet use, etc.)”, monitoring of “means of transport”, monitoring of
“finances” and monitoring of “the new living environment of the at-risk wit-
ness”239.
It is stipulated that this “heightened surveillance” is implemented “for
the sole purpose of guaranteeing security”240. This phrase is rather cryptic:
for whose security? The preparatory work provides many examples of po-
tential beneficiaries of these surveillance measures: the collaborator and his
or her family (protection of physical and psychological safety), police agents
and prison staff (protection of physical safety)241, the protection system itself
(protection of integrity) and the State (cost containment)242. Of course, one
could also wonder if these surveillance measures have other aims than the
security of these different parties, insofar as they allow collection of indica-
tors of any new criminal behaviour on the part of the collaborator. The
preparatory work hardly mentions this point. Instead, it justifies the interest
of these new measures by the need to monitor the inadvertent but problem-
atic conduct of the children of the collaborator who may share details of
their new lives via social media. The conduct of children is highlighted here
to justify intense preventative surveillance of their parents. The intensity of
this surveillance is such that the legislator has stated that the collaborator
should be informed in writing of the possibility of these preventative sur-
veillance measures (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 104, § 5). These pre-
ventative measures are decided by the Federal Prosecutor. The legislator
does not provide reasons for this exception to the competence of the Witness
Protection Commission.
2.7.3. Withdrawal of protective measures
Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out situations where
these different protective measures may be withdrawn. This occurs when:
– the person is “no longer at risk”243
– the person is “suspected of having committed an offence or crime af-
ter protective measures were granted”
– after protective measures have been granted, the person is declared
guilty (or benefits from a penal transaction or mediation) of an offence
which may lead to a custodial sentence of one year, or a higher penalty.
– the person’s actions have in some way compromised the protection
measures granted
– the person is not respecting the conditions of the memorandum244.
239 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 58; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 25 and 95.
240 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 58, emphasis added.
241 The meaning of this systemic and managerial protection is not explained by the
preparatory work.
242 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 58; Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/4, p. 25.
243 Under this hypothesis, the withdrawal of protective measures is compulsory.
244 This is the specific memorandum for at-risk witnesses prescribed by article 107 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is therefore different from the memorandum prescribed
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The Witness Protection Commission rules on the issue of withdrawal
by majority vote, providing reasons for this and with due attention to the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. There is no appeal from the
decision (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 109, § 7). It would perhaps be
worthwhile (to better distinguish between the protective and punitive ap-
proaches) to stipulate that withdrawal of measures granted to the collabora-
tor does not automatically entail withdrawal of the measures granted to
their family. This possibility, which would no doubt be difficult to imple-
ment, is currently impossible (Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 110).
2.8. Monitoring and evaluation of the collaboration system
The legislator has prescribed a monitoring and evaluation mechanism
for this system which is often criticised due to considerations of morality
and reliability245. To this end, the Minister of Justice must submit an annual
report to the Chamber of Representatives (Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
216/8). The report must indicate the number of investigations, the number
of individuals concerned246 and the results obtained within the collaboration
system. The Minister of Justice has mentioned another piece of information
which should be included in this report: the offences committed by the per-
sons concerned247. This information, which is not stipulated by the law,
could be helpful.
2.9. The Law of 22nd July 2018 scrutinised by the Constitutional Court
Two appeals were lodged by two of the accused in a judicial enquiry in
which repentants were used (the “Footgate” case which is still ongoing, see
below), at the Constitutional Court, with the aim of repealing certain provi-
sions of the Law of 22nd July 2018248.
One of the applicants made eight arguments and the other made four
in support of their appeal, mainly from the angle of violation of articles 10
and 11 of the Constitution (principle of equal treatment and non-discrimi-
nation), read in conjunction with the principle of legality, the principle of le-
gal certainty and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The complaints concerned the use of the system for repentants in the con-
text of prosecution, and more specifically the respective roles of the Public
Prosecutor and the investigating judge, the scope of the system for repen-
tants, compliance with the adversarial principle, presumption of innocence,
by article 216/1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which we addressed previously (see above
2.4).
245 M.L. CESONI (dir.), Les nouvelles méthodes de lutte contre la criminalité: la normali-
sation de l’exception, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007.
246 The concept of “individuals concerned” is not satisfactory: should only collabora-
tors be taken into account or also third parties under accusation? If these two types of indi-
vidual are concerned by the statistics, should they not be presented as two separate vari-
ables? Without distinguishing between the two, the statistics may be unusable.
247 Doc., Ch., 2001-2002, n° 1483/4, p. 7.
248 M.B., 12th March 2019, p. 25925.
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promises on sentences, revocation of promises, referral after revocation, the
right to consult enforcement records, confidentiality of evidence and judicial
review (cons. B.2.5).
On 6th February 2020, the Constitutional Court issued a decision reject-
ing the appeal, subject to the interpretation of two provisions of the law249.
Firstly, the Court pointed out that the expediency of using the system
for repentants, when all legal conditions are fulfilled, is a matter for the Pub-
lic Prosecutor alone to decide. However, it underlined that the Public Prose-
cutor must respect the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination
and cannot arbitrarily decide on the individuals who could be considered for
system for repentants (cons. B.7.3). Although the preparatory work shows
that guaranteeing compliance with the condition of subsidiarity is not under
the authority of the investigating and trial courts, “the prohibition of arbi-
trary action is part of the guarantees of the Rule of Law” (cons. B.7.3). Ac-
cording to the Court, it is the responsibility of the “competent investigating
or trial court to check whether the use of the system for repentants is neces-
sary to determine the truth and whether equality of treatment for all persons
involved in the investigation has been respected” (cons. B.7.3). To this ex-
tent, the Court considers that the law provides enough guarantees for effec-
tive judicial review to be carried out on the memorandum (cons. B.8).
Secondly, although the Law of 22nd July 2018 does not stipulate a time
limit for adding a certified copy of the memorandum to the enforcement
record, the Court pointed out that firstly, it could reasonably be considered
that a copy of the memorandum should be immediately included in the en-
forcement record (cons. B.14.2) and secondly, that failure to do so, or doing
so late, could be sanctioned for violation of the right to a fair trial, identified
by the competent investigating or trial court (cons. B.14.5).
The Court added that it considers that there is no violation of the right
to a fair trial due to discrimination, as the individuals concerned by the re-
pentant’s statements reserve the possibility of challenging the reliability, con-
tent and credibility of these statements before the competent investigating or
trial court. The judge can, however, deem the statement to be unreliable and
unusable in the assessment of evidence (cons. B.23.3).
Finally, given that repentants must submit their declarations between
the signature and approval of the memorandum, the Court emphasised that
the competent investigating or trial court should not approve the memoran-
dum if it observes that the repentant has not yet submitted statements or
that the statements made are not linked to the promise (cons. B.32.2).
The Court emphasises the legislator’s inconsistency as regards the
scope of the law; on the one hand, despite the title of the law, the offences
listed do not fall within the strict definition of serious and organised crime
(see above: 2.1.1) and, on the other hand, some offences, such as computer
forgery, appear on the list in article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, while others, such as forgery in writing, do not (cons. B.11.3).
249 Constitutional Court, 16th February 2020, n° 16/2020, Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad,




We will close this overview of the Law of 22nd July 2018 by assessing
this Belgian law from the angle of four criteria for legitimacy which are reg-
ularly raised as a criticism of this type of system for collaboration with jus-
tice: the morality of the system, whether it respects the right to silence,
whether it is reliable, and whether it guarantees equality of treatment and
non-discrimination.
Morality
A first criticism of collaboration is linked to its morally dubious nature.
Informing could be considered morally reprehensible due to 1) underlying
ulterior motives of the collaborator (for example, greed or revenge), 2) the
fact that it can be misleading, and 3) violation of a duty of loyalty or soli-
darity (betrayal of the third party on whom information is provided)250.
Despite its immorality, collaboration is authorised under Belgian law if
this is the only method which will uphold values judged more important
than those it undermines. The principles of expediency, necessity and pro-
portionality, which are formally stated in the law (see above: 2.1), once again
arise here. To authorise or refuse collaboration, the nature of the threat to
the values which collaboration aims to protect must be taken into consider-
ation (is it a current and palpable threat?)251. It is therefore easier to over-
ride the immorality of collaboration for “preservative” and “limitative” types
of collaboration than for “punitive” collaboration (see above: 2.1.4). It seems
to us that the difference between these three types of collaboration is not
sufficiently considered in the law to envisage that it could influence the work
of the police and legal authorities.
The Belgian legislator has chosen to authorise collaboration for an ex-
tensive list of offences, namely those stipulated in article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. This list was not created specifically for the col-
laboration system, but is taken from a list of situations in which phone tap-
ping is authorised (see above: 2.1.1). These characteristics – a broad and
non-specific list – show that the main influence of the scope of collaboration
is not reflection on its immoral nature and its potential excesses with regard
to preserving the values judged most important. Rather, these characteristics
show that the priorities have more to do with simplicity and efficiency.
Pressure to collaborate
When a law authorises collaboration, offenders are subject to a form of
pressure to collaborate due to the difference in treatment of those who col-
laborate and those who do not. Indeed, when an offender is told that if
he/she collaborates the sentence will be three years’ imprisonment, but if not
he/she may be sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, this inevitably puts
pressure on the offender, who may feel that the “six extra years” are not to
250 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 432.
251 Ibid., p. 565.
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punish their illegal conduct but their refusal to collaborate252. There is an el-
ement of truth to this; “as admitted by magistrates (…), the fact that the ac-
cused denies the charges “gives a bad impression” and can lead them to im-
pose a heavier sentence”253. Although this tendency is hard to detect or ob-
jectify, there is a risk that it could become more pronounced when
collaboration is authorised by law254.
Although a certain amount of pressure is inevitable, it is not systemati-
cally unlawful. When the person likely to collaborate has the status of wit-
ness, there is no real “right to silence for witnesses” in Belgium. However, it
may be in the person’s interests not to speak out in terms of respecting soli-
darity and fear of retaliation. Belgian law takes these interests into account
to a certain extent in article 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
states that all individuals must disclose offences and crimes of which they
have knowledge, without prescribing punishment for those who do not com-
ply with this obligation.
When the person likely to collaborate risks self-incrimination, he or she
is in this case protected by a true right to silence. For the pressure exerted
on the person to be legal, their decision to waive this right must be free, in-
formed and accompanied by guarantees255.
Waiving the right to silence is certainly not done freely when a law pre-
scribes a specific penalty to force recalcitrant candidates to do so. On this
subject, we consider it fortunate that Belgian law does not prescribe a spe-
cific penalty for refusal to cooperate on the part of the accused. Belgian law
therefore complies with ECHR case law on this matter256. It also seems ap-
propriate that the Belgian legislator has not introduced penalties for collab-
orators who withdraw from the system and decide not to make a statement
in the end. Under these circumstances, the revocation of the promise and
application of the alternative sanction seems to suffice.
Waiving the right to silence can only be done in an informed manner if
the collaborator knows exactly what he or she will obtain as a result of col-
laboration. Systems where the advantages bestowed on the collaborator are
irrevocable and certain should therefore be preferred.
The decisions of the Belgian Public Prosecutor can in certain contexts
be revoked, as they must receive the approval of the General Prosecutors
and in some cases, the approval of a judge or the Director-General of Cor-
rectional Facilities (see above: 2.4.2). In addition to this, when the memo-
randum on a promise regarding prosecution is signed, the collaborator is
missing an important piece of information: the level of the substitute sanc-
tion. Finally, it must be ensured that the advantages obtained by a collabo-
rator cannot be reduced to nothing by proceedings conducted abroad257. To
benefit from the principle of ne bis in idem, final judgement must have been
252 Ibid., p. 454, 457 and 461.
253 K. Beyens, Straffen als sociale praktijk, Brussels, VUB Press, 2000, p. 390, quoted by
M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 459.
254 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 459.
255 Ibid., p. 464-466.
256 See ECHR, Brusco c. France ruling of 14th October 2010.
257 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 465, 466 and 570.
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passed on the collaborator in Belgium258. It seems to us that the requirement
of approval by a judge provides reassurance with regard to the risk of pros-
ecution abroad.
The result promised by the Belgian Public Prosecutor is sometimes un-
certain. When a promise is made on sentence enforcement, the collaborator
will receive only a favourable “opinion” which does not predetermine the fi-
nal decision (made by the Sentence Enforcement Court). Alternatively, a
favourable “decision” may be granted; however the Public Prosecutor is not
the only party involved in this and its implementation may be affected by the
prior role played by other parties (see above 2.2.2). When a promise on the
place of detention is made, the prison governor may decide not to imple-
ment the promise (even after statements have been made by the collabora-
tor),if he/she considered that this would disrupt discipline, order or security
within the prison (see above 2.4.2.2).
Waiving the right to silence must be accompanied by certain guarantees.
Due to this, in legal literature it is stated that the collaborator must be as-
sisted by a lawyer259. Fortunately, Belgian law provides this assistance (see
above 2.4.2.2). Furthermore, the collaborator should not be “sentenced solely
on the basis of their admission”260. Belgian law requires corroboration in or-
der to punish the third party on whom information is provided, but not to
punish the collaborator. It seems to us that this specific requirement for cor-
roboration is particularly useful when the collaborator deliberately makes
false statements, due to pressure from criminal circles. In the other cases, the
collaborator’s statements will allow the investigators to find other evidence.
Finally, the Belgian legislator stipulates that collaborators should be able to
benefit from protective measures to prevent retaliatory action. The legislator
was particularly attentive to this question, including the opinion of the Wit-
ness Protection Committee very early on in proceedings (see above: 2.4.2.2).
Reliability
There are several reasons to be wary of the reliability of statements
made by collaborators. A good witness, according to F. Gorphé, is someone
who “has no material or moral interests in the proceedings”261. Collaborators
do not correspond to this definition. Furthermore, even if they do not con-
sciously attempt to make untruthful statements, they could be influenced by
“what they think (…) they are expected to say”262. It seems questionable to
believe that the candidates for collaboration will not lie as it is not in their in-
terests to do so (under the threat of having their sentence reduction re-
scinded, or protection measures withdrawn, etc.), as this implies that the col-
laborator considers it impossible to trick the legal authorities263. Be this as it
may, problems concerning the reliability of statements could be mitigated by
including a set of guarantees in the system such as those set out below.
258 Ibid., p. 465.
259 Ibid., p. 466 and 570.
260 Ibid., p. 467, 505 and 572.
261 F. GORPHÉ, La critique du témoignage, 2e ed., Paris, Dalloz, 1927, p. 192, quoted by
M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 471.
262 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 472.
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A guarantee of transparency would mean that the judge (responsible for
the case of the third party on whom information is provided) and the de-
fence (of the third party) would be informed of the witness’ status as a col-
laborator, and of the content of the agreement and the conditions under
which the testimony was obtained. Belgian law stipulates that the judge and
the defence should be aware of the fact that the individual is a collaborator.
These two parties also have knowledge of the content of the agreement, as
the memorandum is included in the enforcement record of the third party
(see above: 2.6). This transparency could have adverse effects in terms of se-
curity for the collaborator (for example if the memorandum states the
prison establishment promised) or for his/her lawyer. There are questions
over the added value for the rights of the defence of knowing exactly what
the promise entails (if only that it allows a lawyer to learn, for future refer-
ence, the room for manoeuvre in their negotiations with the Public Prosecu-
tor264). To ensure the transparency of the conditions under which testimony
was obtained, M.-A. Beernaert proposes, although she can see the problems
with this procedure, that “the first declarations of a collaborator (…) should
always be recorded in audio-visual format”, in order to ensure that the col-
laborator “has not been subject to undue pressure or had to answer leading
questions”265. Belgian law does not address this point.
A guarantee of the adversarial principle seems to be provided by Belgian
law. It appears that the third party on whom information is provided and
his/her lawyer are able to contest the reliability of the collaborator’s state-
ments, as they have access to the memorandum, but particularly because the
law forbids any form of anonymity (see above 2.3.1). If the collaborator’s
need for protection is particularly high, a “remote hearing through an audio-
visual connection”266 seems to be a balanced solution.
The principle of equality of arms could be interpreted as guaranteeing
the defence the power to contest the reliability of the collaborator’s state-
ments by providing the same opportunities as to the Public Prosecutor. In
practical terms, this means that the defence of the third party on whom in-
formation is provided should be able to “grant immunity to any potential de-
fence witnesses”267 This idea, which would no doubt be difficult to imple-
ment, is not addressed in Belgian law.
A guarantee of corroboration seems essential to evaluate the reliability
of statements. This guarantee of corroboration is required by ECHR case
law and stipulates that a third party cannot be sentenced purely on the basis
of testimony given against him or her by a collaborator of justice (see above
1.2). Belgian law provides this guarantee, and even requires statements to be
decisively corroborated by other evidence of a different type (see above 2.6).
263 Ibid., p. 474.
264 For the third party under accusation, it seems that this information on the exact
content of the promise would only strengthen the desire for revenge, without any significant
positive effects in terms of the rights of the defence.
265 M.-A. BEERNAERT, Repentis et collaborateurs…, op. cit., p. 482 and 483.
266 Ibid., p. 494.
267 Ibid., p. 497.
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This guarantee seems necessary, although it limits the principle of certitude
beyond reasonable doubt.
A guarantee of specific statement of reasons could reduce the risk of mis-
carriage of justice268. This would oblige the judge to “specify the reasons why
he or she deems it appropriate to give credence to the statements of a col-
laborator”269. This statement of reasons is not prescribed by Belgian law.
Equality of treatment and non-discrimination
On one hand, the collaboration system must respect “external”270.
equality of treatment. This first requirement concerns the scope of the col-
laboration system; authorisation of collaboration for certain types of crime
but not others must be justified. We consider it important – and this is the
case in Belgium – that this establishment of boundaries be undertaken by
the legislator. The Belgian legislator has chosen to take the severity of of-
fences as a criterion, using the strong expression of the offences “which
most disrupt society”. We have already mentioned the questionable nature of
the operationalisation of this criterion, due to the fact that the legislator has
used the list of offences from article 90-ter, § 2-4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to do so (see above 2.1.1). However, more than this criticism, it is
the criterion of severity of offences which is controversial. On this topic, M.-
A. Beernaert makes a convincing case for the following argument: collabo-
ration should only be possible for litigation “which poses particular difficul-
ties for the legal authorities”271. If the legislator limits the scope only to of-
fences which the criminal justice system would be powerless to process
without collaboration, this will no doubt increase compliance with the prin-
ciples of adequacy and necessity. Limiting the scope in this way would also
provide greater equality of treatment, as it would reduce the initial inequal-
ity between offenders who could become accused third parties (and would
only receive a light punishment as the justice system is powerless to deal
with them) and those who cannot become accused third parties (and who
are more often punished, as the justice system has the power to do so). This
criterion would require periodic evaluation, as changes to tools (technology)
and practices (both on the part of the legal authorities and of the offenders)
could require amendments to be made to the list of criminal litigation in
which collaboration is necessary.
On the other hand, the collaboration system must respect “internal”272
equality of treatment. This second requirement imposes justification of the
fact that different potential collaborators do not all have the same opportu-
nity to collaborate in a useful manner. Only the quickest candidates (as only
these can make statements classed as revealing) can collaborate in a useful
manner. It seems to us that the criterion of speed should not be interpreted
too strictly: a second candidate could also be taken into account for collabo-
268 Ibid., p. 502.
269 Ibid., p. 502.
270 Ibid., p. 542.
271 Ibid., p. 546.
272 Ibid., p. 541 and 548.
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ration and sign a memorandum as long as the first candidate has not yet
made their statements (set out in the first memorandum). This approach
would be even more justifiable if offenders were given the “right to choose
whether to collaborate and the corresponding right to obtain certain benefits
in exchange for collaboration”273. This idea sheds light on the potential in-
equality between offenders when the Public Prosecutor has a margin of dis-
cretion in the choice on whether or not to accept a potential collaboration.
This inequality exists in Belgium.
3. Current case law
As the Law of 22nd July 2018 entered into force only recently, no case
law has been published yet and we do not know of any ongoing cases which
may have used the collaboration system in terrorist cases.
However, the collaboration system appears to be in action in (ongoing)
cases concerning drug trafficking, murder, and organised crime offences274.
Moreover, the Law of 22nd July 2018 was applied for the first time in the
highly mediatised ongoing “Footgate” case. Following a vast enquiry into
corruption in the world of Belgian football, an investigation was launched
into participation in a criminal organisation, money laundering and private
corruption. Nineteen individuals were accused, and nine of these were
placed in detention. One of the main suspects, whose identity was not kept
secret (Dejan Veljkovic) was released under an agreement with the Federal
Prosecutor. This suspect can also lay claim to the title of the first “collabo-
rator” in Belgium. The other accused were also subsequently released during
the investigation. Two of the accused have lodged an appeal with the Consti-
tutional Court, which issued a decision on 6th February 2020 (see above 2.9).
4. Compliance of Belgian law with article 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU
The compatibility of Belgian law with article 16 of (EU) directive
2017/541275 is called into question regarding promises on prosecution (4.1),
on sentence enforcement and on the place of detention (4.2).
4.1. Regarding promises on prosecution
Article 16 of the directive envisages both internal collaboration (“to
identify or prosecute other perpetrators of the crime”)276 and external collab-
oration (“to prevent other offences mentioned in articles 3 - 12 and 14 from
being committed)277.
273 Ibid., p. 552.
274 This information was provided by a magistrate during the Focus Group of 23rd Oc-
tober 2019.
275 (EU) Directive 2017/541 of 15th March 2017 on the fight against terrorism, replac-





The directive only authorises the use of extenuating circumstances for
external collaboration if the collaborator and the third party accused by the
collaborator are both involved in terrorist activities (as the “other offences
listed in articles 3 - 12 and 14” are all linked to terrorist activity). Belgian law
allows collaboration in one case which is not listed in article 16 of the di-
rective: a promise on prosecution can be made in the case that the collabo-
rator is involved in terrorist activities and the third party accused by the col-
laborator is involved in activities not linked to terrorism, as long as the prin-
ciples of relevance, subsidiarity, proportionality and the weighting principle
are respected. We consider that the following example illustrates a situation
in which Belgian law authorises an extenuating circumstance whilst article
16 of the directive does not: a case where the collaborator has received ter-
rorist training and the third party has committed a murder (not linked to
terrorist activities).
4.2. Regarding promises on sentence enforcement and place of detention
The only type of reward prescribed by the directive is sentence reduc-
tion. The question is therefore whether promises on sentence enforcement
and place of detention are compatible with the directive, and particularly
with article 15 which calls for “effective, proportionate and dissuasive crim-
inal penalties”.
Promises on the place of detention do not pose major difficulties. A
change of place of detention does not compromise the effectiveness, propor-
tionality and dissuasiveness of a criminal penalty.
Regarding promises on sentence enforcement, we have seen that Bel-
gian law prescribes either a favourable opinion on a means of enforcement
of the sentence stipulated under the Law of 17th May 2006, or a favourable
decision on sentence enforcement (see above 2.2.2). The first type of advan-
tage does not seem problematic to us. It is only an opinion, and more fun-
damentally, the European Union has shown on many occasions278 that it
promotes alternative means of custodial sentence enforcement and therefore
does not consider that these undermine the requirements of effectiveness,
proportionality and dissuasion of criminal penalties. The second type of ad-
vantage, however, appears potentially problematic if, as the preparatory
work indicates, the favourable decision consists of “not proceeding with sen-
tence enforcement or delaying sentence enforcement, providing the condi-
tions are respected”279. In this case, the effectiveness, proportionality and
dissuasiveness of the criminal penalty are compromised.
General conclusion
Belgium has only had a true “law on repentants” since the entry into
force of the law of 22nd July 2018. Before this law, a penal reward for col-
278 See for example framework decisions 2008/909/JAI, 2008/947/JAI and 2009/829/JAI.
279 Doc., Ch., 2017-2018, n° 3016/1, p. 53.
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laboration was only prescribed for some specific offences (including drug of-
fences), through the grounds for mitigation mechanism, which allowed sen-
tences to be reduced or dropped. This grounds for mitigation mechanism is
hardly used in practice, for the reasons explained in this report.
The Law of 22nd July 2018 is not the first time the Belgian legislator has
tried to introduce a broader mechanism to reward collaborators of justice.
Since the 90s, many draft laws were submitted. To justify their proposals, the
proponents (mainly from the North of the country) pointed to the gaps in the
Belgian system which were highlighted by the sadly famous “Brabant
killings” (1982 - 1985) and more generally, to the needs of the parties involved
in the criminal justice system in order to fight organised crime and terrorism.
The legislator in 2018 did not limit the scope of the collaboration mech-
anism to these types of litigation. The scope of offences upon which infor-
mants can provide information is indeed very wide, as all offences under ar-
ticle 90-ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure are included. Two principles in
particular are meant to limit the scope: firstly, the principle of subsidiarity
only authorises the use of collaboration if the needs of the investigation jus-
tify this and if other forms of investigation appear insufficient. Secondly, the
principle of proportionality does not authorise collaboration if the offence
committed by the informant is more serious than the crime informed upon.
This scope raises questions on the compatibility of Belgian law with article
16 of directive 541/2017/EU. Belgian law authorises sentence reduction
when the collaborator is involved in terrorist activities and the third party
accused by the collaborator is involved in non-terrorist offences, whilst the
directive seems to rule out the use of extenuating circumstances in this case.
The law of 22nd July allows the Prosecutor to promise three types of
benefit. Firstly, the collaborator can obtain a reduced sentence. This sen-
tence reduction must be approved by a judge. How far it is reduced depends
on the severity of the offences committed by the collaborator, the severity of
the offences informed upon, and the severity of the possible consequences of
the offences informed upon. It should be noted that the legislator has pre-
scribed less generous rules for “terrorist” collaborators. Secondly, the collab-
orator can obtain a favourable opinion or decision with regard to sentence
enforcement. People working in the field have strongly criticised this part of
the law. The law should be amended to make this type of reward truly at-
tractive to candidates for collaboration. Thirdly, collaborators can be placed
or transferred to serve their custodial sentence in a prison of their choice.
To benefit from these advantages, collaborators must comply with cer-
tain obligations. The main obligation is of course to make the statements
which they have committed to give, and which cannot be anonymous under
any circumstances. Collaborators must also pay compensation for the dam-
ages linked to their own offence and refrain from committing any new of-
fence of a certain level of severity. If the collaborator does not respect one of
the obligations, the agreement will be revoked and, if the promise was in re-
lation to sentence enforcement, the substitute sanction will be applied.
The declarations made by collaborators can of course have serious con-
sequences on the life of the third party accused by the collaborator, and that
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of the collaborator him or herself (and family). For the third party, it is stip-
ulated that the collaborator’s statements cannot be considered as evidence
unless they are decisively corroborated by other evidence. To guarantee the
rights of the defence of the third party, his or her lawyer will be informed
that the witness for the prosecution is a collaborator (who cannot be granted
anonymity) and will be able to contest the reliability of the testimony. To
avoid retaliatory action, the collaborator and his/her family can be provided
with protective measures, if deemed necessary.
Because the Law of 22nd July 2018 (validated by the Constitutional
Court in its judgment of 6 February 2020) is so recent, there is not yet any
case law linked to terrorist offences. Those involved in this field, when
asked, also stated that no collaboration mechanism is currently envisaged
for any “terrorism” case.
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1. Historical background of rewarding legislation
1.1. Socio-political reasons
Before the 1990s Croatia was one of six republics of the Socialist Fed-
erative Republic of Yugoslavia, which due to its one-party political system,
socialism and state governed market was not part of the European western
democracies. The Republic of Croatia became an independent state in 1991
after the collapse of the socialist political and economic system and the
breakup of Yugoslavia. The quest for independence was accompanied by a
war, which lasted from 1991-1995. Already during the war, a complex and
turbulent transitional reform of the Croatian criminal justice system started
and this process continued until 2000 (the so-called first transitional re-
form). Due to a significantly new international, constitutional and legal
framework, the criminal justice system had to be transformed in order to
protect basic democratic values and individual rights in line with European
standards of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens and
the defence rights. The first transitional reform of Croatian criminal justice
system (1991-2000.) aimed to strike the balance between protection of hu-
man rights and the need for effective criminal justice system including cre-
ating effective solutions to combat new forms of crime, especially organized
crime1 as well as terrorism, which was not in the focus during the socialist
period. The major legislative reform in that regard happened only six years
after independence, in 1997, when a new Criminal Code (CC/97)2 and a new
Criminal Procedure Act3 (CPA/97) were enacted. The Criminal Code has in-
troduced for the first time several rewarding measures for terrorist offences
and the Criminal Procedural Act has introduced the right to fair trial and its
procedural guaranties in line with European Convention of Human Rights
and the Croatian Constitution.
Second transitional reform of Croatian criminal justice system began
with the accession process of the Republic of Croatia to the European
Union, which started on 29 October 2001. On that date Croatia signed the
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union and com-
mitted to fulfil political, economic, legal and administrative criteria from
Copenhagen and Madrid. The process of adopting the EU acquis commu-
nautaire and developing administrative and judicial structures for effective
implementation of Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights and Chap-
ter 24: Justice, freedom and security lasted almost 12 years4 Fight against
corruption and the establishment of an independent and effective criminal
justice system were the most important conditions and the last one to be ful-
filled for accession of Croatia to full membership of the European Union5.
During the negotiations, several forms of rewarding measures have
been introduced into Croatian criminal procedure: the crown witness was
introduced with the Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Preven-
tion Office in 20016 and the judgment at the request of parties in an investi-
gation was introduced in 2002 (Article 190.a CPA/1997) but only for offences
punished up to 10 years of imprisonment, thus excluding severe offences
such as organised crime or terrorism. Similar processes took place in the
field of substantive criminal law. In the course of this timeframe, the Crimi-
nal Code was amended on several occasions, significantly reshaping reward-
ing measures and terrorist offences in line with the acquis.
Following its accession to the European Union in 2013, the process of
harmonization of national legislation with the developing EU law continued
1 See Davor KRAPAC, Zakon o kaznenom postupku i drugi izvori hrvatskog kaznenog pos-
tupovnog prava: redakcijski pročišćeni tekst, objašnjenja i poveznice, stvarno kazalo, Narodne
novine, Zagreb, 2002, pp. 9-10.
2 Criminal Code, Official Gazette 110/97, 27/98, 50/00, 129/00, 51/01, 111/03, 190/03,
105/04, 84/05, 71/06, 110/07, 152/08, 57/11, 143/12.
3 Criminal Procedure Act, Official Gazette 110/1997, 27/98, 58/99, 112/99, 58/02,
143/02, 62/03, 178/04, 115/06.
4 Republic of Croatia submitted official application for full membership to EU in Feb-
ruary 2003, and in 2004 the European Council gave Croatia the official candidate status.
However, the opening of the accession negotiations was delayed until Chief Hague Prosecu-
tor Carla del Ponte declared Croatia’s co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia was complete in October 2005. (see more in: Zlata -DUR-DEVIĆ, Pre-
govori o pridruživanju EU za 24. poglavlje “Pravda, sloboda i sigurnost”, Pravo azila, 1 (2006),
1, p. 3).
5 Berislav PAVIŠIĆ, Novi hrvatski Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Hrvatski ljetopis za kaz-
neno pravo i praksu, 2(2008), p. 512.
6 Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office, Official Gazette
88/01, 12/02, 33/05, 76/07.
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in the Republic of Croatia including the harmonisation with the Directive
(EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism (Counter-Terrorism Directive)7.
1.2. Legislative evolution
For a better understanding of the legislative evolution of rewarding
measures in Croatian law, this chapter shall be divided into two parts ex-
plaining the evolution of Croatian criminal substantive legislation and then
the Croatian criminal procedural legislation.
1.2.1. Evolution of rewarding measures in Croatian substantive criminal law
Mitigation of punishment as such is not a novelty in Croatian legal sys-
tem and neither is remission of punishment. The 1977 Criminal Code of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was taken over and adopted only
with minor adjustments by an Act of the Croatian Parliament as the Basic
Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter BCCRC) in 19918. Mit-
igation of punishment and remission of punishment were governed by Arti-
cles 38 to 41 of the BCCRC and in 1997 the first Criminal Code of the Re-
public of Croatia essentially retained the same provisions from the BCCRC
(see more about classical mitigation and remission of punishment infra,
2.2.2).
Whereas the possibility of classical mitigation of punishment as well as
of remission of punishment, hence, existed in Croatian legislation even be-
fore Croatia became independent, rewarding measures applicable specifi-
cally to terrorism were introduced for the first time by the 1997 Criminal
Code and its subsequent amendments9.
The 1997 Criminal Code introduced a rewarding measure applicable to
the offence Anti-State terrorism (Article 141 CC/1997) – remission of pun-
ishment for those who organized a group of people with a purpose of com-
mitting an act of anti-state terrorism (Article 152 (3) CC/1997), and in case
of a mere membership in the group, remission of punishment was even
mandatory if a member uncovered the group prior to having committed an
act of terrorism (Article 152 (4) CC/1997). It may be assumed that the rea-
sons behind the introduction of this rewarding measure were pragmatic and
utilitarian, i.e. reflected in the desire to motivate terrorists to come forward,
prevent further terrorist activities and facilitate investigations; yet, these
criminal policy considerations have not been explicitly mentioned either in
7 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism (Counter-Terrorism Directive) and replacing Council Frame-
work Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism and amending Council Decision
2005/671/JHA (OJ L 88/6, 31.3.2017).
8 Official Gazette 53/91, 39/92 and 91/92, 31/93, 35/93, 108/95, 16/96, 28/96, NOVOSELEC,
P., Opći dio kaznenog prava, Osijek, 2016, p. 32.
9 Similar provision existed even before in the BCCRC with respect to some other of-
fences against the security of the Republic of Croatia. See Article 115(3) and (4) of the
BCCRC.
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the academic literature or in the explanatory memorandum supplementary
to the new law10.
In 2004, the same possibility of remission of punishment was extended
to those who associated for the purpose of committing acts of international
terrorism and related terrorist offences (Article 187 CC/97)11. By doing that,
Croatian legislator essentially, to an extent, implemented the requirements
set by Article 6 of the Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating
terrorism, which provided for the possibility of reduction of punishment
with respect to all terrorist offences, regardless of whether anti-state or in-
ternational.
Provision defining the offence Association for the Purpose of Commit-
ting Criminal Offenses Against the Values Protected by International Law
(Article 187 CC/97) provided for a more lenient punishment for a perpetra-
tor who organized a group of people or in some other way joined three or
more persons in common action for the purpose of committing any of the
listed (international) terrorist offences12, if by uncovering the group s/he pre-
vented the perpetration of these criminal offences (Article 187(3) CC/97).
Whereas the organizers of such groups were ordinarily to be punished by
imprisonment from three to fifteen years just for organizing a group, pun-
ishment for organizers who prevented the commission of the offence was
significantly less severe – from six months to three years of imprisonment,
with the further possibility of remission of punishment in its entirety (Arti-
cle 187(3) CC/97). Furthermore, remission of punishment was automatic
and mandatory for a member of the group who uncovered the group prior to
having committed any of the listed criminal offences (Article 187(4) CC/97).
With the 2008 Amendments to the CC/9713, the distinct offence of anti-
state, i.e. anti-Croatian terrorism, was abolished and incorporated in offence
Terrorism (Article 169) that was previously entitled “International Terror-
ism”. The 2008 Amendments introduced two new offenses related to terror-
ism – Public Incitement to Terrorism (Article 169a) and Recruitment and
Training for Terrorism (Article 169b) that were also subject to Article 187
regime, allowing for mitigation and remission of punishment.
In 2011 the entirely new Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia
(CC/11) was enacted and it entered into force in 2013. It further harmonized
Croatian criminal legislation with the acquis, also in the field of terrorism14.
Legislative policy discussions and the dominant academic narrative during
this time frame focused almost exclusively on the harmonization require-
10 See Željko HORVATIĆ, Novo hrvatsko kazneno pravo, Zagreb, 1997, p.
11 Technically this was done through the amendments of Article 187 which was until
2004 applicable only to Genocide, Aggressive War and War Crimes. International Terrorism
was incriminated by Article 169 CC/97 and related terrorist offences were the following: En-
dangering the Safety of Internationally Protected Persons (Article 170 CC/97), Taking of
Hostages (Article 171 CC/97), Misuse of Nuclear Materials (Article 172 CC/97), Hijacking an
Aircraft or a Ship (Article 179 CC/97) and Endangering the Safety of International Air Traf-
fic and Maritime Navigation (Article 181. CC/97).
12 For a full list of offences, see footnote 11 supra.
13 Amendments to the CC/97 from 2008 (Official Gazette 152/08).
14 Criminal Code, Official Gazette 125/11, 144/12, 56/15, 61/15, 101/17, 118/18, 126/19.
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ments instead of analysing in depth criminal policy considerations behind
the specific measures15.
The 2011 Criminal Code defines offences related to terrorist activities
in the following articles: Terrorism (Article 97), Financing of Terrorism (Ar-
ticle 98), Public Incitement to Terrorism (Article 99), Recruitment for Ter-
rorism (Article 100), Training for Terrorism (Article 101) and Terrorist Asso-
ciation (Article 102).
The main provision regulating rewarding measures applicable specifi-
cally to terrorism is Article 102 that defines the offence Terrorist Associa-
tion16,17. It provides that an organizer or a leader of a terrorist association18
the aim of which is to commit a criminal offence referred to in Articles 97
through 101 “or any other criminal offence intended to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active
part in an armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act is to intimidate
a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to
perform or to abstain from performing any act” may have his/her punish-
ment remitted if s/he uncovers a terrorist association in a timely manner to
prevent the perpetration of a criminal offence (Article 102(3) CC). The re-
mission of punishment applies under the same conditions to members of a
terrorist association or other persons who commit an act with knowledge
that such an act contributes to the achievement of a terrorist association’s
goal. Finally, remission of punishment is possible with respect to a member
of a terrorist association, who uncovers the association prior to committing
a terrorist offence as its member or on its behalf. Article 102 of the Criminal
Code thus abolished the distinction in the legal consequences for the orga-
15 Comp. e.g. Kristian TURKALJ, Usklad-ivanje hrvatskog pravnog sustava s pravnom
stečevinom EU na području borbe protiv med-unarodnog terorizma, in Davor DERENČINOVIĆ
(ed.), Novi obzori suvremenog terorizma i antiterorizma Hrvatsko motrište, Zagreb, 2007, pp.
79-108, and Ksenija TURKOVIĆ, et al., Komenar Kaznenog zakona, Zagreb, 2013, pp. 152.
16 Criminal Code, Article 102.
(1) Whoever organises or runs a criminal association the aim of which is to commit a
criminal offence referred to in Articles 97 through 101, Article 137, Article 216, paragraphs 1
through 3, Article 219, Articles 223 through 224, Articles 352 through 355 of this Act or any
other criminal offence intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any
other person not taking an active part in an armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act
is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to
perform or to abstain from performing any act, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term of between three and fifteen years.
(2) Whoever becomes a member of the criminal association referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article or commits an act with knowledge that such act contributes to the achieve-
ment of the terrorist association’s goal, shall be sentenced to imprisonment from one to eight
years.
(3) The perpetrator of a criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article
who, by uncovering a terrorist association on time, prevents the perpetration of a criminal
offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or a member of a terrorist association who
uncovers the association prior to committing, as its member or on its behalf, a criminal of-
fence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may have his or her punishment remitted.
17 This provision replaced and slightly amended the content of Article 187 of the for-
mer CC/97.
18 According to Article 328(4) a criminal association shall be made up of three or more
persons acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more criminal offences that are
punishable with imprisonment for a term longer than three years and shall not include an
association randomly formed for the immediate commission of one criminal offence.
153CROATIA
nizers, i.e. leaders and mere members of the terrorist association who re-
nounced their terrorist activity. With respect to the latter, the remission of
punishment is no longer mandatory.
In 2018 the 2011 Criminal Code was amended to comply with the Di-
rective 541/2017. Since the provisions from the Directive 541/2017 were
largely taken over from the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combat-
ing terrorism and its 2008 amendment19, Croatian substantive criminal leg-
islation was already to a large extent harmonized with the Directive. There-
fore, only one new criminal offense related to terrorist offences was intro-
duced – Travelling for the Purpose of Terrorism (Article 101.a CC/19) and
several existing offences were slightly amended. Although this was not ex-
plicitly stated in the explanatory report attached to the amendments, implic-
itly it can be concluded that the legislator considered Article 102 – an article
that regulates rewarding measures for terrorists – in full compliance with
the Directive20.
In the end, it is important to emphasize that in addition to rewarding
measures applicable under Article 102, general provisions on mitigation and
remission of punishment remain applicable under the general conditions
stipulated in Articles 48-50 of the Criminal Code, as will be explained infra,
2.2.2.
1.2.2. Evolution of rewarding measures in Croatian criminal procedural law
Review of legislative evolution of Croatian criminal procedural law may
start with a reference to criminal procedure of former Yugoslavia, more pre-
cisely with the Criminal Procedure Act of 1976 which entered into force on
1 July 1977. After the independence, in 1991 Croatian Parliament co-opted
this law, with some amendments, and it was in force until the adoption of
the new CPA in 1997. The adoption of the CPA of 1997 mark the completion
of the first phase of transitional changes in the Croatian criminal procedure.
Therefore, the first Croatian Criminal Procedure Act, the one from 1997, was
actually founded on the provisions of Yugoslav CPA of 197621.
The original text of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1997 did not contain
the most of the rewarding measures existing today in Croatian criminal pro-
cedural law. They were introduced by the amendments to the CPA/1997 and
with the adoption of new special legislation – Act on Anti-Corruption and
Organized Crime Prevention Office in 2001.
However, the CPA/97 had an important provision that served as a basis
for development of the forthcoming institute of Crown Witness. It autho-
rised the State Attorney General to dismiss a crime report or to drop the in-
dictment against a person who was a member of criminal organization un-
der the following conditions: firstly, if this was “of importance for the dis-
covery of offenses and of the members of a criminal organization”, and
19 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Frame-
work Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, p. 21-23).
20 See www.sabor.hr/sites/default/files/uploads/sabor/2019-01-18/081205/PZE_78.pdf.
21 See more Berislav PAVIŠIĆ, Novi hrvatski Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Hrvatski lje-
topis za kazneno pravo i praksu, vol. 15 No. 2, 2008, Zagreb, pp. 511-512.
154 SECTION I – CHAPTER 3
secondly, if this was “in proportion with the gravity of the offenses commit-
ted and with the importance of that person’s testimony” (Article 176
CPA/97). In accordance with that provision, the Act on Anti-Corruption and
Organized Crime Prevention Office from 2001 introduced a new form of
consensual procedure – Crown witness. The status of a crown witness was
granted to a suspect or defendant, by the court, upon the request of the State
Attorney General. The crown witness as a form of agreement between par-
ties could be used only in cases of organized crime and corruption. Ever
since it was introduced into Croatian law, it has rarely been used in practice,
as will be explained infra (1.3.c) and 2.2.1 B)b))22.
Legislative intervention that introduced another form of consensual
procedure – a judgment at the request of parties in an investigation was
achieved by the 2002 amendments of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1997.
The use of this initial Croatian version of plea-bargaining (Article 190.a
CPA/97), was limited to criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment from
five to ten years. The parties could negotiate only the type and the measure
of the punishment, but not the type and form (criminal law qualification) of
an offence. In the judgment based on the agreement, it was possible to im-
pose a prison sentence up to one third of the upper limit prescribed by law,
while the parties were supposed to indicate explicitly the type and measure
of the punishment. The investigating judge could either agree with the pro-
posed type and measure of the punishment, or disagree, in which case the
judicial panel decided. In case the judicial panel rejected the proposed agree-
ment, the parties had the right to appeal.
In 2008, the new Criminal Procedure Act introduced a new model of
prosecutorial investigation into Croatian criminal proceedings, replacing the
traditional model of judicial investigation. “Judgment at the request of par-
ties in an investigation” was replaced with a “judgment based on agreement
of the parties”. The main difference between the two Croatian versions of
plea-bargaining was that the later version allowed bargaining for all criminal
offences23.
Another form of consensual procedure, “partial procedural immunity
of a witness” or “witness immunity” was also introduced into Croatian crim-
inal procedure with the new Criminal Procedure Act of 2008 (Article 286
CPA). Yet, just a few years later, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Croatia declared unconstitutional the legislative provisions regulating this
institute. More concretely, according to the CPA/08, the State Attorney had
broad powers when granting witness immunity to any person whose testi-
mony would be important in proving a serious criminal offence of another
person, for which a sentence of imprisonment of ten years or more was pre-
scribed by law. The Constitutional Court explained the important procedural
22 Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia. Towards a rights-based ap-
proach to trial waiver systems, page 3-4, 6-7, report available at: https://fairtrials.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publication_pdf/20190513_ Trial_Waivers_Croatia_Final.pdf.
23 Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia. Towards a rights-based ap-
proach to trial waiver systems, page 3-4, 6-7, report available at: https://fairtrials.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publication_pdf/ 20190513_Trial_Waivers_Croatia_Final.pdf.
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difference between the position of witnesses granted with the immunity on
one side, and the Crown witness on the other side24. Following the Constitu-
tional Court decision, Article 286 was brought into line with the Constitution
by 2013 amendments to the CPA. The legislative amendment implied
strengthening the principle of proportionality and therewith narrowing the
margin of discretion of the state attorney when granting the witness immu-
nity. Still, the legislation does not provide for judicial supervision of the state
attorney’s decision to grant the immunity to the witness25 (see more infra,
2.2.1.B)b)).
1.3. Case law evolution
Case law evolution until present days will be presented through four
mechanisms of consensual justice: a) judgement at the request of parties in
an investigation b) judgment based on agreement of the parties, c) crown
witness, d) witness immunity.
a) Judgment at the request of parties in an investigation:
During the first several years, a judgement at the request of parties in
an investigation, existed in the CPA from 2002 to 2008, was barely used in
practice, but its use increased since 2006 when the legislator amended the
Criminal Code and reduced the possibilities to mitigate the sentence and
pronounce suspended sentences, and therefore motivated the defendants to
engage into negotiations with the state attorney26.
b) Judgment based on agreement of the parties:
So far, there have been a few studies on case law of the judgments
based on agreement of the parties. The research conducted at Zagreb County
Court in 2013, that covered the period from 1 September 2011 to 31 May
2013, showed that the judgment based on agreement of the parties was ren-
dered in cases of various criminal offences, including criminal offences re-
lated to drug-abuse, corruption, robberies, abuse of office and official au-
thority etc., but also in cases of murder, attempted murder, rape and at-
tempted rape27. Another research at the same court, covering the period
2013 to 2015, showed that the number (absolute and relative) of judgments
based on agreement of the parties significantly increased every year, though
it did not contain any detail on the type criminal offences28. Yet, it showed
24 USRH U-I-448/2009 of 19 July 2012, points 143 - 146.3, Official Gazette 91/12. See
ibid.
25 Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia. Towards a rights-based ap-
proach to trial waiver systems, page 3-4, 6-7, report available at: https://fairtrials.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publication_pdf/ 20190513_Trial_Waivers_Croatia_Final.pdf.
26 KRAPAC, Davor, Presuda na zahtjev stranaka u stadiju istrage u hrvatskom kaznenom
postupku, in Decennium Moztanicense (ed. Berislav PAVIŠIĆ), Rijeka, 2008, pp. 144-145.
27 See Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS; Dorotea, PULJIĆ, Presuda na temelju sporazuma stranaka
u hrvatskom kaznenom procesnom pravu i praksi Županijskog suda u Zagrebu, Hrvatski lje-
topis za kazneno pravo i praksu 2(2013), pp. 829-830.
28 See Ivan TURUDIĆ, Tanja PAVELIN BORZIĆ, Ivana BUJAS, Sporazum stranaka u kaznenom
postupku - trgovina pravdom ili?, Pravni vjesnik 1(2016), pp. 147-148.
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that all the agreements proposed by the parties, 100% of them, were ac-
cepted by the Zagreb County Court29. This confirms the assumption that the
court has a rather passive role and judges do not check the agreements in
detail30.
On the other side, there are two recent cases where the indictment
panel of Zagreb County court rejected the statement on the agreement of
parties31, and then the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, denied the
County court the authority to question the agreement regarding the choice
of the type and the measure of the agreed punishment32. This decision of the
Supreme Court actually narrows down the authority of the court to question
whether the punishment that the parties agreed upon is not only within the
legislative framework, but also whether it is appropriate and fair.
c) Crown witness:
One of only two cases in the Republic of Croatia where the institute of
Crown witness was used in Croatian judicial practice was the so-called
Pukanić case that relates to a case of murder of the co-owner of the political
weekly Nacional, Ivo Pukanić, and his aide, Niko Franjić. Pukanić and Fran-
jić were killed in the explosion of a bomb planted next to Pukanić’s car in the
car park outside the Nacional offices in central Zagreb on October 23, 2008.
The six defendants, Robert and Luka Matanić, Amir Mafalani, Željko Milo-
vanovic, Bojan Gudurić and Slobodan -Durović, were indicted by the Office
for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime (USKOK) and con-
victed of offences murder for gain, a crime against public security and a con-
spiracy to commit crime33. It is very difficult to collect any data on the use
of crown witnesses, due to its strictly confidential nature.
d) Witness immunity:
Given the fact that testimony of person to whom is granted witness im-
munity is confidential, there are no available information and cases to
demonstrate the functioning of this institute in practice.
2. Current rewarding legislation (where existing)
The rewarding measures will be grouped depending on the stage of the
criminal proceedings in which they are used: the pre-sentencing stage, sen-
tencing stage and post-sentencing stage. The measures will be analysed in
two sections: legislation and results of the focus group. The focus group
29 Ibid., p. 148.
30 Zvonimir TOMIČIĆ, Novokmet, Ante, Nagodbe stranaka u kaznenom postupku -
dostignuća i perspektive, Pravni vjesnik, 3-4(2012), p. 182.
31 Zagreb County Court, decision K-Us-45/15 of 17 May 2016, and decision K-Us-45/15
of 12 March 2018.
32 Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, judgment in case Kzz 38/16-3, of 21 Sep-
tember 2017. See also judgment in case Kzz 17/2018-8, of 8 and 9 May 2018. See Elizabeta
IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia, p. 10.
33 Radio.net, 10 February 2010, Zagreb - https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/trial-in-
pukanic-case-opens-at-zagreb-county-court-20100204.
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worked on the basis of the structured interview with up to three questions
related to each rewarding measure existing in Croatian legislation. There-
fore, this section includes the analysis of the current rewarding legislation
but also experience from the practitioners about their use in judicial prac-
tice.
2.1. Applicability conditions
Explained further under the types of rewarding measures.
2.2. Types of rewarding measures
There are few types of rewarding measures in current Croatian crimi-
nal law. These include: the judgement based on agreement of the parties, the
Crown witness, the Witness immunity, abolishment or reduction of the sen-
tence and mitigation of punishment by the court.
2.2.1. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
pre-sentencing stage
A) The judgment based on agreement of the parties,
a) Legislation34
As said before, the judgment based on agreement of the parties is ap-
plicable to all criminal offences, notwithstanding the gravity or the type. The
34 CPA, Article 360.
(1) The parties may negotiate on the conditions of pleading guilty and agreeing on a
penalty and the other measures referred to in Article 360, paragraph 4, item 3, of this Act.
During negotiations the defendant shall have a defence counsel.
(2) The panel may postpone the session for no more than fifteen days in order that the
parties may complete negotiations.
(3) If prior to the opening of or during the session of the indictment panel the State At-
torney and the defendant and his defence counsel signed a statement on the rendering of a
judgment on the basis of an agreement of the parties, they shall submit the statement to the
panel immediately upon the opening of the session.
(4) The statement referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall contain the following:
1) a description of the criminal offence that is the subject of the charge;
2) the defendant’s guilty plea to the criminal offence in question;
3) the agreement on the type and measure of penalty, judicial admonition, suspended
sentence, partial suspended sentence, special obligations, protective supervision, seizure of
objects, and the costs of proceedings;
4) the defendant’s statement of position on the civil claim filed within the framework
of criminal proceedings;
5) the statement by the defendant on his acceptance of the State Attorney’s proposal
for the imposition of a safety measure and the confiscation of the pecuniary advantage ob-
tained by the commission of the criminal offence;
6) the signatures of the parties and the defence counsel. «(5) After the statement re-
ferred to in paragraph 3 of this Article has been signed, the State Attorney shall notify the
victim or the injured person thereof.
6. Adjudication on the Basis of an Agreement Between the Parties
(5) After the statement referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article has been signed, the
State Attorney shall notify the victim or the injured person thereof.
(6) If the criminal offence in question is a criminal offence against life and limb or
against sexual freedom which is punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment, the State
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negotiation between the parties is taking place in pre-trial stages of criminal
proceedings such as during inquiries, investigation or indictment stage. This
judgement can only be rendered before the indictment panel or at the
preparatory hearing for the trial stage. It can never be rendered in the stage
of investigation, or once the trial has started.
The bargaining procedure is regulated in detail by the Instructions of
the State Attorney General35 (which is internal document and is binding for
all of the state attorneys), and the Criminal Procedure Act only regulates the
procedure before the court, once the parties reach the agreement. The par-
ties (state attorney and the defendant) may only bargain on the conditions of
pleading guilty with regard to the severity of punishment or other criminal
law measure (Article 360 (1) CPA). In cases of criminal offences against life
and limb and criminal offences against sexual liberty, punishable with more
than five years imprisonment, the state attorney must previously obtain the
consent of the victim (Article 360(6) CPA). The minutes of negotiations be-
tween parties is secret and that means that the content of the negotiation
and the motivation of the parties for concluding agreement is not revealed
even to the judicial panel that will deliver the judgment based on it.
However, after receiving the written agreement submitted by the par-
ties, the court must first decide on the indictment (Article 361(1) CPA)
meaning will and may decide to accept the parties’ request only once it has
confirmed the indictment (Article (2) CPA).
The court can refuse to bring a judgement based on the agreement of
the parties only if the agreed punishment does not comply with the rules on
measuring the punishment, or of it is otherwise unlawful (Article 361 (3)
CPA). In the case the statement (the agreement) is accepted, the court shall
pronounce the punishment or measure as determined in the written agree-
ment (Article 361 (3) CPA).
Attorney must obtain the consent of the victim for the reaching of an agreement. If the vic-
tim is deceased or unable to give his consent, consent shall be sought from the persons re-
ferred to in Article 55, paragraph 6, of the present Act.
CPA, Article 361
(1) Upon receipt of the written statement on adjudication on the basis of the agree-
ment reached between the parties, referred to in Article 360, paragraph 3, of the present Act,
the panel shall first determine and state for the record whether the parties agree with the
contents of the statement and then decide on the indictment’s confirmation (Article 354,
paragraph 1, Article 355 and Article 356).
(2) If it confirms the indictment, the panel shall decide on the acceptance of the state-
ment on adjudication on the basis of the agreement reached between the parties, referred to
in Article 360, paragraph 3, of the present Act and shall sentence the accused to a penalty or
other measure referred to in Article 360, paragraph 4, of the present Act.
(3) The panel shall not accept the statement on adjudication on the basis of the agree-
ment reached between the parties, referred to in Article 360, paragraph 3, of the present Act
if in view of the circumstances its acceptance is not in accordance with the determination of
penalty provided for by law or the agreement is otherwise not in accordance with the law. By
an order against which no appeal shall be possible the panel shall reject the statement on ad-
judication on the basis of the agreement reached between the parties.
(4) After the issuance of the order referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, the indict-
ment shall be delivered together with the case file to the president of the panel for the pur-
pose of scheduling the trial.
35 Instructions of the State Attorney General, on the proceedings during bargaining
with the suspect/defendant on terms of pleading guilty and the punishment, O-2/09, of 17
February 2010, http://www.dorh.hr/PresudaPoSporazumu (accessed on 10 October 2019).
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The sentence mitigation agreed upon by an agreement between the
state attorney and the defendant (on which a judgment based on the agree-
ment of the parties is based) must be within the limits prescribed by the
Criminal Code in the Article 49 (Punishment Mitigation Limits)36.
b) Focus group results
Focus group results pointed at some deficiencies of the judgment based
on the agreement of the parties as a rewarding measure. Focus group par-
ticipants found the regulation of the judgment based on the agreement of
the parties inadequate. According to their experiences, there are different
reasons motivating prosecutors to enter into the agreement, which include
improving the cost-effectiveness of the proceedings, discovering new facts
and evidence, and obtaining the testimony necessary to conduct another
criminal proceeding against another defendant. The motive of getting a tes-
timony is not provided by law for this measure as it is legally prescribed for
crown witness. It is only stipulated in the Instruction of the Chief State At-
torney.
Judges and prosecutors indicated that, in practice, the agreement is al-
most never concluded with the aim of improving the cost-effectiveness of the
proceedings. In addition, the judges stated that, in case the goal of the agree-
ment is to obtain evidence against other perpetrator and for another crimi-
nal offence, the problem is that there is no guarantee that the defendant who
reached the agreement will actually participate in another proceeding as a
witness and fulfil his/her part of the bargain once the criminal proceedings
against him/her are completed and a more lenient sentence is pronounced
according to the concluded agreement. Some participants, particularly
judges, pointed out that, according to their opinion, the defendant’s plea
should be judicially fixed as soon as the agreement itself is concluded in or-
der to preserve it for later proceedings and only after the plea is fixed the
court should decide on the request of parties.
Unlike the judges, state attorneys, on the other side, stated that the per-
petrators with whom they entered into an agreement upon which a judg-
ment was subsequently passed, trusted the institutions and fulfilled their
obligations. At the same time, they warned that the formalities for entering
into an agreement with perpetrator are innumerable. This is often demoti-
vating state attorneys to engage into negotiations, and they find that it is eas-
ier for them to just regularly accuse the perpetrator within the classic crim-
inal procedure.
In addition, the state attorneys pointed out that the agreement (on
which the judgment will later be based) between the state attorney and the
accused is particularly useful in cases of crimes involving multiple perpetra-
tors or co-perpetrators. Such procedures are, as a rule, very difficult to con-
duct and complete, so concluding a settlement with several co-defendants is
a significant relief to the State Attorney’s Office.
36 See more in: Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia. Towards a
rights-based approach to trial waiver systems, page 3-4, 6-7, report available at: https://fairtri-
als.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/20190513_Trial_Waivers_Croatia_Final.pdf.
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Finally, all participants agreed that it would be difficult to discuss about
the possibility of applying the institute of a judgment based on the agree-
ment of the parties to terrorist offenses, since so far there were no such pro-
ceedings in the Republic of Croatia.
B) Crown witness
a) Legislation
Crown witness institute is used to obtain evidence needed for the pros-
ecution of a restricted number of the gravest criminal offences. The State At-
torney General requires granting a suspect/defendant a status of a crown
witness and the court assigns it. It was introduced already in 2001 by the Act
on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office37.
Although the institute of crown witness, on the one hand, provides con-
siderable protection for the penitent and is a form of rewarding measure, in
the case of terrorist offenses, the possibility of applying this institute is al-
most completely excluded. Article 39 of the Act on Anti-Corruption and Or-
ganized Crime Prevention Office states that the crown witness cannot be the
perpetrator (circumstances for granting crown witness status) for some of
the most serious offences such as: an act of terrorism referred to in Article
97 (3,4) CC, financing off terrorism referred to in Article 98 (1), CC and a
terrorist association referred to in Article 102 (1) CC.
Even though it cannot be applied to all offences related to terrorism,
the institute of the crown witness still must be mentioned as a form of miti-
gation and rewarding measures since it is an important tool for obtaining
witness testimony as a key evidence in prosecution of grave criminal of-
fences38.
b) Focus group results
Focus group discussion pointed at the main deficiencies of this insti-
tute. Participants agreed that the crown witness, although well-conceived in
theory and regulated in detail in legislation, does not work as intended in
practice. According to participants’ experiences, in Croatia, the status of
crown witness was granted in only two cases so far. In both cases there were
some negative consequences for the witnesses, primarily due to the influ-
ence of the public.
Participants as well pointed that the possibility of assigning the status
of a crown witness to perpetrators is excluded for almost all terrorist of-
fenses, therefore it is disputable whether it can be at all considered an ade-
quate rewarding measure in terrorism cases.
Still, participants emphasized that the institute is necessary on the one
hand, because the testimony of internal communication between members
of a criminal association can only be obtained through the crown witness.
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages, such as a high degree of re-
cidivism among such persons in most countries of the world.
37 Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office, Official Gazette
76/09, 116/10, 145/10, 57/11, 136/12, 148/13, 70/17.
38 Ibid.
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Important advantage of this institute is its strict form, determined by
the law and regulated in detail, as well as a strong judicial control during the
assignment itself. Still, the focus group participants suggested that the
crown witness should be regulated even in more detail. Namely, a person
who obtains such status and is willing to cooperate with the authorities
should be particularly well protected and separated from the environment in
which s/he is located, and the state authorities have to completely prevent
the leakage of information related to his/her private life to the public. This
would prevent populist condemnation by society, but also protect the person
from the criminal milieu of which s/he was a member.
The participants also gave their opinion on why the Crown Witness in-
stitute is not used in practice. The granting of this status is intended for per-
sons who have been members of a criminal organisation, or are in contact
with large and serious criminal organizations. According to the prosecutors,
there are several such organisations in Croatia. The members of these or-
ganisations are so loyal that they are unwilling to cooperate with the au-
thorities. These individuals, even when they face a large prison sentence for
the crime committed, prefer to remain silent rather than cooperative and, as
a rule, are fully loyal to their criminal milieu.
Finally, when asked if, according to their experiences, the judgment
based on agreement of the parties had actually replaced and reduced the use
of the crown witness in practice (having in mind that the main function of
the crown witness is to provide a witness testimony in criminal proceedings
against another defendant, also a member of criminal organization), the fo-
cus group participants had many comments. First, it should be borne in
mind that the interest of the defendant to admit the crime in order to receive
more lenient punishment (which is the basis for the agreement), and the in-
terest to contribute as a witness in another proceeding, are rather different
interests and should be clearly distinguished. The participants believe that a
judgment based on the agreement of the parties in practice actually serves as
a replacement of the crown witness, because it is much easier to use. Still,
they warned that this is not a good solution. Ultimately, with the crown wit-
ness institute a perpetrator is completely abolished for the crimes commit-
ted, while in case of agreement of the parties, the perpetrator is sentenced,
but with a more lenient punishment. Some participants suggested that solu-
tion could be in creation of a new consensual form that would actually com-
bine elements of both above mentioned institutes.
C) Witness immunity
a) Legislation (Article 286 CPA)39
Witness immunity is another form of consensual procedure that applies
to a witness who refused to answer particular question in order not to ex-
39 CPA, Article 286.
(1) A witness shall not be required to answer particular questions if it is probable that
in doing so he would expose himself or his close relative to criminal prosecution, grave dis-
grace or considerable material damage. The body conducting the proceedings shall instruct
the witness thereof.
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pose himself/herself, or a close relative, to criminal prosecution. Then the
state attorney may grant him/her witness immunity, meaning that s/he will
drop charges against him/her if the statement of the witness is important for
proving a grave criminal offence listed in a catalogue40 (Article 286 (2) CPA.
(2) If a witness refuses to answer the questions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle because in doing so he would expose himself or his close relative to criminal prosecution,
the State Attorney may declare that he will not institute criminal prosecution if the answer
to a question and the testimony of the witness are important for proving the commission of
a criminal offence by another person, namely the following criminal offences set forth in the
Criminal Code:
1) war crime (Article 91, paragraph 2), terrorism (Article 97, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3), fi-
nancing of terrorism (Article 98), training for terrorism (Article 101), terrorist association
(Article 102), slavery (Article 105), trafficking in human beings (Article 106), trafficking in
human body parts and human embryos (Article 107), unlawful deprivation of liberty (Article
136, paragraph 4), kidnapping (Article 137, paragraph 3), sexual abuse of a child under the
age of fifteen (Article 158), child pandering (Article 162, paragraphs 1 and 3), exploitation of
children for pornography (Article 163), serious criminal offence of child sexual abuse and ex-
ploitation (Article 166), money laundering (Article 265, paragraph 4), abuse of position and
authority (Article 291, paragraph 2) if the offence was committed by an official person, tak-
ing a bribe (Article 293) if the offence was committed by an official person, trading in influ-
ence (Article 295) if the offence was committed by an official person, criminal association
(Article 328, paragraph 1), committing a criminal offence as a member of a criminal associ-
ation (Article 329, paragraph 1, items 3 through 6), murder of an internationally protected
person (Article 352), kidnapping of an internationally protected person (Article 353);
2) criminal offences against the Republic of Croatia (Title XXXII) and against the
Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Title XXXIV) punishable by imprisonment for a
term of at least five years;
3) criminal offences punishable by long-term imprisonment.
(3) The answer and testimony of the witness must be related to the circumstances of
the case and be credible, in which case the State Attorney shall bring a motion for the ad-
journment of the action in order that the statement within the meaning of paragraph 4 of
this Article can be given. The State Attorney shall have the witness declare in writing that he
as a witness in the criminal proceedings will testify truthfully and will not keep to himself
anything which he knows about the criminal offence about which he is giving testimony and
the perpetrator. Already at the time of giving the declaration the witness shall have a counsel
chosen from among attorneys-at-law so that his rights and interests can be protected.
(4) The declaration referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article may be made by the State
Attorney if the State Attorney obtained the declaration of the witness referred to in paragraph
3 of this Article and the answers to certain questions are important for proving the commis-
sion of a criminal offence by another person as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and
if it is probable that by answering a question the witness would expose himself or a close rel-
ative of his to criminal prosecution for a criminal offence punishable by a sentence that is less
severe than the sentence laid down for the criminal offence about which he is giving testi-
mony. The declaration on the non-initiation of criminal prosecution cannot be made if the
criminal office in question is punishable by imprisonment for a term of at least ten years.
(5) The declaration of the State Attorney on the non-initiation of criminal prosecution
must be made in writing and be certified by the seal and signature of the senior State Attor-
ney. The declaration must include the factual and statutory description of the criminal of-
fence and the legal designation of the criminal offence for which prosecution will not be ini-
tiated. The State Attorney shall hand over the declaration to the witness. The witness and the
person referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article cannot be criminally prosecuted for the
criminal offence that is the subject-matter of the declaration but can be prosecuted for the
criminal offence of giving false testimony.
(6) If the answer to the question referred to in paragraph 2 is incomplete, unrelated to
the circumstances of the case and uncorroborated by other evidence, the State Attorney shall
not make the declaration referred to in paragraph 4 and the answer given to the question
which the witness initially refused to answer for the reasons laid down in paragraph 2 of this
Article shall be struck out from the minutes. The struck-out answer shall be sealed into a spe-
cial envelope which shall be kept separately from the case file.
40 Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia, p. 7.
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The catalogue includes terrorist offences such as terrorism (Article 97 (1, 2
and 3) CC), financing of terrorism (Article 98 CC), training for terrorism (Ar-
ticle 101 CC), terrorist association (Article 102 CC)). In addition, the punish-
ment prescribed for the criminal offence that would be forgiven with the
witness immunity must be lower than the one the witness testimony would
refer to (Article 286 (4) CPA), and must not amount to ten years or more41.
Again, due to the nature of the agreement, there are no publicly available of-
ficial data on the number of such agreements.
b) Focus group results
Focus group participants indicated that the institute of procedural im-
munity of witnesses – witness immunity, is applied much more in practice
than the institute of crown witness, and the most usually it is applied in cor-
ruption cases. According to opinion of several participants, granting proce-
dural immunity to a witness should not be limited to minor criminal of-
fenses. Participants also pointed at some negative experiences with the im-
plementation of this institute. The main problem is the length of the
procedures. Namely, in order to obtain witness immunity, a person must
state that s/he will testify in criminal proceedings as a witness and that s/he
will not withhold any relevant information. From the moment that state-
ment is made and from the moment the State Attorney gives a statement
that s/he will not prosecute, to the moment when the witness in the pro-
ceedings is due to appear before the court, years may pass. During this pe-
riod, there can be various changes in the person of the witness, as well as in
his/her surroundings, so it often happens that such persons declare before
the court that they no longer remember particular circumstances, or they do
not want to testify at all.
But the main deficiency of this institute, according to some opinions of
the focus group participants, is the lack of the precise legislative form for
granting the status of witness immunity (especially comparing with the
crown witness), and particularly the lack of judicial review when granting
immunity. All participants agreed that an additional legislative regulation is
needed. Finally, participants pointed that, according to the legislation in
force, the granting of procedural immunity of a witness would not be ap-
plicable to the perpetrators of terrorist offenses as a rewarding measure,
since most of terrorist offenses are not relatively minor criminal offences,
but just the opposite – the most serious criminal offences which are ex-
cluded from application of this form of consensual procedure.
2.2.2. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
sentencing stage
In addition to the rewarding measures just explained (see supra 2.2.1),
which may under the conditions set in Article 102 of the Criminal Code re-
sult in mitigation or even exclusion of penalty at the sentencing stage, under
Croatian Criminal Code, mitigation and remission of punishment if certain
41 Elizabeta IVIČEVIĆ KARAS, Trial Waiver Systems…, p. 7.
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conditions are met, can be applied to all criminal offenses, including terror-
ism. Although their purpose is slightly different and in Croatian academic
literature mitigation and remission are usually discussed as measures en-
abling individualization of punishment, they can also serve the purpose of
general rewarding measures applicable to all offences.
A) Mitigation of punishment (Article 48 CC)42
In Croatian criminal justice system punishment may be mitigated on
three grounds. One of them is mitigation of punishment as a result of the
agreement between the State Attorney and the defendant (Article 48(3) CC)
(see supra 2.2.1.). Punishment may also be mitigated based on: a) explicit le-
gal authority given to the court to mitigate the sentence (Article 48(1) CC) or
b) the court’s assessment that in a case at hand particularly mitigating cir-
cumstances on the perpetrator’s side justify mitigation provided that the pur-
pose of punishment may be achieved by a less severe punishment (Article
48(2) CC).
a) Explicit legal authority for mitigation (Article 48(1) CC)
With respect to the former, the Criminal Code explicitly prescribes that
the court may mitigate the punishment in connection with these provisions:
omission to act (Article 20(3) CC), excess of the limits of the necessary self-
defence (Article 21(3) CC), substantially diminished responsibility (Article 26
CC), avoidable mistake of law (Article 32(2) CC), attempt (Article 34 (2) CC)
and aiding and abetting (Article 38 CC), regardless of which crime is com-
mitted and who is the perpetrator. The court can also mitigate a punishment
in certain situations related to specific offenses; for example, if a member of
a criminal association who committed, incited or assisted another to com-
mit a criminal offence as a member of a criminal association, substantially
contributes to the discovery of a criminal association, his/her punishment
may not be remitted, but can be mitigated according to explicit authority of
Article 329(3) CC.
b) Particularly mitigating circumstances (Article 48(2) CC)
In the latter case, the court may consider any circumstance as a ground
for mitigation if that circumstance is ‘particularly’ mitigating and base the
decision on the overall assessment of the committed crime and the perpe-
trator. Art. 48(2)of CC lists, as example, several specially mitigating circum-
stances – reconciliation of perpetrator with the victim, compensation in full
42 Mitigation of Punishment, Criminal Code, Article 48.
(1) If expressly so provided by law, the court may impose a less severe punishment
than the one prescribed for a particular criminal offence.
(2) The court may impose a less severe punishment than the one prescribed for a par-
ticular criminal offence also in cases where special mitigating circumstances exist, in partic-
ular if the perpetrator has reconciled with the victim, if he or she has fully or in greater part
compensated for the damage caused to the victim by the criminal offence or if he or she has
made serious efforts to compensate for the said damage, provided the purpose of punish-
ment can also be achieved by such a less severe punishment.
(3) The court may impose a less severe punishment than the one prescribed for a par-
ticular criminal offence also when the state attorney and the defendant have agreed on this.
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or in greater part by the perpetrator for the damage caused to the victim by
the criminal offence or serious efforts by the perpetrator to compensate for
the said damage43. The limits of mitigation of sentence are prescribed in Ar-
ticle 49 of the Criminal Code44 and depend on the severity of the committed
criminal offence.
B) Remission of punishment (Article 50 CC)
In certain cases, the law provides not just for mitigation, but also for re-
mission of punishment. Remission of punishment is regulated by Article 50
of the Criminal Code. The court may remit the punishment of a perpetrator
where:
1. such authority is based upon an express statutory provision e.g. with-
drawal from attempted crime (Article 35 CC) and entirely unsuitable attempt
(Article 34(3) CC) in general part and in context of particular offences, e.g.
Article 102 CC);
2. the consequences of a criminal offence committed by negligence
have aggrieved him/her so severely that his/her punishment is unnecessary
for achieving the purpose of punishment;
3. the perpetrator has sought to avert or reduce the consequences of a
criminal offence committed by negligence and has compensated for the
damage caused by it;
4. the perpetrator of a criminal offence for which only a fine or a sen-
tence of imprisonment of up to one year is prescribed has reconciled with
the victim and compensated for the damage.
It is important to mention that when the court is authorized to remit
the punishment of a perpetrator, it may also reduce the punishment regard-
less of the limits set in Article 49 CC.
In the context of terrorism only Article 50(1)(1) of the Criminal Code is
applicable. Theoretically, the court could remit the punishment in a case of a
terrorist who due to gross ignorance attempted to commit a criminal offence
by unsuitable means or towards an unsuitable object (Article 34(3) CC)45.
43 Petar NOVOSELEC, Opći dio Kaznenog prava, Peto izdanje, Osijek, 2016, pp. 425-427.
44 Punishment Mitigation Limits, Article 49 of the CC/11.
(1) The court may reduce a punishment pursuant to Article 48, paragraphs 1 and 2, of
this Code up to the following limits:
1. if a ten-year term of imprisonment is prescribed as the minimum range for a crim-
inal offence, the punishment may be reduced to three years,
2. if a five-year term of imprisonment is prescribed as the minimum measure for a
criminal offence, the punishment may be reduced to two years,
3. if a three-year sentence of imprisonment is prescribed as the minimum measure for
a criminal offence, the punishment may be reduced to one year,
4. if a one-year sentence of imprisonment is prescribed as the minimum measure for a
criminal offence, the punishment may be reduced to six months,
5. if a six-month sentence of imprisonment is prescribed as the minimum measure for
a criminal offence, the punishment may be reduced to three months.
(2) In the case referred to in Article 48, paragraph 3, of this Code, the punishment may
be reduced up to half of the minimum punishment obtained by reduction pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, but cannot be any shorter than three-months im-
prisonment.
45 Such would be an attempt shoot down a plane, by shooting from a pistol, e.g. NOVOS-
ELEC, Petar, Opći dio Kaznenog prava, Osijek, 2016, p. 292.
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More realistic scenarios are those of withdrawal. According to Article 35(1)
CC, a perpetrator who of his/her own volition gives up the further execution
of a criminal offence being aware that under all the circumstances s/he may
have completed the act or who, after completion of such an act, prevents the
occurrence of the consequences may receive remittance of the punishment.
Particularly interesting is the new provision on the so-called non-causal
withdrawal (Article 35(2) CC). Punishment may be remitted even if a perpe-
trator is unsuccessful in preventing the offence, which remains uncompleted
for reasons independent of his/her will. In fact, an often given example in lit-
erature is that of a perpetrator who installs a bomb, but notifies the police,
not knowing that the police already dismantled the bomb46.
Focus group results were to a great extent conditioned by the lack of ju-
dicial practice in terrorism cases. Regarding the mitigation of punishment
by the court for the perpetrator of a terrorist offense, as well as the optional
release of a member of a terrorist association who discloses the association
or prevents the commission of a terrorist act (Article 102 CC), focus group
participants stated that they could not contribute to the discussion given
that they have never run across such cases in practice. They also pointed at
the fact that such perpetrators may have no reasons to expose themselves to
the risk of retaliation by the criminal organization itself, or to potential ad-
ditional condemnation by the public without any certainty that this would
lead to remission of punishment or at least to obligatory mitigation. Accord-
ing to prevailing view of the focus group participants, the perpetrators are
always motivated by desire to avoid prosecution and/or to obtain a milder
sentence. In doing so, the degree of the perpetrator’s willingness to cooper-
ate is closely linked to the certainty of benefit (mitigation).
2.2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
post-sentencing stage
A) Abolishment or reduction of the sentence47
There are also normative possibilities to remit or mitigate the penalty
or release on parole a convicted person in exchange of his/her testimony.
46 TURKOVIĆ, et al., Komentar Kaznenog zakona, Zagreb, 2013, p. 54; Same example can
also be found in NOVOSELEC, Petar, Opći dio Kaznenog prava, Osijek, 2016, p. 300.
47 Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office, Article 37.
(1) Upon the reasoned proposal of the Director, the Attorney General may submit to
the court referred to in Article 31, paragraph 1 of this Act, a decision on the examination as
a witness of a person convicted as a member of a criminal organization or criminal associa-
tion, together with a request for the renewal of the criminal proceedings for revision of that
final judgment regarding the decision on sentence (Article 43 paragraph 5 of this Act and Ar-
ticle 497 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code), if its evidence is important for the de-
tection and proving of criminal offenses committed within the framework of a criminal or-
ganization or criminal associations or perpetrators of these offenses, or for detecting and
preventing the commission of criminal offenses by members of a criminal organization or
criminal association.
(2) The statements referred to in Article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Act shall be at-
tached to the requests. The sentenced person makes this statement before the competent ex-
ecution judge in the presence of defense counsel.
(3) Instead of the request referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Attorney Gen-
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Upon a reasoned proposal of the Head of the Anti-Corruption and Or-
ganized Crime Prevention Office, the State Attorney General may submit the
court a request to issue a decision to examine as a witness a person who has
been convicted as a member of a criminal organisation or a criminal associ-
ation with the final judgement, along with a request to reopen the criminal
proceeding so as to amend the final judgement in terms of the decision on
the penalty (Article 37(1) and Article 43(5) of the Act on Anti-Corruption and
Organized Crime Prevention Office and Article 497(2) CPA), if that person’s
testimony is relevant for disclosing and proving criminal offences committed
within a criminal organisation or a criminal association, or perpetrators of
those criminal offences, or for disclosing and preventing commission of
criminal offences by members of a criminal organisation or a criminal asso-
ciation. The convicted person shall give his/her testimony before the compe-
tent judge of execution of sentences, in the presence of a defence counsel
(Article 37(2) of the Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention
Office).
The State Attorney General may also submit a proposal to the court
competent for releasing on parole, to release the person on parole beyond
the time limits that are prescribed by a special legislation (Article 37(3) of
the Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office)
Focus group participants could not discuss this institute much because,
according to their experiences, it has never been used in practice. According
to their opinions, one of the reasons why it has never been used in practice,
is the lack of final judgments related to organized crime offenses, committed
within the major criminal organizations. However, the participants agreed
that the institute as such is acceptable.
2.3. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant
a) Judgment based on agreement of the parties:
Although the Criminal Procedural Act regulates the judgment based on
the agreement of the parties and therefore the agreement itself, it does not
contain provisions on the defendant’s obligations to which s/he obliges by
signing the agreement. Only the internal Guidelines on Negotiating and
Agreeing with the Defendant on Plea and Sanction48 issued by the State At-
torney General provide guidance on this issue.
According to that Guidelines, the defendant must comply with some of
the essential elements of the agreement which were decisive for the accep-
tance of the agreement. When testifying as a witness in criminal proceedings
against a specific perpetrator for the specific crime, the testimony has to be
in accordance with a statement given to the state attorney or to the police,
which is attached to the agreement49.
eral may submit to the court competent for the conditional release of prisoners a motion for
parole outside the time limits for repeating the motion prescribed by a special law.
48 Instructions of the State Attorney General, on the proceedings during bargaining
with the suspect/defendant on terms of pleading guilty and the punishment, O-2/09, of 17
February 2010, http://www.dorh.hr/PresudaPoSporazumu.
49 Ibid., p. 8 and additions 2-4, p. 16-22.
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Focus group results show that provisions cited out in Guidelines, do
not provide sufficient guaranties and do not function as intended in practice.
As it was already stressed (supra 2.2.1.A)b)), judges pointed that, in case the
goal of the agreement is to obtain evidence against other perpetrator and for
another criminal offence, the problem is that there is no guarantee that the
defendant who reached the agreement will actually testify in another pro-
ceeding as a witness and fulfil his/her part of the bargain once the criminal
proceedings against him/her are completed and a more lenient sentence is
pronounced according to the concluded agreement. Contrary to the opinions
of the judges, prosecutors stated that the perpetrators with whom they en-
tered into an agreement upon which a judgment was subsequently passed,
trusted the institutions and fulfilled their obligations.
b) Crown witness
In order to obtain a status of a crown witness, a person must state that
s/he will answer the questions in the capacity of a witness, although it is
likely that s/he will therewith expose him/herself or a close person to severe
shame, substantial property loss or criminal prosecution. In addition, in or-
der to become a crown witness, a person must sign a written statement re-
suming the obligation to: speak the truth and not withhold any information
known to him/her regarding particular criminal offences placed in the juris-
diction of the Office, or any other such offence; speak the truth and not with-
hold any information known to him/her about the pecuniary or any other
gain or benefit, objects, acquired assets or other circumstances related to the
particular criminal offences under jurisdiction of the office; and finally state
that s/he is not familiar with any other relevant circumstance (Article 38(1) of
the Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office).
c) Witness immunity:
Witness has to give a factual and credible testimony, tell the truth, not
withhold any information known to him/her about the criminal offence of
which s/he is testifying and the perpetrator of that offence (Article 286(3)
CPA).
2.4. Revocation of rewarding measures
2.4.1. Grounds for revocation
a) Judgment based on agreement of the parties
i) Withdrawal of the party
The parties (the defendant and the state attorney) may waive their
statements, regarding the agreement on which the judgment would be
based, until the judgment is delivered (Article 362(1) CPA). Yet, Instructions
of the State Attorney General narrow down the possibility for the state at-
torney to withdraw from the agreement. A state attorney may withdraw
from the proposal of the agreement until the verdict is rendered only if the
defendant fails to comply with some of the essential elements of the agree-
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ment which were decisive for the acceptance of the agreement (not present-
ing the defence in accordance with the statement given to the state attorney
or the police and which is attached to the agreement, not testifying as a wit-
ness in criminal proceedings against a specific perpetrator for the commis-
sion of a specific crime, in accordance with a statement given to the state at-
torney or to the police and which is attached to the agreement, and in other
cases for which there are special reasons and which must be reported to the
superior state attorney)50. However, in most cases the judgment based on
agreement of the parties is rendered before the giving testimony at the trial
in another criminal proceedings.
ii) Courts’ rejection of the parties’ statement (Article 361(3) CPA)
The court may reject the parties’ statement if “given the circumstances,
its acceptance is not in accordance with measuring the sentence as pre-
scribed by law or the agreement is otherwise not lawful”. The problem with
the interpretation of this provision in practice was discussed supra 1.3.b).
b) Crown witness
The status of Crown witness will be revoked in several cases, according
to Article 46 of the Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention
Office51. The person will lose the status of a crown witness if s/he gives a
false testimony, or does not mention all the facts that s/he is legally obliged
to say when s/he entered into an agreement with the State Attorney General.
Another ground for revocation is commission of a new criminal offence,
placed under jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Pre-
vention Office, or another grave criminal offence listed in the catalogue, if
this crime is committed prior to the final termination of the criminal pro-
ceedings. Lastly, if person with the status of Crown witness becomes a mem-
ber of a criminal organisation or a criminal association and, within its
framework, commits a criminal offence placed under jurisdiction of the of-
fice, the status of a crown witness will also be revoked.
c) Witness immunity
If the answers that witness gives to the questions aren’t factual, sup-
ported by other evidence or are otherwise incomplete, the state attorney can
revoke the witness immunity (Article 286(6) CPA).
50 Instructions of the State Attorney General, on the proceedings during bargaining
with the suspect/defendant on terms of pleading guilty and the punishment, O-2/09, of 17
February 2010, http://www.dorh.hr/PresudaPoSporazumu (accessed on 9 March 2019), page
12.
51 Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office, Article 46.
The provisions of Article 45 of this Law shall not apply and the Attorney General shall
continue criminal prosecution or initiate criminal proceedings:
1. if the Crown witness has not stated all the facts and circumstances referred to in Ar-
ticle 38, paragraph 2 of this Law or made a false statement,
2. if a Crown witness commits a new criminal offense referred to in Articles 21 and 39
of this Law before the final termination of criminal proceedings,
3. if, within two years of the decision referred to in Article 42 of this Act, the Crown
witness has become a member of a criminal organization or criminal association and, within
its limits, has committed the criminal offense referred to in Article 21 of this Law.
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2.4.2. Consequences
a) Judgment based on agreement of the parties:
If the parties withdraw from the agreement, the statement on the agree-
ment as well as all the other data relating to it, must be excluded from the
case file and stored with the judge of the investigation (Article 362 CPA).
They cannot be viewed or used as evidence.
b) Crown witness:
If one of before mentioned reasons for revocation from Article 46 of Act
on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office occurs (supra
2.4.1.b)), the state attorney shall resume or initiate the prosecution.
c) Witness immunity:
If the answer to the question posed to the witness (to which s/he ini-
tially denied the answer) is not complete, circumstantial and supported by
other evidence, the state attorney will not provide a statement on non-pros-
ecution, while the concrete answer will be excluded from the record. The ex-
cluded answer will be sealed and kept outside the case file (Article 286(6)
CPA). The state attorney may initiate the prosecution, including the prose-
cution for giving false testimony52.
2.5. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
a) Judgment based on agreement of the parties:
In cases of criminal offenses for which criminal proceedings are insti-
tuted ex officio, the State Attorney has the power and duty to negotiate an
agreement with the defendant on the plea, punishment and other measures
(Article 38(2)7) CPA). The parties may negotiate on terms of plea and on the
punishment and other measures (agreement on the type and measure of the
punishment, judicial admonition, suspended sentence, partial suspended
sentence, special obligations, protective supervision, seizure of objects and
costs of proceedings). The defendant must have a defence attorney during
the negotiations. The statement on which the verdict will be based must be
submitted to the indictment panel before the beginning of the session, or im-
mediately after its opening. That statement has to be signed by the state at-
torney, the defendant and his/her defence attorney (Article 360(3) CPA).
The content of the parties’ statement for reaching the judgment based
on the agreement of the parties is strictly prescribed by law (Article 360(4)
CPA). The statement must include:
1) a description of the criminal offense, which is the subject of the
charge,
2) the statement of the defendant on the guilty plea,
52 Davor KRAPAC, Kazneno procesno pravo Prva knjiga: Institucije, Narodne novine, Za-
greb, 2015, p. 108.
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3) agreement on the type and measure of the punishment, judicial ad-
monition, suspended sentence, partial suspended sentence, special obliga-
tions, protective supervision, seizure of objects and costs of proceedings;
4) the statement of the defendant on the submitted request for indem-
nification,
5) statement of the defendant on the acceptance of the proposal of the
State Attorney for imposing a security measure and confiscation of the pe-
cuniary gain acquired through a criminal offence,
6) signature of parties and defence attorney.
After signing the statement, the state attorney informs the victim or the
injured party of it. In the case of criminal offenses against life and limb and
criminal offences against sexual freedom, for which a punishment of im-
prisonment of more than five years is prescribed by law, the state attorney
must obtain the consent of the victim before reaching the agreement (Article
360(6) of CPA).
As it was already pointed, the CPA does not regulate the procedure of
negotiation between the state attorney and the defendant, but only the pro-
cedure before the court (supra 2.2.1.A)a)). Relevant provisions were con-
tained in special legislation, as well as in the Instructions of the Attorney
general. In the Article 75 of the State Attorney’s Office Act of 200953, which
is no longer in force, it was determined that ”the State Attorney General
shall provide instructions for the agreement on the sanctions with the de-
fendant. The instructions shall prescribe the manner of organizing the nego-
tiations, the written form and content of the agreement consisting of a state-
ment for the adoption of a judgment on the basis of an agreement reached
between the parties, and the manner for calculating the reduced sentence
that should be applied in the specific case. The instructions may lay down
cases in which the state attorney may not reach agreement on passing the
judgment based on agreement between the parties”. Although the State At-
torney’s Act of 2009 is no longer in force since it was replaced with the State
Attorney’s Act of September 201854 that do not contain this provision, the
Guidelines on Negotiating and Agreeing with the Defendant on Plea and
Sanction issued under the mentioned Article 75 within the Instructions of
the Attorney General, are still in force55.
Hence, according to previous special legislation, the State Attorney
General needed to give directions for plea bargaining, in order to avoid any
potential arbitrariness. Therefore, according to the Instructions of the Attor-
ney general, the reduction of the punishment may be within the limits per-
mitted by law, but the purpose of the punishment and the benefit that pros-
ecutor’s office is gaining by entering into an agreement with repentant
should be considered. Particular attention is given to the agreement leading
to the disclosure of other crimes and other perpetrators or proving guilt of
53 Official Gazette, 76/09, 153/09.
54 Official Gazette, 67/2018.
55 The new State Attorney’s Act from 2018, which is in force since 1 September 2018,
does not regulate plea bargaining.
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other perpetrators. There must be proportionality between the reduction of
the sanction to which the state attorney agrees and other offenses that will
be prosecuted on the basis of the repentant statements. In the case of enter-
ing into an agreement with the co-accused (co-suspect/co-defendant), the
state attorney must take into account all the circumstances of the criminal
offence that defendant committed, the subjective circumstances on the part
of the defendant and especially the criminal offences and perpetrators s/he
would be able to prove on the basis of the repentant’s statements56.
After receiving a written agreement, the court will first determine that
the parties actually agree on the contents of the statement and put it in the
record, and then decide on the confirmation of the indictment. The Indict-
ment must be confirmed before the indictment panel accepts the agreement
of the parties and brings a judgment based on that agreement (Article 361
CPA).
b) Crown witness:
The requirements for granting a status of crown witness are set out in
the Article 36 paragraph 1 Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Pre-
vention Office57. Firstly, the suspect/defendant must be a member of a crim-
inal organization or association. Secondly, there must be circumstances al-
lowing mitigation or remission of punishment. Lastly, granting the status of
crown witness must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and must
be significant for proving, revealing and preventing other criminal offences
committed within the criminal organization. As was already emphasised the
law explicitly excludes the possibility of granting the status of a crown wit-
ness to a perpetrator of the gravest criminal offences, listed in the catalogue
(Article 39 of the Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention
Office). According to the legislature, the gravity of the perpetrator’s criminal
activity would be ex lege disproportionate to the importance of his/her testi-
mony58.
56 Instructions of the State Attorney General, on the proceedings during bargaining
with the suspect/defendant on terms of pleading guilty and the punishment, O-2/09, of 17
February 2010, http://www.dorh.hr/PresudaPoSporazumu (accessed on 9 March 2019), page
10-11.
57 Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office, Article 36.
(1) The Attorney General may require the court referred to in Article 31, paragraph 1
of this Act to issue a decision on examination as a witness of a person who has become a
member of a criminal organization or criminal association:
1. against who a criminal complaint has been filed or criminal proceedings is con-
ducted for a criminal offense referred to in Article 21 of this Act committed within the frame-
work of a criminal organization or criminal association and if there are circumstances on the
basis of which in accordance with the Criminal Code a sentence of a member of criminal or-
ganization or criminal association may be remitted or under which the sentence can be mit-
igated,
2. if the testimony of that person is proportionate to the gravity of the offence com-
mitted and to the importance of that person’s testimony for detecting and proving criminal
offenses committed within the framework of the criminal organization or criminal associa-
tion or their perpetrators, or for detecting and preventing criminal acts of the criminal orga-
nization or criminal association.
58 Davor KRAPAC, Kazneno procesno pravo Prva knjiga: Institucije, Narodne novine, Za-
greb, 2015, p. 497.
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The Attorney General decides to initiate proceedings for granting pro-
cedural immunity to a member of a criminal organization or criminal asso-
ciation in accordance with the law (Article 38(4) CPA). Provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Act apply to interrogation of crown witnesses. Measures
for the protection of crown witnesses and persons close to him/her outside
of the criminal proceedings are taken pursuant to special regulations (see in-
fra, 2.7.b)).
c) Witness immunity:
Article 286 of the Criminal Procedure Act sets out the procedural for-
malities for granting witness immunity to certain persons. The state attorney
may make a statement that s/he will not prosecute a witness who refused to
answer a specific question, in order not to expose him/herself or a close rel-
ative to criminal prosecution, severe shame or significant material damage,
if the answer is important for proving another person’s criminal offence
listed in the catalogue (Article 286(2) CPA). The punishment prescribed for
the criminal offence for which the witness would not be prosecuted must be
less than that prescribed for the offense in respect of which s/he is testifying,
and must not be punishable with imprisonment of ten years or more (Arti-
cle 286(4) CPA).
The state attorney should first obtain a written statement from the wit-
ness saying that s/he will tell the truth and that s/he will not withhold any in-
formation about the crime s/he is testifying of and the perpetrator (Article
286(3) CPA). After obtaining the statement from the witness, the state attor-
ney will prepare and submit to the witness his/her statement on non-prose-
cution (Article 286(4) CPA).
The statement of the state attorney on non-prosecution must be writ-
ten, sealed and signed by the superior state attorney ((Article 286(5) CPA)
and it must precise the criminal offense in relation to which the State Attor-
ney General will not prosecute.
2.6. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations)
In Croatian law, there are no specific rules on probative value of decla-
rations made by crown witnesses, or persons with witness immunity, or wit-
nesses previously sentenced within the judgment based on agreements of the
parties. This means that the principle of free judicial assessment of evidence
applies. Yet, the CPA explicitly prescribes that the conviction may not be
founded exclusively on the testimony of a person granted with the witness
immunity, or on the testimony of endangered witness who was questioned
under special measures of procedural protection (Article 298 CPA)59 (see in-
fra, 2.7.). It should be noted that, in rule, the crown witness would likely be
questioned as an endangered witness.
59 Article 298 CPA: A judgment of conviction cannot be founded solely on a witness tes-
timony obtained under Article 286, paragraphs 2 through 4 of the present Act or on the tes-
timony of an endangered witness.
174 SECTION I – CHAPTER 3
2.7. Measures for the protection of the repentant
a) The judgment based on agreement of the parties:
Until now we were mentioning only the procedural guarantees of the
defendant’s rights. The most important guarantees are defence council and
the judicial control. The presence of a defence counsel is mandatory while
bargaining on a plea with the state attorney from the beginning of the nego-
tiations (Article 360(1) CPA). The judicial control is ensured through the pro-
vision that the court must establish that both of the parties agreed with the
content of the statement (Article 360(1) CPA) and to decide that the indict-
ment is founded on evidence and that there are no impediments for prose-
cution before it accepts the agreement (Article 361(1) CPA).
Beside defence rights guarantees, there are also measures of protection
of endangered witnesses that can also be agreed upon. Special protection
measures that may be agreed upon by the parties while bargaining may be
procedural or extra-procedural measures.
The procedural protection is regulated in the CPA and it includes pro-
viding protection to the endangered witness. This protection consists of a
specific way of examining the witness and his/her participating in the pro-
ceedings. There is also an obligation to act with special care regarding the
protection of witnesses (Article 294(2) CPA). The CPA regulates the special
way of questioning and participation of the endangered witness in the pro-
ceedings (Article 294(3) CPA). It may include the use of pseudonym (Article
295 and 296 CPA), as well as the witness examination through the audio-
video conference with the changed character and voice of the witness (Arti-
cle 297 CPA).
The extra-procedural, or the out-of-court protection (non-procedural
measures and protection) of the witness and his/her close relatives is regu-
lated in the special law (Article 294(4) CPA) – the Witness Protection Act60.
Measures for the protection of a witness and persons close to him/her out-
side the proceedings are set out in Article 17 of Witness Protection Act as fol-
lows: physical and technical protection, transfer, measures of concealment
of identity and property, and change of identity.
b) Crown witness and a convict whose sentence is to be abolished or re-
duced:
When granting the suspect or defendant the status of a crown witness,
the panel of judges shall order that all the records and official notes on that
person’s earlier statements, given in the capacity of a suspect or defendant,
if there are any, be separated from the court records. Such statements, as
well as other evidence they lead to, may not be used as evidence in the crim-
inal proceedings (Article 42(2) Act on Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime
Prevention Office).
Regarding the measures of procedural protection, the panel of judges
shall order exclusion of the public from the part of the main hearing in the
60 Official Gazette, 163/03, 18/11, 73/17.
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criminal proceedings against members of a criminal organization or a crim-
inal association, when the crown witness is interrogated (Article 44 Act on
Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prevention Office). Other procedural
protection measures are applied according to the CPA (see supra 2.7.a)),
while the non-procedural protection is applied according to Witness Protec-
tion Act (see supra 2.7.a)).
c) Witness immunity
A person who is granted a witness immunity, and is questioned as a
witness in criminal proceedings, is provided with the same procedural and
extra-procedural protection under the same conditions as any other witness
to the procedure, according to the CPA and the Witness Protection Act (see
supra 2.7.a)). In addition, the lawyer must be present while the witness is
giving his/her statement in order to protect his rights and interests (Article
286(3) CPA).
2.8. Evaluation and control of the measure
a) Judgment based on the agreement of parties:
As stated before, one of the main deficiencies of this measure is that
there is no guarantee that a person convicted by a judgment based on agree-
ment of the parties will actually fulfil his/her part of the settlement and con-
tribute with his/her testimony in other criminal proceedings to prove other
crimes and perpetrators (see supra 2.2.1.A)b)).
b) Crown witness:
Unlike the judgment based on agreement of the parties, the mechanism
of granting the status of a crown witness does include guarantees that the
crown witness will fulfil his/her part of the settlement. Namely, the status of
a crown witness shall be revoked and the state attorney will continue the
prosecution (see supra 2.3.b), 2.4.1.b), 2.4.2.b)).
c) Witness immunity
The control over the measure is provided through the power of the
state attorney to revoke the witness immunity, if the answers that witness
gives to the questions aren’t factual, supported by other evidence or are oth-
erwise incomplete (Article 286(6) CPA) (see supra 2.3.c), 2.4.1.c), 2.4.2.b)).
3. Current relevant case law (where existing)
The only terrorist crime committed in the Republic of Croatia was the
case of bombing in town Rijeka in 1995. On October 20, 1995, an Islamic
terrorist organization attempted to destroy a police station by driving a car
with a bomb into the wall of the building. Twenty-seven employees in the po-
lice station and two bystanders on the street were injured, although the only
person killed was the attacker.
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The criminal proceedings were not conducted due to the death of the
perpetrator, and it is therefore impossible to discuss the measures applied in
the particular case as they were not even taken. However, we will continue
with brief review and explanation of the circumstances of the case.
In the last days of the Bosnian War in 1995, the Croatian Defense Coun-
cil (HVO), a Bosnian Croat military force, captured Talaat Fouad Qasim
when he attempted to enter Bosnia and Herzegovina. Qasim, an important
member of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, was soon transferred to Egypt with the
active help of Croatia. Because Croatia had de facto controlled the Croatian
Defence Council, the military force which had captured Talaat Fouad Qasim
and due to its active role in the operation, a decision was made to commit a
terrorist attack in Croatia.
At 11:21 a.m. Central European Time, a Fiat 131 Mirafiori entered the
parking lot of the Primorje-Gorski Kotar County police headquarters. Due to
the 90-degree turn needed to enter the lot, the vehicle firstly moved slowly
but then started to accelerate towards the wall at the end of the parking lot.
Due to the low security measures, this incident was not noticed before the
attack itself took place. After 15–20 meters, passing 8-10 available parking
spaces in the small lot, the Fiat crashed into the stairs leading to the police
station and exploded. The time of explosion was recorded as 11:22 a.m. lo-
cal time (10:22 UTC). Subsequently, a police investigation found out that the
car was loaded with 70 kg (150 lb) of highly explosive TNT. The police also
found a part of a Canadian passport inside the remains of the attacker’s car.
The next day, representatives of the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya terrorist organi-
zation from Egypt claimed responsibility for the attack, requesting extradi-
tion of Qasim.
Due to an error made by the attackers, the bombing did not cause fa-
talities, aside from the suicide bomber himself. The police headquarters was
located on a higher ground than the parking lot itself and there were stairs
before the entrance in the building. Due to the smaller size of the parking
lot, the Fiat 131 had neither the space and velocity, nor the horsepower, to
climb the stairs and destroy the police station wall. As a result, the police
station failed to collapse and only 29 injuries were recorded (including two
unaware bystanders). The bomb also carved a large crater in the ground,
battering nearby buildings and destroying vehicles.
With the help of the CIA, officials examined the video footage of the at-
tack. American and Croatian investigative sources came to the conclusion
that Hassan al-Sharif Mahmud Saad had organized this attack. Saad had
come to live in Bosnia only that year; previously, he had been living in Italy.
Soon after the attack, Bosnian officials discovered that Saad was planning a
new terrorist attack, against NATO forces, which was to happen in Decem-
ber 1995. A few days after that attack failed, he was killed in central Bosnia
in a firefight with Croatian Defense Council forces61.





4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to Article 16 of the Direc-
tive 541/2017/EU (where existing)
Although Croatian criminal legislation, through the transposition and
implementation of secondary sources of the European Union law so far –
Council Framework Decisions of 13.6. 2002 on combating terrorism
2002/475 / JHA and Council Framework Decision 2008/919 / JHA of
28.11.2008 had already been largely in line with the provisions of the Direc-
tive (EU) 2017/541, it was nevertheless necessary to make certain amend-
ments to the Croatian Criminal Code – both with respect to the offense of
terrorism referred to in Article 97 of the Criminal Code and the criminal of-
fenses related to terrorism referred to in Article 98-103 of the Criminal Code.
This led to the fourth amendment of the Criminal Code of 201162. whose ex-
plicit purpose was primarily to further align national criminal legislation
with the Directive63.
Yet, the provision allowing for rewarding measures in cases of terror-
ism (Article 102) was not altered, implying that the legislator considered the
existing provisions to be in full conformity with Article 16 of the Directive.
Article 102, however, does not explicitly cover all the possibilities for mitiga-
tion introduced in Article 16 of the Directive. First of all, it is foremost ap-
plicable to members of terrorist associations (both those who organize or
run it, and mere members). In 2013 the provision was broadened to include
the outsiders who knowingly contribute to achievement of a terrorist associ-
ation’s goals; yet the provision is not broad enough to cover the so-called
lone wolf terrorists, although they can also take action such as preventing
and mitigating the effects of the terrorist offence (Art. 16(b)(i)) of the Direc-
tive). Furthermore, explicit possibility of remission of punishment is ex-
cluded under Article 102 if the member had already committed a terrorist
criminal offence64. Article 102 furthermore does not give any special credit
to perpetrators who do not prevent terrorist offences or uncover a terrorist
association, but “merely” mitigate the effects of the offence or find evidence
(Art. 16(b)(i) and (iii) of the Directive). In all of these scenarios general pro-
visions on mitigation of punishment and remission, including that on with-
drawal, remain applicable, as explained above65. This however, can be seen
as insufficient, as demonstrated by the focus group results.
Even though the focus group participants estimate that, in theory,
Croatian legislation is in line with the Directive 2017/541, i.e. that the Direc-
tive has been implemented as required.
62 Amendments of the Criminal Code of 2011, Official Gazette 118/18.
63 See the explanatory memorandum available at https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/
MainScreen?entityId=7635 [20.1.2020.].
64 Yet, it must be emphasized that the Directive does not require remission of punish-
ment at all, and it suffices that the punishment may be mitigated. In Croatia this can be done
both on the basis of general provision on mitigation (particularly mitigating circumstances
in Art. 48 (2) CC/11) and on the basis of explicit provision of Art. 329(3) CC/11, which allows
for mitigation in cases of repentant members of any criminal association, including terrorist
association.
65 There is nothing to prevent the judge from seeing such action as an extenuating cir-
cumstance or voluntary abandonment.
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At the same time, they concluded that in practice the institutes of miti-
gation of punishment for the perpetrator currently existing in the legislature
of Republic of Croatia, with exception of the rewarding measure specific for
terrorism in Art. 102 of Criminal code, would not be adequate or applicable
to perpetrators of terrorist offenses. Indeed, currently the law does not en-
visage some forms of rewarding measures, such as the crown witness and
the witness immunity, for the most serious crimes, including terrorism.
Some focus group participants warned that the entire focus group discus-
sion was based solely on past experiences with “ordinary” criminal offenses,
which are not directly transferable to far more atrocious terrorist offenses.
Some focus group participants pointed that terrorism is an ideologically mo-
tivated crime. On the other side, the organized crime is basically motivated
by the desire to obtain some kind of benefit, mostly the pecuniary gain. Even
though granting the status of a crown witness may work in practice with re-
gard to organized crime, it might not be so with regard to terrorism of-
fences. Terrorists usually pursue their goals even in the face of obstacles and
regardless of the costs involved. They are mostly not afraid of imprisonment
or complete isolation, or an absolute condemnation of society. By accom-
plishing their goals, they often fulfil their life purpose. Consequently, their
cooperation with state authorities cannot be realistically expected, at least
not to the same extent and with the same motivation one would expect from
the perpetrators of other offences, even very serious ones. Due to all that was
mentioned above, the focus group participants questioned the practical ap-
plicability of existing general regarding measures to terrorist offenses.
Although participants were not familiar with any case of prosecution of
terrorist offenses in Croatia, employees of the Security Intelligence Agency
of the Republic of Croatia (SIA) and police officers warned about many ac-
tivities connected to terrorism taking place on Croatian territory. Those acts
are usually undertaken for the purpose of recruiting new members to the
terrorist association or committing a crime of publicly provoking others to
commit a terrorist offence. Participants from the Security Intelligence
Agency warned that even in the absence of a classis terrorist attack in Croa-
tia, one should bear in mind that a number of (typically young) people have
been recruiting and publicly encouraging other people to commit a terrorist
offence. These participants also emphasized the need for prevention. It is
necessary to intervene and prevent further consequences as soon as the min-
imal danger or the first step towards committing terrorist offenses occurs. In
addition, with the right approach young people can relatively easily get back
on course.
Participants further emphasized that there is a major problem within
the legal system itself. Although, criminal offenses of recruitment and public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence exist in theory and are listed in the
Criminal Code, the practice is such that those crimes are difficult to prove
and charge. The reasons for this are numerous, and among other things the
problem is lack of education. There is also a need to educate the prosecuting
structure (under State Attorney’s Office) how to deal with crimes connected
to terrorism.
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Participants suggested that a new form of rewarding measure, suitable
for terrorist offenses, must be created in order to successfully combat po-
tential terrorist threats and attacks in in the future. Potential solutions
should also be sought by looking into the comparative legal system.
In conclusion, in order to combat terrorism by trying to get a perpetra-
tor to cooperate, a new mechanism, appropriate for this category of crimes
(terrorism), should be created in Croatian legal system. This new provision
should secure a degree of certainty that mitigation/protection will indeed be
provided to the penitent, while at the same time ensure that penitent’s testi-
mony has probative force in all subsequent proceedings.
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1. Historical background of rewarding legislation (where existing)
1.1. Socio-political reasons
Although highlighted today by the problem of terrorism, the status of
“repentant” has not been ignored in our previous legislation. But, the refer-
ences that concerned it, such as the comments it has elicited from the doc-
trine, remain few. It is almost futile to try to find references to this notion,
or to what may be related to it, in the writings of the criminal lawyers of the
Ancien Régime. Indeed, few authors follow the path, still poorly marked,
traced by Cesare Beccaria on the subject. In his Traité Des délits et des peines
(ed. 1766, p. 102 ff.), the Italian Marquis mentions, in Title XIV of the book
(Des crimes commencés et des complices), judicial decisions offering “im-
punity to the accomplice of a great crime, who betrays his companions”.
Such practices, which he considers to be denunciation, give him more criti-
cism than reasons for satisfaction. In this way, “the Society,” he said, “au-
thorizes betrayal, even hated by villains among themselves. It therefore con-
tributes to introducing “crimes of cowardice, which are more harmful to a
nation than crimes of courage”. When it “uses” such means, justice “discov-
ers its uncertainty, and the law shows its weakness, imploring the help of the
very person who offends it”.
However, Beccaria does not want to keep the silent about the benefits
of the approach. He insists on the prevention of “major crimes” and the ob-
servation of a practice that seems to “reassure the people who fill themselves
with fear, when they see crimes committed, without knowing the perpetra-
tors”. He remains in his role as a reformer when he calls for the adoption of
a “general law that promises impunity to any accomplice who discovers a
crime”, much more “preferable” to a particular declaration in a particular
case, because it prevents the union of the bad guys, inspiring each of them
to fear exposing themselves alone to danger”. Moreover, such a text, if
adopted, “would not give boldness to villains who see that there are cases
where they are needed”. Finally, “such a law, he concludes, must combine
impunity with the banishment of the legislator” (ibid.).
At that time, Italy, through Beccaria was already setting the tone for a
practice. Although it raised a certain number of reservations, it has helped
gain the support of the population. As J.-F. Gayraud noted (La dénonciation,
Paris, 1995, p. 264), the fact of questioning “the interest of granting im-
punity to criminals in terms that are still relevant” makes Beccaria’s remarks
very precursory, with a “desired objective” that is “always to disintegrate
criminal organizations”.
In 18th century France, criminal doctrine focuses more on the mecha-
nism of active repentance (“To raise the problem of active repentance is to
ask whether an offender who has spontaneously repaired or contributed to
repairing the consequences of the offence he has committed can benefit
from acquittal or a reduction in penalty”, P. Savey-Casard, “Le repentir actif
en droit pénal français”, Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé,
1972, No. 3, p. 515) and the means offered by the justice system to the ac-
complice to reduce the penalty that may be imposed against him in the con-
text of a criminal action. If they are not legally established, these means are
not dismissed by the authors, who keep in mind this type of situation of
which they may have been aware but for which the sources of the law seem
incomplete.
The illustration can be provided here by lawyer Claude-Joseph de Fer-
rière in one of his passages on the “Crime” section in his Dictionnaire de
droit et de pratique (ed. 1769, vol. 1, p. 406). If this jurisconsult specifies first
of all that “he who has concerted to commit a crime, and who can commit
it, by a real remorse of conscience has withdrawn from his undertaking”, he
also evokes the interest shown in the question of “repentance” by the fol-
lowing words: “As if someone who has conceived the plan with others to as-
sassinate a Private Individual, through true and effective repentance, discov-
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ers everything that is going on against him, declares his accomplices, gives
him the means to arrest them and secure his life, he cannot be followed as a
consequence of the will he had to commit an assassination. Indeed, projects
that are not followed by any effective action are not within the competence
of human justice. Since the society is not interested in wishes that are not
followed up, the Society does not punish them.
In the Age of Enlightenment, comments remain too infrequent and
nourished to encourage the deputies of the French Revolution to legislate on
the subject. In any case, the period does not seem to be the right time for
this approach. Indeed, both the principle of the legality of offences and
penalties recognized in articles 7 and 8 of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789 and the sanction of complicity,
punished by death in the Criminal Code of 1791, not to mention the lack of
consideration of mitigating circumstances in the latter text, cannot lead to
any value being given to “repentance”.
However, this is not the case under the Consulate and Empire regimes.
The organized plots against the Emperor undoubtedly contributed to greater
attention being paid to those who, through the information they could pro-
vide, made it possible to thwart crime plans or have the perpetrators ar-
rested if they had actually committed the crime. This is therefore an impor-
tant first step with the 1810 Penal Code.
1.2. Legislative evolution
In France, the first legislative provisions concerning the status of the
“repentant” seem to find a place, in the current state of our research, in the
Criminal Code of 1810. The articles concerned can be considered, as Paul
Savey-Casard (op. cit., p. 518) noted, as “legal exceptions” to “the rule of in-
effectiveness of active repentance”. Here, Parliament is interested in”cases
where the offender’s subsequent conduct in relation to the offence he or she
committed is taken into consideration”. The latter, “for example, […] collab-
orated in the repression of the crime”.
This scenario is already present in article 108 of this Code, which
clearly reflects the context of the plot, which is very clearly perceived during
the Napoleonic period. This article provides that “Exemptions from punish-
ment shall be granted to perpetrators of conspiracies or other crimes against
the internal or external security of the State who, before any execution or at-
tempt to execute such conspiracies or crimes, and before any prosecution is
initiated, shall have first informed the authorities mentioned in Article 103
(namely the Government, the administrative or judicial police authorities) of
such conspiracies or crimes and their perpetrators or accomplices, or which,
even since the commencement of the proceedings, have resulted in the arrest
of such perpetrators or accomplices”. The legislator already provides here
for the two scenarios that may arise, i.e. when a co-author or accomplice de-
cides to inform the constituted authorities, whether this occurs either before
the preparation of a plot or after the execution of this crime, by providing
sufficient evidence to arrest those who committed this crime. In either case,
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article 108, paragraph 2, states that”The perpetrators who have given such
knowledge or made such arrests may nevertheless be sentenced to remain
for life or in time under the special supervision of the high police”.
The same measures may be applied, as provided for in article 138 of the
1810 Penal Code, against persons guilty of the crimes referred to in articles
132 and 133” – i. e. the crime of counterfeiting – again with an exemption
from penalties which may be decided in the cases described above, but also
with the implementation of a “special surveillance of the high police” (secu-
rity measure), whether perpetual or in time. The status of the “repentant” is
further strengthened by article 144, according to which the provisions just
described are also “applicable to the crimes mentioned in article 139”, which
refers to “those who have counterfeited the State seal or made use of the
counterfeit seal; those who have counterfeited or falsified, either one or more
national stamps, or the State hammers used for forest marks, or the stamp or
stamps used to mark gold and silver materials, or who have made use of fal-
sified or counterfeit papers, effects, stamps, hammers or stamps […]”.
Article 285 of the 1810 Code also confirms, but to a lesser extent, the in-
terest of the Napoleonic legislator in denunciation. The reference here con-
cerns “offences committed through writings, images or engravings, distrib-
uted without the name of the author, printer or engraver”. The text states that
“if the printed text contains some provocations to crimes or offences, criers,
billboards, vendors and distributors will be punished as accomplices of the
provocateurs, unless they have made known those from whom they hold the
text containing the provocation”. Paragraph 2 of this article provides that “in
the event of disclosure, they shall be liable only to imprisonment for a term
of six days to three months […]”. Unlike the previous articles, the qualifica-
tion of the facts leads to a mitigation and not to an exemption from punish-
ment. As Paul Savey-Casard (op. cit., p. 518) notes, “this encouragement to
denounce is surprising. The drafters of the Code used it for purely practical
purposes. They saw it as a way to more easily seize the main culprits and pre-
vent offences that are highly dangerous to public order.
During the 19th century, legislation on the status of the “repentant”
seemed to remain relatively static, at least until the time of the anarchist at-
tacks. In this context, a first law of 2 April 1892 amended article 435 of the
Criminal Code. It now provides that persons guilty of “wilfully destroying in
whole or in part or attempting to destroy by mine or any explosive substance
buildings, dwellings, dikes, roadways, ships, boats, vehicles of all kinds,
stores or construction sites or their outbuildings, bridges, public or private
roads and generally all movable or immovable objects of any kind whatso-
ever”, “shall be exempt from punishment if, before the consumption of these
crimes and before any prosecution, they have informed and revealed the per-
petrators to the constituted authorities, or if, even after the prosecution has
begun, they have provided for the arrest of the other perpetrators. They may
nevertheless be subject, for life or in time, to the residence ban established
by article 19 of the law of 27 May 1885.
A second law dated 18 December 1893 – which is one of the famous
rogue laws adopted to repress the anarchist movement in France – amends
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article 266 of the Criminal Code. Paragraph 3 of this article concerns “the
persons who have committed the crime referred to in this article (more
specifically art. 265: “any association formed, whatever the duration or num-
ber of its members, any agreement established for the purpose of preparing
or committing crimes against persons or property […]”)”. These persons
“shall be exempt from punishment if, before any prosecution, they have dis-
closed to the constituted authorities the agreement reached or made known
the existence of the association”.
In terms of legislation, the 20th century seems to have been mainly
marked by the texts adopted during the 1980s and 1990s. Since the late
1970s, France has been confronted with a proliferation of terrorist attacks
that continued over the following decades. In this sensitive context, the law
of 2 February 1981 “strengthening security and protecting the freedom of
persons” replaces articles 265 to 267 of the Criminal Code with articles 265
to 268 of the same Code. The latter article provides that “shall be exempt
from the penalties provided for in articles 265, 266 and 267 – in substance,
participation “in an association formed or an agreement established for the
purpose of preparation in the form of one or more material facts, one or
more crimes against persons or property”, participation “in an association
formed or an agreement established for the purpose of preparation in the
form of one or more material facts, of one or more of the following offences:
1° Pimping […]; 2° Aggravated theft […]; 3° Destruction or aggravated dete-
rioration […].; (4) Extortion […]”, complicity in the offences defined above
when the person “has voluntarily provided, knowing that they were to be
used for the action, means intended to commit the crime or crimes for
which the association was formed or the agreement established – the person
who, having committed one of the acts defined by these articles, has, before
any prosecution, disclosed the association or agreement to the constituted
authorities and has allowed the identification of the persons in question”. As
Bernard Bouloc points out, “this excuse requires that the denunciation allow
the identification, but not the arrest of the perpetrators. It is not, however,
reserved for the first whistleblower, but only concerns the offence of crimi-
nal association without having any influence on the crimes or offences that
were the consequence of the criminal association” (“The problem of the re-
pentant. La tradition française relativement au statut des repentis”, Revue de
science criminelle, 1986, p. 780).
A few years later, the law of 9 September 1986 “on the fight against ter-
rorism and attacks on State security” was added to the system already in
place. Article 6 of this text introduces the following provisions into articles
463-1 and 463-2 of the Criminal Code: Article 463-1, paragraph 1, provides
that “Any person who has attempted to commit as an perpetrator or accom-
plice one of the offences listed in the eleventh paragraph of article 44, when
in relation to an individual or collective enterprise whose purpose is to seri-
ously disturb public order by intimidation or terror, shall be exempt from
punishment if, having notified the administrative or judicial authority, it has
prevented the offence from occurring and identified, where appropriate, the
other perpetrators”. Similarly, paragraph 2 provides that “Any person who,
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as an perpetrator or accomplice, has committed one of the offences listed in
the eleventh paragraph of article 44, when in relation to an individual or col-
lective enterprise whose purpose is to seriously disturb public order by in-
timidation or terror, shall be exempt from punishment if, having notified the
administrative or judicial authority, it has prevented the offence from caus-
ing death and permanent disability and has made it possible to identify,
where appropriate, other offenders”. As for article 463-2, it provides that
“Except in the cases provided for in article 463-1, the maximum penalty in-
curred by any person, author or accomplice to one of the offences listed in
the eleventh paragraph of article 44, when it was in relation with an indi-
vidual or collective enterprise whose purpose is to seriously disturb public
order by intimidation or terror, who has, before any prosecution, permitted
or facilitated the identification of the other perpetrators or, after the initia-
tion of the prosecution, permitted or facilitated their arrest, shall be reduced
by half or, where the penalty prescribed by law is life imprisonment, to
twenty years”. This law confirms the implementation of an exemption from
punishment but also a reduction of punishment for those who will work to
“repent”.
On the eve of the adoption of the New Penal Code, which came into
force on 1 March 1994, the mechanism of repentance has already found its
place in French legislation. As J.-F. Gayraud (op. cit., p. 267 et seq.) noted,
however, the French system differs from neighbouring models. Indeed, “Un-
like the status of repentance established in certain foreign laws, which takes
into account the confession made by an offender for release during the in-
vestigation phase, or certain laws which allow the investigating courts to as-
sess the existence of mitigating circumstances for disqualification, under
French law, impunity is granted in the form of a mitigating or absolute ex-
cuse and falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the court of judgment”.
Nevertheless, this excuse “never exempts the appearance in court and there-
fore never authorizes the investigating court to dismiss the case[… The of-
fence is constituted and the offender remains criminally responsible”.
1.3. Case law evolution
In the current state of research, it is not easy to highlight, in the case of
France, any change in case law relating to the status of the repentant. Inves-
tigations need to be conducted more broadly here to determine any develop-
ments in how this still incomplete piece of our criminal legislation is applied.
In the past, we can mention a few rare decisions handed down on this
subject of “repentance”, in particular a judgment of the Court of Cassation
of 18 August 1820 (Bulletin criminel, 1820, p. 325, Ferchaud and Cobourg).
The court thus decides that “When, on the request made by individuals ac-
cused of making counterfeit money, the jury is asked a question as to
whether the exemption from punishment provided for in article 138 of the
Criminal Code should be applied to them, in favour of those accused of this
crime who have denounced the other perpetrators, the criminal court shall
reject this request by deciding 1°. That the crime was consummated; 2°. That
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the non-consumption of crime is an essential condition for the application
of the said law, it commits, on the one hand, usurpation on the functions of
the jury in deciding the fact of the consumption of the crime; then, it makes
a false application of the law, the accused having, even after the consump-
tion of the crime, the right to have the said question asked”.
We can also note the very late emergence in France of a modern con-
ception of “repentance” that is not quite identical to that implemented in
Italy, where priority is given to the fight against organized crime. The main
target, at a time when French criminal legislation on the subject was be-
coming clearer in the 1980s, was undeniably terrorism. In this respect, it
also appears that “The first French repentant was a repentant: Frédérique
Germain, member of the organization Action Directe” and doctor of law.
“Arrested in 1984, she confessed to several crimes and “gave” names and
facts. Charged with criminal association, she was released in 1986” (J.-F.
Gayraud, op. cit., p. 270; «Les accusés de la fusillade de l’avenue Trudaine
aux assises de Paris – Le repentir de Frédérique Germain, ex-” Blond-
Blond”», Le Monde, 12 juin 1987).
2. Current rewarding legislation (where existing)
2.1. Applicability conditions
Several texts of the French Penal Code and the French Code of Penal
Procedure concern the status of the “repentant”. The latter is generally de-
fined by article 132-78 of the Criminal Code, but this text is applicable, not
to any crime or offence, but exclusively when a particular provision so pro-
vides, which raises the question of its scope of application (see 2.1.2). In ad-
dition, the specific texts, specific to certain offences, sometimes deviate from
the letter of the general text, which may modify the scope of the enactment,
as will be seen.
2.1.1. Persons concerned
With regard first to the definition of “repentant”, the first target is the
person who has attempted to commit a crime or misdemeanour and who,
having notified the administrative or judicial authority, has made it possible
to avoid the commission of the offence and, where appropriate, to identify
the other perpetrators or accomplices.
Secondly, the person who has committed a crime or misdemeanour and
who, having notified the administrative or judicial authority, has made it
possible to bring the offence to an end, to prevent the offence from causing
damage or to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices. The text adds
that it still concerns the person who has made it possible either to avoid the
commission of a related offence of the same nature as the crime or offence
for which he was prosecuted, or to bring such an offence to an end, to pre-
vent him from causing damage or to identify the perpetrators or accom-
plices.
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The repentant person is therefore, in all cases, the perpetrator of an of-
fence that has been committed or at least attempted. Only the perpetrators
of crimes and offences are concerned, it being recalled that under French
law, the attempt to commit a crime is always criminalized, whereas the at-
tempt to commit a crime must be expressly provided for in the criminaliza-
tion text.
2.1.1.1. Author of an attempt
In the first case (article 132-78, paragraph 1), the legislator refers to the
author of an attempt, i.e., according to article 121-5 of the Criminal Code,
the one who either started to execute the offence or performed all the acts of
execution but failed, i.e. did not succeed in consuming the offence. This
criminal or offender must notify a judicial or administrative authority and,
through this approach, make it possible to avoid the commission of the of-
fence and, if necessary, to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices.
The doctrine has highlighted the difficulties involved in the application of
this text. Thus, since the legislator only mentions the author of the attempt,
it seems to exclude that the latter’s accomplice may benefit from the mecha-
nism provided for by the text, if one makes a literal interpretation of the lat-
ter. This analysis, which leads to a narrower definition of repentance, is gen-
erally rejected by the interpreters (V. C. Saas, Jurisclasseur pénal Code, arti-
cle 132-78, fascicule 20, n° 24; A. Mihman, Exemption and reduction of
sentence for repentant persons: contributions of the law of 9 March 2004
known as the “Perben II law”, Criminal law 2005, study 1, p. 7).
The text poses another problem, linked to the very notion of attempted
offence. Indeed, by targeting the person who attempted the offence and pre-
venting its commission by notifying an authority, it raises the question of
whether the “attempt” in question is indeed punishable. The fact of notify-
ing a public authority and thus preventing the commission of the offence
seems to imply that the perpetrator will have voluntarily interrupted the ex-
ecution or will have voluntarily withdrawn, which means that the attempt
would then not be punishable, making the text inapplicable. In other words,
for the attempt to be punishable, it is necessary, according to article 121-5
of the Criminal Code, that the perpetrator of the acts does not succeed in
consummating the offence because of circumstances beyond his control
and the fact of notifying an authority and thus obstructing consumption, as
provided for in article 132-78, paragraph 1, is inevitably a circumstance
that depends on the agent’s will. In addition, the text states that the effect of
the warning given to the authority must be to avoid the commission of the
offence. However, by hypothesis, the perpetrator of an attempt did not carry
out the offence, i.e. he did not consume it and the fact of notifying the au-
thority cannot have the effect of preventing the crime or offence from being
committed. Either the perpetrator himself stops the execution of the acts
and notifies the authority, but he will probably be considered as having vol-
untarily withdrawn, which will mean that the attempt will not be punish-
able and that article 132-78 will not be able to apply. Either the perpetrator
does not voluntarily stop, being arrested by police officers before consum-
188 SECTION I – CHAPTER 4
ing the offence, for example, and in this case the attempt will be punishable
but the text will be equally inapplicable because the perpetrator can no
longer, in this case, notify an authority in order to prevent the offence from
being committed. In other words, in this case, it is not the fact of notifying
an authority that prevents the offence from being committed, but the fact
that the agent has not succeeded in doing so for a reason beyond his control.
The text of paragraph 1 of Article 132-78 therefore poses significant dif-
ficulties of interpretation, making it very difficult to apply (see C. Saas,
above-mentioned article, Nos. 25 to 28).
During the the first Focus Group, practitioners also identified this ob-
stacle to the application of the status. In practice, the general text cannot be
applied because it is not compatible with the condition of interruption for
reasons beyond the perpetrator’s control.
2.1.1.2. Author of a consummated offence
In the second case (Article 132-78, paragraphs 2 and 3), the legislator
refers to the person who has committed a crime or offence which, having
notified the administrative or judicial authority, has made it possible to
bring the offence to an end, to prevent the offence from causing damage or
to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices.
It is therefore the perpetrator of a consummate offence who warns a
public authority and thus causes three alternative consequences. The same
question arises here as for paragraph 1, namely whether only the author
himself or the accomplice is concerned. It should be noted here that some
specific texts applying the provisions of article 132-78 of the Criminal Code
apply not only to the perpetrator but also to accomplices. This is the case,
for example, of article 222-6-2 of the Criminal Code, concerning acts of tor-
ture and barbarism, article 422-2, concerning acts of terrorism, or article
414-4, concerning attacks on the fundamental interests of the Nation. Since
these particular texts are the ones that actually apply, it must be deduced
that the author in the strict sense is not the only one targeted and that other
participants, co-authors or accomplices, are likely to fall within the scope of
the “repentant” status.
The action of notifying the administrative or judicial authority must
make it possible either to stop the infringement, or to prevent it from caus-
ing damage, or to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices. The latter
case does not pose any difficulty because it is a matter of the author de-
nouncing the other participants. On the other hand, the other two, once
again, pose a problem of interpretation. The text first takes into account the
fact that the warning given to the authority made it possible to “bring the in-
fringement to an end”, which implies that it is likely to continue over time.
It should therefore be understood here that only continuous offences, i.e.
those whose consumption lasts for a certain period of time, by the will of the
perpetrator, would be concerned. It can thus be imagined that the mecha-
nism would apply to the case of the author of a sequestration committed by
several persons and who notifies the authorities in order to have the persons
deprived of their liberty released. It should also be noted that provision is in-
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deed made for kidnapping (article 224-5-1, paragraph 2, of the Criminal
Code). However, the specific texts, applying the operative provisions of arti-
cle 132-78 of the Criminal Code, show that the legislator does not only refer
to continuous offences, but also to the cessation of offences such as orga-
nized gang robbery (article 311-9-1 of the Criminal Code) or organized gang
extortion (article 312-6-1 of the Criminal Code) which do not constitute con-
tinuous but instantaneous offences. It therefore follows that the rule that the
authority’s warning must have brought the infringement to an end must be
understood very broadly.
Article 132-78 also takes into account the fact that the author who no-
tifies the public authority prevents the offence from causing “damage”. As
this term is very vague, this damage could be either a necessary element of
the offence or an aggravating circumstance of the offence, or another con-
tinuation of the offence, not taken into account in the context of the crimi-
nalisation. Again, the specific texts applying the mechanism provide valu-
able insights into it because they often specify which “damage” should be
taken into account. Thus, article 224-8-1 of the Criminal Code grants a re-
duction of sentence to the author or accomplice of a misuse of a means of
transport if, having notified the administrative or judicial authority, he or
she has prevented the offence from causing “death of a man or permanent
disability”. However, if the death of a victim is an aggravating circumstance
of the offence (article 224-7 of the Criminal Code), this is not the case for
permanent disability. Similarly, article 225-4-9 of the Criminal Code, on traf-
ficking in human beings, mentions the fact that the author, by notifying the
public authority, must stop the offence or prevent it from causing death or
permanent disability when neither of these two consequences constitutes an
aggravating circumstance. It therefore appears that the “damage” referred to
in article 132-78 of the Criminal Code may be any continuation of the of-
fence and is not necessarily an element of the offence or an aggravating cir-
cumstance.
Finally, it should be noted that some special texts refer only to the fact
that the agent, by notifying the authority, made it possible to stop the of-
fence or to identify the perpetrators or accomplices, without mentioning the
fact that it made it possible to avoid damage (See, in the field of money laun-
dering, article 324-6-1, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code).
In addition, article 132-78, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code stipulates
that the provisions of the preceding paragraph, i. e. those concerning the
perpetrator of a consumed offence, are also applicable when the person has
made it possible either to avoid the commission of a related offence of the
same nature as the crime or offence for which he was prosecuted, or to
bring such an offence to an end, to prevent him from causing damage or to
identify the perpetrators or accomplices. This extension of the system there-
fore implies that the warning given to the administrative or judicial author-
ity has no effect on the offence committed by the perpetrator who carried
out this procedure but on another offence which must be both related and of
the same nature as the offence committed. These criteria are again not very
precise. Thus, connectedness is not precisely defined by the Code of Crimi-
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nal Procedure, which is limited to providing illustrations. According to arti-
cle 203, “offences are related either when they were committed at the same
time by several persons gathered together, or when they were committed by
different persons, even at different times and in different places, but as a re-
sult of a concert formed in advance between them, either where the perpe-
trators have committed some to obtain the means to commit others, to fa-
cilitate, to facilitate, to consummate their execution or to ensure impunity,
or where things removed, misappropriated or obtained by means of a crime
or offence have been concealed, in whole or in part”. The notion, which im-
plies close links between the different offences, depends on the factual cir-
cumstances assessed by the judges.
Similarly, the reference to the “nature” of the offence is vague. Thus,
while it is easy to admit that offences such as theft and extortion are of the
same nature, because they are property offences, it is difficult to know
whether an offence such as procuring committed with torture or acts of bar-
barism (article 225-9 of the Criminal Code) is of the same nature as the
crime of torture or barbarity (article 222-1 of the Criminal Code). Here
again, there is a considerable margin of appreciation for the courts, which is
likely to make it possible to extend the scope of the mechanism applicable to
“repentance”.
2.1.2. Infringements concerned
The scope of the regime applicable to “repentant” depends on the na-
ture of the measures applicable to them.
Indeed, article 132-78 of the Criminal Code provides, on the one hand,
for an exemption from punishment for the author of an attempt which, hav-
ing notified the administrative or judicial authority, made it possible to
avoid the commission of the offence and, where appropriate, to identify the
other perpetrators or accomplices. On the other hand, the author of a con-
summate offence who, having notified the administrative or judicial author-
ity, has made it possible to bring the offence to an end, to prevent the offence
from causing damage or to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices,
shall be entitled to a reduced penalty.
In both cases, the text indicates that these mechanisms do not exist for
any crime or offence but only “in cases provided for by law”. It is therefore
appropriate to make an inventory of legal cases by drawing the distinction
again, even if, for certain offences, both the penalty exemption and the
penalty reduction mechanisms apply.
It should also be noted that, in the case of participation in a criminal
association, the legislator grants, in an original way, an exemption from pun-
ishment, not to the author of an attempt, since the attempt to commit this
offence is not incriminated, but to the person who participated in the group
or agreement if, before any prosecution, he has revealed the group or agree-
ment to the competent authorities and allowed the identification of the
other participants (article 450-2 of the Criminal Code). The exemption from
punishment therefore benefits here the perpetrator of a consummated and
not only attempted offence (see below 3.1. for an illustration).
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2.1.3. Offences exempt from punishment
The offences for which the “repentant” can benefit from an exemption
from punishment are found in the Criminal Code, the Defence Code and the
Military Justice Code.
2.1.3.1. Offences under the Criminal Code
The exemption from punishment is provided, in the first place, for of-
fences against the person, provided for in Book II of the Criminal Code. It is
a question of:
– murder and poisoning (Article 221-5-3, paragraph 1, of the Criminal
Code);
– acts of torture and barbarism (Article 222-6-2, paragraph1, of the
Criminal Code);
– drug trafficking offences (article 222-43-1 of the Criminal Code);
– kidnapping (Article 224-5-1, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code);
– the misappropriation of means of transport (Article 224-8-1, para-
graph 1, of the Criminal Code);
– trafficking in human beings (Article 225-4-9, paragraph 1, of the
Criminal Code);
– pimping (article 225-11-1, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code).
The exemption is applicable, in the second place, for offences of dam-
age to property, provided for in Book III of the Criminal Code. It is a ques-
tion of:
– theft by organised gangs (Article 311-9-1, paragraph 1, of the Criminal
Code);
– organized gang extortion (article 312-6-1, paragraph 1, of the Crimi-
nal Code);
– money laundering (article 324-6-1, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code).
Finally, the exemption is applicable to offences against the Nation, the
State and public peace, which are criminalized by Book IV of the Criminal
Code. It is a question of:
– offences of attack, sabotage, treason or espionage, delivery of all or
part of the national territory, armed forces or equipment to a foreign power
and delivery of information to a foreign power (Article 414-2 of the Criminal
Code);
– conspiracy (Article 414-3 of the Criminal Code);
– acts of terrorism (Article 422-1 of the Criminal Code);
– escape (Article 434-37 of the Criminal Code);
– counterfeit currency (Article 442-9 of the Criminal Code);
– the criminal association (article 450-2 of the Criminal Code).
2.1.3.2. Offences under the Defence Code
The exemption from punishment for the perpetrator of an attempt is
provided for several offences. It is a question of:
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– the offences provided for in Articles L. 1333-13-3 and L. 1333-13-4
and the first paragraph of Article L. 1333-13-6 of the Defence Code (Article
L. 1333-13-9 of the Defence Code) with regard to the protection and control
of nuclear materials;
– offences relating to biological or toxin-based weapons (Article L.
2341-6-1 of the Defence Code);
– offences relating to chemical weapons, as provided for in Articles L.
2342-57 to L. 2342-61 (Article L. 2342-75 of the Defence Code).
2.1.3.3. Offences under the Code of Military Justice
Article L. 333-5 of the Code of Military Justice provides that a person
who has attempted to commit in time of war one of the offences provided
for in articles 411-2, 411-3, 411-6, 411-9 and 411-10 of the Criminal Code
and mentioned in article L. 331-1 of the Code of Military Justice is exempt
from punishment if, having notified the administrative or judicial authority,
it has prevented the offence from taking place and, where appropriate, iden-
tified the other offenders. These are offences such as treason or espionage,
committed in time of war.
2.1.4. Offences giving rise to a reduction of sentence
The offences for which the “repentant” can benefit from a reduced sen-
tence are listed in the Criminal Code, the Defence Code, the Military Justice
Code and the Internal Security Code.
2.1.4.1. Offences under the Criminal Code
First of all, it concerns offences against persons in Book II of the Crim-
inal Code. It is a question of:
– poisoning (article 221-5-3, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code);
– acts of torture and barbarism (article 222-6-2, paragraph 2, of the
Criminal Code);
– drug trafficking (article 222-43 of the Criminal Code);
– kidnapping (article 224-5-1, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code);
– the misappropriation of means of transport (Article 224-8-1, para-
graph 2, of the Criminal Code);
– trafficking in human beings (article 225-4-9, paragraph 2, of the
Criminal Code);
– pimping (article 225-11-1, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code);
The reduction of sentence is applicable, in the second place, for of-
fences of damage to property in Book III of the Criminal Code. It is a ques-
tion of:
– theft by organised gangs (Article 311-9-1, paragraph 2, of the Criminal
Code);
– organized gang extortion (article 312-6-1, paragraph 2, of the Crimi-
nal Code);
– money laundering (article 324-6-1, paragraph 2, of the Criminal
Code).
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The reduction of sentence is provided for, lastly, for offences against the
Nation, the State and public peace, as set out in Book IV of the Criminal
Code. It is a question of:
– intelligence with a foreign power, the provision of information to a
foreign power and the direction or organization of an insurrectional move-
ment (Article 414-4 of the Criminal Code);
– acts of terrorism (Article 422-2 of the Criminal Code);
– passive corruption and influence peddling by public officials (Article
432-11-1 of the Criminal Code);
– active corruption and influence peddling by individuals (Article 433-2-
1 of the Criminal Code);
– obstacles to the exercise of justice (article 434-9-2 of the Criminal
Code);
– corruption and influence peddling of foreign public officials, both ac-
tive and passive (Article 435-6-1 of the Criminal Code);
– corruption and influence peddling, both active and passive, by per-
sons exercising judicial functions abroad and persons treated as such (Arti-
cle 435-11-1 of the Criminal Code);
– counterfeit currency (Article 442-10 of the Criminal Code).
2.1.4.2. Offences under the Defence Code
Several offences criminalized by the Defence Code may result in a re-
duction of sentence in favour of the “repentant”. It is a question of:
– the offences provided for in Articles L. 1333-13-3 to L. 1333-13-5 and
the first paragraph of Article L. 1333-13-6 (Article L. 1333-13-10 of the
French Defence Code) with regard to the protection and control of nuclear
materials;
– offences provided for in Articles L. 2339-2 and L. 2339-10 (Article L.
2339-13 of the Defence Code) relating to the manufacture, trade and import
of war materials, weapons and ammunition;
– the manufacture, without authorization, of an explosive or incendiary
device or explosive product, or any other element or substance intended to
be used in the composition of an explosive product (article L. 2353-4, para-
graph 5, of the Defence Code);
– offences relating to biological or toxin-based weapons (Article L.
2341-6 of the Defence Code);
– offences relating to chemical weapons, as provided for in Articles L.
2342-57 to L. 2342-61 (Article L. 2342-76 of the Defence Code);
– the offences provided for in Articles L. 2353-5 to L. 2353-8 (Article L.
2353-9, paragraph 1, of the Defence Code) with regard to explosives.
2.1.4.3. Infractions of the Code of Military Justice
Article L. 333-6 of the Code of Military Justice provides for a reduction
of sentence for the benefit of the perpetrator or accomplice of the offences
provided for in articles 411-4, 411-5, 411-7 and 411-8 of the Criminal Code
and mentioned in article L. 331-1 of the Code of Military Justice. These are
offences such as intelligence with a foreign power or the delivery of infor-
mation to a foreign power, committed in time of war.
194 SECTION I – CHAPTER 4
2.1.4.4. Infractions of the Internal Security Code
Article L. 317-11 of the Internal Security Code provides for a reduction
of sentence for the benefit of the perpetrator or accomplice of the offence,
provided for in article L. 317-7 of the same Code, of possession of a ware-
house of weapons or ammunition in category C, as well as weapons in cate-
gory D.
2.2. Types of rewarding measures
2.2.1. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
pre-sentencing stage
The French legislator expressly provides, for the benefit of the “repen-
tant”, two types of measures: an exemption from or a reduction of the
penalty. By definition, such a mechanism can therefore only be applied at
the time of the imposition of the sanction, by a court of judgment which has
previously found the perpetrator guilty, or at the time of enforcement of the
sanction, by a court of enforcement of the sentences.
No other measures are explicitly provided for at the pre-trial stage, i.e.
the stage prior to the referral to a criminal court. However, it cannot be de-
duced from this that the question does not arise, in particular at a time
when the public prosecutor’s office is called upon to decide whether it is ap-
propriate to prosecute the perpetrator. It should be recalled that article 40 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the public prosecutor shall re-
ceive complaints and denunciations and shall assess the action to be taken
in accordance with the provisions of article 40-1”. Article 40-1 specifies this
principle by stating that “when he considers that the facts brought to his at-
tention pursuant to the provisions of article 40 constitute an offence com-
mitted by a person whose identity and domicile are known and for which no
legal provision prevents the initiation of public proceedings, the public pros-
ecutor with territorial jurisdiction shall decide whether it is appropriate:
(1) to institute proceedings;
(2) to implement an alternative procedure to prosecution under the
provisions of section 41-1 or 41-2;
(3) to close the procedure without further action if the particular cir-
cumstances related to the commission of the facts justify it.
The latter hypothesis, i.e. the consideration of “special circumstances”,
may apply to the case of a “repentant” who could therefore benefit from a
classement sans suite. Indeed, the text of the Code of Criminal Procedure
does not provide for a scope of application for the latter measure, which
makes it conceivable even for serious offences. In other words, an offender
who agrees to cooperate with the judicial authority, in this case the public
prosecutor, could obtain, in exchange, such a preferential measure. The
great rarity of the application by the courts of the texts relating to exemp-
tions and reductions of sentence tends to confirm that the treatment of the
situation of the “repentant” is more often carried out at this stage of the pro-
ceedings than at the judgment stage. This can have several advantages. On
195FRANCE
the one hand, this practice is discreet and even undetectable, since it leaves
no trace in the procedure. On the other hand, the discontinuance does not
constitute a judicial decision, which means that it does not extinguish the
public action. As it is only an “administrative” measure, the classification
may not be final, which means that the public prosecutor may decide to re-
verse his decision, on the sole condition that the facts are still likely to be
prosecuted and are not covered by the statute of limitations. This non-defin-
itive character therefore presents a flexibility that is not found in the case of
the exemption and reduction of sentence that are pronounced in decisions
having the authority of res judicata.
During the the first Focus Group, the police services pointed out, with
regret, that they cannot promise justice collaborators a reduction/exemption
from punishment and cannot use this in the negotiation phase. However, they
believe that the possibility of offering the reduction or exemption from pun-
ishment, in order to be able to “deal” with the candidate, would be beneficial.
In France, this is not possible in practice, as only the sentencing judge
can decide on the reduction or exemption from sentence. Making promises
at the pre-trial stage would bind the judge at the trial stage. However, the
Court of Cassation considers that the court is always free to set a sentence.
Law cannot bind the judge on the application of a mandatory sentence, or
on the benefit of a favorable status.
This practical impossibility is all the more true when individuals are
tried for a crime before the Assize Court, since there is a real judicial hazard
linked to the popular jury.
Furthermore, if at the pre-sentence phase, the police promise people a
reduction in their sentence and provide protection, and if at the time of
judgment there is no reduction in sentence, this discredits the system of col-
laboration and protection of collaborators. This is problematic, particularly
in drug circles, where the value of using the statute is discussed. Offenders
therefore do not want to talk and prefer not to be protected.
2.2.2. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
sentencing stage
All of the legislative texts previously listed provide for an exemption
from punishment or a reduction of punishment, both of which may be ap-
plicable, in certain cases, to the same offence or category of offences. The
common feature of these two mechanisms is that the person benefiting from
them is found guilty and liable for the offence in question by a court of law.
The difference is reflected in the fact that the exemption from punishment
consists in excluding the imposition of any penalty for “repentance”, as long
as the legal conditions are met, and without the judges having any discretion
as to whether or not to pronounce the said exemption (V. C. Saas, article
cited above, No. 51). The reduction of sentence consists in imposing a sen-
tence on the “repentant”, which will be reduced in a proportion determined
by the text providing for it. The special texts providing for a reduction in
penalty set it at half of the maximum duration incurred (see, for example,
for drug trafficking, article 222-43 of the Criminal Code or, for procuring, ar-
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ticle 225-1-1, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code). Here again, the mechanism
operates as of right, which means that the court cannot modulate the reduc-
tion (see C. Saas, article 51 above). More precisely, since the maximum in-
curred is halved, judges can only impose a penalty equal to or less than half
of this maximum.
The mechanism of sentence reduction at the trial stage must be com-
bined with the principle of individualisation of the sanction, which requires
the trial courts to take into account, in order to determine the nature, quan-
tum and regime of the sentences imposed, the circumstances of the offence
and the personality of its perpetrator as well as his or her material, family
and social situation (Article 132-1 of the Criminal Code).
2.2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
post-sentencing stage
The French legislator has provided for a case in which a reduction of
sentence may be granted after judgment and final conviction of the offender.
Article 721-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an exceptional
reduction of sentence, the amount of which may not exceed one third of the
sentence imposed, may be granted to convicted persons whose statements
made to the administrative or judicial authority before or after their convic-
tion have made it possible to stop or avoid the commission of an offence men-
tioned in articles 706-73, 706-73-1 and 706-74. Where these statements have
been made by persons sentenced to life imprisonment, they may be granted
an exceptional reduction in the probation period provided for in article 729
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which may be up to five years. These ex-
ceptional reductions are ordered by the “Tribunal d’application des peines”.
This mechanism is part of a more general mechanism, which is the re-
duction of custodial sentences that may be granted to persons who have
been sentenced to a life imprisonment and are therefore serving their sen-
tences (articles 721 to 721-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In this case,
it should be noted that the reduction provided for in favour of “repentance”
can only apply in the event of conviction for offences covered by the crimi-
nal or organised delinquency regime, i. e. the offences listed in articles 706-
73, 706-73-1 and 706-74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not
cover the same hypotheses as reductions in sentence at the trial stage. For
example, it is possible for a convicted person on the charge of destroying,
damaging or damaging property in an organised gang as provided for in Ar-
ticle 322-8 of the Criminal Code, whereas the trial court could not order a re-
duction, pursuant to Article 132-78 of the Criminal Code, in the absence of
a special text allowing it. This difference in treatment is difficult to justify.
In addition, and contrary to the reduction provided for at the trial
stage, it is for the court enforcing the penalties to determine the extent of the
reduction, without being able to exceed one third of the penalty imposed.
Judges therefore have a discretionary power here that does not exist at the
trial stage.
The Court of Cassation ruled, with regard to the scope of application of
the mechanism, that the rejection of the request for an exceptional remis-
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sion of sentence made by a convicted person was justified when the facts de-
nounced by him, which amounted to rape, aggravated sexual assault and
corruption of minors under 15 years of age, did not fall within the provisions
of articles 706-73 and 706-74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Criminal
Cass., 24 May 2006, No. 05-86.772; Bull. crim. No. 148).
2.3. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant
The above-mentioned texts do not provide for any general obligation on
the person enjoying the status of “repentant”, but certain obligations may, if
necessary, be imposed as part of the protection mechanism provided for in
article 706-63-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see below).
2.4. Revocation of rewarding measures
No grounds for revoking the status are expressly provided for in the
texts. More precisely, as we have seen, if the person concerned is not prose-
cuted, he remains under the threat of prosecution because the discontinua-
tion of the proceedings does not constitute a court decision or a cause of ter-
mination of the public proceedings. On the other hand, if it benefits from an
exemption from punishment or a reduction of punishment, the favourable
measure may not be withdrawn from it if it has been pronounced by a final
decision. The same applies to the reduction of sentence granted after final
judgment, since article 721-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
provide any grounds for dismissal.
2.5. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
A distinction should be made here between the mechanism of exemp-
tion and reduction of sentence, provided for in the Criminal Code, and the
mechanism of exceptional reduction of sentence, provided for in the Code of
Criminal Procedure
2.5.1. Conditions for the application of the texts of the Criminal Code
The texts of the Criminal Code providing for grounds for exemption or
reduction of sentence do not provide for any specific procedural modalities.
It follows from this that the application for the favourable measure does not
require any formal requirements. It can therefore be formulated at any stage
of the proceedings, during the investigation, investigation or before a court
of law.
In criminal matters, article 181, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal
Procedure states that “the indictment order shall contain, under penalty of
nullity, the statement and legal qualification of the facts on which the charge
is based and shall specify the identity of the accused. It also specifies, where
applicable, that the accused benefits from the provisions of article 132-78 of
the Criminal Code. It can therefore be deduced from this text, which does
not distinguish between exemption and reduction of sentence, that the in-
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vestigating judge can, as early as the judicial information stage, establish the
existence of one of these two mechanisms, the problem being to know what
scope such a decision would have for the criminal court. In a judgment of
the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation of 16 November 2016 (No.
16-85.101, Bull. crim. No. 302), it was held that the decision of the investi-
gating court concerning the application of Article 132-78 of the Criminal
Code is not binding on the trial court, before which the accused may always,
if he considers it appropriate, invoke the benefit of the provisions of that ar-
ticle. In the present case, the investigating judge had rejected the argument
based on the application of the text on the grounds that the statements of
the prosecuted person had not made it possible to avoid the commission of
an offence. The question remains, however, whether, if the investigating
court were to decide otherwise, the trial court would be bound by that deci-
sion, with the result that no special question should be put to the assize
court, which would be obliged to apply the exemption or reduction of sen-
tence (see, in this sense, H. Angevin, JurisClasseur Procédure pénale, Art.
347 to 354, fasc. 20, n° 221). The above-mentioned decision of the Court of
Cassation does not resolve the difficulty.
If the investigating court does not mention in the transfer decision the
existence of a ground for exemption or reduction of sentence, the plea may
be raised before the assize court, before which a special question will then
be asked. Article 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus provides that,
when invoked, each legal ground for exemption or reduction of the penalty
must be the subject of a specific question.
In matters relating to tort, no specific procedural rules are provided for
regarding exemption or reduction of sentence. Article 468 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure merely states that if the accused person has a legal
ground for exemption from punishment, the court shall find him guilty and
exempt him from punishment, which confirms the automatic nature of the
mechanism.
2.5.2. Conditions for the application of the exceptional penalty reduction
Article 721-3, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure states
that the exceptional reduction it provides in favour of “repentant” persons is
granted by the court for the enforcement of sentences in accordance with
the procedures provided for in article 712-7. According to the latter text, the
decision presupposes a reasoned judgment of the court for the enforcement
of sentences seized at the request of the convicted person, at the request of
the public prosecutor or at the initiative of the judge responsible for the en-
forcement of sentences to which the convicted person belongs. This judg-
ment shall be delivered, after consulting the representative of the prison ad-
ministration, after an adversarial debate held in chambers, during which the
court shall hear the requests of the public prosecutor and the observations
of the convicted person and, where appropriate, those of his lawyer. If the
convicted person is detained, this debate may be held in the prison or by
videoconference.
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2.6. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations)
Article 132-78, paragraph 4, of the Criminal Code provides that no con-
viction may be handed down solely on the basis of statements made by per-
sons who have been the subject of the provisions of this article. This provi-
sion is identical to that provided for, in the case of anonymous testimony, by
article 706-62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see also, for statements
made by judicial police officers or agents who have carried out an infiltra-
tion operation, article 706-87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). It shows
that the legislator does not give particular probative value to the declarations
of the “repentant” while admitting that this value does exist. Thus, if the
statements merely corroborate other evidence of the guilt of the persons
charged, they may be taken into consideration by the investigating or trial
courts, in accordance with the principle of freedom of evidence. This is also
the position of the European Court of Human Rights, which considers that
“the statements of the “repentant” must be corroborated by other elements;
in addition, indirect testimonies must be confirmed by objective elements”
(ECHR, 6 April 2000, Application No. 26772/95, Labita v/ Italy, § 158).
The difficulty, in practice, therefore, is whether the sentence is based
solely on the statements of the “repentant” or also on other elements, which
results, in principle, from the motivation of the decision, which must be par-
ticularly precise on this point (see below 3).
2.7. Measures for the protection of the repentant
The legislator provides various protective measures for the “repentant”.
Some of them, not specifically described, are intended to ensure, in general,
the physical protection and reintegration of the person concerned. However,
special provisions are devoted to the possibility of using an assumed identity.
In practice, protection always precedes exemption or possible reduc-
tion of the sentence, whereas the texts suggest the opposite, referring to Ar-
ticle 132-78 of the Criminal Code to determine who is likely to benefit from
protection measures. More specifically, people who might be eligible for ex-
emption or reduction in sentence first request protection at the pre-sentence
stage before considering a beneficial measure under criminal law. The legal
system thus appears to be completely out of step with criminological and ju-
dicial realities and should therefore be rethought on the basis of the latter.
Moreover, a major difficulty arises from the fact that, while the mecha-
nism for exemption from punishment is automatic when the conditions are
met (see above, No. 2.2.2), any reduction in sentence is at the discretion of
the courts and can therefore never be certain for the beneficiary, which
makes it difficult to obtain his or her cooperation at the stage of the police
investigation or inquiry. In addition, there is a significant time lag between
the moment of protection and the decision on guilt and sentence, which
makes the benefit of awarding measure hypothetical.
Here again, a reform would be necessary in order to make the system
more attractive, for example, the reduction in sentence could be acquired by
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the repentant person, provided that his or her cooperation is effective and
lasting, and awarding measures could be revoked if this is not the case. It
could then be decided by the public prosecutor at the investigation stage or
by the investigating judge at the judicial investigation stage, and, if neces-
sary, be revoked later by a court trying the case or enforcing the sentence.
2.7.1. General measures for the protection and reintegration of the “repentant”
Under article 706-63-1, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
“the persons mentioned in article 132-78 of the Criminal Code shall be pro-
tected, as necessary, in order to ensure their safety. They may also benefit
from measures to ensure their reintegration.
The reference to article 132-78 of the Criminal Code suggests that only
persons who have benefited from an exemption or reduction of sentence, by
decision of a trial court, are concerned by the system. If this interpretation
is adopted, it must be deduced that persons who are not prosecuted and are
therefore dismissed without further action, after having provided informa-
tion to prevent an offence, would not be able to benefit from it.
On the other hand, paragraph 5 of the article extends the protection
system to family members and relatives of repentant persons.
It can also be observed that this protection is not automatic but only
possible if it appears justified or necessary.
In practice, offenders immediately request protection. It is the risk of
death that determines the entry into the protection system. In order to enter
a protection programme, the threat on the person’s head must be significant
enough. The sacrifice (social death, change of place of residence, change of
name, etc.) must be worthwhile.
The question of reduction or exemption of penalty is only raised at a
later stage.
Protection and reintegration measures are defined, at the request of the
public prosecutor, by a national commission which sets out the obligations
to which the person must adhere and monitors the protection and reinte-
gration measures, which it may amend or terminate at any time. In urgent
cases, the competent services shall take the necessary measures and inform
the National Commission without delay (Article 706-63-1, paragraph 4, of
the Code of Criminal Procedure).
In practice, the philosophy of protection and reintegration is to offer
applicants a life outside violence.
In France, this protection is difficult to apply to drug-related crimes
and offences. Indeed, for someone who has a very high standard of living
thanks to trafficking, the interest of entering a programme is nil from a fi-
nancial point of view. It is not possible to provide the same lifestyle as in
their previous life.
In such cases, protection cases are mainly about settling scores in
mafia systems. The system is not used in the fight against terrorism.
The composition and functioning of the National Commission for Pro-
tection and Reintegration are determined by Decree No. 2014-346 of 17
March 2014. The Commission is referred to it by the public prosecutor in
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charge of the case, or, where appropriate, by the investigating judge who no-
tifies the prosecutor (article 6 of the decree). It may decide on any propor-
tionate measures it defines, in particular physical protection and domicilia-
tion measures, intended to ensure the protection of persons. It also defines,
where appropriate, rehabilitation measures, taking into account in particu-
lar the material and social situation of the person concerned and, where ap-
propriate, his or her family and close relatives (Article 14).
It can therefore be noted that the protection measures are not precisely
defined but are left to the discretion of the committee, which ensures great
flexibility for the system.
In practice, protection can also benefits family members. Some protec-
tion is provided abroad with the cooperation of Europol. There is no time
limit on the duration of protection.
2.7.2. Authorization to use a borrowed identity
The legislator provides for the possibility of a special measure, which is
the authorization to use the borrowed identity. Article 706-63-1, paragraph
2, provides that, in case of necessity, “repentant” persons may be authorized,
by reasoned order issued by the President of the “Tribunal de grande in-
stance”, to use a borrowed identity.
Articles 18 to 25 of the Decree of 17 March 2014 describe the procedure
for granting and withdrawing authorisation to use such a loan identity. The
President of the “Tribunal de grande instance de Paris” is competent to rule
on applications for authorization of use and withdrawal of such authoriza-
tion. It shall be referred to it at the request of the President of the Commis-
sion, to which shall be attached the written request of the person concerned.
The President of the court may decide to hear the person, this hearing not
being public and not giving rise to the establishment of a record.
The order, issued without public notice, shall be notified to the Presi-
dent of the Commission and to the interested party by any means. The re-
jection of the application for authorization may be appealed to the first pres-
ident of the Court of Appeal by the President of the Commission, the public
prosecutor or the person who requested an identity loan. The time limit for
appeal is fifteen days (Article 21 of the Decree).
According to article 24 of the Decree, only the inter-ministerial techni-
cal assistance service is authorized to create borrowing identities, to pre-
serve all assigned borrowing identities and to reconcile borrowing and real
identities.
Finally, article 25 specifies that in the case of criminal proceedings
against a person with a borrowed identity, the person is sentenced under his
or her borrowed identity. The conviction is entered in the criminal record
under the borrowed identity. In the case of withdrawal of the authorisation
to use a borrowed identity, the person shall be convicted under his or her
real identity as soon as the withdrawal takes place before the conviction de-
cision.
It should be added that article 706-63-2 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure provides for the case in which the “repentant” authorized to use a bor-
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rowed identity is brought before a court. The text states that where such ap-
pearance is likely to seriously endanger his life or physical integrity or that
of his relatives, the court of judgment may, ex officio or at his request, order
his appearance in camera or under conditions likely to preserve the
anonymity of his physical appearance, including by benefiting from a tech-
nical device allowing him to be heard at a distance, his voice then being ren-
dered unidentifiable by appropriate technical means.
2.8. Evaluation and control of the measure
The National Commission for Protection and Reinsertion may amend
or terminate the protection and reintegration measures granted (article 15 of
the Decree of 17 March 2014). It may also decide to withdraw the autho-
rization to use a borrowed identity. It shall decide, at the request of the Pres-
ident of the Commission or the person concerned, when this measure no
longer appears necessary, in particular when the committee terminates the
protection and reintegration measures previously granted or when the per-
son authorised to use an assumed identity no longer so wishes. This with-
drawal may also be pronounced when the person receiving the authorisation
engages in conduct incompatible with the implementation or proper func-
tioning of the measure (Article 23 of the Decree).
In practice, however, a change of identity means that a person who
changes his or her identity remains in the programme for the rest of his or
her life, de facto, as this poses far too many problems in terms of civil and
criminal law. The collaborator will have to stay in contact with the protec-
tion office all his or her life.
3. Current relevant case law (where existing)
There is little case law on the application of the exemption and reduc-
tion of sentence mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are some illustrations of
the implementation of certain specific texts establishing these rules.
3.1. Application of the texts relating to the exemption from punishment
The texts providing for an exemption from punishment almost always
concern the perpetrator of an attempt and there is no known application of
such a device, which seems to confirm that there is a problem of legal tech-
nique that prevents such a mechanism when the offence is attempted (see
above 2.1.1.1.1.). On the other hand, in the case of participation in a crimi-
nal association, the mechanism applies to the benefit of the perpetrator of
the crime consumed, the attempt not being incriminated.
There is a decision granting such an exemption from punishment, is-
sued by a Court of Appeal (CA Douai, 4th Correctional Chamber, 20 January
2010, No. 08/02104). This decision is interesting because of its detailed mo-
tivation. The accused was therefore convicted of participating in a criminal
association. The judges note that he provided information to a gendarme,
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which led to the discovery of stolen car trafficking and the prosecution and
conviction of the participants. Without the information provided by the de-
fendant, the traffic would not have been updated. It adds that article 450-2
of the Criminal Code does not specify the extent or quality of the informa-
tion provided to the competent authority required for the participant in the
criminal association to benefit from the exemption from punishment. It
states that the informant cannot be required to have provided a complete list
of network members and the perpetrators of vehicle theft, as the data re-
vealed by the accused proved sufficient to update and prosecute the mem-
bers of the group. The judges conclude that the legal conditions for exemp-
tion from punishment are met.
3.2. Application of the texts relating to the reduction of sentence
A case decided by the Court of Cassation illustrates the granting of a re-
duced sentence for drug trafficking and sheds light on the judges’ assess-
ment of the textual conditions. In this case, the accused was found guilty on
the charges of unlawful importation, transport, possession, possession, offer,
transfer, acquisition or use of narcotic drugs and benefited from the reduc-
tion by half of the penalty provided for in article 222-43 of the Criminal
Code. The judges state that this text does not require either that the infor-
mation provided by the offender be preliminary to the investigation or that
the offender be bound by an obligation of result. They add that the accused
promptly acknowledged the facts and provided all the information in his
possession, making it possible to identify the sponsors and reconstruct the
circumstances of the trafficking, and that “the cessation of the incriminated
acts was within the power of the various foreign authorities concerned” and
not within the control of the accused. The public prosecutor had lodged an
appeal in cassation on the ground that the accused had not allowed all the
co-authors and accomplices to be identified, but the Criminal Division of the
Court of Cassation rejected this argument, considering that the conditions of
the text were therefore met and that the Court of Appeal had made a sover-
eign assessment of factual circumstances (Cass. crim., 19 June 1997, No. 96-
83.639).
Other illustrations can be found in Court of Appeal decisions. Thus, the
reduction of sentence in the case of drug trafficking is allowed in a case
where the detailed statements of the accused have been verified by investi-
gations carried out on letters rogatory and have made it possible to identify
the sponsor and reconstruct the circumstances of the updated trafficking.
This defendant thus enabled the criminal court to convict an international
drug trafficker (CA Chambéry, Correctional Chamber, 21 October 2009, No.
09/00347).
Similarly, the reduction of sentence was granted, in the same field, to
the individual who, upon arrest, offered to assist in the arrest of other per-
sons, giving their address and helping investigators to understand the
recorded telephone conversations (C.A. Montpellier, 3rd Correctional Cham-
ber, 12 December 2007, No. 07/01215).
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Judges are more often led to conclude that the conditions for benefiting
from the preferential measure are not met. Thus, in the field of drug traf-
ficking, an accused who has not informed the administrative or judicial au-
thorities of the existence of the drug trafficking in which he was involved but
has confined himself, after his arrest, to claiming that two persons, one of
whom could be identified, had forced him to participate in the facts, cannot
be granted a reduced sentence (Cass. crim, 7 November 2001, No. 00-87.885;
see also, Criminal Cases, 10 April 2002, No. 01-85.360; Criminal Cases, 20
June 1996, No. 93-82.187, 95-81.975, Bull. crim. No. 270).
In the same field, it was held that the defendant who, having contacted
customs officials and then a police officer, did not follow up on his initial
contacts, could not benefit from the reduced sentence because the informa-
tion provided was far too imprecise and could not lead to arrest (Cass. crim.,
17 December 1998, No. 97-86.451; see also CA Douai, 4th Correctional
Chamber, 20 March 2008, No. 08/00005). Similarly, a Court of Appeal has
ruled, with the approval of the Court of Cassation, that the commitment to
cooperate provided for in article 222-43 of the Criminal Code must be active,
constructive and fair and not be limited to answering only the questions
asked by the investigators after the arrest (Cass. crim., 30 January 2008, No.
07-82.022).
Another Court considered, in refusing the reduction of sentence, that
the information provided by the accused allowed investigations to be carried
out on a third party appearing to be involved in money laundering activities
related to drug trafficking but that it did not have the effect of preventing the
commission of the offence or a related offence, nor to prevent the offence
from causing damage, nor even to allow the third party to be identified as
actually co-author or accomplice to the offence charged against the accused
(CA Douai, 4th Correctional Chamber, 7 September 2011, No. 10/03660).
On the procedural side, a Court of Appeal, before which the defendant,
who had invoked the reduction of sentence provided for in article 450-2 of
the Criminal Code in matters of criminal association, had called a gendarme
as a witness, refused to proceed with this hearing on the ground that the wit-
ness did not appear before it and that this hearing is only of relative interest.
This decision was censured by the Court of Cassation, which considered that
the Court of Appeal should better explain why the requested hearing was im-
possible or unnecessary to establish the truth (Cass. crim., 12 March 2008,
n° 07-84.949).
3.3. Probative value of the declarations of the beneficiary of a reduced sentence
Another decision highlights the judges’ reasoning regarding the proba-
tive value of the “repentant” statements. In this drug trafficking case, one de-
fendant benefited from the reduction of sentence provided for in article 222-
43 of the Criminal Code. With the resources provided by the investigators,
he phoned a supplier to order heroin. At the scheduled appointment, an in-
dividual appeared whom the “repentant” identified and accused of having
previously delivered heroin to him. This individual was prosecuted and con-
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victed of drug trafficking and alleged a violation of the principle of fair evi-
dence which, in his opinion, would prohibit judges from withholding “re-
pentant” statements invoking the benefit of article 222-43 of the Criminal
Code, obtained in questionable and irregular circumstances by police offi-
cers. The Court of Cassation rejected this argument on the grounds that the
judges established the guilt of this accused on the basis of the statements of
the “repentant” also prosecuted, themselves corroborated by the circum-
stances and presumptions resulting from the investigation (Cass. crim., 31
Oct. 2000, n° 00-82.362). This solution is in line with the provisions of Arti-
cle 132-78 of the Criminal Code and the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights (see above 2.6.).
4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to art. 16 of Directive
541/2017/EU (where existing)
Article 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of 15 March 2017 on combating
terrorism provides for cases where the penalties provided for in Article 15 of
the Directive may be reduced. Member States may choose to reduce penal-
ties in cases where the offender “renounces his terrorist activities and pro-
vides administrative or judicial authorities with information that they would
not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to:
– prevent or Mitigate the effects of the offence;
– identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
– find evidence; or
– prevent other offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14».
Article 16 is optional as it states that “Member States may take the nec-
essary measures […]”. The European legislator does not require Member
States to take measures to reduce the penalty in the event that the offender
repents. Unlike the other mandatory articles of the Directive, it is left to the
Member States to decide whether or not to introduce a specific regime for
“repentant” people. A Member State wishing to establish or strengthen a
regime applicable to the status of “repentant” is free to do so via the trans-
position process of the Directive. However, if a Member State decides to set
up a regime governing this status, it must comply with European require-
ments.
As far as France is concerned, the French legislator did not wait until
the directive was enacted before taking measures related to the status of “re-
pentant”. Indeed, as previously demonstrated, since 1986 and more particu-
larly since 2004 there has been a wide legal arsenal governing this status in
French legislation. There is a general article and special articles. Article 132-
78 of the Criminal Code, which provides for the general regime applicable to
the status of “repentant”, and articles 422-1 and 422-2 provide for the regime
applicable to “repentant” persons in the case of an attempted or actual com-
mission of an act of terrorism.
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It is therefore necessary to ask whether this French legal arsenal is in
line with the scheme proposed by the Directive. In this respect, several re-
marks need to be made.
First of all, it should be noted that the Directive and the French Penal
Code use the same mechanism, namely a reduction in the length of the sen-
tence incurred in order to “reward” the “repentant” of the information he
has given. Moreover, the two mechanisms have in common that they do not
provide for any particular procedural modality. No details on the form or
timing of the request are provided.
However, several elements differ between the French and European
texts.
First of all, we can notice that there is a difference in the terms used.
The Directive uses the term “offence” while Article 132-78 prefers the
term “crime or misdemeanor”. The use of the generic term “offence” can be
explained by the fact that the Directive is intended to be general and to be
understood by all Member States in order to be accepted, through the trans-
position process, in each of the national legal systems. However, not all
Member States have a tripartite categorization of offenses as in France.
However, this semantic difference has no substantive consequences
since both French criminal law and the Directive of 15 March 2017 subject
all acts of terrorism to a penalty involving deprivation of liberty. When re-
duced to the French tripartite classification, this excludes the possibility that
terrorism could be qualified as a contravention. Consequently, the “offences”
of European law are indeed the terrorist “crimes and offences” of French
criminal law. Moreover, article 422-2 of the French Criminal Code expressly
refers to “the penalty of deprivation of liberty”.
This clarifies what is to be understood by the term “sentence”. Thus,
under French law, only the imprisonment sentences would allow an author
or accomplice of an act of terrorism to benefit from the “repentant” regime,
to the exclusion of other penalties, in particular complementary ones. Such
a limitation is not contained in the Directive, which could suggest a reduc-
tion of the fine or an alternative or additional penalty. A question then
arises: does not the harmonization of a “law of repentance” imply a prior
harmonization of the law of penalties, at least in terrorist matters, beyond
the provisions of the directive?
It should also be noted that the first condition proposed by manage-
ment on 15 March 2017 is not included in any French text. The Directive
states that “Member States may take the necessary measures to ensure that
penalties[…] can be reduced when the offender renounces his terrorist activ-
ities”. The Directive lays down two cumulative conditions for the reduction
of sentence. The perpetrator must renounce his terrorist activities and pro-
vide information that the public authorities would not otherwise have been
able to obtain. The French legislator does not envisage that such an action
could be part of the conditions to be met in order to benefit from a reduced
sentence. The absence of such a condition in French law seems surprising
because it would mean, in theory, that an offender who commits a terrorist
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offence could have his or her sentence reduced while continuing terrorist ac-
tivities. In reality, it is the ambiguity of French law that distinguishes the “re-
ward” attributed to the repentant from the regime of protection from which
it benefits, which seems to imply a renunciation of any terrorist activity.
In this respect, French legislation should be amended to be fully com-
patible with European law.
It should also be noted that the Directive uses the generic term “of-
fender”. This can also be understood in the general purpose of the Directive.
It is intended to apply in all domestic legal systems, so it does not precisely
qualify the term “offender”. It seems to have to be heard in its broadest
sense. The regime provided for by the Directive would therefore apply both
to the perpetrators of an attempted offence and to those of an offence com-
mitted or to accomplices. Section 132-78 is more specific than the directive
since it refers to “the person who attempted to commit” and “the person who
committed”. As already mentioned above, the question of the accomplice
then arises. Article 422-2 expressly provides for the possibility for an accom-
plice to benefit from the reduction of sentence provided for in this article.
Thus, by articulating the texts of the Criminal Code, it would seem that the
French status of repentant in the case of a terrorist act could apply to the
same protagonists as those envisaged by the Directive. In this respect, the
texts of the Penal Code would be in conformity with the European directive.
However, Article 16 of the Directive, unlike French legislation, does not
distinguish between the offence committed and the offence attempted – and
this is certainly welcome, given the difficulties of interpreting French law on
this point (supra, 2.1.1.1.1). Thus, according to the European text, the same
criteria should be met for the perpetrator, whether he has attempted to com-
mit or committed an offence, to have his sentence reduced.
In this respect, the French system is more complex than the Directive
since it provides for the possibility of exemption from punishment in the
event of an attempt. Indeed, according to article 132-78, paragraph 1 of the
French Penal Code, in the case where the person who has attempted to com-
mit a crime or offence, and notified the administrative or judicial authority,
has made it possible to avoid the commission of the offence, and if neces-
sary, to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices, he could be exempt
from punishment. This situation is not provided for in the Directive of 15
March 2017.
This exemption from punishment is possible in the event that the cu-
mulative conditions referred to in the first paragraph of Article 132-78 of the
French Criminal Code are met. These conditions are as follows: first, the
person must have attempted to commit a crime or misdemeanor. Secondly,
that it has notified the administrative or judicial authority. Thirdly, its action
must have made it possible to avoid the commission of the offence and to
identify the other perpetrators or accomplices of the offence. These condi-
tions for exemption from punishment do not correspond to those of the Di-
rective and are much more restrictive than those provided for in Article 16.
In any case, this provision of French law is problematic and confusing, so it
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should be repealed, in or outside the context of the transposition of the Di-
rective.
With regard to the case of the consummated offence provided for in ar-
ticle 132-78, paragraph 2, of the French Penal Code, a reduction of penalty
shall apply to the perpetrator who notifies an administrative or judicial au-
thority and who has made it possible to bring the offence to an end, to pre-
vent the offence from causing damage or to identify the other perpetrators
or accomplices. It is therefore provided that an offender who commits an of-
fence may have his sentence reduced if he notifies a public authority and
thus causes three alternative consequences, whereas the European text con-
siders four alternative consequences. French law, unlike European law, does
not provide that assistance in finding evidence may result in a reduction of
sentence. Nor does it clearly provide that preventing other offences referred
to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14[of the Directive] from being committed.
It should be noted, however, that article 422-2 of the Criminal Code
provides for a reduction in the penalty in cases where the author, having no-
tified the public authorities, has prevented the offence from causing death or
permanent disability. The fact of causing the death of a man or a permanent
disability may be classified as a criminal offence under French law. Exam-
ples could include the offences of murder, murder or “deadly blows” for
“death of a man” and intentional or involuntary violence for “permanent dis-
ability”. Thus, the fact that the perpetrator of a predicate offence makes it
possible, by transmitting information, to prevent the occurrence of a per-
son’s death or permanent disability could be associated with the condition
laid down in the Directive since the aim would be to prevent other terrorist
offences from being committed. However, the provision is too restrictive,
since the Directive envisages rewarding the fact of having prevented any
other terrorist offence, well beyond offences against the life or integrity of
individuals. Consequently, French legislation is more restrictive than Euro-
pean legislation and does not seem to be in conformity with European law
on this element either.
As regards the other conditions, those provided for in the Directive and
those provided for in the Criminal Code are not identical. However, it is pos-
sible to make links between French and European conditions.
Indeed, article 132-78, paragraph 2, provides for the case where the
person who has committed a crime or offence and who has notified a public
authority has made it possible to bring the offence to an end or to prevent
the offence from producing damage. If these two conditions are not ex-
pressly provided for in the Directive, it is nevertheless possible to link them
to the first condition laid down in Article 16 of the Directive. The latter en-
visages the case where the offender has provided the public authorities with
information that they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, thereby
helping them “to prevent or limit the effects of the offence”. Several remarks
need to be made in order to understand the links between these different
conditions.
The article of the Penal Code uses the term “damage” but the text of the
directive uses the term “effect”. These two terms are both very vague. As
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demonstrated above, the term “damage” referred to in article 132-78 of the
Criminal Code may be any continuation of the offence and is not necessarily
an element of the offence or an aggravating circumstance. If we consider the
common definition of the term “effect”, it can be defined as the result, the
consequence of the action of an agent, of any phenomenon. The two terms
seem to have a very similar meaning and can be understood in the same
way.
However, article 422-2 of the French Criminal Code, which specifies the
regime of “repentance” in matters of terrorism, sheds light on the notion of
damage by specifying which type of damage must be taken into account.
Thus, it specifies that the penalty of deprivation of liberty of an author or ac-
complice to an act of terrorism is reduced by half if the information has al-
lowed that “the offence does not result in the death of a man or permanent
disability”.
Where “effects” seem to be understood very broadly by the Directive,
French legislation is extremely restrictive as to the “damage” that must be
taken into account in order to benefit from the reduction of the penalty in
the case of an act of terrorism.
Finally, the French text provides for the case where the information
provided would make it possible to identify the other authors or accom-
plices. The European text provides for the case where the information would
help him “to identify or bring to justice the other perpetrators of the offence”
(Article 16, b), ii)). The Directive, unlike the Criminal Code, does not cover
accomplices to the offence. It is possible to wonder whether the penalty re-
duction envisaged by the Directive could apply if the offender denounces an
accomplice. In this respect, it is possible to refer to what has been said pre-
viously on the use of the term “offender” by the Directive, which must be
considered in the broadest possible way. In any case, since the Directive is
an instrument of minimum harmonization, States are free to adopt mecha-
nisms that go further.
In addition, the directive provides for assistance to “identify or bring to
justice”. The second term does not appear in article 132-78 of the French Pe-
nal Code. However, we can ask ourselves whether this is necessary in the di-
rective. Is it possible to help bring someone to justice without first identify-
ing them, in other words, without denouncing them? We could consider as-
sistance in bringing the other perpetrators of the offence to justice by other
means such as the provision of evidence other than a denunciation, but this
is expressly and particularly provided for in the Directive (Article 16(b)(iii)).
Helping to bring a person to justice seems to have a consequential link to
identifying that person. Thus, even if the French text does not refer to this
condition, it would seem that it may be induced by the fact of allowing “the
identification of other perpetrators or accomplices” (article 132-78, para-
graph 2).
In the light of all these elements, a mixed conclusion must be drawn
from this comparative analysis. Indeed, even if there are many similarities
between French and European legislation and even if the French provisions
predate the adoption of the Directive, the absence of certain conditions and
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the existence of overly restrictive conditions in French repentance law sug-
gest that French law would not be fully in conformity with European law if
the reward clause for repentance were made mandatory and not optional.
In addition, there is considerable resistance to the deployment of col-
laborators of justice in the fight against terrorism.
Only one type of terrorism currently affects France: Islamic terrorism.
In this area, there has not been a case where a defendant has benefited from
a reduction or exemption from sentence. Nor is there any protection file
open in this area. According to the French Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office,
this is explained, on the one hand, by the fact that 98% of cases, an offense
has already been completed (which implies that the Anti-Terrorist actors
refuse to protect an accused person after the offense, whereas the law would
allow it). On the other hand, the profile of the accused is particular: the in-
dividuals involved are not afraid to die and do not want any protection. Ac-
cording to counter-terrorism authorities, detainees in terrorism cases experi-
ence prison as a divine experience (which may only be true for those who
are truly involved in the commission of an attack, but leaves out peripheral
protagonists, sometimes with little or even no radicalization).
Moreover, still according to the Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office, the
individuals in question are involved in a process of cover-up (taqyia), so that
it is not possible to establish a relationship of trust, thus ruling out any col-
laboration.
On the other hand, the anti-terrorist services recognize that it is not im-
possible that people may give information about attacks, but this remains
extremely theoretical in France today. This is all the more so as the French
text is inapplicable since it provides for the case of an attempted attack and,
here again, it does not work with voluntary withdrawal.
With regard to the protection of collaborators of justice in terrorism
cases, practitioners consider that it is in practice very complicated to inte-
grate a radicalized person into such a programme. Currently in France,
counter-terrorism actors consider that we are facing a failure in terms of de-
radicalization, so that it would be very difficult to get people to completely
abandon the radical ideology that leads to violent extremism.
Both the National Commission for the Protection of the Repentant and
the magistrates in charge of anti-terrorism are not in favor of using the sys-
tem of collaborators of justice in the fight against terrorism. They also fear
that this would involve the protection programme in managing too many
cases, when the system is not designed to do this and is only viable for a very
small number of cases. Today, in France, about 50 people are protected. The
opening to terrorist litigation (returnees) would potentially concern hun-
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1. Introduction
This questionnaire is intended to describe the opportunities for com-
bating terrorism through the application of rewarding measures under Ger-
man law, taking into account historical developments in case law and legis-
lation.
The first question that arises in this context is that of the scope of re-
warding measures to be analyzed. The first criminal law explicitly dealing
with terrorism came into force in Germany in 19761. It also provided for re-
warding measures. However, the first criminal behavior perceived by society
as “terrorism” had already taken place in 19682. The possibility of applying
rewarding measures by courts, on the other hand, had already existed since
1951, in relation to a certain number of criminal provisions which punished
different types of behavior3. Still today there is a variety of criminal laws
that allow the court to reduce or waive the penalty if the offender behaves in
a certain way before or after committing the respective offence.
In order to ensure a target-oriented analysis, the historical and current
legislation and jurisprudence to be included must be specified in more de-
tail:
The potential success of a project to combat terrorism through the use
of rewarding measures is based on the fact that terrorism is perpetrated by
individuals connected in organizations. If a member of a terrorist organiza-
tion is arrested, it is possible to persuade him or her to cooperate with the
authorities by offering mitigation of punishment or even impunity. At the
same time, the particular danger of this type of crime, and of any other or-
ganized crime, is that there is not only one offender whose capture could
avert the thread. Rather, this is only the case when the organization as such
no longer exists.
Following this reasoning, an important distinguishing parameter can
be established: The analysis has to refer to rewarding measures that do not
only apply if an offender merely prevents his own act or contributes to its
clarification. Rather, it must concern rewarding measures that tie in with
forms of organized crime.
However, this is not sufficient. Organized crime exists in many do-
mains, e.g. in the area of Mafia or white-collar crime structures which, ac-
cording to general understanding, have no “terrorist purpose” and must
therefore be excluded from the analysis.
So what characterizes and distinguishes a terrorist organization from
others? There is no uniform definition. However, there exist a number of cri-
teria on the basis of which the general understanding of terrorism has been
shaped. In addition to an organizational structure, terrorists typically use vi-
olence or destruction as a method of intimidating the population in order to
enforce or clarify goals of a political, religious or other ideological nature4.
The action is mostly directed against random targets, symbolic figures or
buildings of a kind contrary to the ideology of the organization5.
The following analysis will therefore focus on rewarding measures that
were applied or are at least also applicable if the offender discloses informa-
tion about an organization or its actions whose orientation follows the mo-
tives outlined above. The rewarding measures and criminal provisions that
have been applied by courts to cases in which, according to social percep-
1 BGBl. I 1976, p. 2181.
2 Peters, RAF - Terrorismus in Deutschland, 1991, p. 52.
3 BGBl. I 1951, p. 744.
4 https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html.
5 https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html.
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tion, “terrorism” existed or which were created by the legislator under this
impression shall provide a guideline for this purpose.
2. Historical background of rewarding legislation (where existing)
2.1. Socio-political reasons
From 1968 onwards, the Federal Republic of Germany was confronted
with an inner-German terror group, the (later) so-called “Rote Armee-Frak-
tion (“RAF”)6. This group pursued the communist ideal of the “class strug-
gle” in a radical form by attacking and killing people it deemed important
representatives of the capitalist system. Until its self-declared dissolution in
1998, the group was responsible for 33 murders, several hostage-takings,
bank robberies and bombings with more than 200 injured7. During its exis-
tence, 20 members of the RAF died as a result of foreign influence (e.g. as a
result of gunfire with the police), suicide or hunger strike after being im-
prisoned8. The activity of the RAF laid the foundations and was the occasion
for the creation of terrorism-specific legislation and the introduction of re-
warding measures, which applied in particular or exclusively to terrorism.
2.2. Legislative evolution
The provisions deemed relevant and thus presented in the following
were determined on the basis of their application by the jurisdiction for ter-
rorist activities and of the legislative intention in the creation of such laws.
31st August 1951:
Section 129 of the Criminal Code of the German Reich (Reichsstrafge-
setzbuch, “RStGB”) had, already in 1871, made the foundation or member-
ship of criminal organizations a criminal offence9. After its abuse during the
Nazi period (i.e. any grouping contrary to the Nazi ideology was defined as
a criminal organization), it was revised in 1951 and added to the German
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, “StGB”). However, the provision does not
explicitly deal with terrorism due to the fact that it came into force at a time
when the concept of terrorism, at least in Germany, was not yet relevant. It
punished the formation of organizations that were oriented towards the
commission of criminal offences. Typically, this is also the case for terrorist
organizations. It allowed the use of rewarding measures in exchange for in-
formation. Section 129 StGB constitutes the legal reference point of German
counter-terrorism, German courts having applied this article since the first
relevant terrorist activities in the country10.
6 Peters, RAF - Terrorismus in Deutschland, 1991, p. 52.
7 Peters, RAF - Terrorismus in Deutschland, 1991, p. 443 et seq.
8 Lecture by Scheicher on 17th June 2011, at the event, «60 Jahre Staatsschutz im
Spannungsfeld zwischen Freiheit und Sicherheit», Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), p. 2.
9 RGBl. 1871, p. 127.
10 Peters, RAF - Terrorismus in Deutschland, 1991, p. 170.
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18th August 1976:
Section 129a StGB was introduced, constituting the first German crim-
inal provision that explicitly deals with the phenomenon of terrorism, as a
response to the terrorist activities of the RAF.
11 BGBl. I 1951, p. 744.
12 BGBl. I 1976, p. 2181.
13 BGBl. I 1968, p. 741 et seq.
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support of an organi-
zation whose aim is to
carry out typically ter-




– 6 months up to 5
years of imprisonment
– For leading figures: 1
year to 10 years of im-
prisonment
Section 129a para. 5 StGB de-
clares the rewarding measure ac-
cording to Section 129 para. 6
StGB to be applicable mutatis
mutandis:
The above-mentioned rewarding
measure in Section 129 para. 4
StGB had been transferred to Sec-
tion 129 para. 6 StGB13 and had
also changed in content:
“The court may in its discretion
mitigate the sentence (section
49(2)) or order a discharge under
these provisions if the offender
1. voluntarily and earnestly makes
efforts to prevent the continued ex-
istence of the organization or the








ship or support of
criminal organizations
Penalty:
Imprisonment of up to
5 years and possible
police supervision
Para. 4:
“The offender is not punished if he
prevents the continued existence of
the criminal organization or re-
ports its existence to an authority
in good time so that a punishable
offence in accordance with the ob-
jectives of the organization can still
be prevented. The same shall apply
if the offender undertakes the
above-mentioned efforts but an-
other circumstance leads to the
prevention”11.
Sections 129/129a StGB are still in force, although they have been re-
vised several times until reaching their final versions of August and July
2017. However, the content of the rewarding measures has not changed, so
that a detailed description of the changes is not of necessity here. For the
current versions, see below: 3. “Current rewarding legislation”.
16th June 1989:
Adoption of the so-called Leniency Witnesses Act (“Kronzeugenge-
setz”)14 which initially only applied to terrorist activities. On 28th October
1994 revision of Article 5 and expansion to criminal gangs15. The law expired
on 31st December 1999.
14 BGBl. I 1989, p. 1059.
15 BGBl. I 1994, p. 3186 (3193).
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– In addition, possible
order of supervision
and, beginning with a
prison sentence of at
least 6 months, possi-
ble loss of the right to
hold public office and
to be elected in public
elections.
commission of an offence consis-
tent with its aims; or
2. voluntarily discloses his knowl-
edge to a government authority in
time so that offences the planning
of which he is aware of may be pre-
vented;
if the offender succeeds in prevent-
ing the continued existence of the
organization or if this is achieved
without his efforts he shall not in-
cur criminal liability”.





The offender had to be
accused either for
committing or partici-
pating in an offence
under section 129/
129a StGB, or for an
offence related to an
offence under section
129/129a StGB, or for
participating in such
an offence.
The Federal Public Prosecutor
could, with the consent of a crim-
inal senate of the German Federal
Court of Justice, waive prosecu-
tion of the offender if the of-
fender – directly or through a
third party – had disclosed such
information to a prosecuting au-
thority, knowledge of which was
appropriate to either prevent the
commission of any offences re-
ferred to in column 2, to promote
the clarification of such an of-
fence, if he was involved, beyond
his own contribution to the of-
fence, or to lead to the capture of
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an offender or participant in such
an offence.
The aforesaid should only apply if
the importance of what the of-
fender or participant had dis-
closed, particularly in preventing
future offences, justified waiving




see above. Pursuant to Article 4, Section 2
Phrase 1, also a court could de-
cide to waive punishment under
the conditions of Section 1 or in
order to reduce the sentence to
the statutory minimum of the
penalty threatened or to impose a
fine instead of a prison sentence.
If a court intended to terminate
the proceedings under Section
153b Para. 2 German Code of
Criminal Proceedings (Straf-
prozessordnung, “StPO”), i.e. not
to impose a sentence, it could
only do so in accordance with Ar-
ticle 4 Section 2 Phrase 2 with the








or 212 StGB (“Mur-
der”) of the StGB or
offence related to an
offence under Section
211 or 212 StGB.
Article 4 Section 3 Phrase 2 pro-
hibited for the court to order dis-
charge of punishment and for the
public prosecutor to waive prose-
cution for intentional homicides
and punishment could “only” be
reduced to a minimum of three
years. Although the regulation re-
stricted the scope of the court, a
life sentence had to be imposed in
accordance with Section 211
StGB in the event of a murder un-
der specific aggravating circum-
stances being committed. The
possibility of reducing the penalty
to three years meant that there
now was horrendous scope of
mitigation of penalty. In addition,
June 2000:
After the Kronzeugengesetz had expired on 31st December 1999 there
were almost immediate efforts to reintroduce its regulations in German
Criminal Law. Already in June 2000, the German Federal State of Bavaria in-
troduced a new draft law into the German Bundesrat, the so-called “Law to
Supplement the Leniency Program in Criminal Law” (Gesetz zur Ergänzung
der Kronzeugenregelungen im Strafrecht, “KrzErgG”). However, the draft
was rejected by the German Bundestag. A special element of the draft was
that it contained a procedural component. The sentence should also include
the penalty that would have been imposed on the repentant without mitiga-
tion16. This was intended to ensure that if the information given by the re-
pentant proved to be false after sentencing it would be possible to reopen the
proceedings according to Section 362 StPO and – in terms of procedural ef-
fectivity – to sentence the alleged repentant to the higher penalty specified in
the sentence.
August 2001:
Another draft law provided for the extension of the possibilities for mit-
igating punishment within the framework of Section 129a StGB and many
other non-terrorism-specific regulations17. The draft, similar to the draft of
June 2000, was characterized by providing for the integration of the reward-
ing measure into the respective criminal provision to which it should apply,
as was already the case with Sections 129 para. 6 and 129a para. 5 StGB.
The proposal hence constituted a technical difference to the Kronzeugenge-
setz, which contained rewarding measures not integrated into the offence in




a court and the Federal Public
Prosecutor could still waive pun-
ishment or prosecution for crimes
related to a homicide, or the pun-
ishment could be reduced by the
court. According to Article 4 Sec-
tion 3 Phrase 3, all of the above-
mentioned possibilities for the
court and the Federal Public Pros-
ecutor also remained for the acts
constituting attempt of a homi-
cide, the participation in such an
offence or the incitement to such
an offence.
December 2002:
Following the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, calls for the
reintroduction of more extensive rewarding measures for terrorist offences
became increasingly louder. However, it was not until 2002 that Christian
Pfeiffer, then Minister of Justice of the German Federal State of North
Rhine-Westphalia, presented a counter-draft to the above draft laws18. It was
innovative and indicative in several respects. In contrast to the drafts of 2000
and 2001, it was proposed in order to create a general and independent le-
niency provision. This was similar to the Kronzeugengesetz, which expired
in 1999. However, unlike the Kronzeugengesetz, the provision should be in-
tegrated into the general part of the German Criminal Code and the penalty
could only be mitigated for specified offences. Even if the proposal never
passed as a law, a regulation very similar to the proposal is in force today
(Section 46b StGB, see below).
January 2004:
The CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag introduced a draft law to the
Bundestag that took up the above-mentioned Bavarian proposal from June
200019. However, the draft law was never put to vote in the Bundestag.
March 2004:
A draft law with similar content to those of June 2001 and January
2004 was introduced to the Bundestag by the Bundesrat upon initiative of
the states of Bavaria and Lower Saxony20. Once again, the draft was not
adopted as law. This was due in particular to the fact that the integration of
the rewarding measure into each individual offence to which it should apply
was regarded as an ineffective solution in view of the great effort involved
and the associated “swelling” of the StGB21.
1st September 2009:
Section 46b StGB, introduced by the 43rd Amendment to the StGB,
came into force22. It reintroduced a general leniency provision into the Ger-
man Criminal Code and provided for mitigation of penalties or waiver of
penalties for a large number of offences if the offender disclosed informa-
tion. In 2013, Section 46b StGB was partially revised, but the central regula-
tory content remained in force23. A detailed analysis can be found in: 3.
“Current rewarding legislation”.
2.3. Case law evolution
Although terrorism by the RAF had become an intensified social prob-
lem in Germany since around 1970, legal regulations for leniency witnesses
were not provided for in German law for a long time. Although there were
18 BR-Drs. 896/02.
19 BT-Drs. 15/2333.
20 BT-Drs. 15/2771 annex 1.
21 BT-Drs. 15/2771 annex 2.
22 BGBl. I 2009, p. 2288.
23 BGBl. I 2013, p. 1497.
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rewarding measures in Section 129 StGB and since 1976 also in Section
129a StGB, these only applied to the formation of criminal or terrorist asso-
ciations. However, until the introduction of the Kronzeugengesetz in 1989,
there were no legally regulated rewarding measures for crimes typical of ter-
rorism (so-called context offences) such as murder under specific aggravat-
ing circumstances (Section 211 StGB). In 1989, however, the RAF had al-
ready committed 30 of its 33 murders and had hence already left its most ac-
tive period behind24.
Although there was no legal regulation, in the Seventies, former mem-
bers of the RAF appeared in trials against RAF members as leniency wit-
nesses and testified against them25. Thus, the question arises how such a sit-
uation came about albeit absence of legal regulations. On the basis of two fa-
mous cases, it can at least be assumed that the prosecution authorities
reached informal agreements with the repentants in order to convince them
to testify.
The first RAF member to testify was Karl-Heinz Ruhland. After his ar-
rest in December 1970, he was charged, among other, with involvement in
several cases of serious robbery26. For this offence, a minimum penalty of 5
years imprisonment was provided by law. During his interrogations Ruhland
made extensive statements about other RAF members and their involvement
in the robberies. His statements led, among other sentences, to the convic-
tion of the defense lawyer Horst Mahler to 12 years of imprisonment27.
Mahler had been active in the left-wing scene and had defended several
prominent figures of the scene, including later RAF leaders.
Although Ruhland must have indirectly incriminated himself through
his statements (how should he know who was involved in the robberies
other than himself being involved), he was sentenced to only 4.5 years im-
prisonment by the High Court of Düsseldorf in 1972, which was thus below
the minimum sentence28. As early as 1974 he was pardoned by the then Fed-
eral President of Germany, Gustav Heinemann. There were also indications
that Ruhland had received payments of DM 1,000 from the Federal Criminal
Police Department for several years29.
Another leniency witness was Gerhard Müller, who was arrested in
1972 and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in 197630. After serving 6.5
years imprisonment, his remaining sentence was suspended31. He testified in
numerous trials against RAF terrorists, including 1975 against the leaders of
24 Peters, RAF - Terrorismus in Deutschland, 1991, p. 443 et seq.
25 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 138 et seq.
26 Der Spiegel, 24.1.1972, p. 28 et seq.
27 Sehueler, Die Zeit, 9.3.1973, https://www.zeit.de/1973/10/das-fehlurteil-von-moabit.
28 Die Zeit, 21.11.1986, https://www.zeit.de/1986/48/wunderwaffe-kronzeuge.
29 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 143.
30 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 145.
31 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 145.
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the first generation of the RAF. In Müller’s case, according to press reports
and observers from that time, it was remarkable that he was convicted only
for aiding murder under specific aggravating circumstances, membership of
a terrorist organization and explosives offences32. Müller had been charged
with the murder of a police officer and reportedly there had been convincing
evidence against him. This led to the suspicion that Müller had been given
special treatment by the judiciary. He had reportedly also been included in a
leniency program33. However, due to the lack of provisions regulating le-
niency witnesses, such a program did not exist officially at that time. Al-
though precise information on the details of the activities of informal le-
niency witnesses and the nature of informal agreements within the judiciary
is unavailable, the reports and events described show that there was a need
for leniency programs. The absence of a legal regulation, however, led to a
disorderly and uncontrolled procedure.
On the other hand, the 1989 Kronzeugengesetz was not thoroughly ap-
plied. According to a study by Mühlhoff and Mehrens, published in 199934, it
was applied in “an estimated maximum of 25 cases” during the 10 years in
which it was in force35. The more well-known cases of its application con-
cerned RAF terrorists who had committed crimes during the 1970s and were
not arrested until after 1990. The Kronzeugengesetz could also be applied
retrospectively in these cases as it favored the perpetrator, thus conforming
to German Constitution stipulations. As a result, RAF terrorists Susanne Al-
brecht, Werner Lotze, Silke Maier-Witt, Hennig Beer and Monika Helbing all
received lower sentences36. The published judgments concerning Albrecht
and Lotze (both accused of murder under specific aggravating circum-
stances – without the Kronzeugengesetz it would have been compulsory to
sentence both to life imprisonment) indicate that Albrecht was sentenced to
12 years and Lotze to 11 years of imprisonment37. The Kronzeugengesetz
was also applied in the case of PKK official Ali Cetiner. Cetiner was charged
with collaborative murder under specific aggravating circumstances (= com-
pulsory life sentence), but was sentenced to only 5 years of imprisonment38.
He had made numerous statements about PKK leaders and their criminal
offences.
3. Current rewarding legislation (where existing)
With regard to terrorist offences, three rewarding provisions are cur-
rently applicable under German law:
– Section 46b StGB
32 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 144 et seq.
33 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 147.
34 Mühlhoff/Mehrens, Das Kronzeugengesetz im Urteil der Praxis, 1999.
35 Collectively: Mühlhoff/Pfeiffer, ZRP 2000, p. 121.
36 BT-Drs. 12/2610, p. 2.
37 OLG Stuttgart JZ 1992, p. 537; BayObLG NJW 1991, p. 2575.
38 BT-Drs. 12/2610, p. 3.
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– Section 129a (“Forming terrorist organizations”) para. 7 StGB (in
conjunction with Section 129 para. 7 StGB)
– Section 89c para. 7 StGB (“Financing terrorism“)
Only Section 46b StGB is practically relevant. This was clearly con-
firmed within the context of the first Focus Group, in particular by the rep-
resentative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Federal Republic of
Germany, upon explicit enquiry. However, for the sake of completeness, a
brief reference shall also be made regarding the two other rewarding mea-
sures.
3.1. Principles of sanctioning in German Criminal Law
To ensure a better understanding of the functioning of rewarding mea-
sures in German Criminal Law, a brief introduction to the principles of
criminal sanctions in German Criminal Law shall be given in the following.
Penalties applicable under German Criminal Law are either imprisonment
or fines39 calculated on the basis of so-called daily rates (Section 40 StGB).
Fines are regarded as minor punishment in comparison to imprisonment.
Imprisonment penalty can be imposed for a fixed term or as life imprison-
ment. In the case of fixed term imprisonment, the minimum penalty is one
month according to Section 38 StGB. The maximum term of fixed term-im-
prisonment is 15 years. The most severe sanction under German criminal
law is life imprisonment. Section 40 StGB determines the amount of fines.
The lowest fine consists of 5 daily rates of one Euro each, i.e. a total of 5
Euro. The highest fine for one offence amounts to 360 daily rates of 30,000
Euro each, thus a total of 10,800,000 Euro.
Each criminal provision specifies an individual minimum and maxi-
mum penalty for the criminal offence, e.g. Section 239b StGB (“hostage tak-
ing”). If the offender commits an offence under Section 239b para. 1 StGB,
he or she shall be liable to imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than
five years, i.e. between 5 and 15 years. This constitutes the so-called penalty
scale. Within this scale, the court is, according to Section 46 StGB, respon-
sible for deciding on the exact severity of the penalty, taking into account the
guilt of the offender and several other factors such as the effects of the of-
fence to the victim or the offender’s reasons for committing the offence. In
principle, a penalty higher or lower than the penalty provided for by the
penalty scale may not be imposed by the court40.
A deviation from the minimum penalty scale prescribed by a criminal
provision is only possible in cases regulated by law, so-called mitigation pro-
visions. Relevant examples are, among others, the above-mentioned reward-
ing measures according to Section 129a para. 7 StGB (in conjunction with
Section 129 para. 7 StGB) and Section 46b StGB41.
If a mitigating provision is applied, however, the court is not necessarily
completely free concerning the determination of the penalty. Rather, all miti-
39 Fischer, pre § 38 pt. 5.
40 Fischer, § 46 pt. 20.
41 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46 pt. 2.
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gating provisions of criminal law currently in force refer to Section 49 StGB
which determines the scale of mitigating possibilities for the court, as op-
posed to the Kronzeugengesetz which regulated the legal consequences itself.
If a mitigation provision refers to Section 49 para. 1 StGB, it stipulates
precisely how the limits of the penalty scale are altered. If a mitigation pro-
vision, on the other hand, refers to Section 49 para. 2 StGB, the court may
reduce the penalty up to the legal minimum of one month (Section 38 para.
2 StGB) or even impose a fine.
However, the court is not obliged to mitigate the penalty according to
Section 49 para. 1 StGB in every case of referral to Section 49 para. 1
StGB42. The majority of the provisions solely provide the option to shift the
penalty scale if their respective applicability conditions are met43. If the
court is not obliged to mitigate the penalty scale according to Section 49
para. 1 StGB (and not willing to do so), positive behavior of the accused (e.g.
disclosure of information about criminal offences whose planning he is
aware of) can still be respected by passing a sentence on the lower level of
the original penalty scale according to the latitude of the court under Sec-
tion 46 StGB.
Regarding Section 49 para. 2 StGB, it only provides the option for the
court to mitigate the penalty up to the legal minimum of one month while
the maximum term of imprisonment is not affected44. In consequence, if the
Section 49
Special mitigating circumstances established by law
(1) If the law requires or allows for mitigation under this provision,
the following shall apply:
1. Imprisonment of not less than three years shall be substituted for
imprisonment for life.
2. In cases of imprisonment for a fixed term, no more than three
quarters of the statutory maximum term may be imposed. In case of a
fine the same shall apply to the maximum number of daily units.
3. Any increased minimum statutory term of imprisonment shall be
reduced as follows:
a minimum term of ten or five years, to two years;
a minimum term of three or two years, to six months;
a minimum term of one year, to three months;
in all other cases to the statutory minimum.
(2) If the court may in its discretion mitigate the sentence pursuant
to a law which refers to this provision, it may reduce the sentence to the
statutory minimum or impose a fine instead of imprisonment.
42 Fischer, § 49 pt. 3.
43 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 49 pt. 8.
44 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 49 pt. 29.
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applicability conditions of a mitigating provision referring to Section 49
para. 2 StGB are fulfilled, the penalty scale is solely dilated regarding the
minimum penalty.
The options available to the court to exclude a penalty entirely are not
governed in any general systematic form comparable to the mitigating pro-
visions. Rather, individual provisions apply for individual cases. The relevant
provisions within the scope of this questionnaire are presented below.
3.2. Analysis of Section 46b StGB
Section 46b
Contributing to the discovery or prevention of serious offences
If the perpetrator of an offence punishable by an increased mini-
mum sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of life imprisonment,
has substantially contributed to the discovery of an offence under
section 100a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is related to his
own offence by voluntarily disclosing his knowledge, or
2. voluntarily discloses his knowledge to an official authority in time
for the completion of an offence under section 100a (2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure related to his own offence, the planning of which he
is aware of, to be averted,
the court may mitigate the sentence under section 49 (1); a sentence
of life imprisonment shall be replaced with a term of imprisonment of no
less than ten years. In order to determine whether an offence is punish-
able by an increased minimum sentence of imprisonment, only aggrava-
tions for especially serious cases but no mitigations shall be taken into ac-
count. If the offender participated in the offence, his contribution to its
discovery under the 1st sentence No. 1 above must exceed his own con-
tribution. Instead of a reduction in sentence the court may order a dis-
charge if the offence is punishable by a fixed-term sentence of imprison-
ment only and the offender would not be sentenced to a term exceeding
three years.
(2) In arriving at its decision under subsection (1) above the court
shall have particular regard to:
1. the nature and scope of the disclosed facts and their relevance to
the discovery or prevention of the offence, the time of disclosure, the de-
gree of support given to the prosecuting authorities by the offender and
the gravity of the offence to which his disclosure relates, as well as
2. the relationship of the circumstances mentioned in No. 1 above to
the gravity of the offence committed by and the degree of guilt of the of-
fender.
(3) A mitigation of sentence or a discharge under subsection (1)
above shall be excluded if the offender discloses his knowledge only after
the indictment against him has been admitted by the trial court (section
207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
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3.2.1. Applicability conditions
Section 46b StGB is not exclusively applicable to terrorist offences, but
instead constitutes a general rewarding provision unchanged since 2013. Its
applicability depends on a number of conditions.
3.2.1.1. The offence committed by the repentant
First, application of the rewarding measures requires the offence com-
mitted by the repentant to fulfill certain criteria45: The repentant is required
to have committed an offence that is punishable by an “increased minimum
sentence of imprisonment” or a “life sentence of imprisonment”. This means
that not every person accused of an offence under the StGB can benefit from
Section 46b StGB. The minimum term of imprisonment under the StGB is
one month, according to Section 38 para. 2 StGB. Consequently, the offence
committed by the repentant must provide for a higher minimum sentence of
imprisonment, which solely is the case for medium and heavy offences (e.g.
Section 308 para. 1 StGB “Causing an explosion”, for which the perpetrator
shall be liable to imprisonment of not less than one year)46. Typical terrorist
acts, such as Section 129a StGB (“Forming terrorist organizations”), Section
211 StGB (“Murder under specific aggravating circumstances”) or Section
308 StGB are covered by this in any case, so that applicability here is regu-
larly given.
3.2.1.2. The disclosed offence
Secondly, certain conditions are set out concerning the offence on
which the repentant provides information47. Rewarding measures can only
be applied if information regarding a so-called “catalogue act”48 according to
Section 100a para. 2 StPO (“Conditions Regarding Interception of Telecom-
munications”) is disclosed. Section 100a para. 2 StPO is a procedural provi-
sion that regulates the offences for which telecommunications may be inter-
cepted. Thus, the provision in itself has no connection with Section 46b
StGB. What is decisive, however, is that it contains a catalogue of criminal
offences which represent a “serious criminal offence”49. It is hence made
clear that rewarding measures are only used on information relating to seri-
ous criminal offences. A serious offence is generally regarded as such if the
maximum sentence is at least 5 years50. Section 100a para. 2 contains a long
list of offences under the StGB as well as other criminal provisions from
other laws, such as the German Narcotics Act (Betäubungsmittelgesetz,
“BtMG”). A detailed description of all offences would be neither conceivable
nor purposeful within the framework of this questionnaire. Specific criminal
offences regularly (also) present in acts of terrorism, such as Section 129a
StGB (“Forming terrorist organizations”) or Section 211 StGB (“Murder un-
45 Fischer, § 46b pt. 5.
46 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 12.
47 Fischer, § 46b pt. 5.
48 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 14.
49 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 13.
50 BeckOK-StPO/Graf, § 100a pt. 141.
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der specific aggravating circumstances”), are in any case covered by the pro-
vision so that also here an applicability will always be given.
3.2.1.3. The requirement of connection between the offences
Thirdly, the offence on which the offender provides information must
be related to his own offence; i.e. there must be a connection between the
two offences. However, this condition has only existed since 2013. According
to the legislator’s explanatory memorandum when introducing Section 46b
StGB, the provision is precisely intended to intervene in terrorist and other
criminal organizations and networks51. However, due to its broad scope of
application, which is limited in this respect only by the severity of the re-
pentant’s act and Section 100a para. 2 StGB (which, however, applies to the
interception of telecommunications and is therefore not aimed at criminal
networks), it is also applicable to other criminal offences which usually do
not take place within the framework of an organization. It is precisely in re-
gard to such offences that there is a danger of the alleged repentant ran-
domly accusing a third party, whereas with criminal networks this risk is
much lower from the outset, since actual knowledge is regularly given here.
When Section 46b StGB was introduced in 2008, an attempt was made to
limit the risk of false statements by the repentant by introducing increased
penalties in these cases52. However, only a few years later, this did obviously
not seem sufficient in the view of the legislator so that the additional re-
striction condition has been introduced in 2013.
Yet, the concept of “relation to the repentant’s offence” is not a defined
term and therefore requires further definition. According to jurisprudence,
determining the point at which a sufficient relation exists depends on the in-
ner and connecting relationship between the repentant’s offence and the of-
fence uncovered. As a consequence, it has to be possible to relate the dis-
closed information concretely to one or more of the repentant’s individual
offences and therefore to his personally enacted guilt53.
3.2.1.4. Behavior of the repentant
According to Section 46b StGB, the repentant is only privileged if he
has substantially contributed to the discovery of an offence under Section
100a para. 2 StPO by voluntarily disclosing his knowledge or if he voluntar-
ily discloses his knowledge to an official authority in time for the completion
of an offence under Section 100a para. 2 StPO, the planning of which he is
aware of, to be averted.
As a result, the voluntary behavior of the repentant is the principle
obligation in order to benefit from a measure under Section 46b StGB, i.e.
he or she must act without any form of external compulsion54. This is not
the case if the repentant is of the opinion to not be able to maintain quiet
any longer.
51 BR-Drs. 353/07.
52 BT-Drs. 16/13094, p. 2.
53 BT-Drs. 17/9695, p. 8; cf. BGH NStZ 1995, p. 193 et seq.
54 Fischer, § 46b pt. 12.
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3.2.1.5. Quality of information according to Section 46b para. 1 phrase 1 No.
1 StGB
Regarding the quality of the information disclosed, rewarding mea-
sures are only granted if the information actually leads to the discovery of an
offence under Section 100a para. 2 StPO55. Here, however, the question
arises as to when criminal offences can be described as discovered. It could
be assumed that a perpetrator actually has to be convicted on the basis of
the repentant’s statement. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the
mere suspicion that another person has committed a crime is sufficient. Nei-
ther, however, does justice to the purpose of the rewarding provision. Since
rewarding measures always entail the danger of misleading the repentant to
provide false information, the mere substantiation of any suspicion cannot
suffice. At the same time, however, waiting for a conviction would be neither
feasible nor acceptable. As a result, the repentant must provide information
that produces reliable findings about a criminal offence and its perpetrators.
However, it is not necessary for a person to have been arrested. Rather, it is
sufficient if the information is highly likely to lead to a conviction56.
3.2.1.6. Quality and point of time according to Section 46b para. 1 phrase 1
No. 2 StGB
It is decisive that the information is passed on to the authorities at such
an early point in time that an offence under Section 100a para. 2 StPO, the
planned commission of which the offender is aware of, can still be averted.
Here, it is not necessary that the respective offence is in fact prevented57.
Rather, the condition must be determined objectively, i.e. whether the of-
fence could have been prevented by the authorities. Mistakes made by the
law enforcement authorities therefore do not fall within the risk area of the
repentant.
3.2.2. The types of rewarding measures under Section 46b StGB
3.2.2.1. Direct application of Section 46b StGB
Section 46b StGB stipulates two rewarding measures for the disclosure
of information, mitigation and discharge of punishment. Its direct applica-
tion can only be conducted by a court during the main proceedings.
Mitigation of penalty
Although the point in time and conditions of application for mitigating
measures are regulated in Section 46b StGB, the exact scale of the court’s mit-
igating decision in the conviction cannot be found in the provision itself.
Rather, as explained above, reference is made to Section 49 para. 1 StGB
which leads to an optional shift of penalty scale. If the repentant, for example,
is accused of having committed an offence under Section 308 para. 3 StGB by
having caused a non-nuclear explosion that killed another person, the penalty
55 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 15.
56 Fischer, § 46b pt. 14.
57 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 140.
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scale would be imprisonment of no less than 10 years (i.e. between 10 and 15
years). If the applicability conditions of Section 46b StGB are met, the court
is given the option to mitigate the penalty scale according to Section 49 para.
1 No. 3 alternative 1 StGB. Accordingly, the penalty scale is then mitigated to
a possible sentence between 2 years and 11 years and 3 months.
Nota bene: Contrary to Section 49 para. 1 No. 1 StGB, life imprison-
ment is not replaced by a minimum sentence of three years, but rather ten
years, according to Section 46b para. 1 phrase 4 StGB.
Discharge of penalty
Concerning discharge of penalty, there is no general provision such as
Section 49 StGB, which is the reason for its location directly in Section 46b
para.1 sentence 4 StGB. An entire exclusion of penalty is only possible if the
repentant’s offence is punishable by a fixed-term sentence of imprisonment
only and the offender would not be sentenced to a term exceeding three
years. The court must therefore consider whether it would hypothetically
sentence the offender to more than three years of imprisonment without tak-
ing into account the disclosure of information as mitigating factor58. The ex-
clusion of punishment is therefore only possible for minor offences and does
not only depend on the value of the repentant’s information.
Procedural point of time
Regarding the procedural point of time the rewarding measures must
be initiated, the German criminal procedure involves four stages: Investiga-
tion, interim, main and enforcement proceedings59. The investigation proce-
dure (pre-sentencing stage) is initiated when the prosecution authorities be-
come aware of facts that justify the assumption that a prosecutable offence
has been committed60.
Intermediate proceedings (pre-sentencing stage) are opened when the
prosecutor’s office applies to the court for the main proceedings to be
opened61. With the opening order of the court, the main proceedings (sen-
tencing stage) begin62. If the defendant is convicted, the sentence is executed
in the enforcement proceedings (post-sentencing stage)63.
The rewarding measures according to Section 46b StGB must be initi-
ated at the pre-sentencing stage (investigation or intermediate proceedings).
Section 46b para. 3 StGB stipulates that rewarding measures are mandato-
rily excluded if the repentant only discloses his knowledge after the indict-
ment against him (main proceedings, sentencing stage) has been admitted
by the trial court. Direct effect of Section 46b StGB only occurs at the level
of the sentencing stage, since it can only be applied by a court when deter-
mining the penalty (or dispensing with it in the conviction).
The procedural point of time the information has to be disclosed re-
58 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 26.
59 MüKo-StPO/Kudlich, introduction pt. 206 et seq.
60 MüKo-StPO/Kudlich, introduction pt. 214.
61 BeckOK-StPO/Gorf, § 170 pre pt. 1.
62 BeckOK-StPO/Ritscher, § 207 pt. 1 et seq.
63 MüKo-StPO/Nestler, § 449 pt. 1 et seq.
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sults in serious insecurity on the side of the repentant. On the one hand, in
order to benefit from the rewarding measures, he is not only obliged to dis-
close information about the offences committed by a third party, but also to
provide information about offences committed by himself. On the other
hand, the repentant therewith contributes to his own conviction without be-
ing assured that the court will actually make use of the rewarding measures
as the court retains its discretionary power, whether or not it intends to
make use of rewarding measures64. The outer limit of this power is only
reached if and when the court has made gross mistakes concerning taking
into account the positive conduct of the repentant. In Section 46b para. 2
StGB, however, there can be found grounds which the court must take into
account when deciding whether to apply rewarding measures:
“In arriving at its decision under subsection (1) above the court shall
have particular regard to:
1. the nature and scope of the disclosed facts and their relevance to the
discovery or prevention of the offence, the time of disclosure, the degree of sup-
port given to the prosecuting authorities by the offender and the gravity of the
offence to which his disclosure relates, as well as
2. the relationship of the circumstances mentioned in No. 1 above to the
gravity of the offence committed by and the degree of guilt of the offender”.
This should ensure a simpler review of the decision by a higher court
and at least gives the repentant a certain degree of certainty65.
3.2.2.2. Indirect legal consequences as a result of the existence of Section 46b
StGB
The direct application of Section 46b StGB by a court also causes sev-
eral indirect legal consequences due to general rules of criminal and crimi-
nal procedural law.
Pre-Sentencing Stage (investigation and intermediate proceedings)
Section 153b para. 1 StPO provides that the prosecution of the repen-
tant may already be dispensed with by the public prosecution if the relevant
conditions are met. As shown above, Section 46b para. 1 phrase 4 StGB pro-
vides for such a possibility. Consequently, already the investigation proceed-
ings (pre-sentencing stage) against the repentant may be dispensed with
without him being convicted or even indicted, i.e. before the initiation of the
intermediate proceedings. The result is that Section 46b StGB is not applied
at all; on the contrary, the mere fulfillment of its conditions can already lead
to a legal consequence. As a restrictive element, the proceedings can only be
dispensed with the consent of the court that would have jurisdiction over the
main proceedings66.
As soon as the public prosecutor’s office applies to the court for the
opening of the main proceedings (sentencing stage) and thus the intermedi-
64 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 118.
65 Schönke/Schröder/Kinzig, § 46b pt. 16.
66 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 108.
230 SECTION I – CHAPTER 5
ate proceedings are opened (pre-sentencing stage), it is no longer responsi-
ble for closing the proceedings. Therefore, Section 153b para. 2 StPO pro-
vides that the court may dispense with the proceedings before the opening
of the main proceedings if the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met. For
the proceedings to be dispensed with, both the public prosecutor’s office and
the accused must consent67.
Sentencing stage (main proceedings)
After the opening of the main proceedings, Section 46b StGB is applied
directly if the conditions are met and the court decides to do so. However,
the fulfilment of the requirements of Section 46b StGB can also be taken
into account indirectly if the court decides against mitigating the penalty
scale (or dispensing penalty) according to Section 49 para. 1 StGB68. Under
Section 46 StGB, the court has discretion in determining the exact penalty.
Although in this case it would remain within the original (non-mitigated)
penalty scale provided for by the infringed provision, the court would have
to indirectly take into account the fulfillment of the requirements of Section
46b StGB within this original penalty scale.
Post-sentencing stage (enforcement proceedings)
According to Section 46b para. 3 StGB, the rewarding measures do not
apply if the repentant discloses his knowledge after the main proceedings
have been opened. However, the repentant can still benefit, even if he dis-
closes information at a later point in time, at the post-sentencing stage, and
thus Section 46b StGB is not directly applicable69. According to Section 57
StGB, a court may, under certain further conditions, grant conditional early
release of a fixed-term prison sentence after the convicted offender has
served two thirds or at least half of his sentence (if it does not exceed 2
years). The conditions under which the court may grant the conditional
early release also relate to the behavior of the offender after the conviction.
Here, compliance with the (although no longer applicable) requirements of
Section 46b StGB can make a decisive contribution to conditional early re-
lease in this regard70.
3.2.3. Counterpart of rewarding measures: The obligations of the repentant
As the obligations of the repentant are also prerequisite for the applica-
tion of the rewarding measures, see: 3.2.1. “Applicability conditions”.
3.2.4. Revocation of rewarding measures
3.2.4.1. In case of direct application of Section 46b StGB
If Section 46b StGB is applied by a court, an immediate revocation of
the rewarding measure is not stipulated by law. In other words, once the
67 MüKo-StPO/Peters, § 153b pt. 19.
68 MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 131.
69 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 29.
70 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 29.
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(presumed) repentant has been convicted by a final sentence using a re-
warding measure, even if the court has completely dispensed with punish-
ment in accordance with Section 46b para. 1 phrase 4 StGB, this cannot be
revoked if it is subsequently discovered that the conditions for application
were not met or if the (presumed) repentant provided false information
(Section 362 StPO conclusively regulates the cases in which a revocation is
possible. None of these cases are related to rewarding measures.).
However, this does not mean that the alleged repentant may state false
statements without any consequences if he provides false information about
a “catalogue offence” pursuant to Section 100a para. 2 StPO. The negative
consequence of rewarding measures according to Section 46b StGB is the
threat that the perpetrator of an offence threatened with an increased min-
imum imprisonment penalty may provide false information about offences
connected to his offence under Section 100a para. 2 StGB, of which he
claims to know or falsely accuses uninvolved third parties of an offence un-
der Section 100a para. 2 StPO that he claims was committed in connection
with his offence. In order to counter this danger, already existing criminal
provisions concerning false accusations and mislead of authorities about
the commission of an offence were intensified for the case that the perpe-
trator thereby wanted to obtain a reward in the sense of Section 46b
StGB71. If the alleged repentant falsely accuses another person of having
committed a criminal offence in order to benefit from rewarding measures
under Section 46b StGB, he shall be liable to imprisonment from six
months to ten years according to Section 164 para. 3 StGB (“false accusa-
tion”). If the alleged repentant falsely claims to have knowledge about crim-
inal offences committed, but without naming a specific perpetrator (in or-
der to benefit from rewarding measures under Section 46b StGB), he shall
be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years according to Sec-
tion 145d para. 3 StGB (“misleading the authorities about the commission
of an offence”).
These measures are intended to discourage the repentant from making
false statements72. However, at least on a theoretical level (see: 3.2.6.2. “Pro-
bative value” for the practical relevance of false statements), this leads to the
dilemma that precisely those perpetrators who have committed the most se-
rious offences benefit from false statements. Those who face a life sentence
can only be sentenced to a sentence between 10 years (Section 46b para. 1
phrase 1 StGB deviating from Section 49 para. 1 No. 1 StGB) and 15 years
if Section 46b StGB is applied. If a final conviction is passed, it cannot be
subsequently revoked. If Section 46b StGB is applied because the offender
has mislead the authorities about the commission of an offence, an addi-
tional maximum sentence of “only” 5 years may be imposed. In the case of
false accusation under Section 164 para. 3 StGB an additional maximum
penalty of 10 years.
71 Schönke/Schröder/Kinzig, § 46b pt. 22.
72 BR-Drs. 353/07, p. 3.
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3.2.4.2. In case of indirect legal consequences as a result of the existence of
Section 46b StGB
If the investigation proceedings (pre-sentencing stage) against the al-
leged repentant are dispensed with by the public prosecutor according to
Section 153b para. 1 StPO, the public prosecutor is not prohibited to reopen
proceedings against the alleged repentant: If the repentant makes false state-
ments about criminal offences and thereby achieves a suspension of the in-
vestigation procedure, a “revocation” of the rewarding measure is possible
by simply continuing the investigation proceedings73. In addition, in this
case, a further accusation for violation of Section 164 para. 3 or Section
145d para. 3 StGB can be considered. As a result, the alleged repentant ex-
pects not only a non-mitigated sentence for his original offence, but an in-
creased sentence for his false statements.
Section 153b para. 2 StPO provides that the court may dispense with
the proceedings before the opening of the main proceedings if the conditions
set out in paragraph 1 are met. If the court suspends the proceedings ac-
cording to Section 153b para. 2 StPO, the result is a limited ne bis in idem-
effect regarding the further prosecution of the alleged repentant. Further
prosecution will therefore only be possible if further evidence or facts
emerge which, if known, would not have led to a suspension of the proceed-
ings74. If the repentant expresses false statements, this leads to the fact that
Section 46b StGB would not have been applicable in the main proceedings,
as a result of which it would no longer have been possible to dismiss the
case pursuant to Section 153b para. 2 StPO. If the false statements become
apparent, this constitutes new facts and evidence, the knowledge of which
would not have led to a suspension of punishment.
Regarding the indirect impact of Section 46b StGB on the application
of Section 46 and 57 StGB, the possibility of an immediate revocation is not
provided by law. However, the alleged repentant can be prosecuted for of-
fences under Section 164 para. 3 StGB or 145d para. 3 StGB.
3.2.5. Conditions for application of the measures (procedural aspects)
See: 3.2.2.1. “Direct application of Section 46b StGB”.
3.2.6. Conditions for the use of declarations obtained (probative value of dec-
larations)
3.2.6.1. Conditions for use
The repentant’s statements can be applied at several levels of the prose-
cution process, with different requirements for their use.
Initially, they can establish an initial suspicion that justifies the initia-
tion of the investigation procedure (pre-sentencing stage). The only require-
ment for such a case is that, according to general criminalistic experience, it
is possible that a prosecutable offence has been committed. According to
73 MüKo-StPO/Peters, § 153b pt. 17.
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Section 170 StPO, the public prosecution may indict the accused if there is
“sufficient suspicion”, i.e. a conviction is objectively more probable than an
acquittal (intermediate proceedings, pre-sentencing stage)75. This, as well,
can already be caused by a statement of the repentant (but usually sup-
ported by further investigations by the prosecution).
In the main hearing (sentencing stage), on the other hand, the principle
of personal examination applies, Section 250 StPO. This means that the de-
clarations of the repentant made during the investigation process accusing
another person do not automatically count as evidence in the main hearing.
Rather, in principle, a personal testimony of the witness is always necessary,
i.e. he must appear at the court hearing and make his accusations in pres-
ence of the accused76. Deviations from this rule are only possible under cer-
tain circumstances. According to Section 247 phrase 1 StPO, the accused
may be removed from the courtroom during the repentant’s statement if it is
to be feared that the repentant won’t tell the truth when examined in the
presence of the defendant. Nevertheless, the repentant is questioned person-
ally. For his additional protection, the court may exclude the hearing from
public access under Section 172 No. 1a of the German Courts Constitution
Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, “GVG”) if endangerment of the life, limb or
liberty of the repentant is to be feared. It is also possible to deviate from the
principle of examination in person. According to Section 247a StPO, the
hearing of the witness may take place at a place other than the courtroom
and be transmitted live audio-visually to the courtroom if there is an immi-
nent risk of serious detriment to the well-being of the repentant. A certain
disguise of the repentant is also permissible77. Furthermore, recordings of
audio-visual interrogations can be displayed during the main hearing ac-
cording to Section 255a StPO and Section 251 para. 1 No. 2 StPO, if the re-
pentant cannot be interrogated. This may be the case if his identity may not
be revealed within the framework of a witness protection program78. Finally,
under the same conditions according to Section 251 para. 1 No. 2 StPO,
written statements of the repentant may also be read out.
3.2.6.2. Probative value
There is no explicit legal provision dealing with the probative value of
information obtained by the repentant. Ultimately, it depends on the court
(pursuant to Section 286 StPO) whether it believes the repentant in its pro-
ceedings and applies Section 46b StGB (or agrees/decides to terminate the
proceedings under Section 153b StPO). The same applies to the court which
has to decide on the conviction of a person accused by the repentant.
In principle, the legislator has tried to increase the probative value of
the information through several safeguarding mechanisms. On the one
hand, the threat of punishment according to Sections 164 para. 3 and 145d
74 MüKo-StPO/Peters, § 153b pt. 22 et seq.
75 MüKo-StPO/Kölbel, § 170 pt. 14.
76 BeckOK-StPO/Ganter, § 250 pt. 1.
77 BVerfG NStZ 2007, p. 534 et seq.
78 MüKo-StPO/Kreicker, § 251 pt. 56.
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para. 3 StGB. In addition, by the fact that the information must be disclosed
very early, i.e. before the opening of the main proceedings (i.e. during the
pre-sentencing stage, Section 46b par. 3 StGB), in order to ensure that the
information disclosed can be verified. And finally also by the wording of
Section 46b para. 1 No. 1 and 2 StGB, according to which the application
depends on the “detection” or “prevention” of a criminal offence and thus al-
ready requires well-founded findings of the prosecution authorities.
However, the opinion of practitioners, i.e. of judges, prosecutors and
lawyers, of the probative value of rewarding measures is not uniformly high.
This is confirmed by two empirical studies investigating the practical appli-
cation of Section 46b StGB.
Empirical study by Frahm
The first study dates back to 2012 (thus before the introduction of the
connection requirement between the offence of the repentant and the of-
fence about which he provides information). 170 practitioners were inter-
viewed, including 112 prosecutors, 37 criminal judges and 21 lawyers79.
Here, more than 85% of the lawyers rated the risk of abuse of Section 46b
StGB as “high or rather high”. In contrast, only 16.6% of prosecutors and
28.6% of judges were of this opinion80.
In response to the statement “the testimony of the repentant is only of
limited probative value due to the increased incentive for false accusations”,
40% of the judges answered “applies or is more likely to apply”. Regarding
public prosecutors, 30% replied with “applies or is more likely to apply”. In
contrast, over 90% of the lawyers were of the opinion that the statements of
the repentant were of only low probative value.
However, it should be noted that only 21.1% of the prosecutors sur-
veyed had already had practical experience with Section 46b StGB. The fig-
ure was 64.9% for judges and 66.7% for lawyers81. Consequently, the result
of the study is not entirely significant.
Empirical study by Christoph
In the empirical study published by Christoph in 2019, the data of 387
practitioners (106 lawyers, 106 prosecutors, 102 judges and 73 police offi-
cers) was processed and analyzed82. Of these, 207 respondents were already
involved in proceedings in which the application of Section 46b StGB was at
least a possibility. 154 of them, i.e. close to 40%, were involved in proceed-
ings where this provision had actually been applied83.
Of the 207 participants who had had experience with this provision, al-
most 60% reported that false accusations by the repentant had never, rarely
or rather rarely been made. Approximately 58% also confirmed that the re-
pentant had never, rarely or rather rarely attempted to mislead the authori-
ties. On the other hand, 15.5% of the participants replied that there had al-
79 Frahm, Die allgemeine Kronzeugenregelung, 2014, p. 285 et seq.
80 Frahm, Die allgemeine Kronzeugenregelung, 2014, p. 318.
81 Frahm, Die allgemeine Kronzeugenregelung, 2014, p. 289.
82 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 286.
83 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 288.
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ways, frequently or rather frequently been a proven false suspicion or mis-
lead of the authorities84. 21.7% of all respondents (i.e. 387 persons) were of
the opinion that the existing security measures (i.e. Sections 145d para. 3
and 164 para. 3 StGB) were sufficient to prevent false statements. 65.4% of
the respondents expressed their clear opposition85.
3.2.7. Measures for the protection of the repentant
In Germany, witness protection outside criminal proceedings (for pro-
tection during proceedings see: 3.2.6.1. “Conditions for the use”) is primar-
ily regulated by the Law on the Harmonisation of the Protection of Endan-
gered Witnesses (Zeugenschutz-Harmonisierungsgesetz, “ZSHG”)86. Accord-
ing to Section 1 para. 1 ZSHG, the admission of a person into a witness
protection program is conditional upon the existence of a concrete danger
for a person without whose details the investigation of the facts of the case
or the determination of the accused’s whereabouts in criminal proceedings
would be futile or substantially impeded. Depending on the quality of the
statement, this also applies to the repentant who discloses information in or-
der to benefit from Section 46b StGB. With their consent, these individuals
can be protected if there are actual indications which make the occurrence
of damage to life, limb, freedom or property appear probable on the basis of
the statement87. According to Section 1 para. 2 ZSHG, relatives of the re-
pentant or persons close to him may also participate in the protection88.
According to the wording of the provisions of the ZSHG, the repentant
has no legal claim to inclusion in a protection program. In principle, he nei-
ther has a claim to individual protection measures of the Witness Protection
Office. The decision on the beginning, nature, extent and termination of
such measures presupposes in each individual case an examination of pro-
portions in which, in particular, the seriousness of the act, the reason for the
danger, the rights of the person against whom testimony is to be made and
the effects of witness protection must be taken into account89. Section 1
para. 4 ZSHG determines when witness protection measures may be termi-
nated. This is the case particularly if the danger has ceased to exist. On the
other hand, the termination of criminal proceedings does not automatically
lead to the termination of witness protection. This means that even if the re-
pentant is no longer considered as evidence in criminal proceedings, witness
84 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 347.
85 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 349.
86 Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Zeugenschutz im Strafverfahren,
p. 4, File number WD 7 - 3000 - 059/18, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/553366/c
4114898b2fc5327cb00423d0a3c320e/wd-7-059-18-pdf-data.pdf.
87 Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Zeugenschutz im Strafverfahren,
p. 5, File number WD 7 - 3000 - 059/18, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/553366/c
4114898b2fc5327cb00423d0a3c320e/wd-7-059-18-pdf-data.pdf.
88 Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Zeugenschutz im Strafverfahren,
p. 5, File number WD 7 - 3000 - 059/18, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/553366/c
4114898b2fc5327cb00423d0a3c320e/wd-7-059-18-pdf-data.pdf.
89 Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Zeugenschutz im Strafverfahren,
p. 5, File number WD 7 - 3000 - 059/18, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/553366/c
4114898b2fc5327cb00423d0a3c320e/wd-7-059-18-pdf-data.pdf.
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protection is maintained until the specific danger to the repentant ceases90.
According to Section 5 ZSHG, the witness protection authorities are obliged
to provide the persons to be protected with documents and receipts which
can be used to trace a fictitious curriculum vitae (camouflage identity). Ac-
cording to Section 4 ZSHG, the witness protection services can refuse the
distribution of information about the repentant’s personal data to public and
non-public authorities (but not towards the public prosecutor’s office), as far
as this is necessary for his or her protection.
3.2.8. Evaluation and control of the (rewarding) measure
3.2.8.1. Evaluation by authorities
Section 46b StGB is not currently subject to periodic review or evalua-
tion by the legislator or authorities as to its operation and effectiveness. Al-
though an evaluation was announced in 2013 by the then governing parties
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU) and So-
cial Party of Germany (SPD) in their coalition treaty, the state has not yet
implemented such an evaluation91. As far as its practical evaluation is con-
cerned, only the previously cited empirical analyses by Frahm and Christoph
have dealt with the topic (see: 3.2.8.2. “Scientific evaluation and general crit-
icism regarding rule of law and practical aspects” for further results of
Christoph’s study). However, according to German law, there are basically
two ways in which a law can be reviewed for its compatibility with the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Grundgesetz (“GG”)
before the Federal Constitutional Court. On the one hand by means of Art.
93 para. 1 No. 2 GG upon request by the federal government, a federal state
government or one fourth of the members of the Bundestag. In addition, if
a court has to apply a provision of law in a certain conviction, as may be the
case with Section 46b StGB, it may submit it to the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court according to Art. 100 para. 1 phrase 1 GG to determine
whether the law is compatible with the Grundgesetz. However, none of these
control instruments have been applied to date to the rewarding measures in
question.
3.2.8.2. Scientific evaluation and general criticism regarding rule of law and
practical aspects
Rule of law
From the point of view of rule of law, concerns have always been ex-
pressed against rewarding measures. This was also the reason why, although
the RAF had been active since the early 1970s, it was not until 1989 that the
Kronzeugengesetz introduced a rewarding measure applicable to more than
one offence92.
90 Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Zeugenschutz im Strafverfahren,
p. 5, File number WD 7 - 3000 - 059/18, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/553366/c
4114898b2fc5327cb00423d0a3c320e/wd-7-059-18-pdf-data.pdf.
91 Coalition agreement CDU/CSU and SPD 2013, p. 102.
92 König, NJW 2009, p. 2481 et seq.
237GERMANY
First and foremost, criticism mentions a conflict with the so-called
“principle of guilt”93. This is a consequence of the principle of rule of law,
emanating from Art. 20 para. 3 GG and of the principle of human dignity, set
out in Art. 1 para. 1 phrase 1 GG and states that every perpetrator of an of-
fence must be appropriately punished for his guilt (cf. also Section 46 para.
1 phrase 1 StGB)94. The problem is that the perpetrator’s guilt is already es-
tablished upon completion of the offence95. The assistance with investiga-
tions in the later course after the crime can therefore basically have no effect
on the perpetrator’s guilt96. In this respect, it is criticized that Section 46b
StGB leads to inappropriate punishments for the perpetrator’s guilt97.
Others argue that the consideration of the offender’s behavior after the
commission of the offence is not unknown to the law98. Even Section 46
para. 2 StGB mentions the offender’s behavior after the offence and his ef-
forts to compensate for the damage as a factor to be taken into account in
the sentencing. Also, the purpose of the punishment is not only retaliation,
but preventive aspects must also be taken into account. In general, distinc-
tion is made between preventive effects of the punishment on the offender
himself (special prevention) and effects on society in general (general pre-
vention). According to some, Section 46b StGB enables the offender to be
reintegrated into society at a later date, since his statement made it difficult
for him to return to his former criminal environment99.
This is however countered by the argument that the reintegration of the
perpetrator is clearly made more difficult because he is doubly stigmatized:
as a traitor and as a criminal. However, there are no meaningful research re-
sults on this question100.
For reasons of general prevention, some assume that Section 46b StGB
contributes to sowing mistrust within organized criminal structures and that
these thus develop less cohesion101. Others deny this, especially with regard
to religiously motivated organizations102. Here, too, there is a lack of mean-
ingful data. However, the general sense of justice among the population
could actually be disrupted if serious offenders are punished lightly under
application of Section 46b StGB. However, it remains to be seen whether
this will actually happen, as the courts are, as shown, very independent in
the application of rewarding measures.
Section 46b StGB is furthermore criticized in constitutional regard un-
der the aspect of the general principle of equality, which is set out in Art. 3
para. 1 GG103. This prohibits the state to exercise unequal treatment in any
93 Peglau, ZRP 2001, p. 103 et seq.
94 Adam/Schmidt/Schumacher, NStZ 2017, p. 7 et seq.
95 Kaspar/Wengenroth, GA 2010, p. 453 (462).
96 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 195.
97 Jeßberger, in: FS Beulke, p. 1153 (1159).
98 Kaspar/Wengenroth, GA 2010, p. 453 (465).
99 Kaspar/Wengenroth, GA 2010, p. 453 (466).
100 Hannover, Terroristenprozesse - Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse eines Strafverteidi-
gers, 1991, p. 144.
101 Frank/Titz, ZRP 2009, p. 137 (138).
102 Füllkrug, MDR 1989, p. 119 (121).
103 Kaspar/Wengenroth, GA 2010, p. 453 (458 et seq.).
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respect. Consequently, essentially identical facts may not be treated un-
equally by the state. Within the framework of Section 46b StGB, several
points are susceptible to not abiding by this principle. Particularly promi-
nent is the criticism that perpetrators of serious offences (increased mini-
mum penalty) can benefit from Section 46b StGB, but perpetrators of
smaller offences can not104. Here, some see an unequal treatment that can-
not be justified under constitutional law, since even the criminal offence of
the repentant does not suggest the quality and value of his statement105.
Ultimately, Section 46b StGB also experiences criticism with regard to
the principle of freedom of self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum ac-
cusare), which is an expression of the fair trial-principle106. Since the repen-
tant must have made his statement by the time the main proceedings begin,
but at the same time does not know whether he will also benefit from the ap-
plication of Section 46b StGB, the critics believe that he is ultimately in a
dilemma that runs counter to this important principle107.
In the framework of the Focus Group, concrete criticism was also ex-
pressed in regard to the structure of Section 46b StGB. The fact that the re-
pentant, unlike in Art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU, where the perpetrator
has to renounce terrorist activities, did not have to show any remorse, but
only had to benefit the prosecution, constituted a particularly serious viola-
tion of the principle of guilt.
Scientific evaluation and practical criticism
The only available evaluations were conducted by Frahm and Christoph.
However, Frahm’s results are not taken into account here due to their low
significance. In addition to questioning 387 practitioners, 207 of whom al-
ready had experience with Section 46b StGB, Christoph’s study also exam-
ined the frequency of application of Section 46b StGB from 2009 to 2014108.
Large criticism also emanates from legal persons dealing with Section
46b StGB every day, in particular concerning its modus operandi. The ab-
sence of possibilities to reopen the procedure (= revocation of rewarding
measures) is considered to be particularly problematic since the safeguard
mechanism chosen by the legislator through the introduction of paragraphs
3 in Sections 164, 145d StGB is deemed practically insufficient109.
Additionally, the Focus Group dealt with the judicial problem that the
judge often doesn’t have sufficient information about whether and to what
extent the repentant’s statement had brought about the necessary investiga-
tion success Section 46b StGB to be applied. Whether an investigation was
successful and whether the repentant’s statements were true could often only
be clarified within the framework of the follow-up proceedings concerning
the persons against whom the repentant had testified. However, since such a
104 Kaspar/Wengenroth, GA 2010, p. 453 (471).
105 Fischer, § 46b pt. 6a.
106 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 234 et seq.
107 Hassemer, StV 1986, p. 550 (553).
108 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 404 et seq.
109 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 387.
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trial only takes place after the repentant has been sentenced, this uncertainty
often leads to Section 46b StGB not being applied.
Another major criticism was that Section 46b StGB is generally applica-
ble and not, like the Kronzeugengesetz, limited to certain forms of crime.
This means that Section 46b StGB in fact finds its main field of application
in crimes of everyday life and precisely not in those for which it was actually
intended (terrorism, organized crime). This assessment is also supported by
Christoph’s investigation. Between 2009 and 2014, only 126 criminal proceed-
ings were found in which Section 46b StGB was applied110. Of these, only 2%
were attributed to terrorism and 15% - 25% to organized crime111. The re-
maining offences related to so-called “everyday crimes”. It should be noted
restrictively that the application of Section 46b StGB does not have to be re-
ported to the German Federal Central Register for Criminal Offences (Bun-
deszentralregister, “BZRG”). Actual frequency of application can hence differ.
In addition, a statement by the representative of the Office of the Attorney
General of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Focus Group showed that
the use of Section 46b StGB has increased significantly in recent years, par-
ticularly with regard to terrorism. According to the representative, the reason
for this is the return of persons who had joined the Islamic State.
Altogether, both in the Focus Group and in Christoph’s study, the vast
majority of practitioners were in favor of retaining Section 46b StGB, but
not in its current form112.




(1) Whosoever forms an organization whose aims or activities are di-
rected at the commission of
1. murder under specific aggravating circumstances (section 211),
murder (section 212) or genocide (section 6 of the Code of International
Criminal Law) or a crime against humanity (section 7 of the Code of In-
ternational Criminal Law) or a war crime (section 8, section 9, section 10,
section 11 or section 12 of the Code of International Criminal Law); or
2. crimes against personal liberty under section 239a or section 239b,
or whosoever participates in such a group as a member shall be li-
able to imprisonment from one to ten years.
(2) The same penalty shall be incurred by any person who forms an
organization whose aims or activities are directed at
1. causing serious physical or mental harm to another person,
namely within the ambit of section 226,
110 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 407.
111 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 413.
112 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 381 and 388.
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2. committing offences under section 303b, section 305, section 305a
or offences endangering the general public under sections 306 to 306c or
section 307 (1) to (3), section 308(1) to (4), section 309 (1) to (5), section
313, section 314 or section 315 (1), (3) or (4), section 316b(1) or (3) or sec-
tion 316c (1) to (3) or section 317 (1),
3. committing offences against the environment under section 330a
(1) to (3),
4. committing offences under the following provisions of the
Weapons of War (Control) Act: section19 (1) to (3), section 20(1) or (2),
section 20a(1) to (3), section 19 (2) No. 2 or (3) No. 2, section 20 (1) or (2),
or section 20a (1) to (3), in each case also in conjunction with section 21,
or under section 22a (1) to (3) or
5. committing offences under section 51 (1) to (3) of the Weapons Act;
or by any person who participates in such a group as a member, if
one of the offences stipulated in Nos 1 to 5 is intended to seriously intim-
idate the population, to unlawfully coerce a public authority or an inter-
national organization through the use of force or the threat of the use of
force, or to significantly impair or destroy the fundamental political, con-
stitutional, economic or social structures of a state or an international or-
ganization, and which, given the nature or consequences of such offences,
may seriously damage a state or an international organization.
(3) If the aims or activities of the group are directed at threatening
the commission of one of the offences listed in subsection (1) or (2) above,
the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to five years.
(4) If the offender is one of the ringleaders or hintermen the penalty
shall be imprisonment of not less than three years in cases under subsec-
tions (1) and (2) above, and imprisonment from one to ten years in cases
under subsection (3) above.
(5) Whosoever supports a group as described in subsections (1), (2)
or (3) above shall be liable to imprisonment from six months to ten years
in cases under subsections (1) and (2), and to imprisonment not exceed-
ing five years or a fine in cases under subsection (3). Whosoever recruits
members or supporters for a group as described in subsection (1) or sub-
section (2) above shall be liable to imprisonment from six months to five
years.
(…)




(7) The court may in its discretion mitigate the sentence (section 49
(2)) or order a discharge under these provisions if the offender
1. voluntarily and earnestly makes efforts to prevent the continued
existence of the organization or the commission of an offence consistent
with its aims; or
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2. voluntarily discloses his knowledge to a government authority in
time so that offences the planning of which he is aware of may be pre-
vented;
if the offender succeeds in preventing the continued existence of the
organization or if this is achieved without his efforts, he shall not incur
criminal liability.
3.3.1. Scope of Application
First, the question arises as to the interrelation between Section 129a
para. 7 StGB and Section 46b StGB. Section 129a para. 7 StGB applies only
to the perpetrator of an offence according to Section 129a para. 1 - 5 StGB,
whereas Section 46b StGB applies to all offenses that are punishable by a
raised minimum sentence of imprisonment. However, this also includes of-
fences under Section 129a StGB; therefore both provisions can be applicable
in case of a repentant who cooperates with the investigating authorities.
However, both rewarding provisions do not reward the same behavior and
also regulate different rewarding measures, i.e. they are different both in
their conditions and in their legal consequences. In principle, however, the
rewarding measure pursuant to Section 129a para. 7 in conjunction with
Section 129 para. 7 StGB takes precedence as the more specific provision
(lex specialis) for offences under Section 129a StGB113. If their conditions
are not fulfilled, Section 46b StGB can nevertheless be applied114.
Since Section 129a para. 7 StGB only applies to one criminal provision
and Section 46b StGB applies to this provision, the question arises as to the
practical benefit of Section 129a StGB. Its practical significance is indeed
small, especially since the introduction of Section 46b StGB. This was
clearly confirmed within the context of the first Focus Group, in particular
by the representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, upon explicit enquiry. The same can be assumed be-
tween 1989 and 1999 when the Kronzeugengesetz was in force and took
precedence. Although Section 129a StGB allows for more generous reward-
ing measures for the repentant in some cases, the applicability conditions
are harder to accomplish, only likely to be attained by very few repentants.
As a result, Section 46b StGB is generally also applied to offences under Sec-
tion 129a StGB.
3.3.2. Applicability conditions
In technical terms, the rewarding measure under Section 129a StGB,
unlike under the Kronzeugengesetz and Section 46b StGB (see above), is in-
tegrated into the provision that also regulates criminal conduct. This means
that the first condition of applicability of Section 129a para. 7 StGB requires
the offender to have performed an offence under Section 129a para. 1 - 5
113 Schönke/Schröder/Sternberg-Lieben/Schittenhelm, § 129 pt. 18a.
114 BT-Drs. 16/6268, p. 15.
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StGB. As a consequence, Section 129a para. 7 StGB does not apply to any
other offences, including those offences mentioned in Section 129a para. 1
and 2 StGB (e.g. Section 212 StGB “Murder”).
In addition to the fact that the repentant must have committed an of-
fence stipulated in Section 129a para. 1 - 5 StGB, Section 129 para. 7 StGB,
to which Section 129a para. 7 StGB refers, sets out further requirements on
what must be achieved through the offender’s cooperation so that he can
benefit from rewarding measures.
According to Section 129 para. 7 phrase 1 No. 1 alternative 1 StGB, the
offender must voluntarily and earnestly make efforts to prevent the contin-
ued existence of the terrorist organization.
This requires an organization within the scope of Section 129a StGB to
still exist at the time at which the repentant becomes active115. Moreover, his
conduct is not linked to success. It is sufficient for the repentant to merely
attempt to prevent the organization from continuing to exist116. However,
this attempt must be voluntary, i.e. without external coercive effect, and se-
rious117. An attempt is serious if the repentant assumes that the organization
will continue to exist without his intervention and that his action will dis-
solve the organization and its continued existence118.
Section 129 para. 7 phrase 1 No. 1 alternative 2 StGB is applicable if
the repentant either merely tries to prevent the commission of an offence
manifesting the aims of the terrorist organization, or if such a commission
is actually prevented. It is not necessary that the act is prevented by causal-
ity through his efforts119. However, his behavior must again be voluntary and
serious. The act that the repentant prevents must correspond to the goals of
the terrorist organization and must therefore be one from the catalogue of
Section 129a para. 1 or 2 StGB. It should be noted that in particular this
part of the regulation, but also No. 1 alternative 1 is a rewarding measure,
since it rewards the repentant for a behavior after his act. However, it is not
absolutely necessary for him to cooperate with the authorities and pass on
information. Rather, the person who merely prevents the commission of a
criminal offence by the organization, e.g. by disarming a bomb (criminal of-
fence under Section 308 StGB), can also benefit.
According to Section 129 para. 7 phrase 1 No. 2 StGB, the application
of rewarding measures is also possible if the repentant discloses his knowl-
edge about the organization or the crimes planned by it to an authority in
good time so that such crimes can be prevented. It should be noted here
that, unlike Section 46b StGB, the requirement of a connection between the
offence of the repentant and the offence about which he provides informa-
tion does not exist. Suitable authorities to disclose information to are,
among others, the police and other criminal prosecution authorities120. The
115 Lackner/Kühl/Heger StGB, § 129 pt. 12.
116 MüKo-StGB/Schäfer/Anstötz, § 129 pt. 161.
117 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 129 pt. 28.
118 BGH NStZ-RR 2006, p. 232 (233).
119 MüKo-StGB/Schäfer/Anstötz, § 129 pt. 162.
120 MüKo-StGB/Schäfer/Anstötz, § 129 pt. 164.
243GERMANY
repentant’s efforts only have to be directed at preventing a single planned of-
fence, even if the organization as such still exists. He must reveal to the au-
thorities all his knowledge concerning the planned offence and thus make it
possible to prevent it121. As a consequence of the wording of the provision
(“can be prevented”), it is not necessary that the planned offence is actually
averted. It is sufficient that the repentant informs the authorities in a timely
and comprehensive manner122.
According to Section 129 para- 7 phrase 2 StGB, the offender may also
benefit to a greater extent (see below 3.3.3: “Types of rewarding measures
(…)”) if he prevents the continuation of the association or, if this success is
achieved without his involvement, he has voluntarily and seriously at-
tempted to do so. The decisive factor is therefore the termination of the or-
ganization’s activities, not the causality of the repentant’s actions in this re-
spect123.
3.3.3. Types of rewarding measures under Section 129a para. 7 StGB in con-
junction with Section 129 para. 7 StGB
3.3.3.1. Mitigation of penalty
According to Section 129 para. 7 StGB, the court has full discretion to
mitigate the penalty according to Section 49 para. 2 StGB, or fully discharge
the penalty if the repentant has behaved according to phrase 1 No. 1 or 2. If
the penalty under Section 49 para. 2 StGB is mitigated, the court may re-
duce the penalty up to the legal minimum of one month (Section 38 para. 2
StGB) or replace imprisonment by imposing a fine. Here, again, the court is
not obliged to make use of its mitigation option.
Section 49
Special mitigating circumstances established by law
(…)
(2) If the court may in its discretion mitigate the sentence pursuant
to a law which refers to this provision, it may reduce the sentence to the
statutory minimum or impose a fine instead of imprisonment.
3.3.3.2. Discharge of penalty
However, if the repentant, according to Section 129 para. 7 phrase 2
StGB, succeeds in preventing the continued existence of the organization or
if this is achieved without his efforts, the law stipulates compulsorily, i.e.
without alternative option for the court, that the repentant is not punished.
Procedural point of time
In contrast to Section 46b para. 3 StGB, Sections 129 and 129a StGB
do not stipulate up to which procedural point the offender must become ac-
121 MüKo-StGB/Schäfer/Anstötz, § 129 pt. 165.
122 MüKo-StGB/Schäfer/Anstötz, § 129 pt. 166.
123 MüKo-StGB/Schäfer/Anstötz, § 129 pt. 167.
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tive in order to benefit from the rewarding measures. However, since the re-
warding measures must be pronounced by a court in the verdict, the repen-
tant must in principle have fulfilled the preconditions for an application by
this point in time. Due to the nature and extent of what the repentant must
do for applicability, however, in practice the repentant will regularly be
forced to fulfil the preconditions for application already at the pre-sentenc-
ing stage. Theoretically, however, it would also be conceivable that the re-
pentant would only fulfil the preconditions for application after his convic-
tion, i.e. at the post-sentencing stage, and that the proceedings pursuant to
Section 359 No. 5 StPO would therefore have to be reopened in his benefit.
Section 359
Reopening for the Convicted Person’s Benefit
Reopening of the proceedings concluded by a final judgment shall be
admissible for the benefit of the convicted person
(…)
5. if new facts or evidence were produced, which, independently or
in connection with the evidence previously taken, tend to support the de-
fendant’s acquittal or, upon application of a less severe penal norm, a
lesser sentence or a fundamentally different decision on a measure of re-
form and prevention;
Regarding the indirect legal consequences as a result of the existence of
Section 129a para. 7 StGB in conjunction with Section 129 para. 7 StGB, the
same applies as in relation to 46b StGB (see above: 3.2.2.2. “Indirect legal
consequences as a result of the existence of Section 46b StGB”).
3.3.4. Counterpart of rewarding measures: The repentant’s obligations
As the repentant’s obligations are also prerequisite for the application
of the rewarding measures, see: 3.3.2. “Applicability conditions”. This ap-
plies both to direct application and to indirect legal consequences.
3.3.5. Revocation of rewarding measures
With regard to the revocation of rewarding measures, there is only very
little difference to what applies to Section 46b StGB, so essentially, reference
can be made to: 3.2.4. “Revocation of rewarding measures”.
However, there is a small difference concerning direct application. If
the alleged misleads the authorities about the commission of an offence or
falsely accuses another person of a criminal offence, he is not punishable ac-
cording to Section 145d para. 3 StGB (3 months up to 5 years imprison-
ment) or Section 164 para. 3 StGB (6 months up to 10 years imprisonment),
but only according to Section 145d para. 1 or 2 StGB (up to 3 years impris-
onment or fine) or Section 164 Sections 1 or 2 StGB (up to 5 years impris-
onment or fine). This is a consequence of the fact that paragraphs 3 of Sec-
tions 164 and 145d StGB refer only to 46b StGB.
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3.3.6. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
See above: 3.2.2.1. “Direct application of Section 46b StGB”.
3.3.7. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of
declarations)
See above: 3.2.6. “Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained
(probative value of declarations)”. With regard to the probative value of the
information obtained, there are no empirical studies comparable to the stud-
ies investigating Section 46b StGB.
3.3.8. Measures for the protection of the repentant
See above: 3.2.7. “Measures for the protection of the repentant”
3.3.9. Evaluation and control of the (rewarding) measure
See above: 3.2.8.1. “Evaluation by authorities”
3.4. Analysis of Section 89c para. 7 StGB
Section 89c StGB criminalizes financing of terrorism. Anyone who col-
lects, receives or makes available assets with the knowledge or intent that
they be used by another person for the commission of an offence listed in
Section 89c para. phrase 1 No. 1 - 8 StGB shall be punished with a term of
imprisonment of 6 months to 10 years. These are crimes that are typical for
terrorist activities (homicides, arson, explosives, etc.)124. Furthermore,
phrase 2 requires that the act be intended to intimidate the population in a
significant manner, to unlawfully coerce an authority or an international or-
ganization by force or threat of force, or to eliminate or significantly impair
the basic political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or
an international organization, and to cause substantial damage to a state or
an international organization by the nature of its commission or its effects.
According to paragraph 2, likewise punished shall be any person who col-
lects, receives or makes available property in a manner described in phrase
2 of paragraph 1, in order to himself commit any of the offences referred to
in the first sentence of paragraph 1.
The rewarding measure can be found in paragraph 7:
“The court may, at its discretion, mitigate the punishment (Section 49
paragraph 2) or waive punishment under this provision if the offender volun-
tarily abandons further preparation of the offence and averts or substantially
mitigates the danger caused and identified by him that others will further
prepare or perform the offence, or if he voluntarily prevents completion of the
offence. If, without the involvement of the offender, the designated danger is
averted or substantially reduced or the completion of the offence is prevented,
his voluntary and serious efforts to achieve this goal shall suffice”.
124 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 89c pt. 2.
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The wording closely resembles the wording of Section 129a StGB. In
the absence of greater practical relevance, no further explanations shall
therefore be given at this point since essentially the aforesaid regarding Sec-
tion 129a StGB can be applied mutatis mutandis.
4. Current relevant case law (where existing)
Within the last few years, two terrorist developments in Germany have
emerged in particular: Right-wing extremist terrorism and Islamist terrorism.
4.1. Right-wing extremist terrorism
For a long time, the phenomenon of terrorism by right-wing radical
groups was widely underestimated in Germany. According to the Amadeu
Foundation which is recognized by the Federal Agency for Civic Education,
198 people have died as a result of right-wing violence since 1990125, most
recently, on 9th October 2019, when a single perpetrator, heavily armed, at-
tacked a synagogue in the city of Halle an der Saale and killed two people126.
For the same period, according to the Amadeu Foundation, the Federal Gov-
ernment lists only 85 homicides127 The extent to which the aforementioned
cases actually involve “terrorism” in the sense of an organization acting in
the background and not only spontaneous acts of supporters of right-wing
ideologies cannot be conclusively determined. This is due in particular to the
fact that the right-wing scene, as was only discovered in the last few years,
appears to systematically and successfully network undergroun128. More pre-
cise findings about this do not yet exist. Particularly in recent years there
have been cases in which individual perpetrators have committed killings
motivated by right-wing motives without any warning in advance, and it is
only afterwards that it becomes apparent that the individuals had previously
radicalized and connected themselves to right-wing underground organiza-
tions129.
Public attention to this tendency was first aroused on a large scale in
2011 when the existence of the so-called National Socialist Underground
(NSU) was discovered130. Only three people belonged to the core of the
movement. The discussion about the number of supporters and confidants,
on the other hand, is controversial, which illustrates the aforementioned un-
certainty about the connections in the right-wing scene. It is assumed that
there were up to 200 people involved131. The three main perpetrators had





129 E.g. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rechter-terror-luebcke-103.html; https://www.
zeit.de/thema/halle-an-der-saale.





cluding 9 migrants and one policewoman), two bomb attacks and 15 rob-
beries between 1999 and 2011132. The activity was uncovered by the ex-
tended suicide of two of the three perpetrators on 4th November 2011 who
feared being seized by the police following a bank robbery133. On 8th No-
vember 2011, the third main perpetrator, Beate Zschäpe, turned herself in to
the police.
On 11th July 2018, after more than five years of trial, The High Court
of Munich found Zschäpe guilty, inter alia, of murder under specific aggra-
vating circumstances in 9 cases, attempted murder under specific aggravat-
ing circumstances in 32 cases (by one and the same bomb attack), attempted
murder under specific aggravating circumstances (another bomb attack),
murder under specific aggravating circumstances and attempted murder un-
der specific aggravating circumstances (of two police officers in Heilbronn),
robbery, attempted murder under specific aggravating circumstances by an
aggravated arson attack and membership of a terrorist organization (NSU).
The court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment134.
Four other persons were charged with Zschäpe: Andre E., Holger G.,
Ralf W. and Carsten S. While Ralf W. was sentenced to imprisonment of 10
years for aiding and abetting murder in 9 cases135, the other three defen-
dants received significantly lower sentences. Andre E. was sentenced to 2
years and 6 months imprisonment for supporting a terrorist organization136.
Holger G. was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for three cases of support
of a terrorist organization137. Carsten S., who was adolescent at the time of
the crime, was sentenced to 3 years for aiding and abetting murder under
specific aggravating circumstances in 9 cases138. In particular, S. is often de-
scribed as the “principal witness” of the trial, as he made extensive state-
ments very early on, especially against Ralf W.139. However, since he was
convicted under juvenile criminal law, Section 46b StGB was presumably
not applied here since it is not yet clarified to what extent Section 46b StGB
is applicable in this respect140. Holger G. also testified at an early stage. In
particular, he provided information about Zschäpe’s role amongst the three
main perpetrators. This was of great importance as Zschäpe, due to the
death of the other two main perpetrators, took the position that she had not
been a main perpetrator, but merely an accomplice. Without G., it would
have been significantly more difficult to prove her to the contrary141. G’s goal
was to benefit from Section 46b StGB. Whether this was actually applied or
whether G’s conduct was only taken into account in the sentencing has not
132 BT-Drs. 17/14600, p. 71 et seq.
133 http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/167684/der-nationalsozial-
istische-untergrund-nsu.
134 OLG München, press release 78 dated 11th July 2018.
135 OLG München, press release 78 dated 11th July 2018.
136 OLG München, press release 78 dated 11th July 2018.
137 OLG München, press release 78 dated 11th July 2018.
138 OLG München, press release 78 dated 11th July 2018.
139 https://www.br.de/nachricht/nsu-prozess/170119-tagebuch-gerichtsreporter-100.html.
140 Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p. 413.
141 https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/nsu-prozess-staatsanwalt-lobt-aussagen-von-
carsten-s-und-holger-g-a-1073043.html.
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yet been clarified as the judgment is not yet available. According to reports,
however, during the trial his “leniency witness status” was revoked and he
was also released from the witness protection program.142 Andre E. re-
mained silent about the allegations and therefore did not benefit from re-
warding measures.
4.2. Islamist terrorism
Islamist terrorism and Germany’s criminal law response is of high rele-
vance due to the return of supporters of the “Islamic State” in Syria to Ger-
many because of its failure. According to the representative of the Attorney
General’s Office present at the Focus Group, the proceedings initiated
against the IS returnees on account of their membership in a terrorist orga-
nization and related acts lead to a significant increase in the application of
Section 46b StGB. There are currently no empirical studies on this subject
and many proceedings have not yet been concluded. The proceedings
against the presumed heads of the IS in Germany before the High Court of
Celle143, which are based in particular on statements by the leniency witness
Anil O., are particularly prominent. Anil O. himself received a 2-year proba-
tion144 and has been in the Witness Protection Program ever since. However,
there are some doubts about his testimony145. Further insights can only be
gained after the trial against the IS leadership has been concluded146.




Member States may take the necessary measures to ensure that the
penalties referred to in Article 15 may be reduced if the offender:
(a) renounces terrorist activity; and
(b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with informa-
tion which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping
them to:
(i) prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
(ii) identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
(iii) find evidence; or





144 OLG Düsseldorf, judgement dated 15th May 2017, file number: III-5 StS 1/17.
145 https://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Der-Norden/Uebersicht/Prozess-gegen-Abu-Walaa-
Zweifel-am-Kronzeugen-Anil-O.
146 The judgement was issued after the completion of this paper on 24th February
2021. Despite certain doubts, the court based its decision, among other factors, on the state-
ment of Anil O. The main defendant was sentenced to 10 years and 6 months custody.
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When examining Art. 16, it becomes apparent that the wording and the
application requirements are quite similar to those in Section 46b StGB. To-
gether, both provisions permit rewarding measures if the repentant con-
tributes to the success of an investigation or prevents criminal offences com-
mitted by third parties.
Beyond Section 46b StGB, and thus more along the lines of Section
129a para. 7 StGB, Art. 16 also permits rewarding measures if the offender
prevents the effects of his own offence. Furthermore, rewarding measures
can be applied if the repentant merely provides assistance in gathering evi-
dence.
Art. 16 presupposes that the offender has received a penalty in accor-
dance with Art. 15, which in turn presupposes the realization of a criminal
offence in accordance with Art. 3 - 12 or 14. This differs from Section 46b
StGB. Art. 16 applies specifically to terrorism, while Section 46b StGB ap-
plies to all criminal offences of the StGB that are punishable by an increased
minimum penalty of imprisonment.
In particular, however, the two provisions differ in that Section 46b
StGB does not require repentant conduct on the part of the offender in the
sense of renunciation of the organization. Moreover, Art. 16 merely provides
for a possibility of mitigation, while Section 46b StGB allows for a discharge
of penalty. This raises the question of the mandatory effect of Art. 16, which
has not yet been clarified and is to be investigated within the framework of
WP2, with regard to the question of whether and to what extent a Member
State, when introducing rewarding measures, must observe the provisions of
Art. 16 and to what extent it may create more extensive measures than the
rewarding measures outlined. It will also be necessary to clarify to what
extent the stipulation of fewer requirements concerning the behavior of the
repentant with regard to his renunciation of the terrorist organization com-
ply with Art. 16.
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CHAPTER 6
LUXEMBOURG
SILVIA ALLEGREZZA, VALENTINA COVOLO, DIMITRIOS KAFTERANIS
SUMMARY: 1. Historical background of rewarding legislation. – 2. Current rewarding legisla-
tion. – 2.1. Applicability conditions. – 2.2. Types of rewarding measures. – 2.2.1. Re-
warding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the pre-sentencing
stage. – 2.2.2. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
sentencing stage. – 2.2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, ini-
tiated at the post-sentencing stage. – 2.3. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the
obligations of the repentant. – 2.4. Revocation of rewarding measures. – 2.5. Condi-
tions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects). – 2.6. Conditions for the
use of the declarations obtained (probative value of declarations). – 2.7. Measures for
the protection of the repentant. – 2.8. Evaluation and control of the measure. – 3. Cur-
rent relevant case law (where existing). – 4. Conformity of the current rewarding legis-
lation to art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU (where existing).
1. Historical background of rewarding legislation
The criminal offences of terrorism and related activities have been in-
troduced under Luxembourg law by the Law of 13 August 2003 on the re-
pression of terrorism and its financing, which transposed the European leg-
islation and the international conventions on the matter1. Beside the crimi-
nalisation of terrorist activities in Chapter III-1 of the Criminal Code, the
Law of 2003 also set forth some rewarding measures, consisting in the ex-
clusion and reduction of penalties for the authors of those crimes that de-
cide to collaborate with the law enforcement authorities.
According to the explanations contained in the draft law, said reward-
ing measures should allow in practice, a more effective fight and prevention
of terrorist acts. Furthermore, it is specified that the mechanisms for an au-
tomatic reduction or exoneration of penalty thereby established meets the
conditions laid down in Article 6 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13
June 2002 on combating terrorism. The introduction of such rewarding
measures is motivated by having a stronger incentive effect than one left to
the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, the mitigating and exonerat-
ing circumstances reflect one already existing in the Criminal Code in rela-
tion to organised crime offences.
1 Loi du 12 août 2003 portant 1) répression du terrorisme et de son financement, 2) ap-
probation de la Convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme,
ouverte à la signature à New York en date du 10 janvier 2000, Mém. A n° 137.
2. Current rewarding legislation
2.1. Applicability conditions
Luxembourg law subjects the applicability of the rewarding measures
in the field of terrorism to distinct conditions depending on the nature of the
specific measure: while reduction of the penalty is more easily accessible,
more requirements are to be met in order to benefit from an exoneration of
the penalty.
In particular, the exonerating circumstance under Article 135-7, para-
graph 1 of the Criminal Code is granted on the condition that the accused
collaborates with the authorities before the attempt of committing a terror-
ist offence and before the initiation of the prosecution. Likewise, the exon-
erating circumstance set out in Article 135-8 of the Criminal Code is subject
to the condition that the member of a terrorist group provides to the au-
thorities the required information before an attempt to commit a terrorist
act takes place and before the initiation of the prosecution.
By contrast, the attenuating circumstance established in Article 135-7,
paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code is applicable upon the mere condition that
the accused collaborates with the authorities by providing the necessary in-
formation even after the decision to prosecute.
2.2. Types of rewarding measures
2.2.1. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
pre-sentencing stage
In should first be noted that in Luxembourg a State Prosecutor enjoys
discretion as to whether to prosecute a criminal offence2. In this perspective,
the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings is based on written guide-
lines whereby the General State Prosecutor sets forth priorities in the crime
policy, as well as on an individual assessment on a case-by-case basis, which
might include the cooperative attitude of the suspect. As emphasised by the
interviewed stakeholders, the principle of discretionary prosecution, also de-
fined as opportunity principle (opportunité des poursuites) plays a crucial
role in the daily practice and may ultimately constitute the first and among
the commonest form of rewarding measures.
A second measure frequently used by the Luxembourg authorities to
mitigate the penalty are the so-called ‘décriminalisation’3 and ‘décorrec-
tionellisation’4. Luxembourg law distinguishes among three categories of
offences that depending on the severity of the penalty defined by law5 fall
within the jurisdiction of different courts: cases related to misdemeanors
punished by a fine only (‘contraventions’) fall within the jurisdiction of the
‘tribunaux de police’6, the ‘chambre correctionnelle’ of district court (‘tribunal
2 Art. 23 (1) Code of criminal procedure, hereinafter Ccp.
3 Art. 132 Ccp.
4 Art. 132-1 Ccp.
5 Art. 7 ff. Criminal Code.
6 Art. 137 ff. Ccp.
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d’arrondissement’) has jurisdiction to rule over criminal offences punished
by an imprisonment not exceeding five years7 and, lastly, the most serious
crimes punishable by an imprisonment term of at least five years fall within
the jurisdiction of the ‘chambre criminelle’ of the competent district court8.
However, at the end of the investigation, the State Prosecutor may re-
quest the court having jurisdiction to refer the case for trial to take into con-
sideration mitigating circumstances9 – including the fact that the accused
collaborated with the judicial authorities – which will have the effect of de-
creasing the penalty provided by law10 and, in some cases, requalify the of-
fence in a less serious one. For instance, a ‘crime’ punished by imprisonment
for a term between 10 and 15 year may become a ‘délit’ punished by an im-
prisonment not exceeding five years (‘décriminalisation’)11. Likewise, a ‘délit’
punished by imprisonment may become a misdemeanor sanctioned by a
fine only (‘décorrectionellisation’)12. In such hypothesis, the competent court
will refer the case to the tribunal having jurisdiction over the less serious
category of offences to which the requalified act belongs. The competent
trial court has ab initio jurisdiction over the case. This implies that it cannot
reject the mitigating circumstances validated by the court referring the case
for trial nor can it impose a penalty higher than the maximum reduced after
implementing such mitigating circumstance. The requalification of the of-
fence into a less serious one is not possible, however, for crimes punished by
an imprisonment term exceeding 15 years13. In that case, it is for the com-
petent trial court to consider mitigating circumstances at the sentencing
stage of the criminal proceedings14.
2.2.2. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
sentencing stage
In Luxembourg, the rewarding measures provided by the legislation
that exempt or mitigate the penalty for the terrorist offences set out in Chap-
ter III-1 of the Criminal Code are only applicable during the criminal trial,
in particular at the sentencing phase when the competent court determines
the sanction to impose. These measures are established by the subsequent
provisions:
– Art. 135-7 Criminal Code15
The person who, before any attempt to commit an offence under Arti-
cles 112-1, 135-1, 135-2, 135-5, 135-6, 135-9 and from 135-11 to 135-16 of the
7 Art. 179 Ccp.
8 Art. 217 Ccp.
9 Art. 132 and 132-1 Ccp.
10 According to the rules provided under Art. 73 ff. Criminal Code.
11 Art. 74 Criminal Code.
12 Art. 78 Criminal Code.
13 Pursuant Art. 74 Criminal Code, in that case the application of mitigating circum-
stance cannot transform a ‘crime’ into a ‘délit’.
14 See below.
15 Art. 135-7 Criminal Code reads ‘Est exempté de peines celui qui, avant toute tentative
d’infractions aux articles 112-1, 135-1, 135-2, 135-5, 135-6, 135-9 et 135-11 à 135-16 et avant
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Criminal Code and before a decision to prosecute, reveals to the authority
the existence of acts preparing the commission of offences under the same
articles or the identity of the persons having committing said acts, is ex-
empted from sanctions.
In the same cases, the sanction is reduced according to Article 52 Crim-
inal Code and in the measure thereby provided, for the person who, after a
decision to prosecute, reveals to the authorities the identity of the perpetra-
tors that are still unknown.
– Art. 135-8 Criminal Code
The member of a terrorist group that, before any attempt to commit a
terrorist act object of the group and before a decision to prosecute, reveals
to the authorities the existence of the group and the names of its leaders or
deputies is exempted from sanctions16.
One can thereby distinguish between two exonerating circumstances, a
general and a specific one, and one attenuating circumstance.
As to the exonerating circumstances (excuses absolutoires), in the first
place, Article 135-7, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code lays down an exoner-
ating circumstance applicable to several offences related to terrorism. In par-
ticular it is awarded to the person who, before any attempt to commit an of-
fence of attack to persons benefitting from international protection (Art. 112-
1 Criminal Code), terrorism (Art. 135-1 et 135-2 Criminal Code), terrorist
financing (Art. 135-5 et 135-6 Criminal Code), terrorist attack with explosives
(Art. 135-9 Criminal Code) or any other offence related to terrorism defined
from article 135-11 to 135-16 of the Criminal Code (such as incitation to ter-
rorism, recruitment or training of terrorists), and before the prosecution, re-
veals to the authorities the existence of acts preparing the commission of of-
fences under the same articles or the identity of the persons having commit-
ting said acts. The exemption from sanctions is thus granted to the person
collaborating with justice where the following cumulative conditions are met:
– The repentant informs the authorities about the existence of acts
preparing the commission of terrorist offences or the identity of the authors
of those acts;
– The information is provided before a decision to prosecute has been
taken;
– The information is provided before those acts have reached the level
of attempt of a crime.
Secondly, Article 135-8 of the Criminal Code establishes an exonerating
circumstance that is specific to the offence of participation in a terrorist
toutes poursuites commencées, aura révélé à l’autorité l’existence d’actes destinés à préparer la
commission d’infractions aux mêmes articles ou l’identité des personnes ayant posé ces actes.
Dans les mêmes cas, les peines de réclusion criminelle sont réduites dans la mesure déter-
minée par l’article 52 et d’après la graduation y prévue à l’égard de celui qui, après le com-
mencement des poursuites, aura révélé à l’autorité l’identité des auteurs restés inconnus’.
16 Art. 135-8 Criminal Code reads ‘Est exempté de peines le coupable de participation à
un groupe terroriste qui, avant toute tentative d’actes de terrorisme faisant l’objet du groupe et
avant toutes poursuites commencées, aura révélé à l’autorité l’existence de ce groupe et les noms
de ses commandants en chef ou en sous-ordre’.
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group. More precisely, it can benefit from such a measure only the member
of terrorist group that, before any attempt to commit a terrorist act object of
the group and before a decision to prosecute, informs the authorities of the
existence of such group and the names of its leaders or deputies. This re-
warding measure thus applies where the following cumulative conditions
are met:
– The person collaborating with justice is the member of a criminal
group;
– The repentant informs the authorities about the existence of the ter-
rorist group and the names of its leaders or deputies;
– The information is provided before a decision to prosecute has been
taken;
– The information is provided before any attempt on the part of the
group to commit a terrorist offence that is the objective of the group.
As to the attenuating circumstance (excuse atténuante), it is laid down in
Article 135-7, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code. It is granted to the author of
one of the terrorist offences listed in paragraph 1 of the same provision
(those for which the exempting circumstance is also applicable) with the ex-
ception of the offence of participation in a terrorist group, who after being
prosecuted, informs the authorities the identity of unknown accomplices. In
such case, the attenuating circumstance entails a reduction of the applicable
penalty to that immediately lower according to Article 52 of the Criminal
Code. Pursuant to such provision, the immediately lower penalty is:
Imprisonment from twenty to thirty years, where the applicable penalty
would be life imprisonment;
a) Imprisonment from fifteen to twenty years, where the applicable
penalty would be imprisonment from twenty to thirty years;
b) Imprisonment from ten to fifteen years, where the applicable penalty
would be imprisonment from fifteen to twenty years;
c) Imprisonment from five to ten years, where the applicable penalty
would be imprisonment from ten to fifteen years;
d) Imprisonment of at least three months, where the applicable penalty
would be imprisonment from five to ten years.
The above-mentioned measures apply without prejudice to general mit-
igating circumstances (circonstances atténuantes), which are not defined by
law17 but can be taken into consideration and applied by trail courts in indi-
vidual cases when determining the sentence18.
2.2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
post-sentencing stage
As previously mentioned, Luxembourg law does not foresee any spe-
cific rewarding measure in the field of terrorism that is applicable at the
17 D. SPIELMANN, Droit pénal général luxembourgeois (Bruylant 2002) at 454.
18 Art. 79 Criminal Code.
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post-sentencing stage. Nevertheless, the interviewed stakeholders noted that
the fact that a person decides to collaborate with the judicial authorities af-
ter the conviction can be taken into consideration by the Prosecutor accord-
ing to the general rules on the execution of the penalty19, when assessing the
behaviour of the person for the purpose of granting beneficial measures re-
lated to alternative modalities of execution of the penalty, such as for in-
stance conditional release, early release and placement under electronic sur-
veillance.
2.3. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant
It should be preliminarily observed that with relation to the general
measures described above which are not specific for terrorist offences, such
as the principle of opportunity, the decriminalisation and the alternative
measures for the execution of the penalty, the law does not regulate the cor-
responding obligations for the repentant. This can be easily explained be-
cause collaborating with the authorities is not a specific requirement to ob-
tain such measure, but only one of the possible elements taken into account.
Therefore, this section will focus only on the specific rewarding measures
for terrorist offences under Article 135-7 and 8 of the Criminal Code.
In order to benefit from the exemption of sanctions under Article 135-
7, first paragraph of the Criminal Code, the author of the offence has the
duty to provide to the authorities information either on the existence of acts
preparing the commission of the offences related to terrorism listed in the
said provision, or on the identity of the authors of those acts.
To the contrary, the attenuating circumstance set out in Article 135-7,
paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code is granted upon the condition that the au-
thor has revealed to the authorities the identity of the authors of the terror-
ist offences that are still unknown.
Finally, with regard to the exempting circumstance under Article 135-8
of the Criminal Code, the member of a criminal group is required to inform
the authorities the existence of the group and, at the same time, the names
of its leaders or deputies.
2.4. Revocation of rewarding measures
The exempting and attenuating circumstances foreseen in the Luxem-
bourg Criminal Code in relation to terrorist offences are applied by the court
at the stage of the determination of the applicable penalty, in other words
once the judge has already established the criminal liability for a terrorist of-
fence of the defendant collaborating with the authorities. Consequently, the
law does not provide the possibility to revoke such measures of exemption
or reduction of the penalty, exception made for the case where those mea-
sures have been granted in violation of the law.
19 Art. 673 ff. Ccp.
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2.5. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
The law does not regulate the procedural aspects concerning the appli-
cation of the rewarding measures described.
2.6. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations)
The probative value of the information provided by the offender who
cooperates with the enforcement authorities varies depending on his status
in the criminal proceedings. The interviewed stakeholders first noted that a
person involved in criminal activities who is not subject to criminal prose-
cution may play the role of an informant (‘indic’). This practice is particu-
larly used in cases of drug trafficking and organised crime. Under this sce-
nario, the information provided has a mere informative value insofar as it is
only used by the police authorities to further investigate the case. Hence, the
informant does not become a party to the criminal proceedings, nor is his
identity recorded and disclosed in the case file.
This first scenario is to be distinguished from the situation in which the
offender who cooperates with the law enforcement authorities holds the sta-
tus of witness or defendant in criminal proceedings. In the lack of specific
provisions, general rules governing the admissibility and assessment of evi-
dence apply to the declarations obtained. Under Luxembourg law, it is worth
reminding that evidentiary rules are based on three fundamental principles.
On the one hand, criminal offences published by imprisonment can be estab-
lished by any means of evidence (‘liberté de la preuve’)20. Hence, the compe-
tent trial court assesses freely the evidentiary value of statements made by a
person collaborating with justice and benefitting from rewarding measures21.
On the other hand, however, restrictions on the admissibility of evidence may
arise where the statements are collected in violation of the procedural re-
quirements prescribed by law (‘légalité de la preuve’) or by means of unfair
tactics or subterfuges (‘loyauté de la preuve’)22. It thus follow that Luxem-
bourg courts excludes illegally gathered evidence from being used at trial
only if the breach of procedural requirements is sanctioned by nullities (‘nul-
lité’), the violation undermines the reliability of evidence or where the use of
evidence would entail a breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial23.
Against this background, two aspects are worthy of mention. Firstly,
even though a trial court may take into consideration incriminating state-
ments made by a co-defendant, such statements cannot form the sole and
decisive evidence of conviction24 Secondly, Luxembourg law does not allow
20 V. BOLARD, Preuve et vérité, Annales de Droit luxembourgeois, 2013, vol. 23, 39-97, at
75 ff.
21 G. VOGEL, Lexique de procédure pénale (Larcier, 2009), at 346.
22 For a more detailed anaylsis of the admissibility of illegally collected evidence, see
V. COVOLO, Luxembourg, in S. ALLEGREZZA, V. COVOLO (ed.), Effective defence rights in criminal
proceedings. A European and Comparative Study on Judicial Remedies (Kluwer/Cedam, 2018),
at 365 ff.
23 CSJ cass. 22 November 2007, No. 2474.
24 See for instance, CSJ corr. 13 November 2013, No. 556/13 X; CSJ corr. 14 March
2018 No. 112/17 V; CSJ crim. 31 January 2017, No. 5/17.
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anonymous testimony. In 2003, the government presented a bill of law
which intended to introduce procedural rules governing totally and/or par-
tially anonymous witnesses that were largely inspired by the existing provi-
sions under Belgian law25. The initiative was however abandoned owing that
the reform was irreconcilable with the right to defence and fair trial.
2.7. Measures for the protection of the repentant
Luxembourg law does not provide for any specific measure for the pro-
tection of the repentant, neither does it provide for other measures of pro-
tection of witnesses in general. As regards the participation of the repentant
at the criminal proceedings, it has been mentioned above that anonymous
witness is not allowed in Luxembourg. Although the use of videoconference
at the hearing at trial is still rare, it is worth mentioning that oral testimony
via videoconference constitutes an admissible evidence under Luxembourg
law. Regarding witness and informants protection programs, the interviewed
stakeholders suggested that the cooperation of foreign authorities might
prove particularly valuable
2.8. Evaluation and control of the measure
Luxembourg law does not provide for any mechanism of evaluation
and control of the rewarding measure applied.
3. Current relevant case law (where existing)
To date, there is no case-law in Luxembourg regarding terrorist of-
fences, nor concerning rewarding measures that apply in this field.
4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to art. 16 of Directive
541/2017/EU (where existing)
The national legislation on rewarding measures for terrorist offences
described above appears to be in line with Article 16 of Directive 541/
2017/EU. In particular, Article 135-7, second paragraph, allows to reduce the
penalty applicable to terrorist offences where the offender provides the judi-
cial authorities with information that they did not already have and which is
able to help them to identify and bring to justice the other offenders, as well
as prevent further offences, as required by the Directive. Even though Lux-
embourg law does not expicitly require that the offender also renounces to
terrorist activities, this does not affect the conclusion of conformity with Ar-
ticle 16 of the Directive, since such provision lays down a simple option and
not a veritable duty for the Member States.
25 Projet de loi n° 5156 renforçant le droit des victimes d’infractions pénales et amélio-
rant la protection des témoins, 9.10.2003, Doc. No. 5156/00A.
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CHAPTER 7
SPAIN1
MANUEL CANCIO MELIÁ, SABELA OUBIÑA BARBOLLA
SUMMARY: 1. Historical background of rewarding legislation. – 1.1. Socio-political reasons:
overview of the legislative policy discussion. – 1.2. Legislative evolution. – 1.3. Case-law
evolution. – 2. Current rewarding provisions. – 2.1. Conditions of applicability. – 2.2.
Types of rewarding measures. – 2.2.1. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the
penalty initiated at the pre-sentencing stage. – 2.2.2. Rewarding measures that exclude
or mitigate the penalty initiated at the sentencing stage. – 2.2.3. Rewarding measures
that exclude or mitigate the penalty initiated at the post-sentencing stage. – 2.3. Coun-
terpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant. – 2.4. Revocation of
rewarding measures. – 2.5. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural
aspects). – 2.6. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of
declarations). – 2.7. Measures for the protection of the repentant. – 2.8. Evaluation and
control mechanisms of the rewarding measure. – 3. Current relevant case-law. –
4. Consistency of the current rewarding legislation with art. 16 of Directive 541/2017 /
UE.
1. Historical background of rewarding legislation
1.1. Socio-political reasons: overview of the legislative policy discussion
According to the debate taking place within the relevant literature,
there are two main reasons behind the introduction of rewards in counter-
terrorism legislation. As we shall see, these reasons are different in nature
and entity.
At first, it may be asserted that the reasons behind the implementation
of rewarding measures are to be found primarily in pragmatic or utilitarian
criminal policy considerations. These measures may facilitate investigations
and contribute to the dismantling of terrorist organizations by undermining
a supposedly strong internal cohesion. This utilitarian ground would be a
common denominator of other rewarding provisions, such as the classical
1 Manuel Cancio Meliá (Full Professor Criminal Law); Sabela Oubiña Barbolla (Asso-
ciate Professor Procedural Law: The authors wish to thank all professors and researchers for
attending the Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding measures: criminal and substantive as-
pects, organized by Manuel Cancio Meliá and Sabela Oubiña Barbolla as part of the
FIGHTER project that took place on the 24th of October 2019 at the Law Department of the
Autonomous University of Madrid and for sharing their thoughts; special thanks to the ex-
perts invited to the Seminar and to the rapporteurs Marta Pantaleón Díaz and Ángela Fer-
nández Rodríguez for their useful work.
mitigating circumstance2 of confession3, redress4 and regret or other special
provisions applicable to felonies such as drug trafficking5, bribery6, rebellion
and sedition7.
Nevertheless, along with this dominant socio-political explanation,
there are voices that contend the use of the notion8 and the concept of “re-
warding” measures. According to this position, by carrying out the conducts
triggering the application of the different measures, the general and special
prevention fundamentals that justify the handing down and execution of the
punishment would be undermined9. Indeed, especially with regard to terror-
ism, reasons related to the ideological-expressive component inherent to this
phenomenon should not be overlooked; rewarding the terrorist that aban-
dons the organization represents a blow to the set of values, them being po-
litical or religious in nature, to which terrorism of any kind resorts to in
other to justify its acts; in this sense, the dropping out of members and their
cooperation with authorities discredits, from within their own ranks, those
alleged values and the acts perpetrated in their name. More specifically, ac-
cording to the most relevant literature, it can be asserted that terrorism of-
fences10 include elements of danger and of expression among their defini-
tional elements: they amount to serious crimes against individual legal
rights that are manipulated to achieve political goals outside a constitutional
regime. Regarding the particularly dangerous dimension, the constitutive el-
ements of a terrorist act are different from those qualifying other offences
because its extra harmfulness, strictly linked to its terrorist character, refers
to the future in a double sense: on one side, the existence of an organization,
of a dimension of continuity beyond the single individuals, looks to the fu-
2 An introductory explanation of mitigating circumstances in the Spanish Criminal
Code can be found in L. POZUELO PÉREZ (R. ALCÁCER GUIRAO; L. MARTÍNEZ GARAY), “Circunstan-
cias atenuantes”, Memento Práctico Francis Levebvre Penal 2019 (F. MOLINA FERNÁNDEZ, co-
ord.), Madrid, pp. 491-539.
3 Art. 21.4º of Crim. Code in force.
4 Art. 21.5º of Crim. Code in force.
5 Art. 376 of Crim. Code in force.
6 Art. 426 of Crim. Code in force.
7 Arts. 480 and 549 of Crim. Code in force.
8 During the discussions taking place within the first panel “State of art in Spain” of
the Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding measures: criminal and substantive aspects, this is-
sue was raised precisely by two criminal law professors. According to J. NUÑEZ FERNÁNDEZ,
the notion “rewarding” may lead to exceptionality and scepticism, while it should actually be
considered a common case where the penalty shall be reduced in accordance with its own
objectives. Something similar occurs with the notion of repentance because it is not re-
quested for the purpose of penalty mitigation but appears only at penitentiary level, where
renouncing to the objectives is required; he suggests that these dubious labels contribute, in
practice, to their poor performance. In this line, L. POZUELO PÉREZ (Associate Professor of
Criminal Law at Autonomous University of Madrid, participant at the discussion seminar),
highlighted that talking about cooperation with justice is more adequate than talking about
repentance. Furthermore, criminal law cannot request repentance from the accused; in her
opinion, the mistake lies in the fact that what is often requested from the accused is a mea
culpa and this entails impossible procedural issues.
9 See, for all, J. NÚÑEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Sobre punibilidad, terrorismo, víctimas y pena, 2017.
10 See only M. CANCIO MELIÁ, “El concepto jurídico-penal de terrorismo entre la ne-
gación y la resignación”, in A. ALONSO RIMO, A. FERNÁNDEZ HERNÁNDEZ, and M.L. CUERDA ARNAU
(eds.), Terrorismo, sistema penal y derechos fundamentales, editorial Tirant lo Blanch, Valèn-
cia, 2018, p. 95, for further references.
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ture by guaranteeing the continuation of the joint terrorist project. On the
other side, the political dimension of the goals pursued by the organization
confer special intensity to its continuity (while the underlying conflict is
alive). Hence, the special risk dimension arising from the existence and con-
tinuity of an organization disappears in respect of a subject who has aban-
doned the joint terrorist project if there is a definitive cessation of violation
on his behalf given that he would no longer share the motives behind past
actions11. Furthermore, the aim of defying the State and ultimately subvert-
ing the constitutional regime disappears the minute the subject abandons
the terrorist strategy12. This does not necessarily imply a reduction of the
subject’s dangerousness – an event that may arise with regard to the perpe-
trator of any crime and that shall not justify limiting the length or the en-
forcement of his punishment. What is relevant here is that the future-ori-
ented approach that defines the entire legislative treatment of terrorism,
both in terms of the risk arising from an armed organization and in terms of
a violent attack to the basis of the constitutional legal order, disappears in
respect of the individual that drops out from the terrorist organization. The
individual stops speaking the violent language that is terrorism and the
penalty imposed shall indeed reflect it.
What has just been said does not change in any way the fact that indi-
vidual legal rights have been harmed, being the subject responsible for it.
Moreover, from a retrospective criminal law perspective, the subject’s aban-
donment of terrorist violence does not in any way erase the damage inflicted
on the legal rights of individual victims as a consequence of the terrorist ac-
tivity. As a result, an extraordinary weakening of the collective dimension of
the offence of which the convicted terrorist is part, takes place. Conversely,
this does not occur in respect of the individual subjective harm element.
Consequently, from this point of view, the plus in the offences against
individual legal rights (that is, the difference between the penalties for com-
mon homicide and terrorist murder, etc.) vanishes in this new situation. In
the same way, an important part of the harmfulness fades away in the of-
fences that do not cause individual harm such as organizational crime (col-
laboration and membership), the various forms of preparatory acts that
amount to an offence and the types of communication acts constituting
crime. In all of these cases, there are sound reasons that can be found in the
very essence of the crime of terrorism to hold that it is necessary to adopt re-
warding, penitentiary or pardon measures that take into account the new so-
11 For a parallel reasoning on the effects that the dismantling of a terrorist organiza-
tion may have on the sentences to be served by its former members see M. CANCIO MELIÁ,
“Concepto jurídico-penal de terrorismo y cese definitivo de la violencia”, in A. CUERDA RIEZU,
et al. (dir.), El Derecho Penal ante el fin de ETA, Tecnos, Madrid, 2016, p. 46 onwards.
12 These two elements appear differently in the case of State terrorism (on this concept
and on the adequacy of qualifying the dirty war activities carried out by State organs as ter-
rorism, in application of Spanish Law see M. CANCIO MELIÁ, Los delitos de terrorismo: estruc-
tura típica e injusto, 2010, p. 187 onwards.): obviously, once the terrorist activity has ceased,
the organization “State” subsists, together with its capacity to use its coercive power to carry
out terrorist activities. This implies that there can be no definitive cease of violence (see the
definition suggested here in n. 11 and on the problem with regard to Chile and its initially
enacted amnesty law see MAÑALICH, Terror, pena y amnistía, 2010, passim, p. 155 onwards).
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cial context that results from the definitive cease of terrorist violence on be-
half of the subject that now rejects terrorist strategy.
This being said, the historical and sociological conditions needed for
rewarding measures in the scope of terrorism to succeed in practice have
never being met in Spain. The application of these rules, as will be later dis-
cussed, has been merely symbolic. In this context, two factors should be
highlighted:
On one side, it must be pointed out that the fact that the Basque sepa-
ratist organization ETA has been in the spotlight until recently has deter-
mined the relevant role that has been granted to its structural, political and
social features.
On the other side, the progressive restriction of rewarding provisions –
the details of this development will be later presented in the text of this re-
port – has culminated in the current version of article 579-bis 3 Crim. Code,
enacted in 1995, which seems to have been drafted with the aim of accumu-
lating a series of requirements that make its application virtually impossible.
As any careful observer will notice, the events hereby presented are in-
timately connected to the existing environment in respect of the Spanish
counter-terrorism policy, which gave rise, during ETA’s last years of activity
(and operational decline), to the most bitter confrontations between the two
main political parties13. As a result, the coordination and unity among polit-
ical forces reached during the most active years of ETA, has disappeared.
Some victims’ associations have taken part in these conflicts, coordinating
their activities with a given political force and standing by certain political
groups when demanding a “harder” treatment of individuals convicted of
terrorism (this has obviously implied the exclusion of any measure that may
mitigate or reduce the penalty of terrorist convicts). The factual and norma-
tive difficulties together with the problems encountered when attempting
their practical application (that will be referred to later on in this question-
naire) have historically led to resorting to similar institutions, which are,
strictly speaking, functional or quasi-functional equivalents of rewarding
measures: the extended application of certain mitigating circumstances es-
tablished in the Criminal Code, the granting of pardon or the progressive ap-
plication of a normalized penitentiary regime (that is to say, the withdrawal
of those regimes that, de facto o de iure, are more oppressive for those indi-
viduals convicted of terrorism), depending on the case.
As for the first factor, it is well known that terrorism has played a key
role in Spain in the last decades. Despite the considerable number of terror-
ist groups that carried out their activities during the transition from General
Franco’s dictatorial regime to the current political system that came into
force following the 1978 Constitution, until very recently, the leading role in
this matter belonged to the terrorist organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna”
(ETA, “Basque Country and Freedom”) in Basque language. The terrorist at-
tacks perpetrated by the Basque nationalist organization which claimed to
be extreme left, between the death of the dictator until 2011, when they
13 See M. CANCIO MELIÁ, Derecho Penal Contemporáneo No. 55 (2016), p. 37 onwards.
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abandoned unilaterally their activity, have caused more than 800 deaths
(that is, without considering the attacks perpetrated during the dictatorship,
among which, the murder of Prime Minister and representative of the “hard
sector” of the national-catholic regime, Admiral Carrero Blanco, in 1973,
may be highlighted. Among the various terrorist groups different from ETA
that were active during the transition period, the “anti-fascist groups of the
First of October”, the Catalan nationalist group “Terra Lliure” [“Free Coun-
try” in Catalan] and the police dirty war organization “Anti-terrorist Groups
of Liberation”, that perpetrated attacks against ETA militants and people
close to them, may be mentioned). The 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid also
evidenced the presence of Jihad terrorism in the country. It follows that, un-
like other European countries, Spain enjoys a broad and longstanding expe-
rience in the practical application of terrorism offences (the cessation of
ETA activity was not the result of a negotiation between the terrorist group
and the State, and hence, the crimes committed before this moment con-
tinue to be prosecuted). Despite this massive application of the criminal sys-
tem, as will be explained below, rewarding provisions have only been applied
on a residual basis; so has been the case with its functional equivalents (par-
don, application of mitigating circumstances or of non-rewarding peniten-
tiary measures). In the case of ETA, the significant support it enjoyed within
certain social groups and territories in the Basque country and Navarra14 –
it had managed to build within the so-called “abertzale left” (patriotic left, in
Basque) a sort of complete social and political “environment” which sup-
ported the organization – did not certainly encourage abandonment and
even less, did it favour whistleblowing.
More recently, some authors have pointed out that rewarding measures
may not be effective in tackling the so-called Jihad terrorism, given that in
this case we face a particularly intense belief-based terrorism, where the le-
gal consequences of the authors’ acts are irrelevant in terms of motivation.
However, some scholars agree with recent decisions that suggest that in the
coming years it will be necessary to follow the evolution of this phenome-
non, as the possibility of de-radicalisation exists also among this group.
Moreover, contrary to what occurred in the case of ETA15, in Spain, these
terrorists do not usually enjoy a well-structured context, with a group of
population that is aligned with the terrorist organization’s strategy (and, as
various recent empirical studies show, the online environment cannot re-
place personal interactions and links). Perhaps, terrorists belonging to these
groups are more likely than ETA members to resort to these measures once
they have abandoned the terrorist project.
14 Together with the strength conferred to the group by its French sanctuary until the
1990 decade.
15 See M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, “El premio por el abandono de la organización y la colabo-
ración con las autoridades como estrategia de lucha contra el terrorismo en momentos de
crisis interna”, Estudios penales y criminológicos, No. 25, 2004, pp. 3-68. See, specially among
others, pp. 9-12, footnote 4. See further, J. NÚÑEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Sobre punibilidad, terrorismo,
víctimas y pena, 2017. See also some empirical studies, F. REINARES, C. GARCÍA-CALVO, Estado
Islámico en España, Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, available at: http://www.realinstitutoel-
cano.org/publicaciones/libros/Informe-Estado-Islamico-Espana.pdf.
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The absence of the aforementioned historical and sociological circum-
stances, together with the past and present lack of legislation on these mea-
sures, explain the data hereby presented. Unlike in Italy, where these mea-
sures were extremely successful, in Spain, as will be later discussed (see sec-
tion 2 of this chapter), in the scope of terrorism16 rewarding measures have
rarely been implemented in practice.
1.2. Legislative evolution
At the time of writing, October 2019, the Spanish legislator sets out a
special rewarding measure for terrorism offences in art. 579-bis 3 Crim.
Code:
“In the felonies foreseen in this Subchapter, the Judges and Courts of
Law may impose, giving the reasons in the judgement, a punishment lower
by one or two degrees to that stated by the Law for the felony concerned,
when the subject has voluntarily quit his criminal activities and has appeared
before the authorities to confess the acts in which he has participated and has
also collaborated actively with the authorities to prevent the felony taking
place or effectively aids the obtaining of decisive evidence to identify or cap-
ture the others who are responsible, or to prevent the action or development
of the terrorist organizations or groups to which he has belonged, or with
which he has collaborated” (emphasis added).
This provision, as will be explained hereunder, is not particularly
ground-breaking. Since ancient times17, the Spanish legal system, either in
its Criminal Codes18 or in other special laws19, has foreseen similar mecha-
nisms to those contemplated in the current art. 579-bis 3 Crim. Code, with
the scope of avoiding and/or repressing serious crimes that are usually per-
petrated in group and that amount to an attack against the State’s internal
security.
Leaving aside its most ancient antecedents, the legislation in force finds
its closer and most recent precedent in the old Criminal Code of 1973 (here-
inafter 1973 Crim. Code); specifically, in article 57-bis of the 1973 Crim.
Code, which was modified at the end of 1984 by Organic Law No. 9/1984 of
the 26th of December, against acts perpetrated by armed bands and terrorist
elements20 which developed art. 55.2 of the Constitution. Art. 6 of the cited
16 This is valid for all versions of rewarding measures contemplated in the various
criminal codes. For an in-depth analysis of the legal evolution of these provisions see section
1.2 of the present questionnaire.
17 M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, invited speaker to the seminar carries out an exhaustive and
brilliant analysis of those historical precedecents in her monograph, Atenuación y remisión
de la pena en los delitos de terrorismo, Madrid, Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, 1995, see
especially Chapter 1 on the historical evolution, pp. 27-125.
18 1822 Criminal Code (see, among others, arts. 292 y 305); 1848 Criminal Code (arts.
143, 182, 304); 1870 Criminal Code (art. 258); 1928 Criminal Code (art. 299); 1932 Criminal
Code (art. 253); 1944 Criminal Code (art. 226); 1973 Criminal Code (arts. 57-bis b, 174-bis c)
following Organic Law No. 4/1981).
19 Freemasonry Act of 1940; on State security Act of 1941; Decree 123/1947, on ban-
ditry and terrorism; Decree 231/1960 de rebellion, banditry and terrorism; Organic Law No.
9/1984 (art. 6).
20 BOE, January 3, 1985.
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Organic Law No. 9/1984, entitled “Penalty mitigation in the case of aban-
donment with the purpose of social reintegration” reads as follows:
“1. For felonies under art. 1, the following will be considered qualifying
circumstances for the individual graduation of the penalties:
a) The subject has voluntarily quit his criminal activities and has ap-
peared before the authorities to confess the acts in which he has participated.
b) The subject’s abandonment of his criminal activities has prevented or
reduced significantly a situation of danger, has avoided the harmful result or
has effectively aided the obtaining of decisive evidence to identify or capture
the others who are responsible for the offense.
2. In the cases mentioned in the previous section, the Judges and Courts
of Law may impose a punishment lower by one or two degrees to that stated by
the Law for the felony concerned without considering the increase in the
penalty established in art. 3. Moreover, the punishment may be suspended
when the subject’s active collaboration has effectively aided to identify those re-
sponsible, to prevent the felony taking place or to prevent the action or devel-
opment of the terrorist or rebel group, as long as he is not accused of actions
that may have caused death or injuries listed in art. 420.1 and 2 Crim. Code.
Suspension of the punishment shall be on condition he does not commit any
of the felonies foreseen in this Law.
3. The member of a group or armed gang who is serving custodial sen-
tence may be granted probation if any of the circumstances foreseen in section
1.b) of this article concur, as long as a third of the sentence has been served”
(emphasis added).
The first two sections of art. 6 of Organic Law No. 9/1984 were en-
shrined in art. 57-bis b) of the 1973 Crim. Code, which established that:
“1. For felonies under art. 57-bis a) of the 1973 Crim. Code, the follow-
ing will be considered qualifying circumstances for the individual gradua-
tion of the penalties:
a) The subject has voluntarily quit his criminal activities and has ap-
peared before the authorities to confess the acts in which he has partici-
pated.
b) The subject’s abandonment of his criminal activities has prevented or
reduced significantly a situation of danger, has prevented the harmful result
or has effectively aided to obtain decisive evidence to identify or capture the
others who are responsible for the offense.
2. In the cases mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Judges and
Courts of Law may impose a punishment lower by one or two degrees to
that stated by the Law for the felony concerned without considering the in-
crease in the penalty established in the previous article. Moreover, the pun-
ishment may be suspended when the subject’s active collaboration has effec-
tively aided to identify those responsible, to prevent the felony taking place
or to prevent the action or development of the armed gangs, terrorist or
rebel groups, as long as he is not accused of actions that may have caused
death or injuries listed in arts. 418, 419 and 420 of the Crim. Code. and 2
Crim. Code. Suspension of the punishment shall be on condition that he
does not commit any of the felonies foreseen in art. 57-bis a) of the 1973
Crim. Code”.
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As a study carried out by CUERDA ARNAU21 reveals, art. 57-bis of the 1973
Crim. Code was only applied twice; see the National High Court decisions
(SSAN), Sentencias de la Audiencia Nacional, section 2, no 69/1985, of the
5th of November and section 3, no 58/1986, of the 30th of June. In terms of
numbers, the application of this article is merely symbolic – the high num-
ber of cases for terrorism offences should be recalled –. Furthermore, in
both cases, the provision was only enforced indirectly. While in the first
case, from 1985, this measure was applied as a sort of analogous mitigating
circumstance, in the second case, from 1986, this institution was indirectly
used to request a partial pardon on the basis of analogy with the content of
the relevant provision.
As we have already mentioned, the 1995 Criminal Code (hereinafter
1995 Crim. Code) also included a special rewarding measure in the scope of
terrorism. The content of the provision has not been modified since 1995.
However, formally, as a result of the various reforms of the 1995 Crim. Code,
this article has been moved from one number to another.
Originally, in 1995, this provision was to be found in art. 579 of the
Crim. Code, which at the time, had one single section. Following the enact-
ment of Organic Law no 7/2000 of the 22nd of December, which modified the
1995 Crim. Code, and Organic Law No. 5/2000 of the 12th of January gov-
erning the criminal responsibility of minors, with regard to the crime of ter-
rorism, the original content of art. 579 Crim. Code was moved to the third
paragraph of that same provision (art. 579.3 Crim. Code). Almost a decade
ago, with the adoption of Organic Law no 5/2010, it would become the
fourth paragraph (see art. 579.4 Crim. Code). More recently, the entry into
force of Organic Law no 2/2015 turned this provision into the already men-
tioned art. 579-bis 3 of the Crim. Code22. Variations in the location of the rel-
evant article have not modified its material content, which remains un-
changed since 1995.
This detailed chronological review allows us to infer that, for the pur-
pose of this research project, the comparative analysis on rewarding mea-
sures should address art. 57-bis b) of the 1973 Crim. Code and current art.
579-bis of the 1995 Crim. Code (in its current wording).
The table below illustrates the significant differences between the 1973
Crim. Code and the 1995 Crim. Code (in force) in respect of rewarding mea-
sures with regard to terrorism. The few experts23 on the topic have pointed
21 M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, “El premio por el abandono de la organización y la colaboración
con las autoridades como estrategia de lucha contra el terrorismo en momentos de crisis
interna”, supra, p. 15.
22 “In the felonies foreseen in this Subchapter, the Judges and Courts of Law may im-
pose, giving the reasons in the judgement, a punishment lower by one or two degrees to that
stated by the Law for the felony concerned, when the subject has voluntarily quit his crimi-
nal activities and has appeared before the authorities to confess the acts in which he has par-
ticipated and has also collaborated actively with the authorities to prevent the felony taking
place or effectively aids the obtaining of decisive evidence to identify or capture the others who
are responsible, or to prevent the action or development of the terrorist organisations or
groups to which he has belonged, or with which he has collaborated” (emphasis added).
23 M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, “El premio por el abandono de la organización y la colaboración
con las autoridades como estrategia de lucha contra el terrorismo en momentos de crisis in-
terna”, supra.
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out that the former 1973 Crim. Code offered better and more certain bene-
fits to the terrorist offender than the 1995 Crim. Code. While in 1973, the
lowering of the penalty was compulsory24 and suspension25 was a possibility,
the 1995 Crim. Code in force only provides for the possibility of lowering the
penalty, excluding suspension regardless of how significant the collaboration
has been.
Moreover, the behaviour requested by the 1973 legislator (during the
dictatorship) seems to be more realistic, or less impossible to attain, than
that demanded nowadays by the – so-called “democratic” – 1995 Crim. Code.
The text drafted in 1973 included two types of relevant behaviours: 1) Vol-
untary quit with confession; or, 2) voluntary quit (without confession) in ad-
dition to: i) the prevention or mitigation of a situation of danger; ii) the pre-
vention of the harmful result; iii) effectively aiding to obtain decisive evi-
dence to identify or capture the others who are responsible. By requiring
three cumulative actions from the accused, the 1995 Crim. Code in force es-
tablishes requirements that are very hard to meet: i) voluntary quit; ii) con-
fession; and, iii) effectively aiding to obtain decisive evidence to identify or
capture the others who are responsible or to prevent the action or develop-
ment of the terrorist organisations or groups.
24 It should be noted that the second paragraph of art. 57-bis b) of the 1973 Crim. Code
was formulated in mandatory and not optional terms: “the Tribunal shall impose”.
25 The second section of art. 57-bis b) of the 1973 Crim. Code recognized the Tribunal’s
power to suspend the penalty upon particularly significant collaboration from the subject.
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Art. 57-bis b) of the former 1973 
Crim. Code
Art. 579-bis 3 of the 1995 
Crim. Code
1. For felonies under art. 57-bis a)
of the 1973 Crim. Code, the follow-
ing will be considered qualifying
circumstances for the individual
graduation of the penalties:
a) The subject has voluntarily quit
his criminal activities and has ap-
peared before the authorities to
confess the acts in which he has
participated.
b) The subject’s abandonment of
his criminal activities has pre-
vented or reduced significantly a
situation of danger, has prevented
the harmful result or has effectively
aided to obtain decisive evidence to
identify or capture the others who
are responsible for the offense.
In the felonies foreseen in this Sub-
chapter, the Judges and Courts of
Law may impose, giving the rea-
sons in the judgement, a punish-
ment lower by one or two degrees to
that stated by the Law for the
felony concerned, when the subject
has voluntarily quit his criminal ac-
tivities and has appeared before the
authorities to confess the acts in
which he has participated and has
also collaborated actively with the
authorities to prevent the felony tak-
ing place or effectively aids the ob-
taining of decisive evidence to iden-
tify or capture the others who are
responsible, or to prevent the ac-
tion or development of the terrorist
Together with these differences, it is important to highlight that the
criminal codes under analysis foresee variations in the objective scope of ap-
plication of these rewarding measures. Under the 1973 Crim. Code, the
range of felonies to which these measures could be applicable was wider.
This was still the case following the entry into force of Organic Law No.
5/2010 that modified the 1995 Crim. Code. Thus, while under art. 57-bis b)
of former 1973 Crim. Code, these measures could be applied to members of
armed gangs or related to terrorist or rebel activities, the 1995 Crim. Code es-
tablishes a narrower scope. The 1995 legislator26 limited its applicability to
felonies of terrorism (see both its original wording from 1995, which entered
into force on the 24th of May 1996 and its wording on the 23rd of December
26 From the entry into force of the 1995 Crim. Code until the 23rd of December 2010,
the cited mitigating circumstance was only applicable to felonies of terrorism, under that spe-
cific section (art. 579). The relevant provision began by asserting that “For felonies foreseen
in this section, the Judges and Courts of Law may impose, giving the reasons in the judge-
ment, a punishment lower by one or two degrees (…)”. As from the 24th of December 2010,
date in which the Organic Law No. 5/2010 which modified the 1995 Crim. Code entered into
force, the objective scope of the cited measures has been widened to include all the felonies
comprehended in Chapter VII of Title XXII of Book II of the Crim. Code, entitled On terror-
ist organisations and groups and felonies of terrorism.
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2. In the cases mentioned in the
previous paragraph, the Judges and
Courts of Law may impose a pun-
ishment lower by one or two de-
grees to that stated by the Law for
the felony concerned without con-
sidering the increase in the penalty
established in the previous article.
Moreover, the punishment may be
suspended when the subject’s active
collaboration has effectively aided
to identify those responsible, to
prevent the felony taking place or
to prevent the action or develop-
ment of the armed gangs, terrorist
or rebel groups, as long as he/she is
not accused of actions that may
have caused death or injuries listed
in arts. 418, 419 and 420 of the
Crim. Code. and 2 Crim. Code. Sus-
pension of the punishment shall be
on condition that he/she does not
commit any of the felonies foreseen
in art. 57-bis a) of the 1973 Crim.
Code.
organisations or groups to which
he has belonged, or with which he
has collaborated.
2010); this objective scope was widened almost a decade ago following the
enactment of Organic Law No. 5/2010 of the 23rd of December to include all
of the felonies under Chapter VII of Title XXII of Book II entitled On terror-
ist organisations and groups and on felonies of terrorism.
1.3. Case-law evolution
Between 1981 and 2019, special rewarding measures regarding terror-
ism have been applied in no more than ten cases. This fact reveals, on one
side, the failure of these rewarding mechanisms in Spain, conversely to what
has happened in Italy, and on the other, the Tribunals’ reticence towards the
application of exceptional measures.
As will be seen in the section below27, the Spanish judiciary (or the
Government, in the cases of pardon) has mainly resorted to alternative
mechanisms either through the application of general (ordinary or very
qualified) mitigating circumstances or through the granting of pardon. In
addition, the previous experience of the Law No. 46/1977 of Amnesty28,
should be taken into account as it represents a key moment of the transition
towards a new constitutional order.
In any case, it seems that in practice Spain has resorted to the ad hoc
application of general mitigating circumstances as their functional equiva-
lent. As will be seen below, their incidence has nevertheless been quite lim-
ited. As suggested before, this limited application may be linked to the polit-
ical situation in Spain in respect of terrorism as from 2000, which was char-
acterized by an escalating tension between political forces (despite the fact
that ETA’s most deadly years were prior to the 2000 decade).
2. Current rewarding provisions
The Spanish Crim. Code in force foresees a series of general mitigating
circumstances in its article 21, as well as a series of offence-specific mitigat-
ing circumstances. The most relevant content of both types of circumstances
will be presented hereunder; to answer the emerging questions, a general
overview of the Spanish legal system will be presented only to examine in a
more detailed way, when appropriate, those topics of interest for the pur-
pose of this project: terrorism and rewarding measures. Hereinafter, refer-
ence will be made to an approximate and material concept of “rewarding
measures”, examining other legal institutions that may fulfil, though incom-
pletely, the same function.
The Spanish legislator establishes the following general mitigating cir-
cumstances: 1) The causes stated in the preceding Chapter (see art. 20 Crim.
27 See section 3. Relevant current case-law for a list of decisions in which (former) art.
57-bis b) of the 1973 Crim. Code or art. 579 of 1995 Crim. Code have been applied; see also
the list of pardons granted between 1996-2019 in section 2.2.3. Rewarding measures that
exclude or mitigate penalty, initiated at a post-sentence stage.
28 BOE, October 17, 1977.
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Code), when not all the necessary requisites to exclude accountability in the
respective cases concur; 2) The convict acting due to his serious addiction to
alcoholic beverages, toxic and narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or
others that cause similar effects; 3) The convict acting due to causes or stim-
uli so overpowering that they produced fury, obstinacy or another similar
state of mind; 4) The convict having proceeded to confess his crime to the
authorities before having knowledge of the judicial proceedings brought
against him; 5) The convict having compensated the victim for the damages
caused or having lessened the effects thereof, at some phase of the proce-
dure and prior to the trial taking place; 6) Extraordinary or undue drawing
out of the formalities of the proceedings, as long as this is not due to the
convict, such prolongation being disproportionate to the complexity of the
cause; 7) Any other circumstance of a similar importance to the aforesaid.
Nevertheless, as previously stated, other offence-specific rewarding
measures have been scattered within the Crim. Code in force; see, for in-
stance, drug trafficking29 (art. 376 Crim. Code); bribery (art. 426 Crim.
Code30); rebellion31 and sedition32 (arts. 480 and 549 Crim. Code, respec-
tively); and, as we have examined in the previous section33, terrorism (art.
579-bis 3 Crim. Code34). These offence-specific rewarding measures are quite
heterogeneous in terms of their content and effects.
With regard to their effects, in respect of some felonies, such as terror-
ism or drug-trafficking, the law only foresees the possibility of lowering the
punishment by one or two degrees; the Spanish legislator foresees instead
the suspension of the penalty before certain behaviours in the cases of
29 Art. 376 Crim. Code: In the cases foreseen in articles 361 to 372, the Judges or
Courts of Law, giving the reasons in their judgement, may impose a lower punishment by one
or two degrees to that stated by the law for the offence concerned, as long as the subject has
voluntarily abandoned his criminal activities and has actively collaborated with the authorities
or their agents either to prevent the offence from taking place, or to obtain decisive proof for
identification of capture of others who are responsible or to prevent actions or the furtherance
of the organisations or assemblies to which they have belonged or with which they may have
collaborated.
Likewise, in the cases foreseen in articles 368 to 372, the Judges or Courts of Law may
impose the punishment lower by one or two degrees upon the convict who, being addicted to
drugs at the moment of committing the acts, sufficiently accredits that he has successfully com-
pleted detoxification treatment, as long as the quantity of toxic drugs, narcotics or psychotropic
substances was not of notorious importance or extreme seriousness.
30 Art. 426: Should a natural person who has coincidentally obtained a handout or other
remuneration made by an authority or public officer report the fact to the authority whose
duty is of proceeding to investigate the matter, before proceedings commence, as long as no
more than two months have elapsed from the date of the events, he shall be exempt of punish-
ment for the felony of corruption.
31 Art. 480: 1. Whoever, being involved in an offence of rebellion, discloses it in time to
be able to avoid its consequences, shall be exempt of the punishment for it. 2. Those who are
merely instrumental, who lay down their weapons before having used them, submitting to the
lawful authorities, shall be subject to the lower degree sentence of imprisonment. The same
punishment shall be imposed if the rebels disperse or submit to the lawful authority prior to
the call or due to it.
32 In application of art. 549 Crim. Code, rewarding measures foreseen in art. 480 Crim.
Code, either in the form of suspension or of mitigation, are also applicable to the offense of
sedition: “The provisions contained in Articles 479 to 484 are also applicable to the offence
of sedition”.
33 See Section 1.2. Legislative evolution.
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bribery, rebellion or sedition. It should be noted that, except for the felonies
of rebellion and sedition35, the lowering of the penalty in one or two degrees
is optional and hence, subject to the decision of the Judge or the Court. Con-
versely, suspension is always formulated in mandatory terms. Now, accord-
ing to the most expert authors on the subject36, the optional character of the
offence-specific mitigation circumstances refers to the decision to lower the
penalty in one or two degrees, not to the decision of lowering the penalty
tout court.
In terms of content, it should be noted that there is an offence-specific
mitigation circumstance applicable both to drug-trafficking (first paragraph
of art. 376 Crim. Code) and terrorism (art. 379-bis 3 Crim. Code) that is not
identical but similar. It can be inferred from the table below that the offence-
specific mitigation circumstance in the case of terrorism is more demanding
than that applicable to drug-trafficking. In fact, in case of terrorism, confes-
sion is required in addition to voluntary quit and collaboration.
34 See the content and analysis of this provision in the section above.
35 Art. 480 Crim. Code, and art. 549 Crim. Code, establish the mandatory lowering of
the penalty to those who are merely instrumental if they lay down their weapons before hav-
ing used them, and to rebels if they disperse or submit to the lawful authority.
36 This was pointed out by M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, Professor of Criminal Law from the
Universidad Jaume I, during her presentation on “Criminal aspects of the indicted’s coopera-
tion with the proceedings in the Crim. Code: special reference to its regulation with respect to
felonies of terrorism”, within the Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding measures: criminal
and substantive aspects, organized by Manuel Cancio Meliá and Sabela Oubiña Barbolla as
part of the FIGHTER p.
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Drug-trafficking 
(art. 376. I Crim. Code)
Terrorism 
(art. 579-bis 3 Crim. Code)
(…) the Judges or Courts of Law,
giving the reasons in their judge-
ment, may impose a lower punish-
ment by one or two degrees (…), as
long as the subject has voluntarily
abandoned his criminal activities
and has actively collaborated with
the authorities or their agents either
to prevent the offence from taking
place, or to obtain decisive proof for
identification of capture of others
who are responsible or to prevent ac-
tions or the development of the or-
ganisations or associations to which
they have belonged or with which
they may have collaborated.
(….) the Judges and Courts of Law
may impose, giving the reasons in
the judgement, a punishment lower
by one or two degrees (…), when the
subject has voluntarily quit his
criminal activities and has appeared
before the authorities to confess the
acts in which he has participated
and has also collaborated actively
with the authorities to prevent the
felony taking place or effectively aids
the obtaining of decisive evidence to
identify or capture the others who
are responsible, or to prevent the
action or development of the terror-
ist organisations or groups to which
he has belonged, or with which he
has collaborated.
Despite their differences, offence-specific rewarding measures en-
shrined in the Spanish Crim. Code share important common denominators.
Therefore, though it may seem that the legislator ignores these aspects when
drafting the law, the rationale behind these measures is purely utilitarian,
and, directly related to aiding the criminal investigation and/or to crime pre-
vention. On the other hand, despite the subtle differences among their re-
quirements, the triggering act always amounts to a positive post delictum be-
haviour, being this a reparation and/or a procedural collaboration. The ef-
fects of offence-specific rewarding measures are always stated in the
judgements and, as previously mentioned, they are mostly of a mitigating
character, although sometimes they may also act as exempting circum-
stances.
Finally, strong similarities can also be found among constitutional
problems and criticisms. According to most Spanish authors37, problems
have been found to concern three main issues: i) the principle of equality; ii)
offender-based criminal law; and, iii) the fundamental right to the presump-
tion of innocence. An in-depth analysis of these problems is beyond the
scope of this paper, but we would like to refer briefly to some of them.
From the perspective of the principle of equality, these rewarding mea-
sures seem to be formulated in unequal terms insofar in can be inferred
from their wording that they are addressed to leaders at the top of the hier-
archy, hence excluding those subjects who, notwithstanding their lower po-
sition, are willing to cooperate.
The regulation of these measures in the 1995 Crim. Code, especially af-
ter the 2003 amendment, has introduced the problem of offender-based
criminal law by conditioning the lowering of the penalty and the granting of
probation to the existence of a given conduct; no precedents can be found to
the chosen formula in the previous Criminal Codes or in Comparative Law.
In short, and especially as far as terrorism is concerned, the legal wording of
the terrorist’s reinsertion appears as offender-based criminal law.
Lastly, the probative value of the co-defendant’s rewarded statement un-
doubtedly affects the fundamental right to the presumption of innocence.
The significant evolution of the Spanish case-law will be examined below;
while initially, the mere statement of a co-defendant (who is not a witness
and may therefore not be telling the truth) was enough (to meet the proba-
tive requirements), critical voices on the impact of such a statement on the
co-defendant’s right to a defense and to remain silent motivated a shift with
regard to this interpretation, that was reflected in the Constitutional Court’s
judgement STC 153/1997, of the 29th of September; this position was consol-
idated by the Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber decisions38 that followed,
37 On these and other problems (amorality of the reward, principle of proportionality,
results) see E. GARRO CARRERA, “Comportamiento postdelictivo positivo y delincuencia aso-
ciativa”, Indret, 1/2013. In extenso, M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, Atenuación y remisión de la pena en
los delitos de terrorismo, Madrid, Centro de Publicaciones del Ministerio de Justicia e Inte-
rior, 1995.
38 See, among others, legal finding 6: When the co-defendant’s statement amounts to the
only incriminating evidence, it should be recalled that, unlike the witness, the accused has no
obligation to tell the truth. Moreover, in application of the right to remain silent and not to
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leading to a qualitative improvement by requiring the authentication of the
cited statement39. There are, nevertheless, still many pending issues (e.g. the
problem of statements retracted during oral hearings).
2.1. Conditions of applicability
Under this section, only the terrorism-specific rewarding measures en-
shrined in art. 579-bis 3 of the Crim. Code in force will be addressed. Among
other reasons, as previously stated, the failure of rewarding mechanisms in
the scope of terrorism may be explained by an inadequate legal formulation
that ignores the ultimate utilitarian purpose that defines them. Conversely to
what is established in both in the former Spanish legislation40 and in the
Italian laws in force, currently, the legislator foresees a series of cumulative
requirements that may be rarely met in practice. The relevant provision re-
quires:
– Voluntary abandonment of the criminal activity. This requirement
poses two questions:
- On one side, case-law holds that if the abandonment follows the sub-
ject’s arrest it will not be considered “voluntary” for the purpose of this re-
port.
- On the other side, the requirement of the renounce to the “goals” re-
calls a demand of repentance, in its ideological sense, thus overlooking the
rationale behind the institution’s criminal policy, which is purely utilitarian.
– Total or partial confession.
– Active collaboration with the authorities to prevent the felony taking
place, to obtain decisive evidence to identify or capture the others who are
responsible, or to prevent the action or development of the organisations.
This requirement aims to encourage the collaboration from within, thus
complying with the measure’s secondary purpose (mentioned at the begin-
ning) through the weakening of the organisation.
incriminate oneself (art. 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution (hereinafter, CE), which are instru-
mental to the broader right to a defense, the accused may remain partially or totally silent
and even lie. Hence, the co-defendant’s incriminatory statement may not qualify as incrimina-
tory evidence when it is not corroborated by other evidence against the affected co-defendant.
In this case, the Constitutional Court granted the individual appeal for protection of rights,
because the only incriminatory evidence presented was the co-defendant’s statement. There
was no attempt on behalf of the accusation to verify the content of the cited statement.
39 See Criminal Chamber, Supreme Court Judgment (hereinafter, STS), sentencia del
Tribunal Supremo No. 186/2017 of the 23rd of March (RJ/2017/1268) which notes that the co-
defendant’s statement may not confirm the authenticity of another co-defendant’s statement.
Criminal Chamber, STS No. 773/2015 of the 9th of December (RJ/2015/5557) highlights the
need to verify the authenticity of the statement issued by a co-defendant that has been tried
previously and that appears as a witness in a second trial against other co-defendants. Crim-
inal Chamber, STS No. 651/2915, of the 3rd of November, (RJ/2015/4802) holds that when an
indictment is left without effect, the person may appear as a witness and issue a statement,
as long as the questions are not related to facts/events for which he was, at the time, indicted.
Criminal Chamber, STS No. 16/2014 of the 30th of January (RJ/2014/939), asserts, on the
other side, that the existence of potential penalty benefits to deny any probative value to the
co-defendant’s statements. This will only be the case when a lack of credibility may be ratio-
nally inferred.
40 See the analysis of the legislative developments carried out in section 1.2 of this
chapter-report.
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The 1995 Crim. Code in force requires an unrealistic behaviour (for the
costs of all kinds that it entails for the subject to whom the rewarding mea-
sures may be applied) that provides little benefits for the subject. Three cu-
mulative actions are required from the subject convicted of terrorism: i) vol-
untary quit; ii) confession; and, in addition, iii) effectively aiding to obtained
decisive evidence to identify or capture the others who are responsible, or to
prevent the action or development of the terrorist elements, organisations or
groups. If the aforementioned requirements are met, the penalty may only
be lowered in one or two degrees; this potential benefit is also uncertain as,
despite the fact that the leading scholar position holds that the lowering of
the penalty is mandatory upon compliance of the requirements (according to
this opinion, the discretionary power would refer to the decision to lower the
penalty in one or two degrees), there is a minority opinion which considers
the mere lowering of the penalty to be discretionary. It should also be pointed
out that the existing legal framework in Spain does not guarantee the protec-
tion of the witness-collaborator. The inadequacy and obsolency of the 1994
Organic Law on Witness Protection41 will be outlined in a later section42. The
fact that its regulatory developments were never enacted may serve to illus-
trate how limited the application of this Law has been in practice.
It may thus be inferred that if a cost-benefit analysis of the subject’s de-
cision was to be carried out, the costs would most certainly outnumber the
(little) benefits. One of the conclusions that may be drawn from the above is
that success of rewarding measures in the scope of terrorism depends on
multiple factors (e.g. social, political, etc.). One would consequently expect
the legislator to formulate the rewarding provision in such a way not to hin-
der or impede its practical application. But, as we have just seen, the Span-
ish legislator does exactly the opposite.
2.2. Types of rewarding measures
2.2.1. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty initiated at the
pre-sentencing stage
The Spanish legal system does not generally foresee the application of
mechanisms that may mitigate criminal accountability in a criminal
process43 for terrorism before a decision has been issued.
Despite the above, the institution of conformity44 may be considered to
amount to an early termination of the criminal procedure, through convic-
41 Organic Law No. 19/1994, of the 23rd of December, on Protection of Witnesses and
Experts in Criminal Procedures. BOE, December 25, 1994.
42 See section 2.8. Measures for the protection of the repentant for an analysis of the
law’s original problems, the drawbacks of its application to the present case and the chal-
lenges currently posed by this issue.
43 For an explanation of criminal procedure in this topic, see Terrorism in Spain: a pro-
cedural approach, in which several authors focus on a specific detail; the book was directed
by V. MORENO CATENA and H. SOLETO MUÑOZ, and coordinated by A. FIODOROVA, Valencia, Tirant
lo Blanch, 2017.
44 The Spanish legal system foresees the accused’s possibility to admit the most serious
accusation against him terms which are also consistent with the most serious accusation
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tion in the agreed upon terms which are also consistent with the most seri-
ous accusation issued. It should be recalled that this institution ultimately
enables the subject to obtain a lower penalty than that initially requested.
Plus, despite the fact that the Prosecutor’s performance within the criminal
procedure is based on the principle of legality, in practice, in those cases of
collaboration or abandonment of the terrorist organization, he may tend to
agree to a conformity decision. This possibility may end up privileging those
subjects that do not meet the requirements for the direct application of the
offence-specific mitigating circumstance provided for in art. 579-bis 3 Crim.
Code in the decision.
2.2.2. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty initiated at the
sentencing stage
We refer here to art. 579-bis 3 Crim. Code, which has been examined in
the previous sections. The cited provision reads as follows:
“In the felonies foreseen in this Chapter (On terrorist organisations and
groups and on felonies of terrorism), the Judges and Courts of Law may im-
pose, giving the reasons in the judgement, a punishment lower by one or two
degrees to that stated by the Law for the felony concerned, when the subject
has voluntarily quit his criminal activities and has appeared before the au-
thorities to confess the acts in which he has participated and has also col-
laborated actively with the authorities to prevent the felony taking place or
effectively aids the obtaining of decisive evidence to identify or capture the
others who are responsible, or to prevent the action or development of the
terrorist organisations or groups to which he has belonged, or with which he
has collaborated”.
2.2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty initiated at the
post-sentencing stage
At first sight, no terrorism-specific rewarding mechanisms may be
identified. In fact, as we have critically evidenced in another section, the
Crim. Code in force does not only not provide for specific rewarding mea-
sures applicable to those convicted of terrorism during the execution phase,
issued when the penalty requested for the offence does not exceed six years of prison (arts.
655, 787 of the Criminal Procedure Rules – hereinafter, LECrim –) as long as the legal qual-
ification is correct, the penalty is adequate and the conformity is voluntary and conscious.
On conformity within the Spanish criminal proceedings, we suggest the following explana-
tions: V. MORENO CATENA, “Lección 24. La fase inicial del juicio oral”, Derecho Procesal Penal,
9ª ed., 2019, pp. 406-411. The institution of conformity has been extensively studied by S.
BARONA VILAR, La conformidad en el proceso penal, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 1994. A. DEL
MORAL GARCÍA, “La conformidad en el proceso penal: reflexiones al hilo de su regulación en el
ordenamiento español”, Revista autoritas prudentium, nº 1, 2008. On its possible future reg-
ulation see, M.D. FERNÁNDEZ FUSTES, “La conformidad en el Borrador de Código Procesal pe-
nal”, Reflexiones sobre el nuevo proceso penal. Jornadas sobre el nuevo Código Procesal Penal
(R. LÓPEZ JIMÉNEZ, coord.) (V. MORENO CATENA, dir.), Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2015, pp. 871-
889.
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but quite the opposite. The Spanish legislator hardens45 the conditions to ac-
cess probation for those convicted of terrorism, and, more generally, for the
progression in the degree for those terrorists who do not collaborate with
the Spanish legal system. Specifically, art. 90.8 provides that:
“In the case of persons found guilty of felonies related to terrorist or-
ganisations and groups and offences of terrorism under Section two of
Chapter VII of Title XXII of Book II of this Code, or for felonies committed
within criminal organisations, the suspension of the penalty imposed as well
as the granting of probation require the convict to show unequivocal signs of
having abandoned the ends and means of the terrorist activity and has also ac-
tively collaborated with the authorities, either to prevent other offences being
committed by the armed gang, organisation or terrorist group, or to mitigate
the effects of the felony, or to identify, capture and prosecute those responsi-
ble for terrorist offences, to obtain evidence, or to prevent the activities or
development of the organisations or associations to which he has belonged
or with which he has collaborated, which may be accredited by a specific
statement of disavowal of their criminal activities and abandoning violence,
and specifically apologising to the victims of his offence, as well as by means of
technical reports that accredit that the convict has really cut off ties with the
terrorist organisation and the environment and activities of unlawful assem-
blies and groups that surround these, and that he has collaborated with the au-
thorities” (emphasis added).
At this stage, it should be recalled that, unlike the Crim. Code in force,
the 1973 Crim. Code did establish a privileged regime to access probation
for “repentant” terrorists (see art. 98-bis b) of the former 1973 Crim. Code,
following the reform introduced by Organic Law No. 3/198846). The relevant
provision stated that those convicted of the crimes foreseen in article 57-bis a),
may be granted probation if one of the circumstances established in sections 1,
b), or 2 of art. 57-bis, b) concur, and once at least a third of the sentence im-
posed has been served.
In the absence of terrorism-specific rewarding mechanisms during the
execution of the sentence, the person convicted of a terrorism offense may
resort to these general mechanisms. See, for instance, the suspension of the
45 Following the debate held during the Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding mea-
sures, E. PEÑARANDA RAMOS (Full Professor of Criminal Law at Autonomous University of
Madrid) asserted that the current regulation can be considered to be shy because it does not
even dare to say that detachment is enough; that in the case of terrorism, a part of the pun-
ishment is related to the existence of a linkage to the organization (structure, potential to in-
timidate, etc.) and that the disengagement of one of its members entails in itself a value be-
cause there is a sort of “continuing wrong” in the convict’s continuous belonging to the or-
ganization during the serving of the sentence which disappears when the perpetrator
detaches himself from it. SOLAR CALVO pointed out two interesting judgements in this sense.
See National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Order No. 38/2017 of the 8th of February and
Penitentiary Parole Board Court, Order of the 2nd of March (Majarenas case). None of the
judgements grant the pre-release classification, although apparently, the requirements estab-
lished in Art. 72.6 of the General Penitentiary Organic Law are met. Somehow, the serious-
ness of the perpetrated crimes or the former link to the gang limit this direct access to the
pre-release classification. Conversely, the issued decisions opt for a middle path by applying
the flexible regime enshrined in Art. 100.2 of the Penitentiary Rules.
46 BOE, May 26, 1988.
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execution of sentences (arts. 80 onwards Crim. Code). However, suspension
would only apply to a small group of terrorism offences that formally qual-
ify as such (i.e. apologism and other offences of expression), because their
penalties fall within the limit of two years that the Spanish legislator has es-
tablished for the suspension of the execution of custodial sentences. This re-
quirement limits significantly the chances of resorting to this mechanism for
most convictions of terrorism.
The reinsertion mechanisms available to those convicted of terrorism
during the execution of the sentence amounts to a general rewarding provi-
sion applicable within the penitentiary context. The applicability of these
mechanisms appears to be strictly linked to the abandonment of the band,
the acknowledgement of the facts and the victims’ reparations. Though the
above does not imply the application of specific legislation, these post-delic-
tum behaviours (abandonment, acknowledgment and reparation) have re-
cently acquired a significant importance in the light of the Encuentros
Restaurativos47 (Restorative Meetings) project developed in the Nanclares de
la Oca48 prison in Álava (known as the Nanclares way). Most notable, they
have had an impact on the revision of the penitentiary classification (see
arts. 100 onwards of the Penitentiary Rules49). A brief description of this
project’s key features will be presented below50.
The Restorative Meetings project was born and initially conceived as
entailing purely personal consequences for the parties (victim and perpetra-
tor) involved; the legal consequences, as will be explained below, emerged
later on. In the prison of Nanclares de la Oca there were thirty prisoners of
ETA who had already signed the resignation and had abandoned the prison-
ers’ group. It was initially stressed to both parties that the cited meetings
would not be followed by penitentiary benefits. The project had several
phases but explaining the design and work behind each of them is well be-
yond the scope of this paper. The initial phase consisted in interviewing the
prisoners, firstly in order to explain the project to them and to gain their
trust, given their general suspicion51. The interviews that followed addressed
47 Royal Decree-Law No. 190/1996, of the 9th of February. BOE, February 15, 1996.
48 E. PASCUAL RODRÍGUEZ, Criminal mediator and coordinator of the aforementioned
Restorative Meetings was one of the expert guest speakers in the Seminar on Terrorism and
Rewarding measures: criminal and substantive aspects. PASCUAL RODRÍGUEZ shared her experi-
ence and thoughts with the focus group through her presentation on the Legal consequences
of restorative meetings.
49 The team reflected extensively on the project’s name. E. PASCUAL RODRÍGUEZ, ex-
plained that other possibilities such as “criminal mediation” were considered and later dis-
carded because the project could not strictly be qualified as mediation as it was not an au-
tocompositive method prior to the criminal proceeding that leads to the victim’s reparation
and usually, to the lowering of the penalty. As stated before, the project is carried out during
the execution of the sentence and it has a strictly personal character, with no legal conse-
quences initially attached.
50 Nevertheless, the reading of VV.AA., Los ojos del otro. Encuentros restaurativos entre
víctimas y ex miembros de ETA (E. PASCUAL RODRÍGUEZ, ed.), Maliaño, Sal Terrae, 2ª ed., 2013,
is strongly recommended to any researcher or jurist interested in the topic.
51 The prisoners’ suspicion went as far as thinking that the coordinator, Esther, and her
colleagues were undercover agents, journalists and members of the National Intelligence
Centre (CNI), Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, etc.
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those aspects that would potentially be of interest for the victims. Next, the
project’s coordinators met with Victims Directorate in order to select those
victims who were able and willing to participate in those meetings. Once the
first eight victims had been selected (mainly women), another meeting was
held with the double scope of addressing the question of forgiveness and the
motivations behind their participation in the Restorative Meetings project;
there were all sorts of motivations, though reference was mainly made to the
future coexistence in Euskadi, to religion, etc.52. Henceforth, one-to-one
meetings are held with the victims. Strangely enough, victims require a
smaller number of preparatory meetings than prisoners. The selected vic-
tims, having left behind the phase of hatred of the criminal, were in an ad-
vanced stage. Nevertheless, the fact that this project would not imply the
granting of penitentiary benefits for the prisoners was a shared concern
among most of them. Finally, the victim-perpetrator restorative meeting took
place (with the direct victim in some cases and indirect victims in other);
these meetings were very successful and, little by little, more victims and
prisoners express their interest in participating and consequently, the num-
ber of meetings started to grow. However, following a change of government,
the restorative meetings are suspended without further explanation to any of
their participants: coordinators, victims and prisoners. At this time, as a re-
sult of the ECtHR53 reversal of the Parot doctrine, some individuals con-
victed of terrorism were released from prison. Since both parties (victims
and perpetrators) continued to request the celebration of these meetings,
these become Extra penitentiary Restorative Meetings (penitentiary and extra
penitentiary restorative meetings reach a total number of 28). The useful-
ness of restorative meetings is multiple: on one side, they may be used to an-
swer victims’ questions54 to which only the perpetrator knows the answer
(e.g. why me?), and that the criminal proceeding would have left unan-
swered. On the other side, these meetings offer the victim an empowerment
opportunity by enabling her to express the pain resulting from victimization
before the perpetrator. Whereas the terrorists´ apologies emerge almost nat-
urally, victims react to them in various ways: some accept the apologies and
some don’t, but all of them highlight that the apologies are very much ap-
preciated; in fact, many victims contact the team members out of concern of
developing the Stockholm syndrome, as they develop an interest in keeping
in contact with the perpetrator. Finally, the meetings enable the perpetrator
to understand the scope and real impact of the crime. Many declare to have
52 After the first interviews with the victims, two of them decide not to participate
upon request of their sons and daughters who considered that it would amount to a disre-
spect towards their dead fathers. In other occasions, the victims were not prepared.
53 ECtHR, Judgment of the 21st of October of 2013 (Rio Prada vs. Spain). About this
doctrine, see F. MOLINA FERNÁNDEZ, “The legal scars of terrorism: the unreasonable Parot Doc-
trine”, in Multilevel protection of the principle of legality in criminal law (M. PÉREZ MANZANO,
J.A. LASCURAÍN SÁNCHEZ, dirs.), Springer, 2018, pp. 123-140.
54 J. OLALDE ALTAREJOS, “Encuentros restaurativos en victimización generada por delitos
de terrorismo: bases teóricas”, in Los ojos del otro. Encuentros restaurativos entre víctimas y ex
miembros de ETA (E. PASCUAL RODRÍGUEZ, coord.), Maliaño, Sal Terrae, 2nd ed., 2013, p. 51-76.
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regained their dignity and to feel that they have earned the right to live again
in society.
At this point, it should be noted that by granting these meetings effects
from a penitentiary perspective (e.g. granting permits), their legal conse-
quences emerged. Penitentiary Parole Board Judges request reports to the
project coordinators on the restorative meetings but these requests cannot
be satisfied for reasons of confidentiality. Eventually, the Parole Board
Judges accept a formal statement from the project coordinator asserting that
the meeting has taken place successfully and that it was not motivated by
the possibility of obtaining penitentiary benefits. Nevertheless, as a result of
the functioning of the penitentiary system, these reports start to have an im-
pact on the granting of permits, the lowering of the penalty and the granting
of probation. Following the debate held during the Seminar on Terrorism
and Rewarding measures55, PEÑARANDA RAMOS pointed out the problems that
the recognition of these effects may cause in the future given that once it is
established that the meetings may have the cited effects, the door to its in-
strumental use in order to obtain those penitentiary benefits is opened.
Prior to the analysis of the institution of pardon56, two speakers shared
interesting thoughts from the victims’ and victims’ associations’ perspectives
towards rewarding measures57. GÓMEZ CUADRADO expressed his concern to-
wards the victim’s new position58 in the execution of the penalty and towards
the inclusion of the possibility of appealing any resolution even if he has not
been party to criminal proceedings previously, etc. NÚÑEZ FERNÁNDEZ high-
lighted the need of considering rewarding measures not only as a victim
reparation mechanism but as an instrument to protect social order59; he also
outlined the problem of victims associations when most part of the victims
are not associated, and the problem of applying terrorist-specific rewarding
measures to the new forms of terrorism without victims (offences in which
the protection standard has been raised), where, especially following the en-
55 Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding measures: criminal and substantive aspects.
56 F. MOLINA FERNÁNDEZ, has coordinated a book titled El indulto: pasado, presente y fu-
turo (Pardon: past, present and future), Argentina, B de F, 2019. There are very interesting
chapters highlighting its special importance in Spain (F. MOLINA FERNÁNDEZ “El indulto y sus
razones: justicia, utilidad, clemencia y cautela”, pp. 251-332; A. DOVAL, “Las cifras del indulto
en España: del cómputo de los datos de los decretos al primer informe oficial”, pp. 333-381;
M.P. SOLAR CALVO, “Teoría y práctica del indulto penitenciario”, pp. 567-611).
57 Some ideas about pardon and victim, in J.A. DÍAZ LÓPEZ, “La figura del indulto: una
lectura victimológica”, El indulto: pasado, presente y futuro (F. MOLINA LÓPEZ, coord.), Ar-
gentina, B de F, 2019, pp. 535-565.
58 Following the Law No. 4/2015 of the 27th of April, on the Statute of the Victim of an
Offence.
59 Rewarding measures are often perceived to be contrary to the victims’ interests.
However, they incentivise behaviours with a great reparative potential, which implies that
their justification are of a mixed nature: both pragmatic and of general positive prevention.
Thus, advocating for the use of rewarding measures in the fight against terrorism should be
conceived as compatible with the reparation of the victim’s interest given that it does not ad-
vocate for impunity but for the lowering of the penalties for reasons beyond the culpability
for the wrong. About the judicial determination of the penalty and its proportionality has re-
cently be published, G.J. BASSO, La determinación judicial de la pena y proporcionalidad con el
hecho, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2019.
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actment of Organic Law No. 2/2015, the application of offence-specific re-
warding measures to the convict’s collaboration is replaced by the applica-
tion by analogy of the qualifying mitigating circumstance of confession; in
his opinion, a less demanding regulation in those cases could represent a so-
lution.
Leaving aside the above, during the execution of the sentence, pardon60
emerges as one of the last strictly rewarding ordinary measures from which
a person convicted of terrorism could benefit. It is an extraordinary mea-
sure, granted by the King at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice, follow-
ing the deliberation of the Council of Ministers, that may suspend totally or
partially the penalties imposed by final judgement, to those convicted of any
offence, terrorism included.
The figures regarding the granting of pardon in cases of terrorism
sometimes vary depending on the source. This being said, the accessed data
allows us to distinguish two different periods with respect to this phenome-
non: a first period, between 1984-1994, which was characterized by an im-
portant number of pardons granted to those convicted of terrorism (over a
hundred61) in line with the Government’s reinsertion policy; and a second
period, from 1996 onwards, marked by a significant drop of these pardons.
During this period, as we have pointed out before, there was an important
shift in the antiterrorist policies of the Spanish political parties. Coordina-
tion was replaced by a competition to show how unable and disloyal the ad-
versary was, to the point of making accusations of complicity with ETA, in
some cases. This competition led to another competition among political
groups to enact the “toughest” legislation on this matter. Thus, over the last
twenty-two years (1996-201862), twenty pardons have been granted to con-
victs of offences of belonging to terrorist groups and organisations and to
convicts of felonies of terrorism. The most relevant information concerning
each of them is listed below. Some illustrative facts on the pardons granted
between 1996-2019 include the following: all (twenty) of the convicts
granted pardon were male; eighteen out of twenty were granted in 1996, one
of them was granted in 2004 and another one in 2007; four of them were
granted by a social-democratic Ministry of Justice, while twelve were
granted by a conservative Ministry. The table below shows, in chronological
order, the pardons granted between 1996-2019 and the crime(s) they were
referred to.
60 Law of the 18th of June of 1870, establishing the rules for the granting of (the Grace
of) pardon, which was modified by Law No. 1/1988, of the14th of January. Order of the 10th
of September of 1993, of the Ministry of Justice whereby instructions on pardon applications
are given.
61 See between 107-300.
62 Source: Civio-Pardonometer. The pardonometer is a ground-breaking journalistic
project that relies on an important team and that has been created by Eva Belmonte and pro-
grammer Juan Elosúa. The tool collects, analyses and classifies all of the information re-
garding the pardons granted in Spain through Royal Decree-Laws published in the BOE. It
is a simple and illustrative tool that enables the user to search and compare different para-
meters, i.e. type of offence, annual data, government granting the pardon, etc. Available at:
https://civio.es/el-indultometro/ On the pardon in Spain see E. CARRACEDO CARRASCO, Pena e in-
dulto: una aproximación holística, Navarra, Thomson Reuters, Aranzadi, 2018.
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63 Royal Decree-Law No. 481/1996, of the 8th of March. BOE, March 29, 1996.
64 Royal Decree-Law No. 482/1996, of the 8th of March. BOE, March 29, 1996.
65 Royal Decree-Law No. 1611/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
66 Royal Decree-Law No. 1613/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
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Date Offence
8.3.199663 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 1.000.000 pesetas; pos-
session of explosives, sentence of imprisonment of six
years and one day; terrorism, sentence of imprisonment of
ten years and one day; four attempted terrorism offences,
four sentences of imprisonment of one year; unlawful pos-
session of weapons, sentence of imprisonment of one year;
terrorism, sentence of imprisonment of ten years and one
day, fifteen offences of grievous bodily harm, sentence of
imprisonment of five years for each offence with the ac-
cessory penalties of suspension from public employment
and office and special barring from the right to vote dur-
ing the term of the sentence
8.3.199664 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas; pos-
session of explosives, sentence of imprisonment of six
years and one day; attempted terrorism offence, sentence
of imprisonment of one year; terrorism, sentence of im-
prisonment of ten years and one day, fifteen offences of
grievous bodily harm, sentence of imprisonment of five
years for each offence with the accessory penalties of sus-
pension from public employment and office and special
barring from the right to vote during the term of the sen-
tence
28.6.199665 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas with
the accessory penalties of suspension from public employ-
ment and office and special barring from the right to vote
during the term of the sentence
28.6.199666 Collaborating with armed gangs, sentence of imprison-
ment of one year and unlawful possession of weapons,
sentence of imprisonment of one year with the accessory
penalties of suspension from public employment and of-
fice and special barring from the right to vote during the
term of the sentence
67 Royal Decree-Law No. 1614/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
68 Royal Decree-Law No. 1615/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
69 Royal Decree-Law No. 1616/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
70 Royal Decree-Law No. 1618/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
71 Royal Decree-Law No. 1620/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
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28.6.199667 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas and
four terrorism offences, sentence of one year of imprison-
ment with the accessory penalties of suspension from pub-
lic employment and office and special barring from the
right to vote during the term of the sentence
28.6.199668 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas, pos-
session of explosives, sentence of imprisonment of six
years and one day with the accessory penalties of suspen-
sion from public employment and office and special bar-
ring from the right to vote during the term of the sentence
28.6.199669 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas, un-
lawful possession of weapons, sentence of imprisonment
of one year, and terrorism, sentence of ten years of impris-
onment with the accessory penalties of suspension from
public employment and office and special barring from the
right to vote during the term of the sentence
28.6.199670 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 100.000 pesetas, un-
lawful possession of weapons, sentence of imprisonment
of four months; possession of explosives, sentence of im-
prisonment of one year, and three attempted offences of
terrorism, three sentences of imprisonment of one year
with the accessory penalties of suspension from public
employment and office and special barring from the right
to vote during the term of the sentence
28.6.199671 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas; pos-
session of explosives, sentence of imprisonment of six
years and one day; unlawful possession of weapons, sen-
tence of imprisonment of on year with the accessory
penalties of suspension from public employment and of-
fice and special barring from the right to vote during the
term of the sentence
72 Royal Decree-Law No. 1621/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
73 Royal Decree-Law No. 1622/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
74 Royal Decree-Law No. 1623/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
75 Royal Decree-Law No. 1624/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
76 Royal Decree-Law No. 1625/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
77 Royal Decree-Law No. 1626/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
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28.6.199672 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 1.000.000 pesetas with
the accessory penalties of suspension from public employ-
ment and office and special barring from the right to vote
during the term of the sentence
28.6.199673 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day with the accessory penalties of sus-
pension from public employment and office and special
barring from the right to vote during the term of the sen-
tence
28.6.199674 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
six years and one day and a fine of 500.000 pesetas and
four offences of terrorism, four sentences of imprisonment
of one year with the accessory penalties of suspension
from public employment and office and special barring
from the right to vote during the term of the sentence
28.6.199675 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
one year and a fine of 100.000 pesetas; possession of ex-
plosives, sentence of imprisonment of one year, and two
robberies, two sentences of imprisonment of one year with
the accessory penalties of suspension from public employ-
ment and office and special barring from the right to vote
during the term of the sentence
28.6.199676 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
one year and a fine of 100.000 pesetas; and terrorism, sen-
tence of imprisonment of one year with accessory penal-
ties of suspension from public employment and office and
special barring from the right to vote during the term of
the sentence
28.6.199677 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
one year; possession of explosives, sentence of imprison-
ment of one year, and two offences of terrorism, two sen-
tences of imprisonment of one year with accessory penal-
ties of suspension from public employment and office and
special barring from the right to vote during the term of
the sentence
78 Royal Decree-Law No. 1627/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
79 Royal Decree-Law No. 1628/1996, of the 28th of June. BOE, August 8, 1996.
80 Royal Decree-Law No. 1985/1996, of the 23rd of August. BOE, August 8, 1996.
81 Royal Decree-Law No. 2309/2004, of the 10th of December. BOE, December 28,
2004.
82 Royal Decree-Law No. 584/2007, of the 27th of April. BOE, April 28, 2007.
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28.6.199678 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
one year and a fine of 500.000 pesetas, and four offences
of terrorism, four sentences of imprisonment of one year
with accessory penalties of suspension from public em-
ployment and office and special barring from the right to
vote during the term of the sentence
28.6.199679 Belonging to an armed gang, sentence of imprisonment of
one year; possession of explosives, sentence of imprison-
ment of one year, and three offences of terrorism, three
sentences of imprisonment of one year with accessory
penalties of suspension from public employment and of-
fice and special barring from the right to vote during the
term of the sentence
23.8.199680 Collaborating with armed gangs, sentence of imprison-
ment of four years and two months with accessory penal-
ties of suspension from public employment and office and
special barring from the right to vote during the term of
the sentence
10.12.200481 Collaborating with armed gangs, sentence of imprison-
ment of five years and fine of 18 months with a daily
quota of three euros, and a continued offence of terrorism
with respect to a terrorist-inspired offence of damage and
fire, sentence of imprisonment of eight years and nine
months with accessory penalties of suspension from pub-
lic employment and office and special barring from the
right to vote during the term of the sentence
27.4.200782 Deposit of weapons and explosives, robbery with intimi-
dation, three offences of havoc, two offences of participat-
ing in armed gangs, robbery, murder, terrorism, unlawful
use of motor vehicle, grievous bodily harm, sentence of
imprisonment of one hundred and three years, two
months and five days, fine of 150.000 pesetas and depri-
vation of the right to drive motor vehicles or mopeds for
eight years with accessory penalties of suspension from
public employment and office and special barring from
the right to vote during the term of the sentence. National
High Court Order of the 11th of April of 2003 ordered the
accumulation of these penalties in application of art. 70.2
Crim. Code, which establishes a maximum limit of serving
of 30 years.
2.3. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant
The Spanish legislator does not foresee additional obligations so as to
compensate the repentant’s83 rewarding measures for offences of terrorism.
Art. 579-bis 3 Crim. Code, reproduced and analysed above, does not make
the application of the rewarding measures dependant on the repentant’s ful-
filment of additional obligations. That said, perhaps its worth recalling that
the legal configuration of this terrorism-specific rewarding measures fore-
seen in art. 579-bis 3 Crim. Code, is particularly demanding insofar it re-
quires abandonment, confession and result-oriented active collaboration
(see prevent/obtain) to concur cumulatively. In fact, as we have argued, the
controversial nature of the cited legal provision is one of the factors deter-
mining its anecdotal application. If the Spanish legislator had also sought to
impose complementary obligations to the repentant, its practical application
would have been reduced to (almost) nothing.
2.4. Revocation of rewarding measures
Unlike the Italian Special Laws or the German StPO, the Spanish legal
system does not foresee specific provisions regarding the revocation of ben-
efits in the scope of terrorism. Hence, only those of an ordinary character
envisaged in the Spanish Crim. Code may be considered here; see, for in-
stance, the revocation of a suspension (art. 86 Crim. Code84), the revocation
83 This question is answered using the terms that appear by default in the question-
naire. However, as we have already outlined, some authors disagree with the use of the term
“rewarding measures”. The same controversy would probably emerge during the debate with
respect to the notions of repentant and compensation.
84 Art. 86 Crim. Code foresees that: 1. The judge or court will revoke the suspension
and order the execution of the sentence when the convicted person: a) Is convicted of a crime
committed during the period of suspension and this shows that the expectation on which the
suspension decision was based can no longer be maintained. b) Seriously or repeatedly
breaches the prohibitions and duties that would have been imposed in accordance with arti-
cle 83, or is subtracted from the control of the penalty management services and alternative
measures of the Penitentiary Administration. c) Breaches serious conditions or repeatedly
that, for the suspension, would have been imposed in accordance with article 84. d) provides
inaccurate or insufficient information on the whereabouts of goods or objects whose confis-
cation had been agreed upon; does not comply with the commitment to pay civil liabilities to
which he had been convicted, unless he lacked the economic capacity to do so; or provides
inaccurate or insufficient information about his assets, in breach of the obligation imposed
in article 589 of the Civil Procedure Act. 2. If the breach of the prohibitions, duties or con-
ditions had not been serious or repeated, the judge or court may: a) Impose to the prisoner
new prohibitions, duties or conditions, or modify those already imposed. b) Extend the pe-
riod of suspension, without exceeding, in any case, half of the duration of what was initially
set. 3. In the case of revocation of the suspension, the expenses incurred in by the prisoner
to repair the damage caused by the crime in accordance with Article 84 (1) shall not be re-
stored. However, the judge or court will deduct the payments and the work that would have
been carried out or completed in accordance with the 2nd and 3rd measures. In all the above
cases, the judge or court will decide after hearing the Prosecutor and the other parties. How-
ever, he may revoke the suspension of the execution of the sentence and issue a committal
order when it is essential to avoid the risk of criminal reiteration, prison escape risk or en-
sure the protection of the victim. The judge or court may agree to carry out the necessary
verification procedures and agree to hold an oral hearing when deemed necessary to issue a
decision.
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of probation (art. 92 Crim. Code85) or the regression of the degree) (art. 106
of the Penitentiary Rules86).
85 Art. 92 Crim Code: 1. The court will agree to suspend the execution of the review-
able permanent prison sentence when the following requirements are met: a) That the pris-
oner has served twenty-five years of his sentence, without prejudice to the provisions of arti-
cle 78-bis for the cases regulated therein. b) That is classified in third grade. c) That the
court, in view of the personality of the prisoner, his background, the circumstances of the
crime committed, the relevance of the legal assets that could be affected by criminal reitera-
tion, his conduct during the serving of the sentence, his familiar and social circumstances,
and the effects that can be expected from the suspension of the execution and compliance
with the measures that may be imposed, following an examination of the progress reports
submitted by the prison and by those experts appointed by the court, may evaluate positively
the possibility of the offender’s social reintegration. In the event that the prisoner had been
convicted of several crimes, the examination of the requirements referred to in letter c) shall
be carried out assessing all the crimes committed. The court will decide on the suspension of
the reviewable permanent prison sentence after a contradictory oral procedure in which the
Prosecutor and the prosecutor will intervene, assisted by their lawyer. 2. In the case of crimes
related to terrorist organizations and groups and terrorism offenses of Chapter VII of Title
XXII of Book II of this Code, it will also be necessary for the prisoner to show unequivocal
signs of having abandoned the ends and means of terrorist activity and to have actively col-
laborated with the authorities, either to prevent the perpetration of other crimes by the ter-
rorist organization or group, or to mitigate the effects of his crime, or to identify, capture
and prosecute those responsible for terrorist offenses, to obtain evidence or to prevent the
action or development of the organizations or associations to which he has belonged or with
which he has collaborated, which may be accredited by an express declaration of repudiation
of its criminal activities and abandonment of violence and request for forgiveness to the vic-
tims of his crime, as well as by the technical reports that prove that the prisoner is really de-
tached from the terrorist organization and the environment and the associations and illegal
groups’ activities that surround it and his collaboration with the authorities. 3. The suspen-
sion of execution will last from five to ten years. The period of suspension and probation
shall be calculated from the date of release of the prisoner. The rules contained in the second
paragraph of Article 80 (1) and Articles 83, 86, 87 and 91 apply. The judge or court, in view
of the possible modification of the circumstances assessed, may modify the decision that it
had previously adopted pursuant to Article 83, and agree on the imposition of new prohibi-
tions, duties or benefits, the modification of those that had already been agreed on, or their
suspension. Likewise, the Parole Board Judge will revoke the suspension of the execution of
the rest of the sentence and the probation granted when a change in the circumstances that
would have resulted in the suspension does no longer guarantee the lack of danger on which
the decision adopted was based. 4. Once the part of the sentence referred to in letter a) of
paragraph 1 of this article or, where appropriate, in article 78-bis has been extinguished, the
court shall verify, at least every two years compliance with the other probation requirements.
The court will also decide on the requests for the conditional release of the prisoner, but may
set a term of up to one year within which, after a petition has been rejected, his new appli-
cations will not be examined.
86 Royal Decree-Law No. 190/1996, of the 9th of February pursuant to which the Peni-
tentiary Rules are enacted. BOE February 15, 1996. Art. 106 of the Rules foresees that 1. The
evolution in the prison treatment will determine a new classification of the inmate, with the
corresponding proposal of transfer to the appropriate penitentiary Centre or, within the same
Centre, to another department with different lifestyle. 2.The progression in the degree of
classification will depend on the positive modification of those factors directly related to
criminal activity, will be evidenced in the overall conduct of the inmate and will imply an in-
creased trust in him, which will allow the attribution of more important responsibilities that
entail more freedom. 3. The regression of the degree will proceed when a negative evolution
in the prognosis of social integration and in the personality or behaviour of the inmate is ap-
preciated in relation to the treatment. 4. When the inmate does not participate in an indi-
vidualized treatment program, the evaluation of his evolution will be carried out in the man-
ner described in article 112.4, except when the Treatment Board has been able to make an
assessment of the inmate’s social integration by other legitimate means. 5. The same formal-
ities, term and possible extension of the same formalities, terms and possible extension cri-
teria foreseen in article 103 for the initial classification resolutions will be observed for the
resolution of the proposals of progression and of regression of degree.
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Once again, is should be noted that the 1973 Crim. Code enshrined a
provision of this kind. Interestingly, revocation was only foreseen for those
situations where the penalty was fully condoned in the cases of especially rel-
evant active collaboration, not being thus applicable to cases of simple low-
ering of the penalty. Let us remind87 that art. 57-bis b) 2 provided in fine that
suspension would always depend on the convict not offending again.
2.5. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
No special rules apply.
2.6. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations)
For the sake of brevity, the question will be answered in extenso in the
following paragraphs; the reader should however take into account that Sec-
tion 3 on the relevant case-law88 lists the decisions in which these terrorism-
specific rewarding measures have been applied. The legal question underly-
ing an important part of them is precisely that of the probative value of the
repentant co-defendant’s statement89.
For this reason, a broad attempt to narrate the way in which this issue
has been tackled by the Spanish case-law will follow. This account will start
off from the past, it will stop in the present and will most importantly point
out the problems that, in our view, this issue will pose in the future.
From the 80s until the mid-90s, the criteria to establish the co-defen-
dant statement’s probative value was clearly inadequate because the exami-
nation was carried out in application of purely subjective standards (usually
associated to the co-defendant’s motivation), that would thus shift the bur-
den of proof. Within this framework, the credibility of the repentant co-de-
fendant ended up depending on questions posed to the accused on his pos-
sible spurious motives for delation.
By imposing the corroboration standard, Constitutional Court’s judge-
ment STC 153/1997, of the 29th of September triggered a change of paradigm
in this context. During this period90, also the ECtHR turned to this standard,
pursuant to which, the information provided by the co-defendant must be
corroborated by further evidence.
87 We have already referred to this provision in section 1.2. Legislative evolution.
88 See supra on the evolution of the constitutional case-law.
89 See I. SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA DE PAZ, “El coimputado que colabora con la justicia penal. Con
atención a las reformas introducidas en la regulación española por las Leyes Orgánicas 7/ y
15/2003”, Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología, RECPC 07-05(2005). M.P. DÍAZ
PITA, “Declaración inculpatoria del coimputado en el proceso penal y derecho a la presunción
de inocencia: examen de su tratamiento jurisprudencial en España en relación con la doct-
rina del TEDH”, Derecho constitucional para el siglo XXI: actas del VIII Congreso Iberoameri-
cano de Derecho Constitucional (M. CARRASCO DURÁN, J. PÉREZ ROYO, J. URÍAS MARTÍNEZ, M.J.
TEROL BECERRA, dirs.), vol. 1, 2006, p. 2041-2058. R. ALCACER GUIRAO, “El imputado que declara
como testigo en otro procedimiento, ¿coimputado o testigo? Comentario a las SSTC
111/2011, 4 de julio y 126/2011, de 18 de julio”, La ley penal, No. 94-95, p. 8.
90 A little later than the Spanish Constitutional Court.
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Despite the systematic application of the corroboration standard by
Spanish judicial bodies, some issues have arisen because, according to some
experts91, in many occasions, tribunals have not been excessively demanding
when requesting the cited corroboration. The external corroboration is re-
quested (i.e. that the corroboration does not come from the other co-defen-
dant’s statement), but it is not a “strong” one. In this context, it is important
to highlight that the corroboration may either refer to the core of the state-
ment or to some circumstantial elements. This is precisely where the prob-
lem lies: the judicial bodies examine the co-defendant’s statement despite the
fact that the corroboration required to this effect should be referred to the
statement’s main points, and not to its circumstantial elements. In this case,
we would be facing a weak corroboration.
Finally, in order to wrap up this section, we would like to raise some of
the challenges posed by the functioning of the institution of repentance and
its current practical operability within the criminal proceedings. In our
opinion, these challenges will most certainly need to be tackled in the near
future. Some of the questions that arise include: in what context does the re-
pentance take place? does a formalised or deformalized context exist in this
scenario?; or even if these can be of two kinds. According to the legal oper-
ators, including judges, there is no formalized context for the acquisition of
the status of repentance; in other words, there are very few cases in which a
repentance occurring in a normalized context emerges naturally later during
the criminal proceedings. The decontextualized scenario92 of the repentant
obscures the whole criminal proceeding provoking an important conflict
with the principle of contradiction93 (principle that establishes that both
parties to a lawsuit must be heard). The concurrence of an element of sur-
prise resulting in a lost opportunity to react for the defense may amount to
an illustrative example of what has just been outlined. It follows from the
above that the format should certainly be more transparent. However, a low-
ering of the standards of protection has even been detected within the most
recent ECtHR’s case-law. Unfortunately, from the end of the 90s to the pre-
91 See J.J. LÓPEZ ORTEGA’s presentation on the “Procedural aspects of the repentant’s
collaboration in the criminal proceedings” within the Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding
measures: criminal and substantive aspects.
92 Recently J.E. VARGAS VIANCOS, published a report (nº 40) General Legal elements for
the Development of Public Infrastructure projects within the Chilean think tank Espacio
Público, under the direction of the procedural expert Mauricio Duce where, among other is-
sues, the topics of collaboration and delation are tackled within Latin America. More specif-
ically, one of the points addressed refers to the “different scenarios or contexts, in which can
appear” “development of the negotiation”, “institutional coordination”, “validation of the
agreements” and, of course, its “validity and its introduction and validation during the pro-
ceedings”. The protection, probative value and the revocation were also addressed, see espe-
cially p. 1-53. Available at: https://www.espaciopublico.cl/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/
Doc_Ref_3ElementosLegales.pdf.
93 J.J. LÓPEZ ORTEGA, “Contradicción y defensa. Cinco cuestiones sobre la prueba penal,
precedidas de una introducción sobre la eficiencia del proceso penal”, Estudios de Derecho
Judicial, No. 128, 2007, p. 123-156. From the same author, “Elementos esenciales de la no-
ción de proceso equitativo en el orden penal (panorama de la jurisprudencia del TEDH)”, Es-
tudios Jurídicos. Ministerio Fiscal, No. 5, 2000, pp. 303-352. “Garantías anudadas al princi-
pio acusatorio”, Comentarios a la Constitución española (M. PÉREZ MANZANO, I. BORRAJO INI-
ESTA, Coords.), vol. 1, Book 1, 2018, p. 803-813.
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sent, the ECtHR has constantly threatened the guarantees deriving from a
principle pursuant to which both parties to a lawsuit should be heard with
regard to these cases; firstly, by admitting the anonymous witness’ state-
ment; then, by accepting, for the purpose of the trial, a witness declaration
issued during the pre-trial phase; later, by accepting that some parts of the
investigation proceedings remained secret to the defense…). In the light of
the above, achieving transparency in this respect seems a mere illusion, es-
pecially when the domestic (Spanish) standard of human rights protection
tends to relax94 due to the influence of the European standard.
2.7. Measures for the protection of the repentant
When reflecting on protection measures for the repentant, it is advisable
to examine briefly the only Act regulating this issue within the Spanish legal
system. Organic Law No. 19/1994 of the 23rd of December on Protection95 of
Witnesses and Experts in Criminal Procedures (hereinafter LO 19/1994), is,
and probably has always been, an insufficient law with important flaws. This
may explain the fact that it has been rarely applied in practice.
Surprisingly enough, despite its deficiencies, it is one of the few proce-
dural laws that has not been amended to date. And what is even worse, the
regulatory development of the law required by Additional Provision 296 of
the LO 19/1994 was never carried out; after a twenty-five years, academics
and judicial bodies are no longer expecting a regulatory development but
rather a new Organic Law97.
The most important problems of this law may be summarized in the
following points: firstly, LO 19/1994 only foresees the protection of the wit-
94 J.J. LÓPEZ ORTEGA presented data on the “bad influence” of the ECtHR’s case-law on
the Spanish judicial bodies. For instance, the ECtHR Judgment on Murray has been cited
more than 100 times by the Spanish Supreme Court, 116 times by the National High Court
and more than 150 times by a Provincial Court. This means that 3-4 times a week reference
is made to the probative value of the right to silence foreseen in regimes different from that
of terrorism. Opinions expressed during the presentation “Procedural aspects of the repen-
tant’s collaboration in the criminal proceedings” within the Seminar on Terrorism and Re-
warding measures: criminal and substantive aspects.
95 See V. MORENO CATENA, “La protección de los testigos y peritos en el proceso penal es-
pañol”, Revista penal, No. 4, 1999, pp. 58-67; M. ORTELLS RAMOS, “Comentario y desarrollo de
la ley de protección de testigos y peritos”, in La protección de testigos y peritos en causas crim-
inales: comunicaciones y ponencias (J.A. ROBLÉS GARZÓN, dir.), Málaga, Diputación de Málaga,
Centro de ediciones de la Diputación de Málaga, pp. 163-178. N. TORRES ROSELL, “Sentencias
españolas sobre la protección de testigos. Líneas jurisprudenciales”, en La protección de tes-
tigos y peritos en causas criminales: comunicaciones y ponencias (J.A. ROBLÉS GARZÓN, dir.),
Málaga, Diputación de Málaga, Centro de ediciones de la Diputación de Málaga, 2001, p.
185-208. R. ZAFRA ESPINOSA DE LOS MONTEROS, “Algunas cuestiones acerca de la protección de
testigos en el proceso penal”, Diario La Ley, No. 7260, 2009.
96 Additional Provision Two of Organic Law No. 19/1994 provided then that: The Gov-
ernment, within a year from the publication of the present Law, will enact the regulatory provi-
sions required for its execution.
97 During the XIII Session (21st of May), the need of a new law has been highlighted
by the Ministry of Justice, the Ombudsman and more recently by the Prosecutor General
who, during the opening of the judicial year 2019/2020 referred to the need to “broaden the
circumstances for its application, define the measures to guarantee its indemnity and cen-
tralize its management”.
289SPAIN
ness, but not that of the co-defendant. Fortunately, this did not prevent the
National High Court in the 90s from carrying out a broad interpretation of
the subjective scope, which resulted in the extension of its protection to the
co-defendants. Secondly, protection measures are very limited and ineffec-
tive because they are part of a gradual protection system along the criminal
proceeding. This system turns out to provide a very intense protection dur-
ing the pre-trial phase, which becomes scarce once the hearing has been
reached. In practice, the protection mechanism during the hearing is limited
to testifying without being seen (i.e. screen, etc.). Lastly, the cost of an effec-
tive protection, not only in economic terms but also in personal terms
(change of identity, moving out, etc.), amounts to a very important obstacle
that cannot be overlooked. Hence, it cannot be concluded that an effective
witness protection program exists in Spain. This fact is probably related to
the scarce visibility of other instruments of the criminal investigation such
as the cover agents, which in Spain amount to a very small number due to
the impossibility of providing the security forces agents with an adequate
protection. This assertion should actually be corrected because there is
probably a big number of cover agents, the problem being that they do not
come before the tribunals.
Some interesting thoughts that emerged throughout the debate held
during the Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding measures98 shall be out-
lined hereunder. On one side, ORTEGA LÓPEZ suggests a change of paradigm
within criminal law with regard to the increasing complexity of the investi-
gations in the cases of organised criminality. This could be leading to a
model whereby the efficiency of the criminal proceeding requires collabora-
tion in exchange for immunity; immunity however is in conflict with the
general principles of Criminal Law. According to professor LASCURAÍN
SÁNCHEZ99, the problem affecting the most serious cases is not the granting of
immunity but its opacity and its effect in procedural terms; moreover, he
suggests that the amendment of the protection system should consider in-
creasing the protection standards in the later phase. CUERDA ARNAU held that
insufficiencies in protection measures (i.e. the exclusion of family members,
the impossibility of an initial application at the police headquarters, etc.)
may end up undermining the rewarding measures’ effectiveness.
2.8. Evaluation and control mechanisms of the rewarding measure
Inexistent.
3. Current relevant case-law
This section contains a list of the decisions in which offence-specific re-
warding measures previously studied have been applied either under former
98 Seminar on Terrorism and Rewarding measures: criminal and substantive aspects.
99 Full Professor of Criminal Law at Autonomous University of Madrid, participant at
the discussion seminar.
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1973 Crim. Code either 1995 Crim. Code in force. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to carry out a full-fledged analysis of each single decision; thus,
though listed in chronological order, those falling under the 1973 Crim. Code
are separated from those falling under the Crim. Code in force. In some
cases, a brief analysis of relevant extracts for the purpose of this paper will
be carried out.
According to empirical expert research100, former art. 174-bis of the
1973 Crim. Code, predecessor of art. 57-bis b) of 1973 Crim. Code (following
its amendment by Organic Law No. 9/1941), was applied in six occasions.
National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 58/1984, of the
28th of September.
National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 11/1985, of the
11th of March.
National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 69/1985, of the
5th of November.
National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 58/1986, of the
30th of June.
Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgment No. 1358/1997, of the 5th
of November101.
In this decision, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber dismisses a
cassation appeal filed by three private accusations against a decision issued
by the National High Court’s Criminal Chamber convicting an individual on
a count of terrorist attack resulting in death, four counts of murder, eleven
counts of attempted murder and one count of terrorism. The qualified miti-
gating circumstance enshrined in (former) art. 57-bis b) of the 1973 Crim.
Code was applied to all the offences. The appellants hold that the Trial
Chamber violated a substantive criminal provision by applying (inade-
quately, in their opinion) the qualified mitigating circumstance comprised in
art. 57-bis to the accused, hence violating the victims of terrorism’s right to
an effective judicial protection through the compensation of the inflicted
damage (art. 24 Spanish Constitution). The Criminal Chamber dismissed
both arguments, highlighting, among other things, that notwithstanding the
trial decision’s flawed statement of the proven facts, there was an adequate
application of art. 57-bis b) of the Crim. Code to the case: the accused was
linked to the terrorist organisation ETA (more specifically, he belonged to
the Madrid Command) and this link is voluntarily broken when the accused-
convicted presents himself before the Spanish Consul General in the Do-
minican Republic, voluntarily returns to Spain to serve the corresponding
sentence and confesses his participation in all of the relevant events in
which he had participated, including those that were being judged within
the criminal proceedings. On the other side, the Supreme Court has also es-
100 M.L. CUERDA ARNAU, Atenuación y remisión de la pena en los delitos de terrorismo,
Madrid, Centro de Publicaciones del Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, 1995. E. MESTRE DEL-
GADO, Delincuencia terrorista y Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, Centro de Publicaciones del Min-
isterio de Justicia, 1987. J. NUÑEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Sobre punibilidad, terrorismo, víctimas y pena,
Navarra, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2017,
101 Roj: STS 6575/1997 - ECLI: ES:TS:1997:6575.
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tablished that the appellants (victims of the attack) cannot claim to be de-
manding justice when asserting that such a demand would be unsatisfied
upon application of the cited mitigating circumstance because this position
hides a vindictive motivation; the Court then stresses that the laws set out
the preconditions for punishment, offence and circumstances but it is the ju-
dicial bodies’ role to apply and interpret them. In this sense, the legislator
may foresee moral but also utilitarian mitigation circumstances. Though the
appellant may not share this perspective, the application of the cited provi-
sion does not infringe his right to an effective judicial protection because, as
the Constitutional Court has repeatedly pointed out, this fundamental right
includes, among other things, the right to access jurisdiction and the right
for the decision to be complied with, the right that establishes that both par-
ties to a lawsuit must be heard and the right to have judicial bodies deciding
on demands on the basis of legal reasoning. This does not mean, however,
that an effective judicial protection shall include a hypothetical right to the
full satisfaction of claims or requests.
National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 24/2000, of the
8th of May102.
Through this decision from the National High Court’s Criminal Cham-
ber, two men and a women were convicted of the perpetration of several of-
fences103; for the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that, pursuant
to art. 6 of the Organic Law on Armed Gangs, (former) art. 57-bis b) and art.
579 of the Crim. Code in force, the general mitigating circumstance104 of
abandonment of criminal activities and presentation before the authorities
with confession was applied to one of the men, following the Prosecutor’s re-
quest. The private prosecution rejected the application of the cited mitiga-
tion circumstance on the basis of the time lapse between the events and Ser-
afin’s presentation before the Spanish Consulate.
The terrorism-specific rewarding measures contained in the current
Crim. Code has been applied to the following cases:
Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgment No. 2084/2001, of the
13th of December105
Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgment No. 878/2014, of the 23rd
of December106.
For the purpose of this chapter, the relevant motivations behind the
convict’s cassation appeal include: i) violation of the right to a fair trial and,
102 Roj: SAN 3050/2000 - ECLI: ES:AN:2000:3050.
103 i.e. terrorist attack with an attempted crime of murder concurring the aggravating
circumstance of premeditation; murder concurring the general aggravating circumstance of
premeditation; attempted murder concurring the general aggravating circumstance of pre-
meditation; havoc, unlawful use of motor vehicle, using violence and taking hostages to en-
able the execution.
104 These mitigating circumstances, pursuant to legal ground No. 12, are applicable to
the Serafín, who voluntarily renounced criminal activity, confessed and aided effectively to
obtain decisive evidence to identify or capture the others who are responsible or to prevent
the action or development of the terrorist organisations or groups.
105 Roj: STS 9774/2001 - ECLI: ES:TS:2001:9774.
106 Roj: STS 5752/2014 - ECLI: ES:TS:2014:5752.
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more specifically, the evaluation of the evidence without hearing both par-
ties to a lawsuit (see art. 24.2 Spanish Constitution and art. 6.3 ECHR); ii)
violation of the right to be presumed innocent (art. 24.2 Spanish Constitu-
tion). The Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber upholds partially the latter.
Reference shall be made to the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s rejec-
tion of the Trial Chamber’s alleged violation of the principle which estab-
lishes that both parties to a lawsuit should be heard107.
i) Though acknowledging the validity of the case-law presented to sup-
port the appellant’s cassation appeal, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Cham-
ber considers it inapplicable to the case at stake. The ECtHR and Supreme
Court’s case-law refer to cases in which it has been impossible for the ac-
cused or his lawyer to cross-examine the witness attributing him the crimi-
nal acts, either because the co-defendant does not ratify his statement dur-
ing the trial, either because he has decided to exercise his right to silence
during the oral proceedings (art. 24.2 Spanish Constitution). As the Supreme
Court’s Criminal Chamber points out, this is not exactly the situation in the
present case and thus, the alleged violation does not concur. The appellant
holds that the questions that would have been formulated would have evi-
denced the contradictions between the previous statements and the one is-
sued during the oral proceedings. However, the Court was able to carry out
a first-hand verification of the contradictions between the appellant lawyer’s
questions, that were submitted for the record during the trial, and the co-de-
fendant police and pre-trial statements. Moreover, the defense lawyer could
have requested the Tribunal to read out the different statements during the
trial, but decided not to. He did however, submit the questions addressed to
the co-defendant for the record. The co-defendant did not refuse to answer
the questions, nor did he exercise his right to silence. In fact, he answered
the questions posed by the Prosecutor and by his defense lawyer. It should
be further noted that, once the defense lawyer’s questions had been submit-
ted, the Prosecutor could have referred to some or all of them to the effects
of establishing the statement’s probative value. The co-defendant’s statement
on their membership to the terrorist organisation Resistencia Galega may
thus be taken into consideration by the judicial body and may be granted
probative effects insofar it is self-incriminating (the declarant is also con-
victed), and it is corroborated by the police agents’ statements during the
oral proceedings.
In short, the Constitutional Court has successfully addressed the ques-
tion of the probative value of the statement of the co-defendant who does
not answer the other co-defendant’s questions. In general, no value will be
granted to the co-defendant’s statements when there has been a total refusal
to answer the questions posed by the lawyer of the person against whom his
statement was directed. This absolute position was gradually changed to ad-
mit a certain value to these statements because we are not strictly before a
107 The reasons behind this appeal are in line with the Dissenting Opinion of the
National High Court Judgment No. 25/2014, of the 28th of May hereunder examined.
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problem of useability but of reliability of the evidence (statement). It would
be ironic to be able to use the statement of a deceased co-defendant that
may not be cross-examined during the oral proceedings and not be able to
use the statement of a co-defendant that decided to remain silent during
cross-examination. As the Criminal Chamber highlights, “asking without re-
ceiving an answer may amount to a particular type of cross-examination.
Cross-examination may be requested “when possible” in “whatever possible
way”, and thus is not legally possible when the co-defendant exercises his
fundamental right to silence. Besides, the submission of the questions that
would have been formulated to the co-defendant, eventually highlighting the
contradictions and using his silence to question his reliability may theoreti-
cally be considered a type of cross-examination. Some authors consider that
there is a small compliance with right of both parties to a lawsuit to be
heard when the questions are submitted in the oral proceedings but the co-
defendant decides to remain silent. This right may be even more effectively
guaranteed in these cases than in the case in which the co-defendant with-
draws his initial statement during the oral proceedings. The accused’s het-
ero-incriminating statement does not violate this right, the co-defendant’s
statements may still be partially used even if he refuses to answer the co-de-
fendant lawyer’s questions108. The right to cross-examine the witnesses
against the accused provided in art. 6.3 of the ECHR requires an appropri-
ate opportunity to counteract the statements issued against him cross-exam-
ining the author when he is issuing his statement or later. However, when
the co-defendant’s silence is not the result of “a reprehensible judicial ac-
tion”, the right of both parties to a lawsuit to be heard is not infringed be-
cause what the Spanish Constitution and the ECHR guarantee is not the ef-
fective right to be heard but the possibility of being heard, and there is no
right to obtain an answer from the declarant who is legitimately exercising a
fundamental right. The parties that may potentially be affected by the co-de-
fendant’s statement shall be summoned. However, through the inclusion of
the questions in the oral proceeding’s record, the cited right (to be heard) is
guaranteed, despite the co-defendant’s decision to remain silent or to answer
some of the questions given the possibility of cross-examining the co-defen-
dant, challenging the credibility of the statement’s incriminatory content.
ii) Violation of the right to be presumed innocent (art. 24.2 Spanish
Constitution). The Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber partially upholds this
argument to the extent that the judicial body develops, modifies and assesses
the evidence examination processes pursuant to logic, scientific and empiri-
cal rules, thus avoiding arbitrariness; however, from the evidence presented,
and particularly from the vague police intelligence reports, the Court con-
cludes that terrorist organisation membership has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The probative value granted to the aforementioned re-
ports may only prove collaboration with the terrorist organisation.
108 Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 219/2009, of the 21st of December; and Judge-
ment No. 142/2006, of the 8th of May; Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber Judgement No.
129/2014, of the 26th of December.
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National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement no 25/2014, of the
28th of May109 (Trial judgement of the previous case)
The National High Court’s Criminal Chamber convicts two men of var-
ious offences of terrorism organisation membership110 and an offence of
possession of explosives with terrorist aims. As highlighted by NUÑEZ FER-
NÁNDEZ111 during his presentation, an offence-specific mitigating circum-
stance (that is, the special mitigating circumstance resulting from having
quit violence as a means to achieve political goals, active and direct collabo-
ration and confession) is applied to one of them (Ezequiel) by analogy. Judge
Sáez Valcárcel’s Dissenting Opinion is particularly interesting from a proce-
dural perspective for the purpose of evaluating the co-defendant’s statement.
According to the dissenting judge, the Tribunal has failed to guarantee the
procedural right to be heard by examining what he considers to be invalid
evidence. In this sense, co-defendant’s hetero-incriminatory statement is not
only deemed to be invalid but insufficient to prove the accusation beyond
reasonable doubt; plus, the existence of a terrorist organisation and the ac-
cused’s membership have not been proved. For the purpose of this paper, the
Dissenting Opinion is right to note that the co-defendant statement’s evalua-
tion does not take into account that during the oral proceedings he only an-
swered the questions posed by the Public Prosecutor, refusing to answer the
defense’s questions (in fact his lawyer did not intervene). Consequently, the
co-defendant could not be heard in respect of this statement issued against
him, nor was his lawyer granted the possibility of cross-examining him. The
constitutional standard to grant probative power to this kind of evidence re-
quires guaranteeing the right to cross-examine the (prosecution and defense)
witnesses, the right to a fair trial and the accused’s right to an adequate de-
fense. For these reasons, in his view, the co-defendant’s hetero-incriminatory
statement should not have been used to assert that the facts underlying the
other co-defendant’s accusation had been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
furthermore, the co-defendant’s decision to ratify his statement does not, per
se, rehabilitate a statement in respect of which both parties to the lawsuit
have not been heard. When including this statement among the evidence,
the application of credibility and consistency filters would have evidenced its
poor reliability, thus rejecting its probative value because: i) it was the result
of an agreement with the Public Prosecutor who requested the application of
the rewarding measures foreseen in art. 579.4 Crim. Code with its corre-
sponding penalty reduction; and ii) the three different statements issued by
the co-defendant are inconsistent.
National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 73/2007, of the
19th of December112
109 Roj: SAN 2375/2014 - ECLI: ES:AN:2014:2375.
110 In this case, it concerned the group named Resistencia Galega.
111 The expert criticises this heterodox technique because although the Crim. Code
foresees the application by analogy of the general mitigating circumstances embodied in the
Crim. Code’s General Part (see Book I), analogy in respect of crime-specific mitigating cir-
cumstances, as this case seems to apply, is not foreseen in the Code.
112 Roj: SAN 6248/2007 - ECLI: ES:AN:2007:6248.
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National High Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgement No. 5/2018, of the
7th of March113.
In this decision, the Chamber convicts the two men accused (upon con-
formity) on the counts of terrorism organisation membership114 (DAESH),
lowering the penalty in one or two degrees as provided by art. 579-bis 4 (in
force) insofar, according to the Chamber, we are before “non-violent behav-
iours, whereby the facts have been acknowledged which objectively implies
that the seriousness of the acts is smaller in proportion to other activities”.
(Legal reasoning 2).
4. Consistency of the current rewarding legislation with art. 16 of Directive
541/2017 / UE
To begin with, it should be recalled that art. 16 of Directive
541/2017/UE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017115 on combating terrorism provides that:
“Member States may take the necessary measures to ensure that the
penalties referred to in Article 15 may be reduced if the offender:
a) renounces terrorist activity, and
b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information
which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to:
i) prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence116;
ii) identify or bring to justice other offenders;
iii) find evidence; or
iv) prevent further offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14”.
On the 20th of February 2020, various provisions from the Crim. Code
were amended by Organic Law117 so as to transpose, among others118, Di-
113 Roj: SAN 2468/2018 - ECLI: ES:AN:2018:2468.
114 One of them is also convicted for a felony against public health.
115 The title of the Directive is on combating terrorism and replacing Council Frame-
work Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJEU, 31st of
March 2017.
116 It should be noted that the wording of art. 16 of the Directive was slightly modified
on the 9th of April 2018 (more than a year after the enactment of the Directive and its publi-
cation in the OJEU). More specifically, the modification concerned one of the results that
should be achieved by the information provided by the offender to the judicial or adminis-
trative authorities (see the second (cumulative) requirement listed in art. 16.b of the Direc-
tive); the original wording asserting that the offender, in addition to renouncing to terrorist ac-
tivity, providing the administrative or judicial authorities with information which they would
not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them (i) to prevent the offence or mitigate its ef-
fects” is replaced by (i)prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence”.
117 Organic Law 1/2019, of the 20th of February, amending Organic Law 10/1995, de of
the 23rd of November, on the Criminal Code, transposing European Union Directives in the
scope of finance and terrorism and addressing international issues. BOE of the 20th of Feb-
ruary 2020.
118 In addition to the Directive under consideration (541/2017/UE of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 15 March 2017, on combating terrorism), see Directive
2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal
sanctions for market abuse; Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means
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rective 541/2017/UE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2017 on combating terrorism. The provision on terrorism-specific re-
warding measures, regulated in art. 579-bis 3 CP (see above) was not
amended insofar it follows the Directive’s pragmatic approach. Nevertheless,
as highlighted above, the greatest obstacle for the applicability of the Span-
ish law lies in requiring, cumulatively, the concurrence of the positive effects
both on prevention and criminal prosecution, while the European regulation
foresees the concurrence of compatible alternatives.
of criminal law; the improvement of the transposition of Directive 2014/62/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the protection of the euro and other
currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law. The legislator embraces this opportunity
to adapt the Spanish legal system to the provisions on trafficking in human organs and cor-
ruption enshrined in international instruments; see respectively, the European Council Con-
vention against Trafficking in Human Organs trafficking opened to signature precisely in
Spain, in Santiago de Compostela four years earlier (see 25th of March, 2015), as well as the
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States derogate from them? – 1.1.1.1. Are stricter requirements allowed? – 1.1.1.2. Are
broader requirements allowed? – 1.2. Are EU Member States only allowed to mitigate
criminal sanctions? – 1.2.1. Is non-punishment as a reward for cooperation with police
and judicial authorities in line with Article 16? – 1.2.2. What about the closure of the
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mandatory nature of a reward mechanism for collaborators of justice. – 2. On the le-
gal basis of a European statute for collaborators of justice. – 3. On the meaning of the
construction of a European statute for collaborators of justice.
I. Normative context
1. Historical background
Focused on the economic development of Europe, the founding treaties
“did not define any objectives in criminal matters and did not give the Eu-
ropean Communities any competence in this area”1. Because criminal law is
“closely linked to the exercise of law enforcement and sovereignty, it is terri-
torial by nature”2 and has for a long time been ignored in the normative de-
velopments of the European Communities3. In 1992, the Justice and Home
Affairs pillar – the so-called third pillar – was established by the Maastricht
Treaty, inaugurating the European Union’s foray into criminal law. Although
dominated by intergovernmentality, this beginnings of criminal competence
were extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, until it was enshrined in the
1 E. RUBI-CAVAGNA, L’essentiel du droit pénal de l’Union européenne, Lextenso, coll. Les
carrés, 2014, p.15.
2 D. FLORE, Droit pénal européen: Les enjeux d’une justice pénale européenne, 2e éd.,
Larcier, 2014, p. 59.
3 Even if the Communities did not have real competences in this area, European legis-
lation had “positive” and “negative” effects on national legislation.
Treaty of Lisbon. « This Treaty conferred EU a real normative competence in
criminal matters ». By paving the way for the Union’s institutions to have
legislative power in criminal matters, the Treaty “presents the approximation
of the criminal law provisions of the Member States as a fundamental ele-
ment of European construction and considerably increases the scope of the
European Union’s competence to harmonize criminal law provisions”4.
It is within this legal framework that the directive of 15 March 2017 on
combating terrorism was adopted.
2. Indirect EU criminal competency
Although the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EU competence to legislate in
criminal matters, “the European legislator does not have a general compe-
tence to protect Europe’s fundamental social values, but only a criminal
competence to establish an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)
and to safeguard the effectiveness of its policies”5.
On the one hand, the European Union only has special competence to
legislate in areas restrictively listed in the TFEU. On the other hand, the EU’s
competence in criminal matters is an “indirect”6 competence. It is therefore
noted that “the criminal law of the European Union is not as complete as na-
tional criminal law may be”7. More specifically, while the European Union
has a power of incrimination (ius incriminandi) – including the power to lay
down minimum thresholds for maximum penalties – it does not have a re-
pressive body and therefore, strictly speaking, no power of punishment (ius
puniendi). This means that the EU’s competence in criminal matters only al-
lows it “to ask States to issue standards of criminal protection”8 through the
transposition process.
This particularity has certain consequences, in particular on the scope
of the right not to punish Member States (negative law). Indeed, if the Union
asks Member States to sanction in their internal order this or that behaviour,
then Member States are obliged to do so via the transposition process. If
they had previously opted not to penalize it, then they have no choice but to
sanction this behaviour in order to comply with European legislation. Non-
criminalization or ‘decriminalization’ would immediately violate the EU’s
obligation of criminal protection9. Member States would therefore “no
4 G. GIUDICELLI-DELAGE, C. LAZERGES, “Avant-propos”, in Le droit pénal de l’Union eu-
ropéenne au lendemain du traité de Lisbonne, Société de législation comparée, 2012, p. 15.
5 P. BEAUVAIS, “Chronique Droit pénal de l’Union européenne - Harmonisation des in-
fractions et des peines en matière de délinquance sexuelle sur mineurs”, RTD Eur., 2012, p.
877.
6 C. SOTIS, “«Criminaliser sans punir», Réflexions sur le pouvoir d’incrimination (di-
recte et indirecte) de l’Union européenne prévu par le traité de Lisbonne”, RSC, 2010, p. 773.
7 P. BEAUVAIS, “Chronique Droit pénal de l’Union européenne - Harmonisation des in-
fractions et des peines en matière de délinquance sexuelle sur mineurs”, RTD Eur., 2012, p.
877.
8 C. SOTIS, “«Criminaliser sans punir», Réflexions sur le pouvoir d’incrimination (di-
recte et indirecte) de l’Union européenne prévu par le traité de Lisbonne”, RSC, 2010, p. 773.
9 C. SOTIS, “«Criminaliser sans punir», Réflexions sur le pouvoir d’incrimination (di-
recte et indirecte) de l’Union européenne prévu par le traité de Lisbonne”, RSC, 2010, p. 773.
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longer exercise the discretion to assess the need to criminalize once the
choice of criminal response has been made at EU level”10.
However, the criminal competence of the European Union does not di-
rectly influence the right to punish (positive law). Indeed, “the norm thus
adopted does not therefore impose any decriminalization on the Member
States”11. If a Member State has chosen to criminalize and punish a conduct,
EU has no power to oblige the Member State to stop punishing it. This is the
issue at stake in the reflection on the development of a common statute for col-
laborators of justice.
Consequently, “the Union can only lay down minimum rules on the de-
finition of offences12 and cannot, for example, decriminalize certain con-
duct13”14.
3. Union criminal law, a minimum right
With the Treaty of Lisbon, “the choice that has been made in substan-
tive criminal law […] is that of approximation of legislation through the en-
actment of ‘minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences
and sanctions’ in specific areas”15.
The directive of 15 March 2017 is part of this choice. It is based on Ar-
ticle 83.1 TFEU, which provides that “the European Parliament and the
Council may […] establish minimum rules concerning the definition of crim-
inal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a
cross-border dimension”16.
The criminal law of the Union can therefore be analyzed as a ‘mini-
mum law’ since it is based on the mechanism of harmonization (3.1.) which
only allows the EU to lay down minimum rules (3.2.).
3.1. Harmonization
Harmonization is a process of approximation of national criminal law
provisions which “implies the provision of international normative stan-
dards to which national legislators are obliged to adapt, while retaining a
margin of appreciation”17. The criminal law of the European Union is a law
10 E. RUBI-CAVAGNA, «Réflexions sur l’harmonisation des incriminations et des sanctions
pénales prévues par le traité de Lisbonne», RSC, 2009, p. 501.
11 E. BARBE, “L’influence du droit de l’Union européenne sur le droit pénal français: de
l’ombre à la lumière”, AJ Pénal, 2011, p. 438.
12 See Art. 31, e) ex-TEU and Art. 83 TFEU.
13 In spite of the bold theses defended by some authors, such as H.G. NILSOON, “How to
combine minimum rules with maximum legal certainty”, Europättslig tidskrift, 2011, pp. 67
et seq. See also A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012, p. 162.
14 C. BRIERE, A. WEYEMBERGH, “L’Union européenne et la traite des êtres humains”, in D.
BERNARD, Y. CARTUYVELS, et al., Fondements et objectifs des incriminations et des peines, Limal,
Anthemis, 2013, p. 82.
15 E. RUBI-CAVAGNA, «Réflexions sur l’harmonisation des incriminations et des sanctions
pénales prévues par le traité de Lisbonne», RSC, 2009, p. 501.
16 Article 83.1, § 1, TFEU.
17 S. MANACORDA, J. TRICOT, «Synthèse - La coopération en matière pénale», Ju-
risClasseur Droit international, Lexis Nexis, 11 juillet 2016, pt. 8.
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derived from harmonization standards. This method “consists of obliging
Member States to criminalize at least certain types of behaviour. However,
Member States remain free to criminalize more widely18. The supranational
norm thus becomes the reference, but does not oblige Member States to
adopt a strictly identical domestic norm. “The process leads to a conver-
gence of national laws while taking into account national specificities19.
Harmonization is different from unification. “Whereas harmonization
only requires compatibility and hence proximity of the national legal orders
involved, unification presupposes a relationship of conformity and identity,
giving rise to uniform regulation in the legal area concerned. It follows that
“unification implies, for its part, the substitution of a new common rule for
pre-existing national rules and thus corresponds to the hypothesis of trans-
fer of competence. “20”21.
The aim of harmonization is to preserve national particularities while
providing a common basis for cooperation. Thus, the enactment of mini-
mum rules makes it possible to achieve this goal. They impose common
minimum standards that strengthen mutual trust between the different
Member States and thus promote the mutual recognition of judicial deci-
sions, the “cornerstone”22 of the AFSJ.
The approximation of legislation by the EU is based on minimum rules.
Therefore, one must ask what the term “minimum rules” means and implies
in the context of the development of a favorable status for the offender – and
whether Article 16 of the Directive of 15 March 2017 on the fight against ter-
rorism responds to this logic of minimum rules. Indeed, while the logic of
the minimum rules is fairly easy to understand for sentences and incrimina-
tions, one must ask how this logic should be understood for provisions that
introduce reward measures for collaborators of justice. The thinking differs
significantly from the classic repressive logic of drawing up incriminations
and penalties: the aim here is not to define the common boundaries of what
is illegal, but to identify ways of dealing with a phenomenon that has been
identified as illegal23.
3.2. Minimum rules
This term is generally found in Article 83.124 TFEU and, more specifi-
cally, in Article 1 of the Directive of 15 March 2017 on the subject-matter of
18 E. BARBE, “L’influence du droit de l’Union européenne sur le droit pénal français: de
l’ombre à la lumière”, AJ Pénal, 2011, p. 438.
19 E. RUBI-CAVAGNA, «Réflexions sur l’harmonisation des incriminations et des sanctions
pénales prévues par le traité de Lisbonne», RSC, 2009, p. 501.
20 A. WEYEMBERGH, “Fasc. 2700: Coopération judiciaire et rapprochement des législa-
tions en matière pénale au sein de l’UE”, JurisClasseur Europe Traité, Lexis Nexis, 31 octobre
2017, pt. 72.
21 S. MANACORDA, J. TRICOT, «Synthèse - La coopération en matière pénale», Ju-
risClasseur Droit international, Lexis Nexis, 11 juillet 2016, pt. 10.
22 EU, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, point 33.
23 Cf. below, reflections on the basis of a European statute for collaborators with the
judiciary.
24 Art. 83.1 TFEU, “The European Parliament and the Council may, […], establish min-
imum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of par-
ticularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension”.
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this one. This text states: “This Directive lays down minimum rules concern-
ing the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist
offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terror-
ist activities, as well as measures of protection of, and support and assis-
tance to, victims of terrorism”25.
The European Union therefore has the competence to establish incrim-
inations and minimum sentences. The provisions contained in the directives
“are thresholds below which national legislators cannot go, but beyond
which they are free to go”26. In other words, the Member States are always
free to exceed these thresholds when transposing the directive into their do-
mestic law.
This logic is easy to grasp for penalties. Before the Treaty of Amster-
dam, the Union required Member States to impose effective, dissuasive and
proportionate penalties. But since the entry into force of the Treaty, frame-
work decisions and then directives have set “minimum of maximum thresh-
olds27. For example, the directive of 15 March 2017 on the combating ter-
rorism provides that “Member States shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that offences listed in Article 4 are punishable by custodial sentences,
with a maximum sentence of not less than 15 years for the offence referred
to in point (a) of Article 4, and for the offences listed in point (b) of Article
4 a maximum sentence of not less than 8 years”28. Thus, Member States are
obliged to provide for a custodial sentence of at least 15 years as a penalty
for directing a terrorist group, but may well provide for a longer sentence.
So Member States are free to set a more severe penalty than the one pro-
vided for by a directive to punish a conduct, and thus go beyond the mini-
mum rules set by the European text.
However, this logic of minimum criminal law is less understandable
with regard to the other provisions contained in the Directive. And this is the
issue that concerns us here. On the one hand, is the dismissal of the case
or/and the non-punishment of a collaborator of justice in conformity with
Article 16 of the Directive when the latter only refers to a reduction of the
sentence? On the other hand, can Member States provide for other (either
additional or more precise) requirements than those laid down in the Direc-
tive in order to grant the person the status of repentant?
Strictly speaking, according to Article 83.1 TFEU, the establishment of
minimum rules concerns only sanctions and incriminations. But, Article 16
of the Directive of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism does not lay down
either a sanction or an incrimination.
However, this limitation “has not prevented the European legislator […]
from considering these concepts very broadly, as encompassing a range of is-
25 Art. 1, Directive (EU) 2017/541, 15 March 2017, on combating terrorism.
26 D. FLORE, Droit pénal européen: Les enjeux d’une justice pénale européenne, 2e éd.,
Larcier, 2014, p. 268. In French: «des minima de seuils minimaux».
27 D. FLORE, Droit pénal européen: Les enjeux d’une justice pénale européenne, 2e éd.,
Larcier, 2014, p. 268.
28 Art. 15. 3, Directive (EU) 2017/541, 15 March 2017, on combating terrorism.
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sues of general criminal law”29. As was already the case before the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, European legislation in criminal matters has
gone beyond the ‘mere’ enactment of incriminations and sanctions. The di-
rectives lay down rules on the liability of legal persons, participation in the
offence, aid and assistance to victims, etc., taking a truly holistic approach
to the criminal phenomenon dealt with. This limitation of ‘minimum rules’
then seems to apply to all the provisions of the Directives and in our case, in
particular, to Article 16 of the Directive.
II. Questionnaire
1.1. Are the requirements of Article 16 exhaustive?
In this context, the requirements of Article 16 would not be exhaustive.
In line with the logic of the minimum rules, Member States may (the clause
in Article 16 is optional) provide in their internal order at least for compli-
ance with the requirements contained in Article 16 (i.e. a reduction of sen-
tence for the collaborator of justice meeting the conditions laid down), but
they may go “beyond” this.
The question is what can be understood by “beyond”. Can Member
States be stricter in the conditions of application of the article? In other
words, can they add additional conditions without which the repentant per-
son would not be able to benefit from sentence reduction measures? Con-
versely, to what extent can a Member State take more extensive, broader
measures and going beyond the retributive measures described in the Direc-
tive? Can a Member State provide for a system of exemption from punish-
ment in addition to sentence reduction without being in non-conformity
with European Union law?
1.1.1. If the Article 16 requirements are not exhaustive, to what extent can EU
Member States derogate from them?
1.1.1.1. Are stricter requirements allowed?
As a preliminary point, the term “stricter” must be agreed upon, as it is
open to two conflicting interpretations. A stricter requirement may be a re-
quirement that leads to more repression (heavier penalty, broader criminal-
ization). Conversely, a stricter requirement may be a more precise require-
ment – and then it limits the scope of repression.
Some directives give Member States the possibility to adopt or main-
tain stricter measures30. This possibility can work with the elaboration of a
29 D. FLORE, Droit pénal européen: Les enjeux d’une justice pénale européenne, 2e éd.,
Larcier, 2014, p. 123.
30 Sometimes the possibility of being more precise is formally provided for and some-
times it is not. E.g. Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal
law, 23 October 2018 which provides, (13): “Member States are free to adopt or maintain
more stringent criminal law rules in this area”.
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minimum threshold of sanctions or with the definition of a core of offences
but seems difficult to be compatible with the spirit of Article 16.
First of all, Member States may provide for or maintain higher levels of
sanctions than those provided for in the Directive. In this case, the penalties
would be heavier and the response more repressive (and therefore stricter).
Secondly, as far as incriminations are concerned, the logic of harmo-
nization and the room for manoeuvre in the transposition exercise should
enable States to adopt stricter, more precise definitions. However, since the
provisions contained in the directives are already very precise, a State that
would further specify the scope of an incrimination would quickly find itself
in contradiction with European legislation. Thus, while in theory the Mem-
ber States have a margin of discretion in transposing directives, in reality
this margin of appreciation is rather small, since it would have the effect of
reducing the scope of the punishment.
Conversely, the minimum rule offers States the possibility of introduc-
ing greater repression than the minimum required by the directive. More-
over, “many Member States take the opportunity of the transposition of Eu-
ropean instruments to be stricter and more repressive than the texts of the
European Union and to go beyond the incriminations required by them”31.
Thus, for example, the French transposition of the terrorist organization re-
quires not three but at least two participants (Article 421-2-1 of the French
Penal Code), which is much more repressive than European and interna-
tional law. Finally, ‘minimum harmonization may lead to increased crimi-
nalization by setting a minimum level of penalties ‘without ever defining
where these States must stop and what cannot be punished32,33.
With regard to Article 16, the possibility of providing for or maintain-
ing stricter requirements would amount to adding cumulative conditions or
tightening the conditions – making them more precise – for benefiting from
the status of collaborator of justice. In that case, Member States would re-
duce the possibility of being granted the status of collaborator of justice and
would risk running counter to the logic of the minimum rules. For example,
Spain provides in Article 579-bis 3 of its Penal Code the conditions to bene-
fit from a reduction of sentence in case of collaboration with the judiciary in
cases of terrorism. It should be noted that the Spanish Criminal Code in-
cludes all the conditions provided for in Article 16 of the Directive. Thus, in
order to benefit from a reduction in sentence, the collaborator with the ju-
dicial authorities must have voluntarily abandoned his criminal activity,
must demonstrate active collaboration with the judicial authorities for pur-
31 C. BRIERE, A. WEYEMBERGH, “L’Union européenne et la traite des êtres humains”, in D.
BERNARD, Y. CARTUYVELS, et al., Fondements et objectifs des incriminations et des peines, Limal,
Anthemis, 2013, p. 82.
32 A. WEYEMBERGH, «L’espace pénal européen: ‘épée’ des droits fondamentaux dans
l’Union européenne», in Y. CARTUYVELS, H. DUMONT, F. OST, M. VAN DE KERCHOVE et S. VAN
DROOGHENBROECK (dir.), Les droits de l’homme, bouclier ou épée du droit pénal?, Bruxelles, Pub-
lication des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 2007, pp. 175-209.
33 P. SIMON, La compétence d’incrimination de l’Union européenne. Recherche sur le pou-
voir pénal européen, Bruxelles, Bruylant, coll. des thèses en droit de l’Union, 2019, p. 111.
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poses similar to those provided for in the Directive, but in addition, a con-
fession from the collaborator is required. As this condition is not provided
for in the Directive, it can be said that Spain goes “beyond” what is provided
for in the European text. In this context, Spanish legislation, by adding a
condition to the granting of the status, reduces the number of people who
can benefit from it, even though all the conditions laid down in the Euro-
pean text are included.
It may therefore have to be concluded that States, once engaged in leg-
islation to reward collaborators of justice, should at the very least allow for
reductions in sentences under the conditions set out in Article 16.
1.1.1.2. Are broader requirements allowed?
The answer to this question implies continuing with questions 1.2.
1.2. Are EU Member States only allowed to mitigate criminal sanctions?
1.2.1. Is non-punishment as a reward for cooperation with police and judicial
authorities in line with Article 16?
1.2.2. What about the closure of the case (before the suspect is charged/ac-
cused)?
While only the reduction of sentence was envisaged by the Directive,
the hypothesis of no prosecution (at the pre-sentence stage) or exemption
from sentence is not formally excluded and does not seem to have been en-
visaged by the writers. Are they to be considered excluded? Or, on the con-
trary, does silence not prohibit them?
It can be argued that there is nothing to prevent the Member State
from providing for more situations and mechanisms favoring the collabora-
tor of justice, as long as the conditions envisaged by the Directive are at
least provided for in national legislation. Under these conditions, any pre-
sentence benefit (e.g. absence of prosecution), granted at the sentencing
stage (exemption and reduction of sentence) or at the post-sentencing stage
(reduction of sentence, promise of assignment to penal institutions), would
be in conformity with the Directive provided that it is additional to the hy-
pothesis provided for in Article 16 (reduction of sentence for those who re-
nounce terrorist activities and collaborate with institutions). There would
therefore appear to be nothing to prevent going “beyond” the reduction of
sentence, for example by providing for consequences other than a reduction
of sentence, or a wider scope of application to the mechanism. This inter-
pretation would make it possible to validate the existing national mecha-
nisms.
Thus, Belgium provides for broader cases than those envisaged by the
Directive, where the collaborator of justice can benefit from an extenuating
circumstance: “Belgian law allows collaboration in one case which is not
listed by Article 16 of the Directive: a promise on prosecution can be made in
the case that the collaborator is involved in terrorist activities and the third
party accused by the collaborator is involved in activities not linked to ter-
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rorism”34. This corresponds, for example, to the case where an employee has
received terrorist training and the person reported has committed a murder
that is not linked to terrorist activities. This possibility is therefore far re-
moved from the objective of the Directive, which is to combat terrorism, but
does not seem to undermine the logic of the minimum rule. In France, the
principle of discretionary prosecution (Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) allows the Public Prosecutor to decide whether or not to initiate pub-
lic action when he is aware of an offence. This principle paves the way for an
invisible practice of not prosecuting collaborators of justice. This way of do-
ing is not without question, because, on the one hand, it is not part of an as-
sumed criminal policy and, on the other hand, it deprives the system of any
publicity and therefore of any capacity to encourage collaboration35.
In addition, French law also provides for an exemption from punish-
ment for collaborators who prevented the offence from being committed.
Here too, it is tempting to think that this alternative is in line with Article 16
in so far as it is in addition to the hypothesis of a reduced sentence. How-
ever, the situation could hinder the strengthening of mutual trust between
Member States (hypothesis of one State granting a total exemption from
sentence while the others only grant reductions).
At the end of the trial, Belgium or Italy36 go beyond the directive in that
their legislation provides for promises as to the execution of the sentence
and the place of detention, whereas the directive only refers to the possibil-
ity of a reduction in the quantum of the sentence.
What about States such as France and Luxembourg which do not re-
quire one of the conditions of Article 16? For example, neither French nor
Luxembourg legislation requires the offender to renounce his terrorist activ-
ities in order to be granted a reduction in his sentence37. By not taking up
the first condition of Article 16, these legislations are broader than the Di-
rective since more individuals could theoretically benefit from the status38.
If it seems difficult to question legal and cultural choices to offer wider
benefits to the collaborator of justice, a fortiori when these choices have
been made for a long time by some Member States, the logic of the mini-
mum rule could lead to interpreting Article 16 as, on the one hand, the min-
imum obligation (if the choice to adhere to the optional clause of Art. 16 is
made) to provide for a possibility of a reduction in sentence meeting the
conditions of Article 16 (with the obligation to establish that violence has
been renounced), on the other hand, the possibility of providing for other
types of rewards.
34 Belgian First Report, p. 47, point 4.1.
35 Thus, the recent trial of the January 2015 attacks in France brought to light the hy-
pothesis of individuals protected by the judicial institution, who were not prosecuted in this
case: H. Seckel, “Au procès des attentats de janvier 2015; l’indic, les armes et le chaînon man-
quant”, Le Monde, 2 October 2020. The indicator and the collaborator of justice are two dis-
tinct figures, but their boundaries are not always well defined, especially in the pre-trial
phase where the collaborator of justice has no legal existence.
36 Belgian First Report, p. 48, point 4.2; Italian First Report, point 2.3.
37 In France, however, this abandonment of violence is a requirement for access to the
repentant protection programme.
38 Luxembourg First Report, points 1.2.2. and 5.
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It can be seen here that the logic of the “minimum rule” is difficult to
interpret when it comes to creating not a repressive regime but a preferen-
tial regime.
Conclusion on point 1
Optional transposition, implementation and application of Article 16 at
national level: do EU Member States have absolute or relative discretion?
The special feature of Article 16 is that it is optional39. Member States
are not obliged to provide for it, but it would appear that when they choose
to do so, they must comply at least with the requirements of the article.
Their discretion would then be absolute in so far as Member States have the
choice whether or not to transpose this article but they would have only rel-
ative discretion in the application of the conditions once the choice is made
to transpose it. Indeed, if the Member State did not comply with the mini-
mum conditions, this would run counter to the principle of primacy40 and
would not be in conformity with European legislation. The Member State
would then risk an action for failure to fulfil obligations before the CJEU.
This leads to the conclusion that, if the reduction of sentence under the
conditions of Article 16 is introduced, national legislation may, in addition,
provide for other mechanisms to reward collaborators of justice at the pre-
sentencing stage (decision on prosecution), at the sentencing stage (exemp-
tion from sentence / modalities of execution of sentences) and at the post-
sentencing stage (idem).
III. Perspectives
1. On the optional or mandatory nature of a reward mechanism for collabo-
rators of justice
On the one hand, the logic of harmonization argues for a compulsory
rather than an optional mechanism. Indeed, the optional nature of the
clause maintains disparities and could be analyzed as an obstacle to trust
and a danger for cooperation mechanisms based on mutual recognition.
On the other hand, the research shows that there is already a broad
consensus on the admission of the status of collaborator of justice «criminal
laws». Disparities do not relate to the principle but to the modalities. This is
the whole issue of harmonization, which must aim at approximating legisla-
tion in order to facilitate mutual trust and judicial cooperation.
In these circumstances, an amendment to the Directive could remove
the optional nature of Article 16.
39 Art. 16, Directive (EU) 2017/541, 15 March 2017, on combating terrorism, “Member
States may take”.
40 ECJ, Costa v. ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case C-6/64.
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2. On the legal basis of a European statute for collaborators of justice
Once the principle of a reward system for collaborator of justice has
been accepted, the question arises as to its legal basis. What is the most ap-
propriate legal basis for a European statute for collaborators of justice? Ar-
ticle 16 of the Directive on the fight against terrorism is indeed part of a sub-
stantive law directive based on Article 83.1 TFEU and within the defined
framework of the fight against a single crime: terrorism.
– A first possibility is to organize a genuine European statute for col-
laborators of justice within the strict framework of the fight against terror-
ism, and therefore to propose an amendment to Article 16 of the Directive.
In this perspective, the amendment work should decide on the compulsory
or optional nature of the clause as well as on its scope of application (which
procedural stages? what consequences? what modalities?).
– A second possibility would be to propose a procedural directive based
on Article 82 TFEU which would organize an autonomous status of collabo-
rator of justice.
The stakes of this choice are not neutral in terms of criminal policy.
A general directive on the status of collaborator of justice would make
it possible to detach this status from the sole question of the prevention of
terrorism and to open it up to the fight against either all forms of crime or
serious crimes with a cross-border dimension. However, in many States, the
status of collaborator of justice has a scope of application that goes far be-
yond the fight against terrorism – this status has moreover largely emerged
in the fight against organised crime. In France, the reward of collaborators
of justice is possible in terrorism matters but is not used there to be reserved
for the fight against organised crime. The Focus Group organised with com-
petent practitioners has indeed revealed a real reluctance of magistrates to
use this status with regard to jihadist terrorists presented as systematically
using taqîya (a concealment technique) and untrustworthy in a commitment
to renounce terrorist violence.
3. On the meaning of the construction of a European statute for collabora-
tors of justice
The question being asked is criminological and political. In Italy, Red
Brigades terrorism has been largely defeated thanks to the reintegration of
repentant and dissociated people41. On the contrary, the fight against the ji-
hadist terrorism that Europe is currently facing, develop mechanisms that
reflect the dehumanization of the terrorist and assume a form of separatism
of the national community. That could explain the reluctance to exploit the
mechanism of the collaborator of justice in the field of the prevention of ter-
rorism (do we really want to reintegrate the jihadist?)42.
41 I. SOMMIER, «Repentir et dissociation: la fin des “années de plomb” en Italie?», Cul-
tures et Conflits n° 40 (4/200), p. 43 et s.
42 J. ALIX, «Radicalisation et droit pénal», Rev. Sc. crim., 2020 p. 769.
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The challenge of the European incentive to develop a European statute
for collaborators of justice is perhaps to get around this political resistance,
as all systems that make use of collaboration of justice seem convinced of its
effectiveness in the field of the fight against organised crime.
What should be the ratio legis of such a mechanism?
Are these extenuating circumstances? Or is it a mode of proof? Adopt-
ing a general directive on criminal procedure makes it possible to place col-
laboration with the judiciary in what it appears to be fundamentally: a legal
tool for gathering evidence, before being an individual means of benefiting
from criminal rewards. A general directive about a European model of re-
warding measures would focus on the probative dimension of the rewarding
measures rather than the sentencing dimension.
Is it a repressive or preventive tool? One of the interests of FIGHTER is
to take a clear criminal policy stance: it is no longer possible to reduce the
contrivance of criminal law in the fight against terrorism to a purely repres-
sive contribution. Criminal law must be conceived and mobilized, beyond its
repressive dimension, as a tool for prevention and, beyond that, for reinte-
gration into society: this is the meaning of criminal responsibility and pun-
ishment.
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1. Introduction
With the adoption of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) of 15 March
20171, based on Art. 83 para. 1 TFEU, the EU legislator has taken a further
1 O.J. 2017 L 88/6.
step in the harmonisation of national criminal law provisions in the field of
terrorism. The Directive replaces Framework Decision 2002/475/JI (Terror-
ism) of 13 June 20022 (amended by the Framework Decision 2008/919/JI
(Terrorism) of 28 November 2008)3 and thus responds to newly emerging
forms of terrorist threat – particularly as a result of the increased appear-
ance of the Islamic State (“IS”) as from 20144.
The Directive and previous Framework Decisions reflect the EU’s ap-
proach to the harmonisation of national criminal law: Harmonisation fo-
cusses primarily on repressive elements and is only permitted in certain ar-
eas of (cross-border) crime5. The legal bases enabling the harmonisation of
material criminal law in these certain areas of crime only refer to the possi-
ble creation of criminal offences and the definition of minimum rules on
penalties6. As a result, one may speak of the concept of “punitivity of crimi-
nal law in Europe”7.
Nevertheless, Art. 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) – as well as
Art. 6 of the previous Framework Decision – contain a provision which al-
lows (but does not obligate) the Member States to adopt provisions which
provide for a reduction of penalty if the offender cooperates with the crimi-
nal prosecution authorities and thus contributes to solving crimes or pre-
venting the commission of further offences (“rewarding measures”). The EU
legislator has apparently identified the cooperation of offenders in the field
of terrorism as a mechanism for infiltrating the usually isolated and con-
spiratorially acting terrorist structures and generating successes in investi-
gations8. As a consequence, the punitive character of European criminal law
has been softened in this respect.
Art. 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) forms the approach of
the project “FIGHTER: Fight against international terrorism. Discovering Eu-
ropean Models of Rewarding Measures to Prevent Terrorism” and raises a
number of questions which the Munich Unit will address in the context of
this paper.
Firstly, due to its voluntary nature, it is evident that Art. 16 of Directive
(EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) does not obligate the Member States to provide
for rewarding measures for terrorist offenders9. Nevertheless, many Member
States already provide for such provisions. Therefore, it shall be examined
how Art. 16 of the Directive should be interpreted with regard to a possible
2 O.J. 2002 L 164/3.
3 O.J. 2008 L 330/21.
4 Zywietz, Propaganda des „Islamischen Staats“, p. 1.
5 Satzger, International and European Criminal Law, § 7 para. 42; Satzger, ZIS 4 (2009),
691, 692.
6 Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009: Art. 31 para. 1
point (e), 34 para. 2 point (b) TEU; since then: 83 TFEU.
7 Satzger, International and European Criminal Law, § 7 para. 42; Satzger, ZIS 4 (2009),
691, 692; Schünemann ZIS 2 (2007), 528, 529 et seq.
8 For the first time explicitly formulated with regard to organised crime, cf. Council
Resolution of 20 December 1996 “on individuals who cooperate with the judicial process in the
fight against international organized crime”, O.J.C 10/1.
9 Zimmermann, in: Satzger (ed.), Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the Euro-
pean Union, 577 (602).
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binding effect on rewarding measures applicable under national law in the
field of terrorism, in terms of their conditions and their legal consequences,
if Member States provide or wish to provide for such provisions.
In addition, the question shall be investigated as to which problems do
or may arise as a result of the non-mandatory and thus non-harmonised
adoption of rewarding measures under national criminal law of the Member
States in the fight against terrorism and under which conditions a binding
harmonisation of rewarding measures appears feasible and reasonable. In
addition to rewarding measures, the analysis shall, as a systematic approach,
also concern provisions that provide for a positive effect on the penalty (e.g.
mitigation) of a criminal offender (“beneficial provisions”) in general.
In order to achieve the research goals, first of all, a general assessment
regarding the binding effect of beneficial provisions on national criminal law
shall be made, taking into account the EU legislator’s general policy with re-
gard to the harmonisation of sanctions (2. General assessment on binding
effect of beneficial provisions taking into account the general policy of har-
monising sanctions).
The results of the analysis will be applied to the concrete interpretation
of Art. 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) de lege lata, with regard to
its binding effect on rewarding measures under national law (3. Transposi-
tion to concrete analysis of Art. 16).
Furthermore, the results shall be used to consider the possibilities of a
future mandatory harmonisation of rewarding measures in the field of ter-
rorism as well as beneficial provisions in general and to identify the possible
need for additional legal steps at the European Union level. (4. Future op-
tions to introduce binding rewarding legislation at a European level).
2. General assessment on binding effect of beneficial provisions taking into
account the general policy of harmonising sanctions
2.1. Legal basis for harmonising substantial national criminal law
Ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997 came into force
on 1 Mai 199910, the EU legislator has had the competence, on the basis of
Art. 31 para. 1 point (e), 34 para. 2 point (b) TEU, to adopt minimum rules
for the approximation of the national criminal law of the Member States in
certain areas of crime by means of Framework Decisions11. This competence
was consolidated when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on December 1,
200912. Since then, the EU legislator has basically had two legal instruments
at its disposal which give it the competence to harmonise the national crim-
inal law of the Member States by issuing Directives.
10 O.J. 1997 C 340/1.
11 Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, § 11 pt. 1.
12 Further details can, for example, be found in: Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, § 11
pt. 2; For the question to be addressed in the context of this Paper, the statements made on
Directives can be transferred to Framework Decisions correspondingly; a differentiated dis-
play is therefore widely abstained from.
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While Art. 82 TFEU refers – with respect to the competence of legal har-
monisation – mainly to the law of criminal procedure13, Art. 83 TFEU regu-
lates the competence to harmonise substantive criminal law14. The legislator
has so far – including Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) – based his enacted
beneficial provisions and minimum rules on sanctions on Art. 83 TFEU15.
According to Art. 83 para. 1 TFEU, the legislator may “establish mini-
mum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the
areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting
from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat
them on a common basis” by means of Directives. This reflects the punitive
nature of the harmonisation of criminal law by the European legislator as
mentioned above16. The legislator is only entitled to determine the minimum
requirements for criminal offences on the one hand and the minimum level
of sanctions for the respective offences on the other17. In addition, the word-
ing of Art. 83 para. 1 phrase 1 TFEU does not explicitly provide for the har-
monisation of criminal law to the effect that certain types of conduct are de-
criminalised by the EU legislator, and neither for the introduction of benefi-
cial provisions having a positive effect (i.e. which favour the offender in view
of his criminal liability or the level of the penalty) on the offender of a crim-
inal offence18.
Moreover, the competence for harmonisation does not extend to the
area of the entire criminal law of the Member States but is limited to those
fields of crime listed in Art. 83 para. 1 phrase 2 and para. 2 TFEU, including
particularly the field of terrorist crime.
As a result, it can be stated that the harmonisation of the criminal law
of the Member States by the EU legislator is subject to narrow limits, both
in terms of content (= only minimum requirements) and scope (only special
fields of crime)19.
2.2. Systematic approach to beneficial provisions in EU legislation
Despite the narrow limits within which the EU legislator has the com-
petence to harmonise national law based on Art. 83 TFEU (and preceding
Framework Decisions) and in addition to the definition of minimum re-
13 Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 1.
14 Streinz/Satzger, EUV/AEUV, Art. 83 pt. 1; Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/
Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 1.
15 An overview can be found in: Zimmermann, in: Satzger (ed.), Harmonisation of
Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, 577 (605 et seqq.); Here, Art. 7 para. 4 of Direc-
tive (EU) 2016/343 “on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence
and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings”, O.J. 2016 L 65/1, is listed be-
ing actually based on Art. 82 para. 2 point (b) TFEU. However, Art. 7 para. 4 of Directive
(EU) 2016/343 contains only general statements and may therefore not be called a concrete
beneficial provision in the context of this Paper.
16 Satzger, ZIS 4 (2009), 691, 692; Schünemann ZIS 2 (2007), 528, 529 et seq.
17 Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, § 11 pt. 4 et seqq.
18 Satzger, International and European Criminal Law, § 7 pt. 42; Schünemann ZIS 2
(2007), 528, 529 et seq.
19 Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 83 pt. 1 et seqq.
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quirements for criminal offences and minimum rules for sanctions, in some
Directives there can also be found provisions which allow Member States to
provide for a reduction of the offender’s sentence, so-called beneficial provi-
sions20. With a view to the policy the EU legislator follows when introducing
beneficial provisions, the system applied here does not seem very consis-
tent21: The beneficial provisions inserted in the Directives based on Art. 83
TFEU often name different legal situations or place different requirements
on the offender for the respective applicability of beneficial provisions:
– Art. 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) provides for a possible
sentence reduction as reward for cooperation with the authorities
– Art. 5 Directive (EU) 2014/62 (Counterfeiting)22 provides for possible
lower minimum-maximum level of penalty if counterfeit currency was re-
ceived without knowledge
– Art. 8 Directive (EU) 2011/36 (Human trafficking)23 provides for non-
prosecution or non-application of penalties for offenders themselves victims
of human trafficking
– At the same time, other Directives and Framework Decisions, e g. Di-
rective (EU) 2018/1673 (Money laundering)24, do not foresee the possible
adoption and application of beneficial provisions under national law at all.
As a consequence of the inconsistent introduction of beneficial provi-
sions, the question arises as to how such provisions can be compatible with
the legal basis of Art. 83 TFEU and what binding effect they impose on the
national criminal law of the Member States.
2.2.1. Beneficial provisions as regulations on minimum penalties
The first interpretative approach assumes that from the obligation of
the Member States to comply with the minimum penalties laid down by the
EU legislator, conclusions can also be drawn with regard to the binding ef-
fect of beneficial provisions on national criminal law.
2.2.1.1. Binding effect on national law in the absence of EU legal acts permit-
ting beneficial provisions
When EU legislation provides for minimum penalties, the presence and
absence of beneficial provisions in Directives based on Art. 83 TFEU (and
preceding Framework Decisions) could be interpreted as follows:
The Member States cannot apply any form of beneficial provision/mea-
sure25 under national law to those fields of crime for which the EU legislator
20 An overview can be found in: Zimmermann, in: Satzger (ed.), Harmonisation of
Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, 577 (605 et seqq.).
21 Zimmermann, in: Satzger (ed.), Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the Euro-
pean Union, 577 (605 et seqq.).
22 O.J. 2014 L 151/1.
23 O.J. 2011 L 101/1.
24 O.J. 2018 L 284/22.
25 The addition “beneficial measure” with regard to national law results from the fact
that not all Member States may provide for codified rules in the sense of a “provision”.
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has introduced minimum rules on criminal penalties, if such option is not ex-
plicitly provided for in a Directive.
2.2.1.1.1. Compatibility with the legal basis, Art. 83 TFEU
Although the EU legislator – at least on the basis of harmonisation of
substantive criminal law – is not explicitly authorised to harmonise benefi-
cial provisions/measures under Art. 83 TFEU, there could be a way to inter-
pret the harmonisation of beneficial provision/measures in accordance with
the legal basis.
The EU legislator has the competence to establish minimum rules on
criminal sanctions. If he only provides for possibilities for impunity or miti-
gation of punishment in certain cases in some Directives and precisely not in
others, then this could be understood as regulation of minimum provisions
on sanctions in such a way that only in these cases the level of punishment
may be reduced below the minimum level provided for in a Directive. In any
case, the mostly voluntary formulation (“Member States may…”)26 of benefi-
cial provisions for adoption in national law fits in with this approach. If it is
a matter of regulation of minimum penalties, the Member States must be
permitted to impose more severe penalties by not adopting a beneficial pro-
vision.
2.2.1.1.2. Incompatibility with the existing policy on the harmonisation of
sanctions
The interpretation presented above sounds reasonable at first in that
the EU legislator is competent to set minimum penalties. If beneficial provi-
sions/measures under national law lead to these minimum penalties not be-
ing respected, this would lead to a breach of the principle of primacy of EU
law27. Thus, Member States would only be allowed to deviate if a deviation
is explicitly stipulated. However, the current policy of the EU legislator to
harmonise sanctions does not allow such an interpretation. The Directive
(EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) can be used as an example to illustrate which
minimum sanctions are usually imposed by the legislator:
“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
– the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14 are punishable by ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties (…)28, [so called
“minimum triad”]
– the terrorist offences referred to in Article 3 (…), insofar as they relate to
terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those im-
26 E.g. Art. 7 para. 4 of Directive 2017/1371 (Financial Interests), O.J. 2017 L 198/29;
Art. 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism); an exception can only be found in Art. 8 of
Directive (EU) 2011/36 (Human trafficking) according to which beneficial provisions shall be
provided. According to the view presented in this Paper, it is difficult to reconcile such a pro-
vision with the current EU’s competence for harmonisation.
27 Cf. for an overview on EU competences: Satzger, International and European Crim-
inal Law, § 8 pt. 18 et seqq.
28 Here, however, the Directive additionally requires that the penalties may entail sur-
render or extradition. Still, this has no effect on the lower level of the penalty, since the con-
ditions of the EAW are also only linked to minimum sentences, cf. Art. 2 para. 1, 2 Frame-
work Decision 2002/584/JI, O.J. 2002 L 190/1.
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posable under national law for such offences in the absence of the special in-
tent required pursuant to Article 3.
– that offences listed in Article 4 are punishable by custodial sentences,
with a maximum sentence of not less than 15 years for the offence referred to
in point (a) of Article 4”
This shows that the EU legislator is not setting strict minimum levels of
punishment29. The minimum triad is a rule relating to the level of penalties
to be provided for on a general basis. It does not, however, specify in a con-
crete way how a Member State should (at least) punish an offender in each
individual case30.
The same applies to the minimum maximum penalties and the condi-
tion of relatively more severe punishment. The Member States must gener-
ally provide that such a minimum maximum penalty can be imposed in
principle, but there is no obligation to do so in individual cases31. Moreover,
in order to establish or maintain a coherent system of sanctions, the Mem-
ber States must be entitled to regulate the different levels of penalties to be
imposed. In this respect, they must also be able to provide for rules in indi-
vidual cases according to which the offender is to be punished more le-
niently or even not punished at all, as long as this does not result in the min-
imum and maximum penalty being generally considered no longer applica-
ble.
This result would probably have to be assessed differently if the legisla-
tor were to provide for a concrete lower limit of penalty, e.g. 6 months to 15
years. In this case, the legislator would have provided for a rule on how even
the mildest case of committing such an offence in the Member States should
be punished. Consequently, it can be assumed that there would no longer be
any room for the MS to disregard the specific minimum level of penalties in
specific individual cases.
Although the introduction of such strict minimum penalties has already
been proposed and discussed in a very concrete way, it was ultimately re-
jected32. The reason for this was the problematic issue that the introduction
of such strict lower penalty limits only in those or only in one field of crime
for which the EU has the competence to harmonise sanctions according to
Art. 83 para. 1 TFEU may disturb the coherence of national criminal law
systems in general33.
In summary, it can be concluded that the absence of beneficial provi-
sions in EU directives cannot have a binding effect on the Member States
with regard to the application of beneficial provisions/measures, provided
that this does not mean that the EU minimum requirements are no longer
met on a general basis (e.g. if each offender is granted a reduced penalty
29 Cf. Satzger, Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, p. 670 et
seqq.
30 Zimmermann, in: Satzger (ed.), Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the Euro-
pean Union, 577 (602 et seq.).
31 Cf. Satzger, Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, p. 672.
32 See Proposal for Directive 2014/62 (Counterfeiting), COM 2013 42 final.
33 Detailed: ECPI, ZIS 2009, 697 (706).
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without further conditions). Provided this is ensured, it is therefore left to
the Member States to introduce and apply such rules in the absence of ben-
eficial provisions in EU legal acts.
2.2.1.2. Partial binding effect of the presence of beneficial provisions
However, assuming that in the absence of beneficial provisions in EU
legislation, the provisions/measures existing in national law remain applica-
ble (as long as they do not lead to a general breach of the required minimum
penalties) the question arises as to the legal binding effects of the presence
of such provisions on national law.
The fact that, as shown above, the legislator is entitled to lay down min-
imum rules on penalties is an indication that the effect is not purely de-
claratory. If it introduces a beneficial provision for a specific legal situation,
this can be interpreted as meaning the legislator in these cases provides for
a special rule on minimum penalties:
Beneficial provisions/measures addressing the specific legal situation de-
fined in a Directive (e.g. rewarding measures) shall only be applied under na-
tional law if the offender at least complies with the requirements set forth by
the legislator. At the same time, the legal consequences mentioned in a benefi-
cial provision (e.g. mitigation) bind the Member States to the effect that they
may not go beyond those legal consequences (e.g. by providing for impunity)34.
Since the Member States are not obliged to adopt beneficial provisions,
this interpretation leaves a margin of discretion between non-adoption and
the literal adoption of the EU-beneficial provision in the system of sanction-
ing under national law. Seen as regulation on minimum penalties, stricter
conditions or less extensive legal consequences can therefore be provided for
under national law.
Yet, the question remains as to how the presence of a beneficial provi-
sion for a certain legal situation (rewarding measure) and its application to
a certain field of crime (e. g. terrorism) affects the application of beneficial
provisions/measures under national law that deal with other legal situations
than the one being set forth in a Directive. As stated above (see 2.2.1.1.2. “In-
compatibility with the existing policy on the harmonisation of sanctions”), it
cannot be assumed that the absence of beneficial provisions will have bind-
ing effects on national law. This approach can also be applied to this situa-
tion. Beneficial provisions only affect the legal situation they cover but have
no effect on beneficial provisions/measures in national law that apply to
other legal situations:
Beneficial provisions/measures of national law that are aimed at other le-
gal situations must therefore remain unaffected.
This result can be seen as supported by the fact that, in its proposal for
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA (Illicit drug trafficking)35 of 25 October
34 With the same result regarding the effect of Art. 6 of Framework Decision (EU)
2002/475/JI (Terrorism): Sieber/Satzger/v. Heintschel-Heinegg/Kreß/Gazeas, Europäisches
Strafrecht, § 19 pt. 48.
35 COM 2001 259 final.
320 SECTION II – CHAPTER 1 “B”
2004 concerning the introduction of rewarding measures, the legislator
stated: “Without prejudice to any other mitigating circumstances defined in
their national legislation, Member States shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that the penalties referred to in Article 4 can be reduced (…)”.This spe-
cific wording of the proposal indicates that the legislator does not have the
intention to generally affect beneficial provisions/measures under national
law by the partial introduction of such provisions for certain legal situa-
tions.
The advantage of the interpretation presented here consists in the fact
that it is compatible with the legal basis of Art. 83 TFEU, but also takes into
account the interests of the EU legislator and the Member States. If the ex-
plicitly created beneficial provisions in EU legal acts are conceded a partial
binding effect for the legal situations and the field of crime they cover, ben-
eficial provisions/measures in the Member States that are considered partic-
ularly relevant by the EU legislator can at least be approximated. At the
same time, the coherence of national law is enhanced by the fact that the
Member States must, if necessary, only adopt a more repressive approach to
the conditions or legal consequences for particularly serious areas of crime,
since the EU’s competence is limited in this respect (see Art. 83 para. 1
TFEU “particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension”.).
According to the legal bases and the legal system currently available at
the level of the European Union, this interpretation – although it does not al-
low for comprehensive harmonisation – shall therefore be considered prefer-
able.
2.2.1.3. Follow-up questions of partial binding effect
The assumption of a partial binding effect of beneficial provisions in
EU legal acts on national law leads to the subsequent question under which
conditions Member States might be allowed to deviate from the EU mini-
mum requirements despite the binding effect in principle. As stated above,
the view taken here is that stricter requirements are always possible. In this
respect, stricter means – since it concerns rules on minimum penalties –
higher requirements for the offender or less extensive legal consequences.
It remains to be clarified to what extent the Member States can provide
for more extensive conditions or more extensive legal consequences. Here,
the state of opinion on minimum rules for sanctions and criminal provisions
can be transferred mutatis mutandis. According to this, the Member States
are only allowed to deviate from the minimum rules if this would otherwise
violate fundamental principles of national criminal law or constitutional
law36. However, before refusing to implement them, it should first be exam-
ined whether an increase in conditions of application also in other areas of
crime could restore coherence. Only if such option is deemed not possible, a
Member States may deviate from minimum rules set out by the EU legisla-
tor.
36 Cf. Judgment BVerfG (German Federal Constitutional Court), NJW 2009, 2267
(2274, 2287).
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2.2.2. Reverse interpretative approach: Genuine harmonisation of beneficial
provisions by EU-Legislation
A different result would be obtained by seeing beneficial provisions de-
fined in EU legal acts – just as in the area of criminal offences and sanctions
– as “genuine” minimum requirements for beneficial provisions.
This would mean that the Member States would at least have to com-
ply with the conditions and legal consequences of a beneficial provision as
required by the EU, but could also go beyond this. Illustrated by Art. 16, this
would mean that the Member States – if they decide to implement reward-
ing measures at all – would have to provide at least for the conditions and le-
gal consequences mentioned there. However, it would also be possible to in-
troduce more far-reaching regulations/measures. In the case of rewarding
measures or beneficial provisions/measures in general, this would mean that
it would then be made easier for the offender to benefit from a rewarding
measure or that he could be granted greater advantages – e.g. exemption
from punishment instead of mitigation of punishment.
However, this seems debatable – at least on the basis of Art. 83 TFEU.
According to At. 83 TFEU, the EU legislator only possesses the competence
to harmonise criminal offences and sanctions by establishing minimum
rules. As a matter of fact, the EU has been exercising its limited competence
to an extensive extent and, for example, has also issued regulations on the
criminal liability of legal persons37 or questions regarding general principles
of national criminal law such as the criminal liability of attempts of a crim-
inal offence38.
The mere fact that the EU exercises its competence extensively does
not mean that one may assume such a de facto existing competence. In ad-
dition, the criminal liability of the attempt and of legal persons must at
least still be placed within the framework of the definition of minimum
rules on criminal offences or sanctions. On the other hand, beneficial pro-
visions – if not seen as special regulations on minimum penalties – are the
exact opposite.
Furthermore, there are other reasons contesting such an interpretation.
On the one hand, the interpretation would have the consequence that a
Member State that decides not to implement the beneficial provisions for-
mulated optionally by the EU as a whole would be in conformity with EU
law. On the other hand, a Member State that implements beneficial provi-
sions/measures but provides for stricter conditions (benefit harder to ac-
complish) or legal consequences (e.g. only mitigation instead of impunity)
for the offender would be in breach of EU law.
There might also be conflicts with regard to the coherence of national
law. As has been shown, the EU legislator only has competence to adopt
minimum rules in certain areas of crime. These are types of offences in the
area of serious crime. However, if a Member State provides for beneficial
provisions/measures which place higher demands on the offender or entail
37 E.g. in Art. 18 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism).
38 E.g. in Art. 14 para. 3 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism).
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less benefit than those provided for by EU law, it would have to lower these
particularly in the area of serious crime, while they could remain in place
for lighter areas of crime where the EU has no competence for defining min-
imum rules.
As a consequence, although an interpretation in the sense of a genuine
harmonisation might be a desirable solution from a harmonisation point of
view (still without being able to remove all differences between Member
States), it does not seem compatible with Art. 83 TFEU.
2.3. Summary
In our view, it is thus preferable on the basis of the existing legal basis,
Art. 83 TFEU, to regard beneficial provisions in EU Directives as minimum
rules on criminal penalties for the specific legal situation they cover.
Accordingly, Member States can decide for these legal situations
whether they allow the application of beneficial provisions/measures at all.
However, if they do so, they can only extend the application to the maximum
extent provided for by the EU legislator. The same applies to the legal con-
sequences, so that the Member States may at any time provide for lower
benefits but may not go beyond the minimum level defined in a directive
(e.g. mitigation).
With regard to all other legal situations not explicitly regulated by the
EU legislator, the Member States remain free to regulate the nature and
scope of the applicable beneficial provisions/measures, as long as this does
not generally lead to non-compliance with the minimum requirements on
penalties provided for by a Directive – in particular the minimum triad.
Deviations from explicitly regulated beneficial provisions are only pos-
sible on the basis of fundamental principles of national criminal or consti-
tutional law.
3. Transposition to Art. 16 - in-depth analysis
The principles developed on the basis of the general policy of the EU
legislator can now be applied in concreto to the question of how the binding
effect of Art. 16 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Terrorism) for rewarding measures
under national law should be interpreted. First, the requirements of applica-
tion and then the legal consequences will be considered.
3.1. Binding effect of requirements set forth in Art. 16
3.1.1. Exhaustive effect of requirements set forth in Art. 16
It should be noted in advance that Art. 16 does not oblige the Member
States to introduce rewarding measures for the offences defined in Art. 3 -
12 and 14 (“may take the necessary measures”). In this respect, the question
of exhaustive effect refers (only) to the situation that rewarding measures al-
ready exist or are to be introduced in the criminal law of the Member States.
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However, based on the model developed on the basis of the general policy of
the EU legislator on the harmonisation of sanctions and beneficial provi-
sions, it emerges that the application requirements of Art. 16 cannot have an
explicit exhaustive effect. The EU legislator is according to Art. 83 para. 1
TFEU only competent to define minimum rules.
3.1.2. Resulting scope of discretion of the Member States
3.1.2.1. Theoretical interpretation
Following the approach presented in this paper, the conditions of ap-
plication of Art. 16 on the basis of Art. 83 TFEU represent minimum rules
on penalties. As a result, with respect to the legal situation of the applica-
tion of rewarding measures, the Member States have to ensure that they are
only applied under national law if the offender fulfils at least the conditions
laid down in Art. 16. Consequently, the Member States are not prevented
from introducing stricter conditions of application, i.e. to place higher de-
mands on the offender with regard to the applicability of a rewarding pro-
vision. Due to the voluntary nature of the implementation of Art. 16, this
opens up a margin of discretion for the Member States ranging between the
literal transposition of Art. 16 and no implementation at all. On the other
hand, broader requirements can only be provided for in exceptional cases,
namely when fundamental principles of national law would otherwise be vi-
olated.
3.1.2.2. Concrete application of theoretical approach on the individual require-
ments
According to the result on the theoretical level, the concrete impact of
the partial binding effect of the requirements of Art. 16 on national law shall
be examined.
3.1.2.2.1. Renunciation of terrorist activity, Art. 16 point (a)
Art. 16 point (a) requires the terrorist offender to renounce his or her
terrorist activity, providing a relatively definite minimum requirement. Ac-
cordingly, the Member States may not grant the terrorist offender access to
rewarding measures without the latter at least promising not to engage in
further terrorist activities. If – as is currently the case, for example, in Ger-
man criminal law – rewarding measures are applied in the national criminal
law system on terrorist offences that do not provide for a renunciation39,
these would have to be adapted according to the approach presented here.
Otherwise, it would lead to broader access for terrorist offenders to reward-
ing measures. However, the Member States are at liberty – which can also be
useful in practice – to impose certain additional requirements on the renun-
ciation in order to ensure its seriousness40.
39 Cf. Section 46b German Criminal Code (“StGB”).
40 For example, by specifying concrete actions that the offender must take or refrain
from taking.
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3.1.2.2.2. Disclosure of information and causal success in detection or preven-
tion, Art. 16 point (b)
Unlike in the case of Art. 16 point (a), the conditions listed in Art. 16
point (b) sub-points (i) - (iv) are significantly less clear in terms of their
meaning.
3.1.2.2.2.1. Basic requirement: Disclosure of not otherwise obtainable informa-
tion
The basic requirement mentioned in Art. 16 point (b) is that the of-
fender must disclose information to the law enforcement authorities that
they could not have obtained in any other way. If one were to interpret this
basic requirement narrowly, the Member States would have to implement
measures into national law or already provide for an assessment of whether
the authorities could have also obtained the disclosed information by other
means. Accordingly, it would not represent a sufficient requirement under
national law if the disclosed information merely provided the authorities
with new findings, i.e. such information that was previously unknown.
However, it must be pointed out that the wording in this case must be
described as of a rather impractical nature. The obligation of the Member
States to introduce a prognosis as to whether the information could have
been obtained in any other way appears hardly feasible under practical as-
pects. If the authorities receive new information through the statements of
the offender, it will presumably in most cases not be assurable that the in-
formation could not have been obtained in any other way at some future
point in time through investigations, e.g. telecommunications surveillance.
Consequently, based on a corresponding application of the principle of
“effet utile”41. an interpretation should be considered here that allows a
more practical implementation of rewarding measures. It is an endeavour of
the EU legislator to promote the introduction of rewarding measures in the
Member States in order to enhance judicial cooperation and effectiveness of
law enforcement in Europe42. Therefore, it cannot be an aspiration of the
legislator to introduce a minimum requirement that would prove to be a
hindrance in practice.
Accordingly, an interpretation of this requirement is proposed to the ef-
fect that Member States must at least ensure that not every form of infor-
mation disclosure leads to the applicability of rewarding measures, but that
the information provides new insights of a certain significance. Such inter-
pretation stays relatively close to the current wording but does not require a
prognosis decision being difficult to implement in practice. If this suggestion
were not followed, the wording of the basic requirement would probably
have to be transposed exactly into national law, since a compliant deviation
by means of a different form of wording seems difficult to imagine.
41 With regard to this principle comprehensively: Potacs, EUR 2009, 465.
42 Council Resolution of 20 December 1996 “on individuals who cooperate with the ju-
dicial process in the fight against international organized crime”, O.J. C 10/1.
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3.1.2.2.2.2. Requirement of a causal success in detection or prevention
A further requirement is that it is not sufficient if national rewarding
measures reward the disclosure of new information alone. The wording of
Art. 16 point (b) suggests that the information must also have had a certain
effect, namely to help the authorities in one of the avenues listed in sub-
points (i)-(iv). Thus, the connection of the information with a causal detec-
tion or prevention success is to be provided for under national law.
As far as the exact implementation is concerned, however, the Member
States seem to be granted wide discretion. If the Member States only provide
for one of the avenues set forth in sub-points (i)-(iv), they already impose
stricter requirements on the offender and therefore act in compliance with
the minimum rules set forth in Art. 16. In addition, the avenues mentioned
in sub-points (i)-(iv) are worded so broadly that it can hardly be assumed
that a conflict of national rewarding measures will arise as long as the nec-
essary connection between information and causal success is maintained.
According to sub-point (i), it is sufficient if the offender mitigates the
effects of his own offence by disclosing information. In the absence of addi-
tional requirements, any mitigation, however minimal, would be in compli-
ance with Art. 16 point (b) sub-point (i). At first sight, however, sub-point
(iv) represents a narrower criterion. According to this, the Member States
may not apply rewarding measures if the offender has only contributed to
mitigating and not to preventing further offences pursuant to Articles 3-12
and 14.
However, when mitigating the effects of offences committed by third
parties, the offender will generally contribute to obtaining evidence in ac-
cordance with sub-point (iii) or help to identify other offenders or bring
them to court according to sub-point (ii). It remains questionable how the
formulation “the other offenders” in sub-point (ii) is to be understood. The
conclusion could be drawn that here a connection between the offence of the
informing offender and the offenses of the offenders determined on the ba-
sis of this information is necessary. This interpretation is, however, negated
by the fact that in sub-point (iii) the finding of evidence in any form and not
restricted to terrorist offences is deemed a sufficient minimum requirement
for application.
This shows that the requirements under sub-points (i)-(iv) have very lit-
tle, if any, concrete binding effect on national law. Rather, it seems to be left
to the Member States in a very far-reaching way to decide how to define
their national provisions with regard to the effect that the information has to
provide.
3.1.2.2.3. Summary
In summary, the Member States must ensure in any case that the of-
fender at least renounces terrorist activities. In addition, it is necessary – in
accordance with the proposed broader interpretation of the requirement –
that the information passed on provides the authorities with not merely in-
significant new findings. The disclosure of information must also be linked
to at least some success in the investigation. However, the concrete form of
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this success is largely left to the Member States, since the requirements set
forth in this respect are of a very broad nature.
3.2. Binding effect of legal consequences referred to in Art. 16
3.2.1. Interpretation of reference to Art. 15
Art. 16, regarding the legal consequences, stipulates that, if its condi-
tions are met, the minimum penalties laid down in Art. 15 may be reduced.
The reference in Art. 16 to the minimum penalties defined in Art. 15 could
be understood to mean that each of the numbers in Art. 15 must be consid-
ered separately with a view to reducing the penalties. This would result in a
multi-stage system, whereby for the offences mentioned in Art. 15 No. 1 – if
the offender has fulfilled the conditions of the rewarding measure – compli-
ance with the minimum triad would no longer be necessary. Consequently,
the penalties under No. 2 could be set milder for the terrorist offender than
for the offender without terrorist intent and the minimum-maximum level
under No. 3 could be set gradually lower (e.g. 10 instead of 15 years).
However, such a differentiation does not seem convincing. First, Art. 15
No. 2 and 3 only concern the upper level of punishment to be provided for.
In individual cases, a milder penalty can be imposed even without rewarding
measures43. The minimum lower limit of the punishment is also here deter-
mined by the minimum triad. If Art. 16 stipulates that a reduction can take
place, the Member States do not have to adhere to the minimum upper or
lower limit to be provided. Another argument against the assumption of a
multi-stage system is that it remains unclear how the possible reduction
would affect Art. 15 No. 4, which, unlike the other numbers, does not pro-
vide for a terrorist but for another reason for aggravation of punishment
with regard to the involvement of children in terrorist activities. Finally, also
the EU legislator himself has explicitly spoken out against the introduction
of such a system44.
Thus, the reference of Art. 16 to the penalties set forth in Art. 15 should
rather be interpreted in a general way meaning that only if at least the re-
quirements of Art. 16 are met, the legal consequence of the reduction of
penalty shall be made available to the Member States.
3.2.2. Interpretation of the term “reduction” with regard to the possible admis-
sion of non-punishment as reward
However, the previously developed principles still leave unanswered the
question of whether the legislator’s formulation that the penalties can be “re-
duced” is also to be understood to mean that the offender can remain ex-
empt from punishment altogether as a result of the application of rewarding
measures. In the sense of a rule on minimum penalties, the opposite could
43 Cf. Satzger, Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, p. 672.
44 Cf. Proposal for Framework Decision (EU) 2004/757/JI (Illicit drug trafficking) COM
2001 259 final.
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also be assumed, i.e. that reduction is to be understood as meaning that the
offender must be punished, albeit more leniently, but in any case.
A limitation to mitigation has to be assumed if the EU legislator wished
to explicitly exclude the possibility of non-punishment. This would result in
Art. 16 actually being a negative provision for the offender. As shown in the
context of the considerations on the general system of harmonisation of ben-
eficial provisions, without the existence of Art. 16 it would be possible for
the Member States to allow non-punishment as a legal consequence of a re-
warding provision. This is still the case in some Member States, including
Germany45.
Nevertheless, a systematic consideration speaks for such an interpreta-
tion. The formulation of Art. 16 has its origin in Art. 6 of Framework Deci-
sion 2002/475/JHA (Terrorism) and has principally been adopted word-for-
word. Art. 6 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (Terrorism) also referred
merely to the possibility of reducing the penalty. On October 24, 2008,
Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA (Organised Crime)46 was passed, which
also provided for a rewarding measure in Art. 4. Here, however, although the
wording was otherwise very similar, there was an explicit possibility “that the
offender may be exempted from penalties”. In Framework Decision 2008/
919/JHA (Terrorism), which supplemented Framework Decision 2002/475/
JHA (Terrorism), the difference in wording was not corrected. As a result,
some see this as an argument that the Member States shall not be permitted
to provide for the exemption of penalty in the context of terrorism47.
The better arguments, however, suggest that exemption of penalty in
the rewarding measures of the Member States can (still) be granted under
Article 16. First of all, the wording “reduction” does not preclude reduction
to “zero”48. The exemption of penalty can therefore be included in the word-
ing without further effort. Even if the legislative materials of the legal acts
on terrorism and organised crime do not reveal any concrete intention on
this point, it may be possible to do so taking into account the Proposal for
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA (Illicit Drug Trafficking). The wording of
the rewarding measure – as suggested in Art. 6 of the Proposal – also merely
provided for the penalties to be “reduced”. However, in the Proposal, it says:
“It is for the competent authorities to define the criteria for determining what
constitutes valuable information and to decide the amount by which the sen-
tence will be reduced or even, depending on the circumstances, to waive the
punishment altogether”49. Even if this may only be an indication, it still
speaks for the admissibility of exemption of penalty.
45 E.g. Section 46b StGB.
46 O.J. 2008 L 300/42.
47 Sieber/Satzger/v. Heintschel-Heinegg/Kreß/Gazeas, Europäisches Strafrecht, § 19
pt. 48.
48 Admittedly, the German version “mildern” suggests a different interpretation at first
glance, since German criminal law explicitly distinguishes between grounds for mitigation
(“mildern”) and exemption from punishment (“absehen”). In principle, however, the German
wording also permits a corresponding interpretation.
49 Cf. Proposal for Framework Decision (EU) 2004/757/JI (Illicit drug trafficking) COM
2001 259 final.
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Overall, it can also be assumed that the explicit non-admission of ex-
emption of penalty could also impair the effectiveness of rewarding mea-
sures under national law. This would contradict the legislator’s explicitly
stated goal of promoting the application of such regulations in national
law50.
3.2.3. What about dismissal of the case (before the suspect is charged/in-
dicted)?
The dismissal of the case is a component of the criminal procedural
law. On the basis of Art. 83 para. 1 TFEU, the EU legislator can therefore ba-
sically not regulate to what extent a state can or cannot decide to dismiss a
case51. Since, however, according to the interpretation presented in this pa-
per, exemption of penalty is also possible, the ratio of Art. 16 does not imply
any fundamental considerations against a dismissal of the case, to the effect
that otherwise there would be the threat of a circumvention of Art. 1652.
4. Future options to introduce binding rewarding legislation at a European
level
4.1. Necessity of increased harmonisation of rewarding measures at European
level
As the research presented above has shown, the existing rewarding
measures can strongly be affected by the specific legal system of each Mem-
ber State due to the relatively wide scope of discretion of the Member States.
This heterogeneous scenario risks to significantly decrease the effectiveness
of judicial cooperation on the one hand, and to favour the emergence of fo-
rum shopping on the other53.
From the first point of view, relevant issues are doomed to affect the co-
operation between judicial authorities that request an EAW to authorities of
a Member State that does not provide for any sort of mitigation for the dis-
closing offender, which could therefore deny the delivery in the name of the
“just punishment”, or vice versa, a Member State able and willing to exploit
the rewarding measures in order to obtain useful information in order to
prevent further attacks may refuse a EAW requested by a Member State only
able to punish the arrested, as it would frustrate any preventive activity54.
From the second point of view, terrorists willing to recruit other mem-
bers may choose to settle in Member States that do not provide for any mit-
50 Council Resolution 97/C 10/01 of 20 December 1996, “on individuals who cooperate
with the judicial process in the fight against internationally organised crime”.
51 Since this competence is set forth in Art. 82 TFEU, cf. Frankfurter Kommentar
EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 1.
52 If the member states threatened to circumvent the minimum requirements of Art. 16
at the procedural level, this could constitute a breach of TEU concerning the obligation of
loyalty resulting from Art. 4 para. 3 TEU.
53 Cf. Proposal SEP-210523548 “FIGHTER”, Part B, p. 5.
54 Cf. Proposal SEP-210523548 “FIGHTER”, Part B, p. 5.
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igation, in order to discourage the recruited to cooperate once arrested; and
terrorists willing to prepare an attack may choose those Member States
where rewarding measures are more favourable in case of failure. Overall,
different rewarding measures in the Member States – as well as different
beneficial provisions in general – thus contribute to a weakening of mutual
trust. Consequently, an increased harmonisation is highly desirable in this
respect55.
4.2. Possible cross-fertilisation: Compliance of terrorism-related rewarding
measures under German law with Art. 16
4.2.1. General rewarding measure, Section 46b StGB
In German national criminal law, Section 46b StGB is the most relevant
rewarding measure. Although Section 46b StGB is not limited to application
in the terrorist field alone, it has been inserted specifically with a view to ap-
plication to terrorist offences56.
4.2.1.1. Compliance of legal consequences with Art. 16
Section 46b StGB provides that the penalty of the offender – if he has
fulfilled the conditions for application – can be reduced and in certain cases
also exempted. With regard to the minimum requirements which Article 16
imposes on national law, the assumption is made that both mitigation and
non-punishment should be permissible. Consequently, according to the in-
terpretation presented in this paper, the legal consequences provided for by
Art. 46b StGB are compliant with Art. 16.
4.2.1.2. Compliance of requirements with Art. 16
Section 46b StGB provides for two situations in which an application
can be carried out.
According to Section 46b para. 1 phrase 1 No. 1 StGB, it can be applied
if the offender
“has, by voluntarily disclosing what he or she knows, contributed sub-
stantially to the detection of one of the offences under section 100a (2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) which is related to his or
her own offence”;
while according to Section 46b para. 1 phrase 1 No. 2 StGB it is ap-
plicable if the offender
“voluntarily discloses what he or she knows to an authority in time to
prevent the completion of one of the offences under section 100a (2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which is related to his or her own offence, the
planning of which the perpetrator is aware of”.
In accordance with the interpretation and binding effect of Art. 16 rep-
resented in this paper, stricter conditions of application are always permissi-
ble, while further conditions are only possible in exceptional cases.
55 Cf. Proposal SEP-210523548 “FIGHTER”, Part B, p. 6.
56 BT-Drs. 16/6268, p. 1.
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First of all, it can be noted that Section 46b StGB – in contrast to Art.
16 – does not require the offender to renounce his criminal acts57. In this re-
spect, Section 46b StGB causes easier access for the offender to benefit from
an application and therefore does not comply with Art. 16. Consequently, an
adjustment of the requirement for application should be considered here.
Something different could only result if such an adjustment conflicted with
fundamental principles of national criminal or constitutional law58. This is
not the case here, however. Especially with regard to the Principle of Guilt,
prompted in Art. 1 para. 1 GG59, the absence of such a requirement is often
criticised in German criminal law scholarship60. An adjustment – also be-
yond the field of terrorism – would thus not violate the principles of national
law but would even accommodate them.
Art. 16 further requires that the offender provides the “authorities with
information which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain”. In con-
trast, Section 46b StGB merely requires the voluntary disclosure of substan-
tial information (No. 1) or the voluntary disclosure of information in good
time (No. 2). This constitutes a deviation from the wording of Article 16, as
German law does not require the information to be examined to see whether
it could have been obtained by other means. Under national law there only
is an examination of whether the information was essential for the required
success of the investigation or decisive for the required prevention of an of-
fence61. If one were to assume that Art. 16 is to be understood literally here,
it would appear questionable whether Section 46b StGB would be compliant
in this respect. However, in accordance with the proposed interpretation of
this basic requirement of Art. 16 due to its practical weaknesses, we assume
that Art. 16 is to be understood in such a way that the offender is at least
obliged to pass on not merely insignificant new information to the authori-
ties. Consequently, it can be assumed that Section 46b StGB does not violate
Art. 16 with regard to this requirement.
Finally, Article 16 also requires at least the connection of the informa-
tion with a success in terms of detecting or preventing further offences.
Here, Section 46b StGB is much stricter in its requirements. No. 1 presup-
poses a significant contribution to the clarification of a criminal offence62.
This goes well beyond the formulation of Art. 16 point (b) sub-point (iii),
“find evidence”. Since a connection between the offender’s offence and the
offence about which he provides information is also required63, there is also
no conflict with sub-point (ii), “identify or bring to justice the other offend-
ers”. Furthermore, Section 46b para. 1 phrase 1 No. 2 StGB explicitly re-
quires that another offence must have been prevented or at least the possi-
57 MüKoStGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 28.
58 Cf. Judgment BVerfG (German Federal Constitutional Court), NJW 2009, 2267
(2274, 2287).
59 Cf. Adam/Schmidt/Schumacher, NStZ 2017, 7 et seqq.
60 For a detailed analysis cf. Christoph, Der Kronzeuge im Strafgesetzbuch, 2019, p.
195 et seqq.
61 NK-StGB/Streng, § 46b pt. 10; MüKo-StGB/Maier, § 46b pt. 140.
62 NK-StGB/Streng, § 46b pt. 9.
63 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 13 et seqq.
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bility of doing so must have existed if the authorities had acted in accor-
dance with their duties64. According to Art. 16 point (b) sub-point (i) it is suf-
ficient for the offender to merely mitigate the effects of his own offence.
Consequently, no conflict is to be feared in this respect.
4.2.2. Other rewarding measures applicable in the field of terrorism under na-
tional law
Under German law, further rewarding measures are also applicable
with regard to terrorist offences. However, as was confirmed in particular by
the Focus Group, these are in principle of very little practical relevance in
German criminal law. Therefore, only a few remarks are made in this re-
spect, as they are presumably not very suitable for cross-fertilisation.
Section 129a para. 7 in conjunction with Section 129 para. 7 StGB is
only applicable to offences under section 129a StGB (“Forming terrorist or-
ganisations”). Although the wording of the rewarding measure differs
slightly from Section 46b StGB, the statements set out there can in principle
be applied65.
Sections 89a66 para. 7 and 89c67 para. 7 StGB reward the offender for
“voluntarily giving up further preparation of the offence and averting or sub-
stantially reducing a danger, caused and recognised by him, that others will
continue to prepare or carry out the offence, or if he voluntarily prevents the
completion of the offence”. His voluntary and sincere effort to achieve that
objective is sufficient if, without his intervention, the “designated danger is
averted or substantially reduced or the completion of the offence is prevented”.
It is already questionable whether Art. 16 is applicable at all in this re-
spect. According to the principles presented in this paper, Art. 16 applies
only to the legal situations it describes. In this case this would be the situa-
tion of reward for cooperation with the authorities. In contrast, Section 89a
para. 7 and 89c para. 7 StGB are basically only concerned with the offender
voluntarily counteracting the effects of his own offence68, while cooperation
with the authorities is not the legal situation covered. However, if an of-
fender cooperates with the authorities in order to counter the effects of his
offence in accordance with Section 89a para. 7 or 89c para. 7 StGB and this
would result in the assumption of Art. 16 being applicable, no conflict with
the minimum requirements of Article 16 would be expected. Since the of-
fender voluntarily gives up his offence and does not, as in the case of Section
46b StGB, only pass on information voluntarily after committing his of-
fence, one may assume that also here a renunciation of his terrorist activi-
ties is introduced in the sense of a requirement for the reward of the of-
fender.
64 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 46b pt. 13 et seqq.
65 A detailed analysis of the requirements of Section 129a para. 7 in conjunction with
Section 129 para. 7 StGB was carried out in the context of the WP-1-Questionnaire, cf. p. 45
et seqq.
66 “Preparation of serious violent offence endangering the state”.
67 „Financing of terrorism“.
68 BeckOK-StGB/Heintschel-Heinegg, § 89a pt. 44.
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4.3. Adequacy of current non-binding EU minimum provisions with a view to
further harmonisation of national rewarding legislation
The policy currently applied by the EU – concerning both the harmon-
isation of sanctions and beneficial provisions – is, as has been shown, merely
a very slight intervention in the national criminal law systems of the Mem-
ber States.
This low binding effect indirectly leads to the fact that also the benefi-
cial provisions hardly need to be uniformly implemented in the national
criminal law systems of the Member States.
A more consistent system in the area of beneficial provisions might at
first view be achievable by the means of the EU legislator setting true mini-
mum rules on penalties within its sphere of competence, and this to a large
extent. This would bind Member States as regards the lower limit of crimi-
nal liability and would not – or at least not to the current extent – allow
them to deviate from these minimum penalties. However, since the applica-
tion of beneficial provisions is both a necessary and regular instrument of
national criminal law systems, the EU legislator would then also have to re-
act adequately by dealing with the introduction of beneficial provisions in a
comprehensive and systematic way. If this was undertaken, it would allow, at
least with regard to the EU’s area of competence, for the type of beneficial
provisions applicable in the Member States to be harmonised.
At the same time, however, the EU legislator would still not have the
competence to oblige the Member States to adopt beneficial provisions at
all. At present, its competence in substantive criminal law only relates to the
area of minimum penalties. Therefore, there would always remain a margin
of discretion between non-application and the literal adoption of the benefi-
cial provisions. Moreover, harmonisation would again only take place in
some sub-areas of national law, which could massively disrupt its general co-
herence69. Consequently, also the introduction of strict minimum rules and
corresponding more binding beneficial provisions seems to be no viable path
for the EU legislator in the area of substantive criminal law. In addition, the
effectiveness of such kind of minimum harmonisation would still appear at
least questionable with regard to beneficial provisions/measures under na-
tional law.
As the papers of the other project participants have also shown, there is
no really automatic harmonisation in the specific area of rewarding mea-
sures undertaken by the Member States. As harmonisation of national re-
warding measures has to be seen as a highly desirable objective, the current
approach chosen by the EU legislator when harmonising national law by
non-binding minimum rules – which also applies to sanctions and beneficial
provisions in general – can not be described as adequate.
4.4. Feasibility and advisability of binding harmonization
According to the view presented in this paper, binding harmonisation
69 Satzger, Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, p. 667.
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following the current approach of the legislator on the basis of Art. 83 para.
1 TFEU is not a feasible and also not advisable option. Consequently, more
attention should be paid to alternatives.
4.4.1. Harmonisation of rewarding measures based on Art. 82 TFEU
Art. 82 TFEU concerns judicial cooperation between the Member States
in criminal matters and also includes the approximation of the criminal law
of the Member States in the areas mentioned in Art. 82 para. 2 and 83
TFEU70. Accordingly, in the cases referred to in Art. 82 para. 1, Regulations
and Directives, and in the cases referred to in para. 2, only Directives can be
issued to promote mutual recognition of the Member States (para. 1) and to
approximate criminal procedural law (para. 2)71.
Harmonisation on the basis of Art. 82 para. 1 TFEU appears to be dif-
ficult to implement due to its focus on general aspects of mutual recogni-
tion72. It has been shown that the different existence of rewarding measures
and thus the different legal status of the collaborator of justice may have
negative effects on mutual recognition between the Member States. How-
ever, Art. 82 para. 1 TFEU only covers cross-border cooperation (mutual le-
gal assistance), not the competence to harmonise criminal procedures under
national law73.
Thus, only the harmonisation of criminal procedural law based on Art.
82 para. 2 TFEU appears to be a conceivable avenue to follow. An imple-
mentation of the rules on the offender’s cooperation with the authorities in
national criminal procedural law and not – as at least the EU legislation has
done so far – in substantive criminal law does not appear to be an option ex-
cluded from the outset. On the contrary, this is – if one considers, for exam-
ple, the regulations in Belgium74 and Austria75 – even a rather common way
to go, which can therefore be described as promising. However, this presup-
poses that a harmonisation of the rules on the cooperation of the offender
with the public authorities would also be compatible with the requirements
of Art. 82 para. 2 TFEU.
4.4.1.1. Usefulness of Art. 82 para. 2 phrase 2 point (b) TFEU as legal basis
One conceivable avenue to follow could be to define regulations on the
nature and manner of cooperation with the judicial authorities as a right of
the individual accused in criminal procedure in the sense of Art. 82 para. 2
phrase 2 point (b) TFEU, and hence this being a possible legal basis for cor-
responding Directives on minimum rules. Admittedly, harmonisation would
not be conclusively possible here either. But unlike on the basis of Art. 83
TFEU, rewarding measures could be defined positively and not be limited to
only some areas of crime, with the consequence that a minimum standard of
70 von der Groeben/Schwarze/Meyer, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 1.
71 Streinz/Satzger, EUV/AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 1 et seqq.
72 Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 5 f.
73 Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 15.
74 Art. 216/1 - 216/8 Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure.
75 Sections 209a, 209b Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.
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rules could be achieved at European level in this field. This would certainly
strengthen mutual trust between the Member States and reduce the risk of
forum shopping. Consequently, the basic requirements for the adoption of a
corresponding Directive would presumably be in place as Art. 82 para. 2
TFEU requires that Directives be issued only “to the extent necessary to facil-
itate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and ju-
dicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension”76.
Although the wording of Art. 82 para. 2 phrase 2 point (b) TFEU does
not exclude from the very beginning such a definition as procedural right,
such an approach has so far at least not found its way into the considera-
tions of the EU. The issues addressed in the Resolution of the Council of 30
November 2009 “on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of sus-
pected or accused persons in criminal proceedings”77 show that the focus here
is mainly on other aspects of criminal procedural law, such as the right to le-
gal advice or the right of communication with relatives, employers and con-
sular authorities. Against this background, the compatibility of general stan-
dards on the collaborator of justice with the wording seems doubtable78.
4.4.1.2. Usefulness of Art. 82 para. 2 phrase 2 point (d) TFEU as legal basis
According to Art. 82 para. 2 phrase 2 point (d) TFEU “any other specific
aspects of criminal procedure” can be covered and approximated by means of
directives. Accordingly, an excessively extensive intervention in national pro-
cedural law is not possible, as is shown in particular by the limitation of the
wording to “specific aspects”79. However, the legal status of the collaborator
of justice is to be seen as only a partial criterion of national criminal law. It
can be compared, for example, with the establishment of minimum rules on
the reopening of criminal proceedings, which is considered to be permissi-
ble80. Consequently, it can be assumed that the adoption of a Directive to
this effect would in principle be possible.
However, the basic prerequisite here is that a unanimous decision of
the Council, with the consent of the European Parliament, must be taken in
order to classify the legal status of the collaborator of justice as an aspect of
criminal procedure that requires regulation81.
That there is such a need for regulation or at least an interest in the ex-
istence of such regulations on a national level was already confirmed by the
Council itself in 1996 in a Council Resolution in which the Member States
were called upon to provide for such regulations in national law82. Conse-
76 Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 24.
77 O.J. 2009 C 295/1.
78 Nevertheless, Art. 7 para. 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 issued on the basis of Art. 82
para. 2 phrase 2 point (b) TFEU already contains – albeit superficial – statements on miti-
gating factors.
79 Council Resolution of 20 December 1996 “on individuals who cooperate with the
judicial process in the fight against international organized crime”, O.J. C 10/1.
80 Streinz/Satzger, EUV/AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 65.
81 Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV/Hochmayr, AEUV, Art. 82 pt. 30.
82 Council Resolution of 20 December 1996 “on individuals who cooperate with the
judicial process in the fight against international organized crime”, O.J. C 10/1.
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quently, Art. 82 para. 2 phrase 2 point (d) TFEU appears not only as a possi-
ble, but also as a promising basis upon which at least improved harmonisa-
tion of provisions on the legal status of the collaborator of justice could be
achieved.
4.4.2. General revision of the system of defining minimum rules on sanctions
based on Art. 83 TFEU
Another much more far-reaching variant of harmonising rewarding
measures and beneficial provisions in general would be to begin by funda-
mentally changing EU policy and measures on the harmonisation of sanc-
tions. One conceivable example could be the institution of a Category Model
for the Harmonisation of Criminal Sanctions in Europe, as proposed by a
group of European legal scholars, the European Criminal Policy Initiative
(“ECPI”). The ECPI’s proposal will therefore be described in broad terms
with regard to its possible harmonising effect on rewarding measures and
beneficial provisions as a whole83.
The ECPI has proposed to move away from the current policy of the
European legislator to provide for concrete, but ultimately non-harmonising
minimum penalties. Rather, harmonisation is to be achieved by means of a
category model which obliges the Member States to divide the sanctioning
options under national law into five categories according to their severity.
The EU legislator would then specify in its Directives, when determining the
minimum penalties for each of the offences defined, the minimum category
into which an offence shall be placed under national law.
On this basis, it would also be possible to harmonise the beneficial pro-
visions in national law – at least in those areas of law in which the EU has
the competence to do so. In particular, the approach proposed here was to
give the Member States the possibility of changing the category of penalties
to a lower (or in the case of aggravating circumstances a higher) category for
a specific legal situation:
“The Member States stipulate category IV sanctions for [the specific of-
fences]. In presence of [a specific mitigating or aggravating circumstance] they
stipulate a category III/V sanction”.
If one assumes, as argued in the context of this paper, that the intro-
duction of beneficial provisions on the basis of Art. 83 TFEU can only be un-
derstood as regulations on minimum penalties, the proposal made by ECPI
is also compatible in this respect. If the Member States have to provide for
at least category IV as a penalty for a criminal offence, a downward devia-
tion is no longer possible, unless the EU legislator explicitly allows this. The
category model could therefore be used to regulate both the minimum re-
quirement of a beneficial provision and the minimum penalty that the
Member State must provide for if the conditions for a beneficial provision
are met.
83 For a detailed description of the following cf. Satzger, Harmonisation of Criminal
Sanctions in the European Union, p. 707 et seqq.
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This would still leave the Member State free to make use of the intro-
duction of a beneficial provision or to provide for a higher penalty. However,
the category model could offer the opportunity to define beneficial provi-
sions on a broader basis with regard to their minimum requirements, and
also to achieve a binding harmonisation of the minimum legal conse-
quences, which would not be possible or not possible to the same extent on
the basis of the currently pursued EU policy. Moreover, taking into account
the coherence of national law, it would probably be expected that at least
some of the legal consequences of beneficial provisions would actually be
adopted directly and that there would be less need for deviations.
5. Conclusion
The research conducted in this paper has shown on a general level that
the measures pursued by the EU legislator in harmonising beneficial provi-
sions and sanctions have so far only allowed for minimum harmonisation in
the cases specifically provided for.
At the same time, the Member States have a wide margin of manoeuvre
in the actual implementation in national law and are also at liberty to apply
beneficial provisions for every legal situation not explicitly regulated by EU
law. Since the harmonisation of beneficial provisions on the basis of Art. 83
TFEU can only be understood as a regulation of minimum penalties, even in
the presence of a beneficial provision in EU law, the Member States have a
discretionary scope not to implement such provisions at all or to provide for
stricter conditions or legal consequences.
The concrete analysis of Art. 16 of the Directive with regard to its bind-
ing effect on national law has pointed out, however, that at least the possi-
bility of setting minimum conditions for its application can – depending of
the wording of a condition – have a certain harmonising effect in national
law when the Member States decide to adopt or to apply rewarding mea-
sures. In accordance with the view presented in this paper and with regard
to the extent of the legal consequences to be granted, the Member States re-
main completely unbound.
The remaining possibilities for deviation in the Member States con-
cerning the application of rewarding measures in the field of terrorism and
moreover the remaining scope for the application of beneficial provisions in
legal situations not yet covered by EU law can, among other factors, lead to
problems with regard to mutual trust between the Member States and judi-
cial cooperation in criminal matters.
In order to improve this, the establishment of genuine minimum con-
ditions for the legal status of the collaborator of justice on the basis of Art.
82 TFEU in national procedural law could be a conceivable solution. This
would also achieve minimum harmonisation irrespective of the type of
crime field concerned. At the same time, this would only cover the legal sit-
uation of the collaborator of justice, but not other cases. It would also be
conceivable to comprehensively change the policy of the EU legislator when
introducing sanctions by means of a category model. In this respect, not
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only rewarding measures but also beneficial provisions in general could be
further approximated. At the same time, however, this would be limited to
certain fields of crime.
In conclusion, a combination of both possible measures could be a vi-
able option for the future in order to approximate rewarding measures and
beneficial provisions in general to the furthest extent possible on the basis of
the regulatory competences currently attributed to the European Union by
the treaties.
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6. Conclusion: remarks and first guidelines towards the comparative analysis of
rewarding legislations.
1. Introduction and methodology
This paper provides a brief overview and draws conclusions about the
research carried out by the French and German units in the second section,
which looked into the EU criminal law competence, the meaning of Article
16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 and its effects at the national level. Not only
this Article provides for the possibility to issue more lenient criminal sanc-
tions in a field of law where punishment has prevailed over the last decades,
but also entitles the Member States to transpose and enforce rewarding
rules. Article 16 grants the national legislators the choice whether or not to
mitigate criminal sentences for terrorist offences1, provided that the perpe-
trator has cooperated with administrative and judicial authorities in a re-
markably fruitful fashion during the criminal proceeding brought against
him/her. Article 16 is set forth by a directive which aims to harmonise na-
tional criminal legislations and is binding upon the Member States as to the
(punitive and) preventive result to achieve.
The French and German units firstly addressed the topic of the legisla-
tive powers enshrined under the criminal law competence of the EU. The
shared goal was to analyse the EU minimum norms on rewarding measures,
in order to understand their scope, meaning and effects, as well as their in-
terplay with national legislations. Against this background, the French unit
(coordinated by Prof. Julie Alix) focused the analysis on the understanding
of minimum norms under the EU criminal law competence, whereas the
German Unit (coordinated by Prof. Helmut Satzger) addressed the same
topic providing also insights on the features (and shortcomings) of the EU
harmonisation policy in the field of criminal sanctions.
The University of Ferrara, which coordinated the French and German
units, proposed a methodology based on a questionnaire that reads2:
1 In this paper, the terms ‘offence’ and ‘crime’ are used interchangeably.
2 On their part, the research units provided insightful remarks to fine-tune the first
draft of the questionnaire.
1. If Member States choose to transpose (and then implement) Article
16, do they enjoy absolute or relative appreciation?
1.1. Are requirements provided for by Article 16 exhaustive?
1.1.1. If the answer is in the negative, to what extent can EU Member
States derogate from them?
1.1.1.1. Are stricter requirements allowed?
1.1.1.2. Are broader requirements allowed?
1.2. Are EU Member States only allowed to mitigate criminal sanctions?
1.2.1. Does non-punishment as a reward for cooperation comply with
Article 16?
1.2.2. Does dismissal of the case (before the suspect is charged/indicted)
comply with Article 16?
The questionnaire asked the two research groups to address two cou-
ples of alternative hypotheses:
i) Stricter requirements at the national level are allowed. According to
this hypothesis, for instance, national rewarding laws would be entitled to
add further clauses or specify those already set forth under Article 16, in or-
der to make the issuing of rewarding measures less likely.
ii) Broader requirements at the national level are allowed. In line with
this stance, national rewarding laws would be entitled to depart from the
minimum rules provided for by Article 16, so as to make the implementation
of rewarding measures easier.
a) Dismissal of the case and non-punishment do not comply with Article
16. From this standpoint, mitigating circumstances would be the only re-
warding measure that complies with the EU minimum rules in force.
b) Dismissal of the case and non-punishment comply with Article 16. In
this event, conversely, the transposition (and implementation) of Article 16
at the national level would not be limited to mitigating circumstances.
Along with the comparative analysis of the national rewarding laws,
this phase of the research laid the ground for an assessment of the state of
play and the way forward of the harmonisation of rewarding legislations in
the EU. The assessment also includes the choice of the most suitable legal
basis in the Lisbon Treaty to this effect.
2. The substantive criminal law competence of the EU: an overview of Arti-
cle 83 TFEU
Article 16 has been adopted on the legal basis of Article 83.1 TFEU,
which has been comprehensively analysed by the Croatian unit3. Both the
French and the German research units provided a contextual analysis of the
provisions of Article 16 in light of the EU criminal law competence en-
3 Zlata DURDEVIC, Mirta KUŠTAN, EU Criminal Law Competences With Special Regards On
Terrorist Offences (Section II, Chapter 3).
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shrined therein. Article 83.1 TFEU empowers the EU legislator to ‘establish
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions
in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension re-
sulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to
combat them on a common basis’ (the shared, sector-based and indirect crim-
inal law competence of the EU). Against the background of the non- (or
quasi-) federal structure of the EU and its Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (hereinafter AFSJ), the EU legislator can establish minimum defini-
tions of offences and sanctions in listed fields of crime (among which, ter-
rorism) that must be transposed at the national level, in compliance with the
principle of legality4. The exercise of the EU criminal law competence envis-
ages harmonising the criminal legislations of the Member States. At the end
of a long way (from the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty), the EU is
legally competent to narrow the differences between the (in this case, sub-
stantive) criminal laws of the Member States5. The rationale behind the har-
monisation of national criminal laws is manifold. In this paper, for the sake
of simplicity, we shall refer to the distinction between
‘at least six possible justifications for the EU enacting a harmonized de-
finition of crimes: the criminalization rationale; the cooperation ratio-
nale; the free movement rationale; the justice rationale; the socializing
rationale; and the regulatory rationale’6.
Up to now, the approximation of national criminal legislations has been
pursued mostly from a punitive standpoint7. Conversely, non-criminalisation
(here understood in a broad sense, meaning the legislative and/or judicial
choice not to punish) and decriminalisation (i.e., downgrading criminal of-
fences into administrative offences or at least less serious types of crime)
have largely been ignored at the EU level. Therefore, the resort to criminal
law at the EU level has proved one-way thus far. Moreover, after a certain
conduct is criminalised at the EU level, decriminalisation by the national
legislators is prohibited8.
Against this background, on the one hand, by adopting directives the
EU legislator bridges the gaps between the criminal laws of the Member
States. On the other hand, national legislators retain a leeway for apprecia-
tion. Harmonisation does not amount to unification (which would imply
that no difference among legislations could be maintained), but rather to a
shared ‘minimum law’ that needs to be transposed (and, to some extent,
adapted) in each national criminal justice system9. This holds true especially
4 See Christina PERISTERIDOU, The principle of legality in European criminal law, Cam-
bridge, 2015.
5 See Valsamis MITSILEGAS, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon: Rights, Trust and the Trans-
formation of Justice in Europe, Hart, 2016.
6 Irene WIECZOREK, The Legitimacy of EU Criminal Law, Hart, 2020, 83.
7 M. DONINI, Introduction To A European Project For «Rewarding Measures» To Prevent
Terrorism, supra, 1 ff.
8 Clémence QUENTIN, Jean-Yves MARÉCHAL, Julie ALIX, French Report (Section II, Chapter
1-A), § 2.
9 Ivi, § 3.
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with respect to EU minimum rules crossing also general rules of national
criminal laws (provided that no general rules of EU criminal law have been
provided for yet)10 and, as far as the topic of this paper is concerned, to the
rewarding rules set forth by Article 16.
For the purpose of EU harmonisation of national legislations, ‘mini-
mum norms’ are understood as the essential content of the definition of
crimes and sanctions, ‘which shall bind Member States under threat of sanc-
tions in the event of failure of incorporation into the domestic legal order’11.
In particular, as regards EU minimum rules on criminal sanctions,
‘the sanction to be imposed need not be determined by the European
legislator; that latter task could indeed be performed more aptly on a
domestic level, in accordance with the principle of proportionality and
the particularities of each criminal justice system’12.
Undoubtedly, the appreciation and adaptation of EU minimum rules at
the national level can bring about wider transpositions, this meaning that
more (or broader) conducts than those listed by the EU legislator can be
punished. Likewise, whenever criminal sanctions (that must always be ade-
quate, that is to say effective, proportionate and dissuasive) are defined by EU
minimum rules in their ‘minimum maximum’, the Member States are free to
opt for higher penalties13, according to the general rules on criminal sanc-
tions in force at the national level.
3. Article 16 of Directive (EU) 2017/541
Whereas the above-mentioned assumptions are well-grounded and es-
tablished, the issues raised by optional and lenient provisions of a (binding)
directive have not been addressed extensively. Article 16 is a paradigmatic
case study to analyse: how must the concept of ‘minimum norms’ be under-
stood, in the presence of a provision leaving the Member States with the op-
tion to establish mitigating circumstances as rewarding measures for terror-
ist offenders who cooperate with law enforcement authorities, listing the re-
quirements thereof? Does the aforementioned optional nature create an area
which is safe from primacy claims, irrespective of what content the national
laws lay down, or rather does this nature refer only to the initial choice
whether to transpose or not the Article at hand at the national level?
10 See André KLIP, Towards a General Part of Criminal Law for the European Union, in
A. KLIP (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union, Antwerpen, 2011; Jeroen
BLOMSMA, & Christina PERISTERIDOU, The way forward: a general part of European Criminal
Law, in Anne WEYEMBERGH, & Francesca GALLI (eds.), Approximation of substantive criminal
law in the EU: the way forward, Brussels, 2013; Sakari MELANDER, Effectiveness in EU Crimi-
nal Law and its Effects on the General Part of Criminal Law, NJECL, 5, 3, 2014; Eliette RUBI-
CAVAGNA, Un droit pénal général de l’Union Européenne?, in Julie ALIX, et al. (eds.), Humanisme
et Justice. Mélanges en l’honneur de Geneviéve Giudicelli-Delage, Paris, 2016.
11 European Criminal Policy Initiative, The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in
2011, EuCLR, No. 1/2011, 27.
12 Ibidem.
13 In this paper, the terms ‘criminal sanction’ and ‘penalty’ are used interchangeably.
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Article 16 reads:
«Member States may take the necessary measures to ensure that the
penalties referred to in Article 15 may be reduced if the offender:
(a) renounces terrorist activity; and
(b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information
which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them
to:
(i) prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
(ii) identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
(iii) find evidence; or
(iv) prevent further offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14».
Undoubtedly, Article 16 is a beneficial provision in that it grants the
possibility to mitigate criminal sanctions at the national level, provided that
the offender gave up carrying out terrorist activities and cooperated with law
enforcement authorities for (totally or partly) preventive, investigative
(and/)or prosecuting purposes. The first requirement laid down by Article 16
is renouncing terrorist activity (a). As such, it does not raise significant is-
sues. Arguably, this requirement seems reasonable from both a legal and
practical perspective. Not only its objective understanding – not requiring
necessarily inner regret, but rather material discontinuance of terrorist ac-
tivity – seems preferable, but also consistent (if not with the rules in force at
the national level) with shared judicial practices14. To fulfil the requirement
of renouncing terrorist activity, at least the offender’s promise to surrender is
necessary15. Moreover, the minimum rule at hand grants sufficient leeway to
impose certain additional requirements on the renunciation16.
The second requirement is providing the administrative or judicial au-
thorities with information which they would not otherwise have been able to
obtain (b). Competent authorities are defined broadly, as administrative au-
thorities are expressly included. Conversely, the relevance of the information
required is defined in the much narrower fashion of a complex prognosis.
According to Article 16 (b),
‘it would not represent a sufficient requirement under national law if
the disclosed information merely provided the authorities with new
findings, i.e. such information that was previously unknown’17.
Interestingly, although the proposal seems hardly compatible with the
text of Article 16 (b), the German unit suggests that the rule be interpreted
differently, allowing for cooperation that provides new and considerably im-
portant information. Otherwise, the effet utile of rewarding measures would
be jeopardised18. Under Article 16, the importance of the information is re-
14 Arguably, what might look rather questionable is the lack of express rules on revo-
cation of rewarding measures in some national legislations.





lated to its ‘causal connection’ towards the engagement in the listed range of
four law enforcement activities (i-iv). Their transposition at the national
level is only possibly cumulative, in that
‘[i]f the Member States only provide for one of the avenues set forth in
sub-points (i) – (iv), they already impose stricter requirements on the
offender and therefore act in compliance with the minimum rules set
forth in Art. 16’19.
With respect to Article 16 (i-iv), more interpretative issues arise. Ac-
cording to Article 16 (i), the information provided must be useful to ‘prevent
or mitigate the effects of the offence’. As the German unit pinpoints, consid-
ering the requirements to apply rewarding measures satisfied in the pres-
ence of a mere mitigation of the effects of the offence might pave the way to
rewards for marginal results20. Article 16 (ii) requires that the information
rendered helps law enforcement authorities to ‘identify or bring to justice
the other offenders’. This task is paramount in practice, especially for the
aforementioned purpose to prevent or mitigate the effects of terrorist of-
fences. The same holds for finding evidence (iii), whose ideal connection
with the identification or surrender of terrorist offenders to justice (original
step) and the prevention or mitigation of the effects of the offence (final
goal) is apparent. The requirement under Article 16 (iii) is not further spec-
ified and as such does not oblige to establish any type of connection between
the committed and the reported offence21. Conversely, Article 16 (iv) states
that the information given must help law enforcement authorities to prevent
(and not just to mitigate) further terrorist offences. Therefore, only the iden-
tity of legal qualification of the crimes as terrorists is required. Considering
also the alternative nature of the requirements established from (i) to (iv),
the room for manoeuvre left to the Member States is yet large. The fil rouge
is that ‘the disclosure of information must also be linked to at least some
success in the investigation’22.
4. The German Unit research findings
a) The effects of Article 16 at the national level
By adopting a systematic approach that puts the EU and the national
criminal justice systems together, the German unit addressed the topic of
minimum beneficial provisions under EU criminal law, in order to provide
guidance on the assessment of whether the national rewarding legislations
of the Member States involved in this research comply or not with Article
16. Maintaining a first hypothesis, Member States could not provide for (and
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if no express rule with this regard is set forth at the EU level. EU rules on re-
warding measures such as those laid down by Article 16 would comply with
Article 83.1 TFEU as long as their adoption at the national level remains op-
tional. Maintaining a second hypothesis, EU obligations to criminalise re-
quire the Member States to adopt minimum maximum criminal sanctions
for EU crimes only as a general rule. If no EU (optional) beneficial provision
is provided for (be it mitigating or waiving the penalty, of a rewarding nature
or not), the EU policy on the harmonisation of criminal sanctions does not
affect the individualisation of punishment, which is not only a fundamental
right of the defendant but also a matter of internal coherence of the crimi-
nal law which is retained, as such, in the national criminal justice systems23.
Conversely, if EU (optional) beneficial provisions are provided for24, the
scenario is twofold: i) if Member States choose not to transpose, no binding
effect is produced at the national level; ii) if Member States choose to trans-
pose EU beneficial provisions,
‘[b]eneficial provisions/measures addressing the specific legal situation
defined in a Directive (e.g. rewarding measures) shall only be applied
under national law if the offender at least complies with the require-
ments set forth by the legislator. At the same time, the legal conse-
quences mentioned in a beneficial provision (e.g. mitigation) bind the
Member States to the effect that they may not go beyond those legal
consequences’25.
Moreover,
‘[b]eneficial provisions only affect the legal situation they cover but
have no effect on beneficial provisions/measures in national law that
apply to other legal situations’26.
that is to say outside the field of counter-terrorism criminal law (general re-
warding measures).
Against this background, narrower rewarding rules (i.e., higher require-
ments for the offender to meet or less beneficial legal consequence to apply)
than those set out by Article 16 are always allowed at the national level:
‘the Member States have to ensure that they are only applied under
national law if the offender fulfils at least the conditions laid down in
Art. 16’27.
Conversely, in principle, national rewarding legislation laying down
broader requirements or more favourable legal consequences is prohibited
23 Ivi, § 2.4.1 ff.
24 Irrespective of the date when the rules were adopted, that is to say either before or
after the entry into force of counterterrorism rewarding legislations of the Member States.
Hence, also those that date back from the 70s onwards also fall within this hypothesis.
25 Helmut SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 2.4.1.2.
26 Ibidem.
27 Ivi, § 3.1.2.1.
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under Article 16. As the German unit pinpoints, the violation of fundamen-
tal principles enshrined in the national Constitutions and the internal co-
herence of the criminal law are to be considered the only possible excep-
tions. Another argument in favour of a non-absolute limitation of ‘reduc-
tion’ of criminal sanctions under Article 16 to mitigating circumstances
only would be that ‘‘reduction’ does not preclude reduction to ‘zero’’28.
Again, the means available to support this argument are to be found in the
systematic, constitutional and functional interpretation of Article 16. Finally,
the German unit argues that discontinuance of criminal proceedings (pre-
trial dismissal of the case) does not raise issues, in that criminal procedural
matters fall outside the legal basis of Directive 2017/541/UE (Article 83.1
TFEU).
b) The harmonisation of rewarding legislations: critical assessment and
proposals
On the basis of the results of the previous part of the research, in which
the national laws on rewarding measures to counter terrorism have been
analysed, the German unit concluded that ‘an increased harmonisation is
highly desirable’29. Maintaining both an inconsistent approach at the EU
level and large legal differences at the national level undermines mutual
trust and mutual recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
Moreover, such a state of art risks favouring forum shopping30.
The German unit argued that non-optional and binding EU harmonisa-
tion is needed. Consistent with the narrow interpretation of the material
scope of EU minimum rules on the definition of criminal sanctions and with
the necessary coherence of the criminal law31, the German unit rejects the
competence of the EU legislator to resort to Article 83.1 TFEU. Conversely,
the way forward could be represented by the exercise of the EU competence
in criminal procedural law enshrined in Article 82.2 b) TFEU. The latter
reads:
‘To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments
and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and
28 Albeit hardly, as it is confirmed by the translations of the text of Article 16 in lan-
guages other than English: with reference to the German version, ivi, § 3.2.2. The same
holds, for instance, to the Italian translation, in that the title ‘Circostanze attenuanti’ (miti-
gating circumstances) refers to reduction of criminal sanctions at the sentencing phase,
whereas the non-punishment at hand belongs to the legal category of ‘cause di non punibil-
ità’ (also known as ‘cause di esclusione della punibilità’). Furthermore, in the absence of any
soft or hard principle or rule of general criminal law at the EU level, to infer that waiving
punishment as a rewarding measure complies with Article 16 by reading other clearer EU
criminal law texts adopted in other areas of cross-border serious crime does not seem un-
questionable. To this end, the German unit mentions Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of
24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime and the Proposal for Framework Deci-
sion 2004/757/JHA in the field of illicit drug trafficking (ibidem).
29 Ivi, § 4.1 
30 Ibidem.
31 See supra, sub a), “The effect of Article 16 at the national level”.
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the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules
shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and
systems of the Member States.
They shall concern:
[…] b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure’.
[…] d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the
Council has identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption of
such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the
consent of the European Parliament’.
The choice of Article 82.2 TFEU (namely, most likely, under let. d)
would imply, among other effects, a threefold shift. Firstly, the EU harmoni-
sation of rewarding legislations of the Member States would be attached to
mutual trust and mutual recognition. Secondly, this harmonisation would
not be narrowed to the sole area of counterterrorism32. Thirdly, the EU crim-
inal law on rewarding measures would adopt a major rights-friendly ap-
proach33. However, admittedly, the choice of Article 82.2 d) TFEU would
need an unanimous decision of the Council to be adopted, ‘after obtaining
the consent of the European Parliament’34.
Alternatively, the German unit proposes to distinguish ranges of crimi-
nal sanctions at the EU level. This even more far-reaching proposal, that
would represent a major breakthrough in the EU criminal policy, would al-
low to both establish mandatory minimum sanctions and set more precise
(albeit yet flexible) penalty scales35.
5. The French Unit research findings
a) The effect of Article 16 at the national level
The analysis from the French unit of the effect of Article 16 at the na-
tional level is grounded on the same basic assumption that EU minimum
rules on the definition of crimes and criminal sanctions only set lower lim-
its. Notably, national transpositions of these rules can (and often do) over-
define the criminalised conducts and/or exceed the minimum maximum of
penalties established by EU Framework Decisions and Directives36. Like the
German unit did37, the French unit maintained, more generally, that trans-
posing in an overly narrower manner the EU minimum rules on rewarding
32 Helmut SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 4.4.1 ff.
33 For further insights, see L. BIN, A Model of Reward Measures (Section III, Chapter 1).
34 The last sign of a political will to enact EU rules on rewarding measures dates back
to the Council Resolution of 20 December 1996 on individuals who cooperate with the judi-
cial process in the fight against international organized crime.
35 Helmut SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 4.4.1.2.
36 Clémence QUENTIN, Jean-Yves MARÉCHAL, Julie ALIX, op. cit., § 3.1.
37 With respect to the aforementioned prognosis of the impossibility to gather the in-
formation otherwise (laid down by Article 16 (b)), but also to the interpretative issue regard-
ing the compatibility of non-punishment of terrorist offenders as rewarding measure with
EU law: Helmut SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 3.2 ff.
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measures to counter terrorism ‘would reduce the possibility of being granted
the status of collaborator of justice’ and that this ‘would risk running
counter to the logic of the minimum rules’38. However, unlike the German
unit, the French unit argued that whichever additional requirements or re-
warding measure complies with Directive 2017/541/EU, ‘as long as the con-
ditions envisaged by the Directive are at least provided for’ at the national
level9.
This assumption pursues a twofold goal. The first is to ensure greater
effectiveness to national rewarding legislation. The second is admittedly to
‘validate the existing national mechanisms’40, which consist of a broader
spectrum of rewarding measures. This includes not only mitigating circum-
stances, but also pre-trial discontinuance of the criminal proceeding (dis-
missal of the case)41, non-punishment at the trial phase and post-trial re-
wards, as well as crown witnesses and similar measures to ensure that testi-
mony against a third party is provided.
Admittedly, the French stance – which is in favour of largely flexible in-
terpretations of Article 16 and assessments of the compliance of national re-
warding legislations with the same Article – acknowledges that harmonisa-
tion in the field at hand is unsatisfactory42 and that mutual trust and mutual
recognition are jeopardised43. Arguably, the French unit based its argument
on a bottom-up approach to the extent that the state of play across Europe,
which is deemed unsatisfactory with a view to EU harmonisation and judi-
cial cooperation, is said to mirror long standing ‘legal and cultural choices to
offer wider benefits to the collaborator of justice’44.
Be that as it may, the French unit acknowledges that
‘if the Member State did not comply with the minimum conditions [set
forth under Article 16], this would run counter to the principle of pri-
macy and would not be in conformity with European legislation. The
Member State would then risk an action for failure to fulfil obligations
before the CJEU’45.
b) The harmonisation of rewarding legislations: critical assessment and
proposals
The arguments and findings of the research carried out by the French
unit picture the inconsistent coordination of the evolution of rewarding leg-
38 Clémence QUENTIN, Jean-Yves MARÉCHAL, Julie ALIX, op. cit., 10. See also Helmut
SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 1.1.1.1.
39 Ivi, § 1.2.2.
40 Ibidem.
41 Which ‘paves the way for an invisible practice of not prosecuting collaborators of
justice’: ibidem.
42 Arguably, the point upon which the French and the German unit agree (albeit with
different arguments) is that national non-specific beneficial provisions that apply to other le-
gal situations are not affected.
43 Clémence QUENTIN, Jean-Yves MARÉCHAL, Julie ALIX, op. cit., § 1.2.2. See also Helmut
SATZGER, Patrick BORN, op. cit., § 4.1.
44 Clémence QUENTIN, Jean-Yves MARÉCHAL, Julie ALIX, op. cit., § 1.2.2.
45 Ivi, sub ‘Conclusion on point 1’.
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islations across Europe. This inconsistency can be seen also with respect to
other areas of the fight against serious crime in which rewarding measures
have been adopted. The French unit argues that ‘an amendment to the Di-
rective could remove the optional nature of Article 16’ and/or possibly add
other minimum rules ‘on its scope of application (which procedural stages?
what consequences? what modalities?)’46. Admittedly, this thesis and that of
the German unit does not match, in that this amendment would question
the narrow understanding of Article 83.1 TFEU as a competence to lay down
minimum harmonisation to define criminal sanctions. Nonetheless, broadly
speaking, such a de facto exercise of the EU criminal law competence is not
prohibited a priori. Alternatively, the French unit recalls Article 82 TFEU,
whose resort would make sense of the large use of rewarding measures that
is made beyond the fight against terrorism47.
6. Conclusion: remarks and first guidelines towards the comparative analy-
sis of rewarding legislations
a) Article 16 and national rewarding legislations: interpretation and
room for manoeuvre
The French and the German unit provided their view on the interpreta-
tion of Article 16 of Directive 2017/541/EU. Albeit with different arguments,
two conclusions are shared. Firstly, notwithstanding that the transposition
of Article 16 is optional, the leeway for discretion at the national level is not
absolute. In principle, in the event that legislations on rewarding measures
to counter terrorism are (or have been) enacted, the national law cannot
provide for broader requirements and/or more lenient legal consequences
than those set forth by the minimum rules under Article 16.
More in detail, according to the perspective adopted by the German
unit, reward measures cannot be considered as provisions directly referred
to by art. 83.1 TFEU, but only as somehow “internal limits” to such norms,
i.e. to the provisions defining criminal offences and sanctions. Conversely,
the French unit adopted the opposite perspective, stressing out that benefi-
cial dispositions such as Article 16 fall indeed within the scope of Art. 83
TFEU.
In the first scenario, the reward measures embodied in Art. 16 are to be
viewed as the only cases in which the EU legislator enables the national leg-
islators to waive from the minimum criminal provisions contained in the Di-
rective 2017/541/EU. In the second scenario, these reward measures are to
be considered themselves as minimum provisions provided for by the EU
legislator: therefore, they only bind the national legislator insofar as it
chooses to introduce some reward measures; and in such case, the latter is
bound to implement at least the reward measures provided for by art. 16, be-
ing free to adjoin other reward measures to such “minimum reward mea-
sures”.
46 Ivi, § 2.
47 Ivi, § 3.
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Both units share therefore the view that, notwithstanding the “option-
ality” of Article 16 transposition, the leeway for discretion at the national
level is not absolute if such path is chosen. At this regard, however, the two
units walk opposite ways. According to the French unit, in fact, only broader
requirements would be admissible compared to those enshrined in Art. 16:
Directive 2017/541 sets some requirements under which the terrorist must
be accorded with the reward measure, while the national legislator cannot
restrict such requirements or add further ones. Spanish law (art. 579-bis.3 of
the Spanish Criminal Code) provides for a clear example of not-complying
stricter requirements, inasmuch as it currently requires also a confession
from the repentant, a condition which is not listed by Art. 16.
Two main consequences seem to derive from such approach:
i) once the measures described by Art. 16 are transposed, there are no
limits for national legislator to add further and more far-reaching reward
measures;
ii) the rewards enclosed in Art. 16 – in such States that decide to im-
plement them – look like an actual “right” for the repentant.
Undoubtedly, the first consequence would amount to a valuable result –
even more considering the grounds and the aims of the present research –
that would allow a wide space for reward measures, way beyond those al-
ready mentioned in Art. 16.
However, whereas it may be argued that Art. 16 enshrines an actual
right for the repentant – which would incoherently produce a large disparity
between States that decide to implement it and States that do not, with im-
mediate relapses on judicial cooperation – interpreting the beneficial mea-
sures contained in Art. 16 as minimum standards directly identifiable with
those referred to in art. 83 TFEU seems nonetheless to reveal some difficul-
ties. As stressed out by the German unit – and apart from the issues related
to the wording of Art. 83 – such an insightful point of view seems to clash
with the facultative nature of art. 16: it would in fact be hard to explain un-
der which reasons only Member States that do precisely implement Art. 16
and those that do not at all would be in conformity with the EU law, while
Member States that decide to add stricter requirements – such as the con-
fession of the repentant – would infringe it. We cannot find sufficient rea-
sons or convincing principles able to sustain such a setting, which would
thus result in arbitrary discrepancies. Hence, we rather interpret Art. 16 as a
derogation conceded by the EU legislator to the minimum criminal provi-
sions embraced by Directive 2017/541.
b) Shortcomings of Article 16 with a view to harmonisation and judicial
cooperation and grounds to justify derogations at the national level
Both units maintained that exceptions to Art. 16 might be justified on
specific grounds. Admittedly, the latter can be manifold from a theoretical
perspective. Whereas the German unit highlighted the fundamental princi-
ples of the national Constitutions and the internal coherence of the criminal
law, the French unit emphasised the rather settled traditions of the Member
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States in this field, which embody both the law and legal practice. Arguably,
the bottom-up angle of the relationship between Article 16 and national re-
warding legislations sponsored by the French unit would apply a broad
reach filter, which would justify a large variety of national derogations. Con-
versely, the constitutional and systematic view proposed by the German unit
would perhaps enable to preserve less extensive ‘safe havens’ in the national
rewarding laws. Ultimately, only the national principles and rules that fall
outside the EU criminal competence and the primacy of EU law would be
retained, in light of respectively the ultra vires and counter-limits doctrine
and case law.
Following the view sponsored by the German and the Croatian units, it
is at first arguable that national legislators cannot provide for broader re-
quirements and/or more lenient legal consequences than those set forth by
Art. 16. Nonetheless, some exceptions might be justified. As the German unit
pointed out, if Art. 16 is interpreted in such a way as to list the only cases in
which the EU legislator allows the Member States to “go below” the mini-
mum criminal law standards, i.e. the only cases in which the criminalization
obligation may be implemented in a less severe way than it should accord-
ing to the other dispositions of the Directive, it is also true that this is re-
stricted to the specific matter object of the Directive, that is the counter-ter-
rorism criminal law response. In other words, Art. 16 only binds the legisla-
tor willing to introduce reward measures specifically connected to the
offences that fall within the scope of the Directive, while all the provisions
that are not specifically drawn up for this matter are not subject to the lim-
its of Art. 16. Consequently, Directive 2017/541 does not automatically put
all the national dispositions that may lead to a lesser penalty than the one
fixed as minimum standard by the Directive out of compliance with the EU
law: only measures specifically “attached” to terrorist offences are subject to
the conditions set forth by Art. 16.
At the very least, the national judge will have to evaluate if such dispo-
sitions do lead to infringe the general obligation to respect the “minimum
triad”, i.e. if the criminal response may still be considered effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive. In such a case, should a consistent interpretation not
be deemed sufficient, the principle of legality would most likely prevent the
judge from “disapplying” the national provision. Therefore, the national
judge would have to ask for the intervention of the Constitutional Court –
whose eventual declaration of unconstitutionality could only have pro-futuro
effects.
Accordingly, the most advisable way to introduce reward measures ex-
ceeding the strict limits of Art. 16 (that does not allow other kinds of and
rules on counter-terrorism reward measures) seems to be the resort to gen-
eral provisions on repentance. However, as the German unit argued, there
are some other grounds upon which broader reward measures specifically
designed for terrorists may be maintained as legitim. In fact, although Art.
16 traces a strict limit to the implementation of such measures, it must
nonetheless be noted that this limit must always be consistent with funda-
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mental principles and rights. Otherwise, that limit could not reasonably be
held still.
In this perspective, there are some cases in which EU law itself seems
to suggest the overcoming of such a limit. Considering in fact that many
Member States already provide for general reward measures (whereas others
do not) and especially that in some Member State the justice system even al-
lows the prosecutor to directly terminate the proceeding after a successful
“negotiation” with the repentant, one may conclude that remarkable dispar-
ities on the matter are currently already existing. As long as general com-
prehensive reforms of national criminal law and criminal procedure law fall
outside the scope of the EU competences (or at least its de facto exercise),
this evidently raises manifold issues. The inconsistent approach of the EU
legislator towards the harmonisation in the field at hand risks fostering fo-
rum shopping and jeopardising the purposes of punishment, along with un-
dermining judicial cooperation.
This is indeed one of the main reasons that justified this whole re-
search. In order to tackle all these issues, the limit set forth by Art. 16 should
be maintained as legitimately waivable. Otherwise, an EU Directive would
result in hindering judicial cooperation, which is one of the main goals of
the EU’s AFSJ itself. In order to boost judicial cooperation, while the best so-
lution would probably be the adoption of a specific Directive aimed at har-
monising the reward measures making the most rewarding ones already ex-
isting in the Member States the binding standard in the EU, national legis-
lators willing to introduce rewarding measures for terrorist offenders
beyond the requirements provided for by Art. 16 should already be deemed
as free to do so. It is barely necessary to specify that such measures should
be shaped already in abstracto in such a way as to be applicable only to
transnational cases, as their legitimacy resides in this very condition.
Upon conclusion, while Art. 16 seems to contain strict limits to the na-
tional legislator willing to implement (already existing or new) reward mea-
sures as a tool for countering terrorism, it must be noted that:
i) reward measures not specifically targeted to terrorist offenders do
not fall within the scope of Directive 2017/541/EU and therefore may also
provide for broader requirements than those listed by Art. 16;
ii) reward measures specifically targeted to terrorist offenders which
exceed the limits set forth by Art. 16 shall be deemed lawful if they corre-
spond to a general model of reward legislation as developed by the present
research.
Be that as it may, one shall bear in mind that as long as the optional na-
ture of Article 16 is maintained, by its very nature the Article itself does not
approximate the rewarding legislations of the Member States. This means
that justifying derogations from the requirements and legal effects set forth
by Article 16 at the national level would not achieve the goal of improving
judicial cooperation between national authorities. Indeed, the state of play
across the EU shows that, to a large extent, forms of spontaneous harmoni-
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sation (such as ‘migration’48 and/or ‘cross-fertilisation’49 of rewarding mod-
els) have so far not ensured enough convergence of laws on the matter50.
c) The way forward the EU harmonisation of rewarding legislations: le-
gal basis, issues and perspectives
Both the French and the German research unit agree on the unsatis-
factory state of play of the harmonisation of national rewarding legislations
and on the inadequacy of Article 16 to this effect. The fragmented and un-
suitably coordinated evolution of rules on rewarding measures at the na-
tional and EU levels should drive the Member States and the EU institutions
to pursue far-reaching harmonisation. Therefore, new binding rules should
be laid down at the EU level, in order to accomplish a more comprehensive
harmonisation of rewarding legislations. Notwithstanding, further debate on
the topic at hand ought to also address the issue regarding the choice of le-
gal basis for new rules on rewarding measures at the EU level.
The research units explained the meaningful differences between Arti-
cle 82 and 83 TFEU. Admittedly, the perspective of EU harmonisation based
on Article 83 TFEU has been ruled out by the German unit, which sponsored
a narrow view of the EU substantive criminal law competence. Alternatively,
the whole EU policy on criminal sanctions should change its settled fashion,
thus shifting to the establishment of binding penalties scales to apply at the
national level. Conversely, the French unit considers resort to Article 83
TFEU to be possible as a necessary (albeit minimum) clarification of the
scope, effects and limits of Article 16. Conversely, the choice of Article 82
TFEU has been suggested by both units. With this respect, whilst the French
highlighted the importance of extending EU rewarding rules beyond the
fight against terrorism from a criminal law and policy angle, the German
emphasised also the angles of judicial cooperation and procedural rights
protection. Notably, in the event that a new Directive based on Article 82.2
b) be adopted, the EU regulation on rewarding measures would be centred
around minimum common standards of fundamental rights in the EU for
the purpose of ensuring smooth judicial cooperation. To this effect, although
Article 83 TFEU cannot be excluded a priori (and neither can a joint use of
Articles 82 and 83 TFEU), Article 82 TFEU might be the suitable legal basis,
in light also of the recent accomplishment of the ‘ABC Directives’ in the field
of criminal procedure.
To this effect, also the conclusions of the Croatian unit shall be borne
in mind. Both Article 83 and 82 TFEU are viewed as possible legal basis to-
wards the EU harmonisation of rewarding measures. The Croatian unit
shares the opinion that resorting to Article 83 would pave the way to an
amendment of Article 16, which would thus be limited to the field of
48 See Kent. ROACH, The migration and derivation of counter-terrorism, in Genevieve
LENNON, Clive WALKER (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism, Routledge, 2015.
49 Colin KING, & Clive WALKER, ‘Counter Terrorism Financing: A Redundant Fragmen-
tation?’ (2015) 6(3) NJECL.
50 See M. CANCIO MELIÁ, S. Oubiña Barbolla, Substantial Law Issues: Selected Problems
(Section II, Chapter 5); S. ALLEGREZZA, V. COVOLO, E. MILITELLO, L. ROMANO, Comparative Ap-
proach To Criminal Procedure Aspects (Section II, Chapter 4).
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counter-terrorism. Conversely, choosing Article 82 TFEU would mean that ‘a
new directive with a general scope’ would be adopted: ‘all the offences would
be included and rewarding measures would be harmonised for the main
purpose of preventing any criminal act. This would have a general dimen-
sion applicable not only to the crimes related to terrorism, but it would in-
stead open up a way to deal with a wider scope of perpetrators of other se-
rious crimes’51. Either one legal basis or the other can be chosen, although
admittedly ‘[i]f the enactment of the new rules is limited only to the reward-
ing measures for the perpetrators of the terrorist offences the consensus will
be easier to reach’52.
51 Zlata DURDEVIC, Mirta KUŠTAN, op. cit., § 6.
52 Ibidem.
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Introduction
Questioning the relevance of a collaboration policy with “reformed”
perpetrators of terrorist offences includes a three-dimensional reflection: un-
derstanding the terrorist phenomenon and its meaning in our contemporary
societies; studying the explanatory elements that allow an understanding of
the path led by some perpetrators in committing so-called “terrorist” ac-
tions; and questioning the issues of “collaboration” with the justice system,
a key element in the framework of this research.
The literature is vast on these different questions. Without in any way
claiming to be exhaustive, on the basis of a recent study of the literature1, our
proposal is to proceed in three stages: firstly, to clarify the concept of “terror-
ism” itself, a widely controversial notion and prone to multiple interpreta-
tions as well as its genealogy in Europe. The aim is to better understand the
framework in which terrorism exists today and the answers that we are try-
ing to give to it, including collaboration with the judiciary (I). Secondly, to
provide a summary of the major categories explaining the involvement in a
terrorist trajectory. The understanding of collective and environmental, indi-
vidual and procedural elements which lead a person to engage in a terrorist
“career” is central in order to assess the relevance (or lack thereof) of the use
of collaboration mechanisms with the justice system in the fight against ter-
rorism today (II). Finally, a reflection on the issues of collaboration with the
justice system will conclude the analysis. The question that arises is the
chances of success of a collaborative process marked by negotiation and de-
nunciation dimensions in the specific field of terrorism (III).
I. Terrorism in Europe: characteristics and evolution
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon – the origin of the term can be
found at the end of the 18th century and references to it can be found well
before that2; its contemporary expression responds to two specific concerns
and shows specific characteristics. In order to better understand the terror-
ism that is currently hitting Europe, it is useful to go back to the notion of
terrorism first (1), before presenting a summary of the main developments
of terrorism in Europe in the past years, on the basis of a classical distinc-
tion between the political terrorism of the 1960s, sometimes qualified as
“traditional terrorism”3 and “contemporary terrorism”4 marked by a jihadist
reference (2).
1. Terrorism: between a controversial notion and a plural reality
Even though terrorism is a widely-used concept in the political, legal
1 In the framework of this project, it is impossible to provide a “bibliographic update”
that covers the countries involved in the project. We thus decided to focus on the literature
in English and French, whose contributions were compared with the results of a similar
study based on Italian and Spanish sources (F. ROSSI, The multifactorial process of radicalisa-
tion to «jihadi» fundamentalism, 2020, available at www.criminaljusticenetwork.eu; F. ROSSI,
“Brevi note sul processo multifattoriale di radicalizzazione”, Rassegna italiana di criminolo-
gia, 2021, 2, p. 122 to 129). This position highlights significant convergence of the key read-
ings used in the different languages, especially the multifactorial and procedural dimensions
of the trajectories leading to a terrorist action.
2 Terrorism was defined for the first time in the French Academy Dictionary of 1798
(“Système, régime de la terreur”, Dictionnaire de l’Académie française de 1798, Supplément,
1798 p. 775.) Certain authors have pointed out its existence in Roman times with the
“sicaires”, an organization fighting against Roman occupation in Judea (V. FLAVIUS, La guerre
des Juifs, éd. De Minuit, 1988).
3 T. DELPECH, Le terrorisme international and l’Europe, 2002, Paris, Institut d’Études de
Sécurité, 2002, p. 7; D. BENJAMIN, “Le terrorisme en perspective”, Politique étrangère, 2006, p. 894.
4 R. LETSCHERT and A. PEMBERTON, “Addressing the needs of victims of terrorism in the
OSCE region”, Security and Human Rights, 2008, 19, 4, p. 299.
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and media fields, its definition is still controversial5 (1.1). Particularly at the
international level, consensus on a legal definition of terrorism is proving
difficult to find. At a doctrinal level, however, a number of characteristics
seem to be accepted to qualify and action as a “terrorist” one (1.2).
1.1. Lack of a consensual legal definition
From a legal perspective, there is no comprehensive, complete and uni-
versally accepted legal definition by all States6. At the international level,
years of debate have not led to a consensual definition. Three draft defini-
tions focusing on the traits generally associated with terrorism by the inter-
national community will be presented in this paper. The first one is the re-
sult of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 from 8th Octo-
ber 2004 whereby States are called to define as terrorists the criminal
offences targeted at civilians with the intention to cause death or serious in-
juries, or with the aim of spreading terror among the population, in a group
of people or by individuals, to intimidate a population or to constrain a gov-
ernment or an international organisation to perform or abstain from per-
forming acts7. In 2005, the Organisation of the United Nations (UNO) in
turn proposed a draft definition at the General Convention on International
Terrorism in 2005; emphasis was placed on offences which caused the death
of others or serious physical damage to others, offences which caused seri-
ous damage to public or private goods of various kinds and whose aim is to
intimidate a population or put pressure on authorities to perform or abstain
from performing any act8. Finally, in the European Union (EU), the frame-
work decision of 13th June 2002 relating to the fight against terrorism de-
fines more clearly in article 1 terrorist offences as deliberate acts aimed at
points a) to i)9, “as defined as offences under national law which, given their
5 M.-H. GOZZI, Le terrorisme, Paris, Ellipses, 2003 p. 39; J.-F. GAYRAUD, “Définir le ter-
rorisme, est-ce possible, est-ce souhaitable?”, Revue internationale de criminologie and de po-
lice technique, 1988, 2, p. 190 to 193.
6 A. MASSET, “Terrorisme”, Postal Mémorialis, 2017, p. 1 to 27; H. L’HEUILLET, Aux
sources du terrorisme: de la petite guerre aux attentats-suicides, Paris, Fayard, 2009.
7 Resolution 1566 (2004) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 5053th meeting on
8th October 2004, available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-
resolution-1566-2004-on-threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/.
8 The draft general convention on international terrorism proposed for the first time by
the special committee of the United Nations on terrorism, 29th July 2005, art. 2. The latest
version of the draft is available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
A/C.6/65/L.10&Lang=F.
9 (a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport sys-
tem, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on
the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or re-
sult in major economic loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explo-
sives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and develop-
ment of, biological and chemical weapons;
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nature or context may seriously damage a country or an international or-
ganisation, were committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a popula-
tion, or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to
perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or de-
stroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social struc-
tures of a country or an international organisation”10.
The three broad definitions emphasise two elements specific to terror-
ist actions which are largely shared by the international community11: the
commission of a “criminal” material act damaging the life or body of per-
sons or causing material damage of a certain intensity, and the presence of a
specific moral or intentional element (intimidating a population or spread-
ing terror, destabilising of putting pressure on a state or an international or-
ganization.)
From the perspective of national law, the content of these definitions
will have to be transposed and specified in the national laws, as many coun-
tries have adopted specific legislation in recent years specifying the types of
“terrorist” offences and their scope12. It follows that, in practice, the legal
classification of an act as a terrorist act and its penal construction remain
variable and protean, depending on the cultural context and legal traditions
specific to each country, but also on the interpretation of the events in which
the act takes place and the geopolitical interests it raises for each State con-
cerned13.
1.2. The characteristics of a terrorist offence
From a political perspective, the terrorist offence undoubtedly under-
lines in an exemplary manner the socially constructed nature of any crimi-
nal offence, the result of conflicts of values and interests14. An act perceived
and incriminated by one individual as a “terrorist act” will be interpreted by
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of
which is to endanger human life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental
natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).
10 Framework Decision 2002/475/JAI of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.
11 R. LETSCHERT and A. PEMBERTON, “Victims of terrorism in the OSCE (Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe) region. Analysis of a questionnaire on the practice of
OSCE participating states on solidarity with the victims of terrorism”, Report commissioned
by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2009, Poland. See also
on this topic: R. LETSCHERT and A. PEMBERTON, “Addressing the needs of victims of terrorism
in the OSCE region”, Security and Human Rights, 2008, 19, 4, p. 298 to 311.
12 As an example, Belgium adopted by an act of 19th December 2003, a specific chap-
ter to the penal code entitled “terrorist offences” articles 137 to 141-ter of the Penal Code).
13 H. L’HEUILLET, op. cit., 2009, p. 69; A. CONTE, Human Rights in the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism, Heidelberg, Springer, 2010, p. 11 and 12; A. PEMBERTON, “Needs of
Victims of Terrorism”, Assisting Victims of Terrorism. Towards a European Standard of Justice,
R. LETSCHERT, I. STAIGER and A. PEMBERTON (eds.), Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 127.
14 On this topic, see D. DUEZ, “De la définition à la labellisation: le terrorisme comme
construction sociale”, K. BANNELIER, Th. CHRISTAKIS, O. CORTEN and B. DELCOURST (eds.), Le
droit international face au terrorisme. Après le 11 septembre 2001, Paris, Pedone, 2004, p. 105
to 118.
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another as an act of resistance or a legitimate act of liberation15. An act con-
demned by a State as a terrorist offence in one context will be supported by
the same State in another context16. Likewise, the line between terrorist of-
fence and other forms of political violence, such as acts of insurrection,
guerrilla warfare or even civil disobedience, is not always easy to draw17.
To consensually define terrorism, to agree on the scope of this concept
and the acts that could qualify it as a “terrorist” offence remains an arduous
task, as the semantic field in question gives rise to diverse and contextual in-
terpretations. If need be, this is evidenced in that the proposal of integrating
the crime of terrorism on the list of crimes included in the Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court resulted in failure, given the lack of a political
consensus on its definition18. Through the literature, there is nonetheless
room for drawing a series of characteristics that are relatively consensual in
the Western world around the notion of a terrorist act. Compared to other
criminal acts or forms of social or political protest, terrorism will be distin-
guished by the following features.
The first one is committing or repeating material acts of violence against
people or goods, generally incriminated by national laws. This violence can
be “blind”19, aimed at indeterminate and arbitrary targets, or otherwise “tar-
geted”, aimed at specific figures with a high symbolic content20. However,
some believe that an act of violence is not a requirement and that the mere
“threat” of such an act might suffice, provided that other criteria of an in-
tentional nature are present21.
The second one is the will to create a situation of lasting fear and terror
within a targeted community22, using a communication strategy that turns
the terrorist act into a message to society. Besides its instrumental dimen-
sion, terrorist violence has a strong symbolic dimension: the act is part of a
“psychological warfare”23, aimed at creating a state of emotional shock
within the targeted group, with a view to making them aware of a situation,
15 R. DRAKE, The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, Bloom-
ington, Indiana University Press, 1989, p. xiv; A. PEMBERTON, op. cit., 2010, p. 127; P.C. KRAT-
COSKI, and al., “Terrorist Victimization: Prevention, Control and Recovery”, International Re-
view of Victimology, 2001, 8, 3, p. 257.
16 Islamist terrorism, widely condemned nowadays, was supported by the West when
it came to finding against the expansion of the USSR in Afghanistan (D. SOUCHON, “Quand les
djihadistes étaient nos amis”, Monde diplomatique, février 2016, p. 14 and 15).
17 L. WEINBERG, A. PEDAHZUR and S. HIRSCH-HOEFLER, “The Challenges of Conceptualiz-
ing Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2004, 16, p. 777 to 794.
18 M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 53.
19 P. GUENIFFEY, “Généalogie du terrorisme contemporain”, Le Débat, 2003, 126, p. 160
and 161.
20 R. LETSCHERT and A. PEMBERTON, op. cit., 2008, p. 299.
21 L. WEINBERG, A. PEDAHZUR and S. HIRSCH-HOEFLER, op. cit., 2004, p. 786.
22 A.P. SCHMID, J. ALBERT and A.J. JONGMAN, Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, au-
thors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers,
1988, p. 5; M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 31; S. FREEDMAN, “Psychological Effects of Terror At-
tacks”, Essentials of Terror Medicine, S. SHAPIRA, J. HAMMOND and L. COLE (eds.), London,
Springer, 2009, p. 405 to 424; H. L’HEUILLET, op. cit., 2009, p. 69.
23 H. L’HEUILLET, op. cit., 2009, p. 79; M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 65; D. SPINELLIS,
“Terrorism”, Revue hellenique de droit international, 1994, 47, p. 446 to 462.
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influencing them or forcing them to adopt certain positions24. The terrorist
act therefore seeks to benefit from the widest possible publicity and, in this
context, its direct victims are merely “collateral damage”: they are in fact ex-
ploited, set up as messages to influence more broadly the social group that
is the main target of the terrorist action25.
The third one is to promote a specific ideology of a philosophical, social,
cultural, political or religious nature26. This ideological dimension allows to
distinguish terrorism from other types of violent crimes27 and its perpetra-
tors from other criminals such as those belonging to organised crime (the
Mafia or Cosa Nostra in Italy, the cartels in Latin America, etc.) However,
the line between these two worlds is sometimes blurred28. The perpetrators
of the terrorist act perceive it as a legitimate means of propaganda, in the
context of a political conflict where an attempt is made to defend a cause
that does not have (or not enough) legitimacy (the terrorist act is then
analysed as being linked to an “impatience to act” in a conflict that lacks
popular support and/or has an imbalance of forces)29. This ideological-polit-
ical dimension of terrorism as a “weapon of the weak” mired in a battle for
influence is clearly supported in cases of nationalist terrorism, liberation, re-
sistance, secession or insurrection faced together with an authoritarian
regime or an invading State30. It is also claimed nowadays in the framework
of jihadist terrorism which presents itself in many ways as the vanguard of
the fight against the West and its posture of domination and exploitation31.
24 P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 158 to 161; M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 31.
25 B. PFEFFERBAUM, “Victims of Terrorism and the Media”, Terrorists, Victims and Soci-
ety. Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences, A. SILKE (eds.), West Sussex,
Wiley, 2003, p. 175 to 187; P. MANNONI, Les logiques du terrorisme, Paris, In Press, 2004, p.
119; A.P. SCHMID, “Magnitudes and Focus of Terrorist Victimization”, Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, A.P. SCHMID (eds.), Bangkok, UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, 2005; R. LETSCHERT and I. STAIGNER, “Introduction and Definitions”, Assisting Victims
of Terrorism: Towards a European Standard of Justice, R. LETSCHERT, I. STAIGNER and A. PEM-
BERTON (eds.), Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 8; J. PAUST, “A Survey of Possible Legal Responses
to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative Action”, Georgia Jour-
nal of International and Comparative Law, 1975, 2, 5, p. 431 to 469; A. SCHMID and A. JONG-
MAN, Political Terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and lit-
erature, Brunswick, Transaction, 1988, p. 5; L. WEINBERG, A. PEDAHZUR and S. HIRSCH-HOEFLER,
“The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2004, 16, p.
777 to 794.
26 D. SPINELLIS, op. cit., 1994, p. 446.
27 R.A. FRIEDLANDER, “Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Violence in Theory and Prac-
tice”, Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, 1976, 6, 1, p. 83to 93. The latter all the
successfully summarised that “terrorism is different from criminal violence in that its pur-
pose is symbolic, its means psychological, and its ends political”. (Ibid., p. 88).
28 M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 41 and following.
29 M. CRENSHAW, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic
Choice”, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, W. REICH
(eds.), New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 13; D. SPINELLIS, op. cit., 1994, p. 446;
M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 28 and following.
30 Some authors therefore insist on the distinction between illegitimate terrorism and
legitimate national liberation struggles (the especially P.C. KRATCOSKI, M.M. EDELBACHER and
D.K. DAS, “Terrorist Victimization: Prevention, Control and Recovery”, International Review
of Victimology, 2001, 8, p. 257).
31 S. GARCET, “La question de la privation relative au sein du processus de radicalisa-
tion”, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 2019, 1, p. 53.
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In a way, it is also reinforced by the answer it receives, often presented as a
“war against terrorism”, against its perpetrators and the values it defends32.
The fourth and final feature of a terrorist act, central to this “ideologi-
cal war”33 is the will to destabilise a social group, its institutions and its val-
ues. Terrorism generally targets a specific group, its fundamental values and
its representations in the name of opposing values and representations. In
this context, it may seek to exacerbate the conflict and fragment opinions in
order to widen the gap between them and win over potential members who
are sympathetic towards the values it promotes, the discrimination it de-
nounces and the struggle it defends34.
We shall therefore retain that the terrorist act, if it has a material ele-
ment (an act of violence against people and goods), is characterised above
all by the particularity of its moral element. It is the intention linked to the
act, which can be broken down into various elements revolving around the
ideological core, which gives the terrorist act its true specificity. This is also
what makes the largely privileged criminal response difficult: on the one
hand, the more it is exacerbated, which is often the case35, the more the
criminal response reinforces the war logic that the terrorist strategy aims to
create, potentially fuelling recruitment channels it wants to fight against. On
the other hand, the traditional objectives of sentencing in terms of deter-
rence, moralisation and reintegration, already widely questioned in response
to ordinary crime, are even more difficult to imagine in a dispute with such
strong ideological connotations36. This also makes the conceptualization of
discussion or collaboration mechanisms of a “repentant” type more difficult
with authors engaged in a struggle against a system they wish to destroy.
2. A genealogy of terrorism in Western Europe (1960-2020)
Terrorism took on a specific dimension in Europe after the Second
World War. In this regard, two periods can be distinguished quite clearly.
The first is the period of the “Years of Lead” (1960-1980), marked by the de-
velopment of political terrorism, but also by autonomist or separatist terror-
ism (2.1). The second is the contemporary terrorism of the beginning of the
21st century, characterised by a weakening (although not the disappearance)
32 G.W. BUSH, Speech before Congress, 20 September 2001, cited in T. DELPECH, op. cit.,
2002, p. 37.
33 H. L’HEUILLET, op. cit., 2009, p. 79; M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 71.
34 T. DELPECH, op. cit., 2002, p. 679; M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 10 and 41.
35 Penalties are generally harsher, procedural rules are more flexible, and certain gen-
eral principles of criminal law (legality, proportionality) are undermined in “special
regimes”. M.-L. CESONI, “Nouvelles méthodes de lutte contre la criminalité: paradigme de l’-
efficacité et désuétude des principes fondamentaux. Introduction générale”, Nouvelles méth-
odes de lutte contre la criminalité: la normalisation de l’exception. Étude de droit comparé (Bel-
gique, États-Unis, Italie, Pays-Bas, Allemagne, France), M.-L. CESONI (eds.), 2007, Bruxelles,
Bruylant, p. 1 to 56.
36 R. LETSCHERT and M. GROENHUIJSEN, “Global Governance and Global Crime - Do Vic-
tims Fall in Between?”, The New Faces of Victimhood, Globalization, Transnational Crimes
and Victim Rights, R. LETSCHERT and J. VAN DIJK (eds.), 2011, p. 40.
361TERRORIST TRAJECTORIES
of this political terrorism and especially by the rise of a jihadist terrorism
which mobilises the political-religious reference (2.2).
2.1. Terrorism during the Years of Lead: political polarisation and autonomist
claims
The expression “Years of Lead” refers to the period of political violence
in which several European countries were confronted between the end of the
1960s and the end of the 1980s37.
This period is characterised in several European countries by political
radicalisation phenomenon against the background of a left-right split, ac-
companied by terrorist movements resorting to armed struggle in order to
assert their political message. While the two countries most dramatically ex-
posed to this type of political terrorism were West Germany and Italy, reso-
nances were heard in France, Spain and Belgium as well. Characteristically
enough, these countries will experience an alternation of attacks attributed
sometimes to the extreme left and sometimes to the extreme right, against a
backdrop of marked (if not absolute) differences: the extreme-left move-
ments, anxious to attack the capitalist system and to win the popular masses
in their struggle, develop a targeted terrorism, aiming at symbolic figures
representative of the system to be brought down38. Extreme right terrorism
is more marked by a blind and indiscriminate violence intended to spread
fear and create reflexes of identity or conservative withdrawal among the
population39.
Italy is without doubt the most representative country of this dual ter-
rorism of extreme left and extreme right that will develop for 20 years start-
ing in the 1960s. The attacks claimed by the extreme left (the Brigate Rosse
but also to a lesser extent Prima Linea or the Nuclei Armati Proletari) will
combine the “black terrorism” of the Fronte Nazionale Rivoluzionario, d’Or-
dine Nuovo or the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari, marked by indiscriminate
and unclaimed attacks, against the backdrop of what some call “the tension
strategy”40 and a judicial activity very regularly blocked by invoking state se-
crecy41.
In (Western) Germany, la Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) or “Baader-Mein-
hof group” resort to armed struggle and to “urban guerrilla” in order to fight
37 M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 11 and following.
38 M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 16.
39 G. BOCCA, Il terrorismo italiano 1970-1980, Milano, Rizzoli 1981, p. 133.
40 G. FLAMINI, Il partito del golpe, La strategia della tensione e del terrore dal primo cen-
trosinistra organico al sequestro Moro, Bologna, Bovolenta, 1981-1985. The tension strategy
refers to a strategy promoted by the extreme right in Italy aimed at creating fear and to dis-
qualify the “historical compromise” under negotiation between the Christian Democracy and
the Italian Communist Party against the backdrop of the intervention of the P2 lodge and,
potentially, the “gladio” cells (see specially, G. Panvini, Ordine nero, guerriglia rossa, Turin,
Einaudi, 2009; G. FLAMINI, op. cit., 1981-1985).
41 Y. CARTUYVELS, “Justice et intérêt: la lutte contre le terrorisme noir et le secret d’État
politico-militaire en Italie”, Droit et intérêt. Droit positif, droit comparé et histoire du droit, Ph.
GÉRARD, Fr. OST and M. VAN DE KERCHOVE (eds.), Brussels, F.U.S.L., p. 115 to 138.
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against capitalism and state imperialism42. Mainly practising targeted ter-
rorism on the national scene, the RAF laid down its arms in 1992 and an-
nounced its dissolution in 1998. As a counterpoint, between 1950 and 1980,
Germany saw the development of various neo-fascist groups such as the
Wehrsportsgruppe Hoffman, which carried out indiscriminate attacks in pub-
lic places43. In France, the Direct Action (“AD”) group, inspired by commu-
nism and libertarianism developed the project of creating along with the
Rote Armee Fraktion, a common revolutionary front of the extreme left in
Western Europe44. In Belgium, the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), cre-
ated in 1983, resorted to targeted attacks directed at material targets before
its leaders were arrested in 1985. These years are also marked in Belgium by
bloody and unclaimed attacks, the “Brabant killings” (28 deaths between
1982 and 1985). The source of these attacks, which has not been clarified to
date, has been attributed sometimes to organised crime and sometimes to
paramilitary forces as part of an Italian-style tension strategy45. Finally, in
Spain, the Grupos de resistencia antifascista primero de octubre (“GRAPO”)
resort since 1975 to armed struggle and revolutionary guerrilla warfare to
fight against Franco’s regime, bourgeois domination and imperialism46.
In addition to this political terrorism, some European countries such as
France, Spain or the United Kingdom have been facing separatist or inde-
pendence terrorist movements since the mid-20th century. Since the end of
the 1950s, Spain has been confronted with Basque separatist terrorism, rep-
resented by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”) organization47. Gradually
losing influence with the democratisation of the Spanish regime, Basque ter-
rorism is undoubtedly one of the deadliest in Europe, claiming countless vic-
tims (more than 800 dead and thousands injured between 1959 and 2008)48.
In response to this separatist terrorism, an extreme right-wing neo-fascist
movement developed at the end of the 1970s, namely with the Groupe Anti-
terroriste de Libération (“GAL”), a group that uses methods of armed struggle
and targeted assassination against ETA members49. In Northern Ireland, the
Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) is a group of nationalists fighting for the an-
nexation of Ulster to Eire and the recognition of a single sovereign state out-
42 S. AUST, Baader-Meinhof, The Inside Story of the R.A.F., Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2009.
43 P. CHASSAIGNE, Les années 1970. Fin d’un monde et origine de notre modernité, Paris,
Armand Colin, 2012, p. 230 and following.
44 See Action Directe and RAF, bilingual press release entitled in its French version
“pour l’unité des révolutionnaires en Europe Occidentale”, January 1985. Available at
http://www.socialhistoryportal.org/sites/default/files/raf/fr/0019850100_01%2520FR_2.pdf.
45 House of Representatives, “Parliamentary enquiry into the necessary adjustments to
the organisation and functioning of the police and judicial system in light of the difficulties
that arose during the investigation into the Brabant killers”, 14 October 1997, No. 573/7-
95/96. Available at http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/49/0573/49K0573007.pdf.
46 Ibidem.
47 R. ALONSO and F. REINARES, “L’Espagne face aux terrorismes”, Pouvoirs, 2008, 124, 1,
p. 107 to 121; G. MÉNAGE, L’oeil du pouvoir. Face aux terrorismes 1981-1986. Action directe.
Corse. Pays basque, Fayard, Paris, 2000, p. 12.
48 R. ALONSO and F. REINARES, op. cit., 2008, p. 107.
49 R. ALONSO and F. REINARES, op. cit., 2008, p. 112.
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side the United Kingdom50. In this case once again, in response to the ac-
tions of the IRA, small terrorist groups emerge that oppose the demands for
independence51. In France, there are the actions of the Front National de
Libération de la Corse (“FNLC”), which become more violent as of the
1990s52.
2.2. The transformation of terrorism in Europe in the 21st century
Although political and/or separatist terrorism has not completely disap-
peared in the 21st century, it has clearly declined in intensity, with the result
that from 2010 onwards the various groups and entities linked to such ter-
rorism will no longer be included on the list drawn up by the Council of the
European Union53.
In practice, after the turning point of the attacks of 11 September 2001
in the United States, 21st century Europe has been faced with a “new phase”
of terrorism54, of political and religious inspiration and with a significant
transnational character which embodies “Islamist jihadism”55. Originating
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1970s, gaining strength in the con-
text of the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, jihadist
radicalism flourished in Africa and the Middle East in the 1990s before
reaching Europe at the beginning of the 21st century56. The armed interven-
tion in Iraq initiated in 2003 by the United States and followed by some Eu-
ropean states – the coalition forces – favoured the expansion of jihadist ter-
rorism, whose aim is to attack the West, its posture of domination and its
logic of exploitation, its values and principles57.
Unlike the previous “political” terrorism, jihadist terrorism would be
characterized by claiming a religious ideological inspiration58, relying on a
50 N. BERNHEIM, “I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army)”, Encyclopædia Universalis [en ligne],
disponible sur: http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/irish-republican-army/; J. TARNERO, Les
terrorismes, Paris, Milan, 1997, p. 16 and 17.
51 T. DELPECH, op. cit., 2002, p. 7 and 8.
52 J. TARNERO, op. cit., 1997, p. 37. Still active in the 21st century, the organisation an-
nounced their commitment to a demilitarisation process on 25 June 2014 (Le Monde, “Corse:
le FNLC annonce qu’il dépose les armes”, article du 26 June 2014).
53 Council Common Position 2009/468/CFSP of 15 June 2009 updating Common Posi-
tion 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repeal-
ing Common Position 2009/67/CFSP, Official Journal of the Union 1/45; Council Decision
2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010 updating the list of persons, groups and entities to which Ar-
ticles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures
to combat terrorism apply.
54 D. BENJAMIN, “Le terrorisme en perspective”, Politique étrangère, 2006, 4, p. 887 to
900.
55 R. JACKSON, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic
Discourse”, Government and Opposition: an International journal of comparative politics,
2007, p. 394 to 426.
56 C.R. LISTER, The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction, Washington, Brookings Institu-
tion Press, 2015; G. KEPEL, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam, Harvard, Harvard University
Press, 2002.
57 A. LAOUKILI, “Emprise de l’idéal, pacte dénégatif et répétition: l’islamisme comme
matrice idéologique du terrorisme djihadiste”, Connexions, 2017, 107, p. 87 to 106.
58 R. GUOLO, L’ultima utopia. Gli jihadisti europei, Guerini e Associati, Milano, 2015, p.
14.
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largely transnational59 structure and seeking to produce mass victimisation
in order to accentuate its message. Endorsing a war logic at the expense of
blurring the boundaries between crime and act of war60, it would have the
effect, instead, of toughening the response of Western states both inside61
and outside62 their borders, this time at the expense of blurring the bound-
aries between criminal and military response63.
The religious reference, regularly instrumentalized and producing a con-
flation between Islam and terrorism, unfortunately echoed by various West-
ern leaders64, is very present. The perpetrators of some thirty attacks on Eu-
ropean soil since those in Madrid in March 200465, members of Al Qaeda
first of all, and then of the Islamic State, invoke radical Islam to justify a
fight aimed at destroying the enemy66. If, unlike the “political” terrorism of
the Years of Lead, the religious banner is well raised, not all the political di-
mension has been removed: where revolutionaries of the Years of Lead
claimed the defence of the working class against an oppressive capitalist sys-
tem, the jihadists invoke the defence of the Muslim community exploited
and persecuted by the modern West, both in the South (colonisation, armed
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, etc.) and in the North (exclusion, Is-
lamophobia, racism, etc.)67. Jihadist terrorism in fact functions, perhaps in
the end no less than its “political” predecessor, on a double political-religious
level68.
59 I.B. GOMEZ DE LA TORRE, El terrorismo en el siglo XXI: del terrorismo nacional al ter-
rorismo global, Revista penal, 2018, 42, p. 5 to 30.
60 M. LLOBET, “Terrorism: Limits Between Crime and War. The Fallacy of the Slogan
‘War on Terror’”, Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Security and Human
Rights in Countering Terrorism, A. MASFERRER (eds.), Dordrecht, Springer, 2012, p. 101 to 117.
61 K. ROACH, “Sources and Trends in Post-9/11 Anti-terrorism Laws”, SSRN Electronic
Journal, 2006, (disponible sur http://ssrn.com/abstract=899291); C. WALKER, Terrorism and the
Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 386; C. WALKER, “The Impact of Contemporary
Security Agendas Against Terrorism on the Substantive Criminal Law”, Post 9/11 and the
State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Security and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism, A.
MASFERRER (eds.), Dordrecht, Springer, 2012, p. 122 and 123.
62 T. DEGENHARDT, “The Use of War as Punishment in the International Sphere: Special
issue on ‘War, Law and Global Order’”, Jura Gentium. Journal of Philosophy of Law and
Global Politics, 2007, p. 15.
63 M. TRAPANI, “Guerra e diritto penale. Sull’adeguatezza degli strumenti penalistici nei
confronti del c.d. terrorismo islamico”, Politica criminale e cultura giuspenalistica. Scritti in
onore di Sergio Moccia, A. CAVALIERE, C. LONGOBARDO, V. MASARONE, F. SCHIAFFO, A. SESSA (eds.),
Napoli, 2017, p. 249 and 250.
64 R. JACKSON, op. cit., 2007, p. 394 to 426.
65 We will mainly cite the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, in London in July 2005
and in June 2017, in Paris in January and in November 2015, in Brussels in March in 2016,
in Nice in July 2016, in Berlin in December 2016, in Manchester in May 2017 and in
Barcelona in August in 2017.
66 W.R. LOUIS and D.M. TAYLOR, “Understanding the September 11 Attack on America:
The Role of Intergroup Theories on Normative Influence”, Analyses of Social Issues and Pub-
lic Policy, 2002, p. 10 and following.
67 W.R. LOUIS and D.M. TAYLOR, op. cit., 2002, p.10 and following.
68 A traditional distinction tends to oppose political terrorism at the end of the 20th
century to the jihadist terrorism against the backdrop of a double distinction: “traditional”
terrorism would intend to alter the social structures whereas jihadist terrorism would aim at
“destroying the enemy” (P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 169). The religious ideology typical of
the latter deepens the divide and facilitates the resort to mass victimization. Some, however,
rightly point out that the gap is probably less important than it seems: on the one hand, the
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Another characteristic of this contemporary terrorism is its transna-
tional character. While terrorism of the 20th century was generally (although
not exclusively69) local, domestic or internal70, jihadist terrorism is interna-
tional both in its structure and organisation, its functioning and its inten-
tions and in the issues it raises71. The aim is to take the fight to an interna-
tional level, with transnational recruitment that promotes a discourse cen-
tred on a “conflict of civilisations” and mirrored by the conviction that the
“war on terrorism” can no longer be thought of on the basis of a strictly na-
tional approach72.
A third specificity of contemporary terrorism is the emphasis put on
mass victimisation designed to fuel fear and increase the divide within Eu-
ropean societies. While it has not escaped blind and indiscriminate forms of
violence73, political terrorism at the end of the 20th century is more generally
described as “individual”, local and targeted terrorism74. Contemporary ter-
rorism, for its part, clearly pursues mass violence, with the conviction that
the greater the victimisation, the greater the media repercussions will be and
the greater the strength of the message it seeks to deliver. In this regard, the
mass media coverage of contemporary terrorism, though not new75, is a cen-
tral strategic issue. Today’s communication technologies (the Internet, social
networks) facilitate a wider and faster dissemination of terrorist acts, facili-
tating the spread of terror and manipulation of the popular audience76.
A fourth characteristic of contemporary terrorism is to mark a turning
point in the response to it. The political terrorism of the 20th century was, for
the most part, regarded as a crime and fought with the weapons of criminal
law, even if this was at the expense of emergency laws. Jihadist terrorism has
led to a questioning of the criminal approach: if classical criminal law re-
mains mobilised, it is largely overwhelmed by the creation of a “criminal law
ideological reference of the political terrorism of the Years of Lead could also have a “quasi-
religious” dimension, (D. BENJAMIN, op. cit., 2006, p. 887 to 900; P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p.
169), seeking to destroy the “class enemy” and resorting to “indiscriminate” attacks targeting
an undetermined number of people; on the other hand, contemporary jihadist terrorism also
claims behind a religious reference, a political dimension with an outspoken will of using vi-
olence to protect an oppressed community.
69 20th-century terrorism, particularly extreme left on, already had four in elements
whether at logistics, planning or even operational level (G. MÉNAGE, L’œil du pouvoir, t. 2,
Face aux terrorismes, Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2000, p. 6).
70 H. L’HEUILLET, op. cit., 2009, p. 243.
71 R. LETSCHERT and A. PEMBERTON, op. cit., 2008, p. 305.
72 See especially: Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges and Change, AMore SecureWorld: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc A/59/565
(2004), para 145.
73 “Blind” violence was more readily practised by the extreme right.
74 E. MARENSSIN and A. SQUIRREL, La “bande à Baader” ou la violence révolutionnaire,
Paris, Champ libre, 1972, p. 162 and following.
75 P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 158 and 159.
76 G. WEIMANN, Terror on the Internet. The New Arena, the New Challenges, Washington,
United States Institute of Peace, 2006; T. GARCIN, Terrorisme, Médias et Démocratie, Lyon,
Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2001; U. YANAY, “Victims of terrorism: Is it a ‘Non-issue’?”, He-
brew university of Jerusalem, 1993, 20, p. 28; J. BRECKENRIDGE and P. ZIMBARDO, “The strategy
of terrorism and the psychology of mass-mediated fear”, Psychology of Terrorism, B. BONGAR,
L. BROWN, L. BEUTLER, J. BRECKENRIDGE and P. ZIMBARDO (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2007, p. 116 to 133.
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of the enemy” derogating from the basic principles of criminal law for effi-
ciency reasons77, as well as by a militarisation of the fight against “enemy
combatants”78, or even against “unlawful combatants”79, at the expense of a
potential depersonalisation and dehumanisation of the other, which are pre-
cisely part of the objectives of the jihadist strategy80.
II. Understanding the terrorist trajectories: from socio-political factors to in-
dividual paths
The causes of contemporary terrorism and the explanation of the tra-
jectories leading to radicalisation and jihadist terrorism have been the sub-
ject of numerous studies in Europe81. Without going into a detailed analysis
of the various explanatory models, we propose in this paper a synthetic
analysis of the main types of explanations put forward in the literature to ex-
plain the success of radicalisation and the slide of some towards a terrorist
trajectory. In this regard, a dual framework can be organized. The first one
emphasizes the general or environmental factors (“a clash of civilisations”,
geo-political power relations, mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination)
which concern more or less large groups of individuals and which are regu-
larly shared in the literature to explain the success of contemporary terror-
ism (1). The second emphasises the truly individual dimension of involve-
ment in a terrorist trajectory, highlighting the role of various elements of a
subjective nature (personality of the subject, conditions of a cognitive en-
counter with the terrorist narrative, the procedural dimension of a violent
path) in the construction of such a trajectory (2).
1. The contextual dimension: clash of cultures, geopolitical power relations,
social exclusion and racial discrimination
Three factors of an environmental character are generally put forward,
which constitute a sort of “backdrop” or reservoir of elements to explain the
rise of contemporary terrorism, in its jihadist version. The first is the success
77 J. ALIX, O. CAHN, “Mutations de l’antiterrorisme et émergence d’un droit répressif de
la sécurité nationale”, Revue de sciences criminelle et de droit pénal comparé, 2017, 4, p. 845
to 868.
78 R.A. DUFF, “Notes on Punishment and Terrorism”, American Behavioral Scientist,
2005, 48, p. 758.
79 See mainly H. CARVALHO, “Terrorism, Punishment, And Recognition”, New Criminal
Law Review, 2012, 15, p. 345 to 374; R.A. DUFF, op. cit., p. 760.
80 A. PEMBERTON, op. cit., 2010, p. 109; A. LAOUKILI, op. cit., 2017, p. 92.
81 For a summarised approach, see F. ROSSI, “Brevi note sul processo multifattoriale di
radicalizzazione”, op. cit.; M. HAFEZ, C. MULLINS, The radicalizazion puzzle: a theoretical syn-
thesis of empirical approaches to homegrown extremism, in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
n. 38/2015, p. 967; C. GUÉRANDEL and E. MARLIÈRE, «Les djihadistes à travers Le Monde”,
Hommes et migrations, 2016; P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 166 and following; A. LAOUKILI,
«Emprise de l’idéal, pacte dénégatif et répétition: l’islamisme comme matrice idéologique du
terrorisme djihadiste”, Connexions, 2017, 107, p. 87 to 106; D. BENJAMIN, op. cit., 2006, p. 887
to 900; D. BACHET, “Le terrorisme djihadiste: ses causes, ses effets et ses suites”, L’Homme et
la Société, 2015, 195-196, p. 25 to 28.
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of a culturalist argument that links terrorism to the “clash of civilisations”
between the West and the Muslim world (1). The second underlines the role
played by a second mobilising narrative, focusing on the geo-political and
economic power relations between the West and the Muslim world (2). The
third focuses on the links to exploitation and discrimination experienced in
Europe by people of the Muslim faith (3). These three elements are likely to
nourish a feeling of injustice among a certain number of actors prone to be-
ing sensitive to terrorist discourse.
1.1. The “clash of civilisations”: a culturalist argument
The culturalist explanation associates jihadist terrorism to a conflict of
civilisations, referring to the theory on “clash of civilisations” by S. Hunt-
ington. According to him, the end of the Cold War and the East-West divide
would give room to a conflict of civilisations at the heart of which Islam
would play a driving role82. Against the backdrop of a historical conflict with
the West, which goes back to the Crusades and more recent episodes of
colonisation, the Islamic religion would serve as a sounding board for a ji-
hadism seeking to place the Muslim world in a logic of war against non-
Muslims83.
Regardless of the relevance of the concept of “clash of civilisations”84, it
is clear that this culturalist argument has been mobilised by jihadist propa-
ganda85 and symbolised by the choice of certain emblematic targets of the
culture of the adversary to be destroyed86. From this perspective, the West,
its values (democracy, pluralism, freedom, secularism, modernity, respect for
human rights, the rule of law, etc.) and its “infidel” populations represent the
enemy of Islam: if the West is presented as the source of the political, eco-
nomic and social problems of Muslim societies87, it also, if not above all, in
this culturalist perspective, represents a danger of the “deterioration of val-
ues”88, of corruption and moral decay for Islam. Terrorism therefore appears
82 S. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1996, p. 98 and following.
83 M. LAZAR, “Le terrorisme en Italie et en France. Questions de recherche”, Vingtième
siècle. Revue d’histoire, 2017, 2 p. 42; M. GAUCHET, Le Monde, 19 March 2016, p. 1.
84 Huntington’s thesis is based on “the absence, in the Muslim world, of the matrix po-
litical values that underpin representative democracy in Western civilization: the separation
of political and theological authority, the rule of law, social pluralism, parliamentary institu-
tions of a representative government, the protection of individual rights and civil liberties,
which act as a buffer between citizens and the power of the State” (R. INGLEHART and P. NOR-
RIS, “Le véritable choc des civilisations”, Le Débat, 2003, 126, p. 77). Some global studies
(World Values Survey), show the empirical weakness of this thesis, since they allow us to
conclude that “today throughout the world, societies, both Muslim and Judeo-Christian, con-
sider democracy to be the best form of government”. (Idem, p. 77).
85 S.J. BAELE, K.A. BOYD and T.G. COAN, “The Matrix of Islamic’s Propaganda: Maga-
zines”, ISIS Propaganda. A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message, S.J. BAELE, K.A. BOYD and T.G.
COAN (eds.), New York, Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 84 to 126.
86 The attack of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015 comes to mind, or the attack
in the Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014.
87 W.R. LOUIS and D.M. TAYLOR, op. cit., 2002.
88 R. GUOLO, op. cit., 2015, p. 31 and following; J. RAFLIK, Terrorisme et mondialisation.
Approches historiques, Paris, Gallimard, 2016.
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to be an act of resistance by a civilisation defending its culture in the face of
a “cultural westernization of the globe” or “westoxification”89, characterised
by a “religious exit”90 as well as by the spread of widely shared Islamopho-
bic sentiment. This also explains why jihadist terrorism has developed in-
tensely and as a priority within the Arab-Muslim world itself, in order to
fight against the secularisation of Islam, a sort of Trojan horse of the West-
ernization of the world91.
This culturalist argument has also been abundantly echoed by many
European politicians during various attacks. Several of them did not hesitate
not to qualify each new attack as an attack on European civilisation, its prin-
ciples and fundamental values92, at the risk of encouraging the confusion be-
tween Muslims and jihadists, of increasing polarisation within European so-
cieties between the Muslim community and the rest of the Western popula-
tion, and of increasing the stigmatisation of Muslim immigrants93.
1.2. The geopolitical issue: an asymmetric relationship between the West and
the Arab-Muslim world
The culturalist argument crosses and is based on a second mobilising
“great narrative”, which is that of the geopolitical relations between the West
and the Arab-Muslim world94. Sometimes associated with a “Third World”
reading, the analysis here highlights the role played by the policy of Western
domination over the Muslim world in the context of colonisation and de-
colonisation in Africa and the Middle East95. From the Sykes-Picot agree-
89 R. GUOLO, op. cit., 2015, p. 18 to 22.
90 M. GAUCHET, “Le fondamentalisme islamique est le signe paradoxal de la sortie du re-
ligieux”, Le Monde, 22-23 November 2015.
91 P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 169.
92 Certain reactions from European leaders following the attacks in Brussels in March
2016 illustrate this fact well: “Through the attacks in Brussels, the whole of Europe is being
hit” (the French President, François Hollande); “These attacks were not only aimed at Bel-
gium, but also at our freedom of movement, our mobility”, values that “are part of the Eu-
ropean Union” (German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière); “This is an attack on demo-
cratic Europe. We will never accept that terrorists attack our open societies” (Swedish Prime
Minister Stefan Löfven); “Europe has been touched in the heart but we remain who and
what we are: an open and democratic society” (Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte). The ex-
cerpts of speeches and reactions of European leaders were taken from the website of la libre
Belgique dated 22 March 2016: http://www.lalibre.be/actu/politique-belge/toutes-les-reactions-
politiques-a-travers-le-monde-apres-les-attentats-a-bruxelles-56f1139f35702a22d59e03ad.
93 Report prepared by the “Migration Policy” group of the OSCE entitled “Policies on
Integration and Diversity in some OSCE Participating States - An Explanatory Study”, thus
concluded that the war on terrorism mainly affects Muslim immigrants by making their in-
tegration into Western populations more difficult. See also V.M. ESSES, J.F. DOVIDIO and G.
HODSON, “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States and Canada in response
to the 11 September, 2001 ‘Attack on America’”, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy,
2002, 2, 1, p. 69 to 85; L. SHERIDAN, “Islamophobia Pre and Post September 11th 2001”, Jour-
nal of Interpersonal Violence, 2006, 21, 3, p. 317 to 336.
94 J-P. FILIU, Les Arabes, leur destin et le nôtre. Histoire d’une libération, Paris, La Dé-
couverte, 2015; F. KHOSROKHAVAR, La radicalisation, Paris, Maison Des Sciences de l’Homme,
2014.
95 R. LIOGER, La Guerre des civilisations n’aura pas lieu. Coexistence et violence au XXe
siècle, Paris, CNRS, 2016; D. BENJAMIN, op. cit., 2006, p. 887 to 900; D. BACHET, “Le terrorisme
djihadiste: ses causes, ses effets et ses suites”, L’Homme et la société, 2015, 195-196, p.185.
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ments redrawing the borders of the Middle East (1916) to the military inter-
vention in Syria (2011-2017), from support for the creation of Israel (1948)
to contempt for the Palestinian cause since the Six Day War (1967), the in-
vasion of Iraq (1991 and 2003), to the war in Afghanistan (2001) and the
armed intervention in Libya (2011), or the opportunistic support of certain
dictators in the Middle East, the attitude of the Western world provides pow-
erful elements for jihadist propaganda.
Perceived as an expression of contempt for the Muslim world, a source
of political and socio-economic destabilisation in the Arab world96, the West-
ern stance which does not hesitate to exploit the conflicts in the Middle East
for economic purposes is a source of humiliation and resentment in the
Muslim world97. The logic of domination and exploitation poorly masked by
Western interventionist policies appears then to be a powerful driver of ji-
hadist terrorism, which can promote itself as a defender of the oppressed
and an actor in the fight against injustice. In the same way, the disastrous
humanitarian consequences caused by Western (especially the US) armed
interventions, which are considered illegitimate98 or, on the contrary, the dis-
engagement of Western forces according to their interests, reinforce bitter-
ness and feed the desire for revenge or vengeance of young people who are
more receptive to calls for radicalisation99.
1.3. The duplication of a relationship of domination within the Western world:
exclusion and discrimination
The geopolitical context, when marked by international conflicts, can
generate a sense of injustice and influence a process of violent engage-
ment100. Reinforced by a culturalist interpretation of the conflict, the overall
sense of injustice, fuelled by radical propaganda, is likely to reinforce the in-
dividual’s identification with a group perceived as persecuted and threat-
ened, whose honour and dignity must then be repaired, at the heart of a bat-
tle between the just and the unjust placed under divine arbitration101.
Moreover, this feeling of injustice can be intensified for a certain num-
ber of people when the logic of domination denounced on the international
scene finds an echo within European countries, in a kind of duplication of
North-South relations within the Western world. This feeling of injustice, a
source of frustration, anger or revolt, is based on two elements, distinct from
96 D. BENJAMIN, op. cit., 2006, p. 887 to 900.
97 P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 169; D. BACHET, op. cit., 2015, p. 25 to 28.
98 The war in Iraq in particular, the theatre of more than a million deaths, would have
offered a new “field of Jihad” from which the Islamic State would be created in 2006. (D.
BENJAMIN, op. cit., 2006, p. 887 to 900; T. DEGENHARDT, op. cit., 2007, p. 15.
99 F. KHOSROKHAVAR, op. cit., 2014.
100 X. CRETTIEZ, “‘High Risk Activism’: essai sur le processus de radicalisation violente
(deuxième partie) ”, Pôle Sud, 2011b, 35, p. 100.
101 M. HAFEZ and C. MULLINS, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of
Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2015,
38, p. 967.
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each other but often experienced as cumulative and sometimes associated
with the title of “social reasons”102.
The first highlights the reality of social and economic exclusion experi-
enced by Muslim populations in European countries. The various forms of
economic exclusion (difficulties in access to employment and discrimination
in hiring, legal access prevented by the consumerist model) and social ex-
clusion (relegation to certain schools, poor access to higher education) can
feed a feeling of revolt103. This will be all the stronger as this type of exclu-
sion is often coupled with forms of spatial segregation (confinement in ghetto
suburbs) or is based on a high visibility and proximity to the wealth of oth-
ers104. As Piazza points out, “Countries that permit their minority communi-
ties to be afflicted by economic discrimination make themselves more vul-
nerable to domestic terrorism. (…) The overall economic status of a country
has a smaller effect on terrorism than does the economic status of a coun-
try’s minority groups”105. Furthermore, if it turns out that the process of
marginalisation is perceived as the result of an intentional policy of the au-
thorities in place, the sense of injustice increases.
The second is the feeling of being subject to cultural and racial discrim-
ination in societies that present themselves as multicultural but do not pro-
vide themselves with the means to do so106. While the promotion of multi-
culturalism gives “the appearance of (an) equal dignity to all cultures”, Islam
in Europe is still conceived as an illegitimate subculture107 and some mem-
bers of the Muslim community feel discriminated against and are regularly
discriminated against. In this context, the interactions experienced with the
police and the judiciary play a significant role. On the one hand, the feeling
of being a victim of police targeting (ethnic profiling)108 or of being sub-
jected to discriminatory judicial treatment109 feeds the discriminatory read-
ing. It is also known that imprisonment, particularly when accompanied by
ill-treatment or even torture110, regularly contributes to the process of radi-
102 A. SILKE, “Becoming a terrorist”, Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Per-
spectives on Terrorism and its Consequences, A. SILKE (eds.), 2003, Chichester, Wiley, p. 29 to
53.
103 F. KHOSROKHAVAR, “Le nouveau terrorisme djihadiste”, La pensée de midi, 2010, 31, p.
188 and 189; D. LAPEYRONNIE, Ghetto urbain, ségrégation, violence, pauvreté en France aujour-
d’hui, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2008; X. CRETTIEZ, “‘High Risk Activism’: essai sur le processus
de radicalisation violente (première partie) ”, Pôle Sud, 2011a, 34, p. 49.
104 L. VAN CAMPENHOUDT, Comment en sont-ils arrivés là? Les clés pour comprendre le par-
cours des djihadistes, Malakoff, Armand Colin, 2017, p. 54 and following.
105 J. PIAZZA, “Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination and Domestic Terrorism”,
Journal of Peace Research, 2011, 48, p. 350.
106 C. TORREKENS, “Pour une analyse interdisciplinaire des processus de radicalisation”,
L’effet radicalisation et le terrorisme, F. BRION, C. DE VALKENEER and V. FRANCIS (eds.), Brussels,
Politeia, 2019, p. 107.
107 F. KHOSROKHAVAR, “Le nouveau terrorisme djihadiste”, La pensée de midi, 2010, 31, p.
186.
108 L. MUCCHIELI, Violences et insécurité. Fantasmes et réalités dans le débat français,
Paris, La Découverte, 2007.
109 C. ADAM, J.-F. CAUCHIE, M.-S. DEVRESSE, F. DIGNEFFE and D. KAMINSKI, Crime, justice et
lieux communs. Une introduction à la criminologie, Brussels, Larcier, 2014.
110 S. Labat, Les islamistes algériens. Entre les urnes et le maquis, Paris, Le Seuil, 1995;
X. CRETTIEZ X. and R. SÈZE, Saisir les mécanismes de la radicalisation violente: pour une
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calisation, both through the creation or accentuation of traumas and
through the phenomenon of acculturation to radical Islamism and socialisa-
tion into existing networks, which it encourages111. Sommier shows, how-
ever, that repression (torture, incarceration) can have opposite conse-
quences; depending on its “degree” and “timing”, it can either discourage the
activist (because of the imbalance between the benefits of violent action and,
on the other hand, the risks and costs involved) or cause a moral shock and
(morally) justify the struggle in the eyes of the activist112. On the other hand,
in the context of the fight against terrorism, preventive police and judicial
actions can escalate the phenomenon of radicalisation instead of combating
it. While certain administrative police measures (closing down premises, en-
forcing curfews, etc.) may discourage some “moderates”, they may also ex-
asperate others, encouraging their radicalisation and leading them to take
action in a more clandestine context113. A political-judicial discourse of “war
on terrorism”, opposing “defenders of freedom” to the “axis of evil” accentu-
ates the divide and can have the same effects114 on those who consider the
reactions unjust or outrageous.
Against a backdrop of socio-economic exclusion and sometimes politi-
cal marginalisation115, the feeling of cultural and racial discrimination is
likely to stir up an identity problem, particularly among young people who
analyse processuelle et biographique des engagements violents, Rapport de recherche pour la
Mission de recherche Droit et Justice, 2017.
111 A. SILKE and T. VELDHUIS, “Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: a review of key
recent research and critical research gaps”, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2017, 11, p. 2 to 11; F.
KHOSROKHAVAR, “Radicalization in prison: the French case”, Politics, Religion and Ideology,
2013, 14, p. 284 to 306; A. MAC GILLOWAY, P. GHOSH and K. BHUI, “A systematic review of path-
ways to and processes associated with radicalization and extremism amongst Muslims in
Western Societies”, International Review of Psychiatry, 2015, 27, p. 39 to 50; F. KHOSROKHAVAR,
“Nouveau paradigme de radicalisation en prison”, Cahiers de la sécurité et de la justice, 2014,
30, p. 17.
112 I. SOMMIER, “Engagement radical, désengagement et déradicalisation. Continuum et
lignes de fracture”, Lien social et Politiques, 2012, 68, p. 22. Fillieule also insists, though in a
different fashion, on the ambivalence of repression (O. FILLIEULE, “Le désengagement d’or-
ganisations radicales. Approche par les processus et les configurations”, Lien social et Poli-
tiques, 2012, 68, p. 49). According to the author, if repression only concerns the leaders and
active members of a movement, it could cause activists’ disengagement. On the other hand,
if it is indiscriminately directed at all of its supporters, their engagement could increase.
Amghar and Fall believe that fear of prison could have a demobilising effect on the accused
persons than prison itself. (S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, “Quitter la violence islamique. Retour sur
le phénomène de désaffiliation djihadiste”, Revue du MAUSS, 2017, 1, 49, p. 123).
113 D. DELLA PORTA, “Radicalization: a relational perspective”, Annual Review of Political
Science, 2018, 21, p. 461 to 474; S. MALTHANER, “Contextualizing Radicalization: the Emer-
gence of the ‘Sauerland-group’ from Radical Networks and the Salafist movement”, Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, 2014, 37, p. 638 to 653; I. DETRY, B. MINE and P. JEUNIAUX, “Revue
des études empiriques concernant la radicalisation et la justice”, Revue internationale de
criminologie et de police technique et scientifique, 2019, p. 285.
114 A. GARAPON, “Le terrorisme du XXIe siècle, une coproduction de la mondialisation”,
La pensée de midi, 2010, 31, p. 198.
115 If a social group is, intentionally or unintentionally, excluded from traditional po-
litical decision-making arenas, terrorist violence is a possible resource for trying to penetrate
political life in order to establish itself as a credible interlocutor (M. HUMPHREYS and J. WEIN-
STEIN, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War”, American Journal of Po-
litical Science, 2008, 52, p. 440). This was the case, for example, in 1991 with the banning of
the Islamist Salvation Front and the imprisonment of some of its leaders. (S. AMGHAR and K.
FALL, op. cit., 2017, p. 123).
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do not find their place in the dominant culture. Sometimes distancing them-
selves from their “integrated” parents, these young people feel torn between
“an Islamic culture which fascinates them but which they know little about
and a Western society which seems to reject them”116. Engaging in violent
behaviour can then be understood as a revenge strategy based on a “stigma
reversal”: having experienced various processes of exclusion and discrimina-
tion, these young people claim their stigma in order to better turn it against
the perpetrators117, some of them overplaying the role assigned to them by
taking on a “rigid identity to respond to an Islamic ideal wounded by the
West and its values”118. Adherence to jihadism then allows these young peo-
ple to rediscover an identity that their parents would have dishonoured, with
religion becoming a place for asserting their identity rather than a sign of
submission to religious dogmas119. The jihadist commitment of these young
people in an identity crisis would therefore be more the result of the Islami-
sation of a radical revolt against the world around them (“Islamisation of
radicalness”) than the fruit of a religious drift (“radicalisation of Islam”)120
and which could just as easily have resulted in the adoption of other types of
disruptive behaviour121.
This explanation focuses on structural elements whose effects are high-
lighted both outside (geopolitical context) and within the European territory
(exclusion, Islamophobia, racism, etc.)122. The diversity of these factors
would explain why, as was the case with the extreme left-wing terrorism of
previous years, radicalisation has not only affected “excluded young people”
in revolt against a society of discrimination123, but also young people who
are educated and well-integrated. They see the jihad as a form of “humani-
tarian commitment” and solidarity or as a “duty” to react against the impe-
rialism of the Western project124.
These explanatory factors provide an interesting macro-sociological
backdrop for understanding various forms of radicalisation and their dri-
116 X. CRETTIEZ, “Penser la radicalisation”, Revue française de science politique, 2016a,
66, p. 724.
117 E. GOFFMAN, Stigmate: les usages sociaux des handicaps, Paris, Minuit, 1963; H.
BECKER, Outsiders: études de sociologie de la déviance, Paris, Métailié, 1985.
118 “The individual who has experienced exclusion, racism, inner indignity finds in
radical Islam the instrument of the desire for revenge”. (R. GUOLO, op. cit., 2015., p. 66); See
also K. YUSOUFZAI and F. EMMERLING, “How identity crisis, relative deprivation, personal char-
acteristics, and empathy contribute to the engagement of Western individuals in Islamist ter-
rorist behavior”, Journal of Terrorism Research, 2017, 8, 1, p. 68 to 80; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit.,
2016a, p. 725. This may also explain Benslama’s concept of “super Muslim”. (F. BENSLAMA, Un
furieux désir de sacrifice. Le surmusulman, Paris, Seuil, 2016).
119 V. CRET and M. PANTEA, “Islamic fundamentalist terrorism issues”, International
Journal of Juridical Sciences, 2013, p. 17; O. ROY, Globalised Islam, London, Hurst, 2004.
120 O. ROY, Le djihad et la mort, Paris, Seuil, 2016.
121 Such as engagement in an anorexic, drug-addicted or artistic trajectory (D. LE BRE-
TON, “Jeunesse et djihadisme”, Le Débat, 2016, 188, p. 130).
122 R. LIOGER, La Guerre des civilisations n’aura pas lieu. Coexistence et violence au XXe
siècle, Paris, CNRS, 2016; D. BENJAMIN, op. cit., p. 887 to 900; D. BACHET, op. cit., p. 25 to 28.
123 D. BACHET, op. cit., p. 25 to 28; J-P. FILIU, op. cit., 2015; F. KHOSROKHAVAR, op. cit.,
2014; C. GUÉRANDEL et É. MARLIÈRE, op. cit., 2016, p. 10 and following.
124 A. GARAPON and M. ROSENFELD, Démocraties sous stress. Les défis du terrorisme
global, Paris, PUF, 2016, p. 109 and 110.
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vers. They have, moreover, been largely mobilised by terrorist propaganda,
in a differentiated way to adapt to the diversity of individual profiles.
2. The individual dimension: subjectivity: cognitive encounter and proce-
dural engagement
The contextual elements, or environmental variables evoked so far con-
stitute a relevant but insufficient framework to explain a radicalisation tra-
jectory that remains, each time, singular. This individual trajectory refers to
categorical or personal variables specific to the subject (2.1) and presup-
poses the existence of an environment capable of generating a cognitive en-
counter between the subject and the radical ideology (2.2). It also has a
strong procedural dimension that can be associated with the construction of
a “career” (2.3).
2.1. The importance of elements related to subjectivity in the radicalisation
trajectory
A sociopsychological literature emphasises several elements of an indi-
vidual nature that would make certain subjects more receptive to radical ide-
ology and the transition to violent acts.
The focus is first on certain “personality traits”, such as psychopathy,
anti-sociability, low self-esteem, anxiety, depression, aggressiveness, mental
fragility, impulsiveness, instability or a strong sensitivity to injustice125. This
pathologising approach is debatable: apart from the fact that it employs
vague concepts – what is “anti-sociability”? what is a “strong sensitivity to
injustice”? – it regularly pushes “open doors”: for someone who is aggres-
sive, radicalisation provides an excuse and an outlet126; for someone suffer-
ing from depression, radical ideology provides an escape route127; for some-
one suffering from a disorder of self-esteem, becoming a fighter helps to
strengthen that self-esteem beyond one’s true social identity128. As in other
areas of deviance129, the heuristic potential of this type of pathologising ex-
planation remains low and, moreover, regularly contributes to masking the
social sources of behaviour deemed problematic130.
125 V. G.M. NANNA, Minori, radicalizzazione e terrorismo, Bari, 2018; C. TORREKENS, op.
cit., 2019, p. 111; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016a, p. 723; D. BOUZAR, “Repérer les idéaux proposes
par les groupes radicaux pour refaire du lien humain”, Le sociographe, 2017, 58, p. 74; F.
KHOSROKHAVAR, «Nouveau paradigme de radicalisation en prison”, Cahiers de la sécurité et de
la justice, 2014, 30, p. 17.
126 C. TORREKENS, op. cit., 2019, p. 112.
127 J. DE BIE, C. DE POOT and J. VAN DER LEUN, “Jihadi networks and the involvement of
vulnerable immigrants: reconsidering the ideological and pragmatic value”, Global Crime,
2014, 15, p. 275 to 298.
128 J. WILHELMSEN, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen
Separatist Movement”, Europe-Asia Studies, 2005, 57, p. 41.
129 Y. CARTUYVELS, “L’avenir de la criminologie en question. Réflexions à partir du débat
français”, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 2017, n° 7, pp. 703-723.
130 M. SAGEMAN, Understanding terror networks, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylva-
nia Presse, 2004; J. HORGAN, Walking Away from Terrorism. Accounts of disengagement from
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On the other hand, other variables of an individual nature seem more
relevant. In this way, moments of critical transition in the construction of a
subject’s identity, such as adolescence, make the subject more permeable to
radical ideologies and their staging work131. This would help to explain the
recruitment of younger minors132. Similarly, individual motivations for vio-
lent engagement may differ by gender. For women, reasons related to a per-
sonal situation such as to avenge a relative133, a desire for emancipation or,
on the contrary, a way of assuming tradition134 would be motivating factors.
For men, environmental (peer pressure and fear of being seen as a coward)
and ideological motives would be more effective135.
Finally, a material or symbolic gain is also presented as a potential in-
centive. A material incentive, such as the lure of gain from violent engage-
ment, may encourage an “opportunistic activist” to take action136. This is
particularly the case when the violent engagement allows parallel racketeer-
ing activities or when the offer of engagement holds out the prospect of es-
caping from a situation of poverty137. These material gains, which are not
systematically discovered at the beginning of the radical engagement, are
analysed as a “reward for radical sacrifice”138. But sometimes it is a symbolic
incentive that will act as a driving force. By providing an official status (e.g.
martyr, hero), violent engagement can fill an existential void or a lack of
recognition, compensate for the futility of a daily life experienced as trivial,
reinforce one’s self-esteem (being the “just”, the “avenger”, the “guide” of a
community…) or even the perception of one’s ability to act (at the level of
history or one’s destiny)139. Besides this logic of filling the existential void,
some underline the real pleasure of engaging in radical actions, which pro-
radical and extremist movements, London and New York, Routledge, 2009; J. VICTOROFF, “The
mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches”, The Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, 2005, 49, 1, p. 405 to 426.
131 C. TORREKENS, op. cit., 2019, p. 112. Thomson speaks of “selfie djihad” to interpret
the stagings that some young people post on social networks (D. THOMSON, Les revenants,
Paris, Seuil, 2016).
132 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, TE-SAT 2017, p. 13.
133 K. JONES and P. TAYLOR, «Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Dif-
ferent Reasons», Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2008, 31, p. 304 to 326.
134 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a: p. 48 and 49.
135 K. JONES and P. TAYLOR, op. cit., 2008.
136 F. KHOSROKHAVAR, L’Utopie sacrifiée. Sociologie de la révolution iranienne, Paris,
Presses de science po, 1993; A. BLOOM, “Les kamikazes du Cachemire, ‘martyrs’ d’une cause
perdue”, Critique internationale, 2003, 20, p. 143.
137 While the impact of this economic factor is undoubtedly more crucial in certain
countries devastated by the war in the Middle East, it is not absent in Europe. On the role
played by this factor, see A. SPERINI, “I Modelli Sistemici del jihadismo: aspetti evolutivi in
chiave anti-sistema”, Comprendere il terrorismo. Spunti interpretativi di analisi e metodologie
di contrasto del fenomeno, R. RAZZANTE (eds.), Pisa, Pacini, 2019, p. 87; E. GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA,
“Las oleadas históricas de la violencia terrorista”, Revista de Psicología Social, 24, 2, 2009, p.
119 and following; C. DEL PRADO HIGUERA, E. SÁNCHEZ DE ROJAS DÍAZ, Terrorismo islamista: El
caso de Al Gama’a al Islamiya, Valencia, Tirant, 2018, p. 74 and following.
138 I. SOMMIERs, op. cit., 2012, p. 23.
139 J.M. POST, The Mind of the Terrorist: the psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al-
Qaeda, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a, p. 51; V. NIKOLSKI,
Le moment escapiste. Militantisme et production théorique dans une conjoncture de crise. Deux
mouvements de jeunesse radicaux (NBP and ESM), Thèse de doctorat, Paris I, 2010; X. CRET-
TIEZ and R. SÈZE, op. cit., 2017; I. SOMMIERs, op. cit., 2012, p. 23.
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vide excitement and narcissistic rewards140. This type of symbolic incentive
is clearly employed by terrorist organisations which, like Daesh, do not hes-
itate to offer young people a positive personal dream with a concrete chance
of realization141. It would also explain the conversion of certain offenders
into radical terrorist involvement142.
2.2. The cognitive dimension or the encounter between an individual and the
terrorist discourse
In addition to the existence of predisposing factors, involvement in a
terrorist trajectory presupposes an encounter of a subject with a cognitive
framework offering a “reading” or “interpretation mechanisms” that encour-
age the use of violence143. These acculturation channels can be multiple and,
in order to be fruitful, presuppose that the proposed cognitive framework be
rooted in a cultural background capable of making it resonate.
2.2.1. Diverse acculturation channels in the jihadist discourse
Access to “cognitive radicalisation”144 or to the reading framework of-
fered by the radical ideology specific to contemporary jihadism can be pro-
vided through various channels of acculturation to this type of discourse. A
first traditional channel of socialisation is family. Family plays an important
role in reinforcing the jihadist narrative when it is itself caught up in an an-
cestral conflict, where it transmits its memory and favours the cause, even
instilling a desire for vengeance in its youngest members145. If, in some
countries, a second actor in the socialisation of the cause may be a clan, i.e.
a group structured around (male) village populations146, in the Western
world the second type of access to radical discourse is more likely to take
place through friendly and relational networks147. It is through the interac-
tions that take place in small groups operating on this gang model (a group
140 V. NIKOLSKI, “Lorsque la répression est un plaisir: le militantisme au Parti national
bolchevik russe”, Cultures et conflits, 2013, 89, p. 13 to 28; Thus, Venhaus indicates, with re-
gard to Al-Qaeda fighters, that beyond “revenge seekers” and “identity seekers”, there are
30% of individuals that he qualifies as “status seekers” and “thrill seekers”. (J. VENHAUS, «Why
Youth Join Al-Quaeda”, United States Institute of Peace, 2010, 236, p. 8).
141 S. ATRAN, “Looking for the roots of terrorism”, Nature, 15 January 2015, interview
available at https://www.nature.com/news/looking-for-the-roots-of-terrorism-1.16732.
142 T. HOLMAN, “Belgian and French Foreign Fighters in Iraq, 2003-2005: A Compara-
tive Case Study”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2015, 38, p. 603 to 621; M. VAN SAN, “Lost
Souls searching for answers? Belgian and Dutch converts joining the Islamic state”, Perspec-
tives on terrorism, 2015, 9, p. 47 to 56.
143 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a, p. 52.
144 X. CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, op. cit., 2017; F. DEMANT, M. SLOOTMAN, F. BUIJS, J. TILLIE,
Decline and Disengagement. An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation, Amsterdam, IMES
Reports Series, 2008, p. 12 and following.
145 A. ELORZA, J.M. GARMENDIA, G. JAUREGUI, F. DOMINGUEZ and P. UNZUETA, ETA, une his-
toire, Paris, Denoel, 2002, p. 272.
146 This clan logic explains why, in some cases in Afghanistan and Kurdistan, the
members of entire villages have become involved in armed struggles. (X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit.,
2011a, p. 53).
147 M. SAGEMAN, Understanding terror networks, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylva-
nia Presse, 2004, p. 113; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a, p. 54.
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of peers) that ideologies and beliefs can be mobilised and exploited, which
also helps to strengthen group cohesion facing the rest of the world148. This
shows the role that local places of socialisation such as sports halls, schools,
associations, youth centres, places of worship or buildings’ entrance halls
can play149.
The channels of acculturation to the radical discourse mentioned above
are procedural, they proceed in phases and are marked by the relationship
and are engraved in time. Today, they are complemented by more individual
and sometimes more instantaneous modes of indoctrination, which are re-
inforced by new communication technologies. On the Internet or with social
networks, the encounter with jihadist discourse and “moral entrepreneurs”
(some being real “professional recruiters”)150 is done virtually. The radicali-
sation “process” can here be compressed over time, giving rise to forms of
“express radicalisation” that are much more difficult to circumvent151. In-
deed, with regard to jihadist terrorism, the Internet makes it possible to
spread information on the struggle, to create “emotional communities”, to
have access to political or politico-religious speeches encouraging violent en-
gagement, to images valuing the combatants and to give practical advice152.
However, the impact of the Internet needs to be contextualised, which is un-
derlined by authors who criticise the thesis of self-radicalisation through the
Internet153.
2.2.2. The prior existence of a favourable cultural breeding ground
In order for the encounter with an ideological discourse advocating vi-
olence to have an effect on the subject, it still needs to resonate with a cul-
tural breeding ground capable of legitimising this violence. In other words, a
discourse advocating radicalisation is all the more likely to have a larger ef-
fect if it unfolds against the backdrop of an experience of injustice or op-
pression experienced by the individual, awakening or accentuating emotions
of fear, hatred or moral indignation154. As Crettiez points out, ideology
“feeds action only if it confirms in the eyes of activists a situation of injus-
148 L. VAN CAMPENHOUDT, op. cit., 2017, p. 41.
149 S. ATRAN, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”, Science, 2003, 299, p. 1534, C. TORREKENS,
op. cit., 2019, p. 117; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016a, p. 720.
150 L. BONELLI and F. CARRIÉ, “La radicalité djihadiste en France. Quelques enseigne-
ments tirés d’une recherche récente”, L’effet radicalisation et le terrorisme, F. BRION, C. DE
VALKENEER and V. FRANCIS (eds.), Brussels, Politeia, 2019, p. 88.
151 A. GARAPON, M. ROSENFELD, op. cit., 2016, p. 98.
152 B. AININE, T. LINDEMANN, X. CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, Saisir les mécanismes de la radi-
calisation violente: pour une analyse processuelle et biographique des engagements violents,
Rapport de recherche pour la Mission de recherche Droit et Justice, sous la direction de X.
CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, 2017, p. 10 (disponible sur www.gip-recherche-justice.fr); G. WEIMANN,
Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, Washington, United States Insti-
tute of Peace, 2006; Ph. SEIB and D. JANBEK, Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post al-
Qaeda Generation, London, Routledge, 2010; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016a, p. 722.
153 I. VON BEHR, A. REDING, C. EDWARDS and L. GRIBBON, Radicalisation in the digital era.
The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism, Rand, 2013 (disponible sur
www.rand.org); D. BENSON, “Why the Internet is not Increasing Terrorism”, Security Studies,
23, 2, 2014, p. 293 to 328.
154 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a, p. 56.
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tice or oppression that is actually felt and allows negative emotions to be fu-
elled”155.
The power of radical ideology must therefore be recontextualised with
regards to the unique path and environment of the individual. In order to be
effective, it must lead the subjects to agree on three elements. It is first nec-
essary to stir consent on the diagnosis of the situation, by proposing a con-
vincing cognitive framework and identifying those responsible of the prob-
lem (diagnosis frame). It is then necessary to stir consent on the (violent)
means to remedy the problem, highlighting the powerlessness of traditional
actors (e.g. religious leaders considered “lethargic”) or of public authorities
to solve problems in a fair and equitable manner (prognostic frame). Finally,
agreement must be reached on the need for action to achieve the desired
change (motivational frame)156.
In light of this threefold requirement, the jihadist discourse adapts to
the backgrounds and needs of the candidates to be recruited157. Far from be-
ing unequivocal or necessarily centred around religion, the proposed cogni-
tive framework proves to be flexible, likely to insist on elements of a social,
political or religious nature, depending on the emotions to be mobilised in
the subject in order to encourage radicalisation158.
2.3. Violent engagement, the result of a gradual process
The presence in a subject’s environment of various factors predisposing
him/her to a violent engagement and/or the existence of individual variables
likely to influence it do not automatically lead to an act of violence. What-
ever the impact of these factors, they must always be recontextualised taking
into account local situations and individual experiences. In other words, vi-
olent engagement is always part of a particular biographical itinerary which
mobilises these contextual factors in a unique way each time.
This subjective perspective, which highlights how a factorial logic in
search of universal categories or “profiles”159 is incomplete, emphasises the
importance of the process in engaging in terrorist violence. Speaking in
terms of “a process” allows us to underline the time and interaction dimen-
155 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a, p. 57.
156 C. TORREKENS, op. cit., 2019, p. 107. See also J. JACKSON, A. HUQ, B. BRADFORD and T.
TYLER, “Monopolizing force? Police legitimacy and public attitudes toward the acceptability
of violence”, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2013, 19, p. 479 to 497; B. BRADFORD, “Polic-
ing and social identity: procedural justice, inclusion and cooperation between police and
public”, Policing and Society, 2014, 24, p. 22 to 43.
157 N. BOUZAR, op. cit., 2017.
158 Thus, if the unconscious needs of young people are to flee the real world to build a
“just” world, the ideological discourse will insist that jihad will enable them to build a truly
egalitarian and solidary society. Whereas if the young person wishes to take revenge and pro-
tect Muslims perceived as victims, the ideological discourse will focus on the fact that the ji-
had will allow him to fight against the army of Bashar Al-Assad, dictator and torturer. (N.
BOUZAR, op. cit., 2017, p. 68). If the young person has a bad self-image and seeks recognition
and dignity, the speeches will insist on self-sacrifice in the name of the cause, his violent
commitment will allow him to pass from the status of a slave of Western imperialism to that
of a courageous adversary (capable of giving death and sacrificing himself as a martyr).
159 L. BONELLI and F. CARRIÉ, op. cit., 2019, p. 93.
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sions that are most often present in building a violent engagement, at the an-
tipodes of an approach that sometimes dramatically emphasises the notions
of “turnaround” and “lone wolf”160.
This process approach is compatible with using two complementary
reading grids derived from interactionist sociology to understand engage-
ment in terrorist violence. The first uses the notion of a deviant career161 to
shed light on a gradual trajectory that is built up in stages. The second is
concerned with the strengthening of a deviant subculture fostered by the
functioning of a group that helps to anchor a new identity for the subject in
question162.
2.3.1. Entering the “violent career”: diversity and stages
Thanks to Howard Becker163, the notion of “deviant career” makes it
possible to underline that a behaviour is the result of “a series of different se-
quences ordered in relation to each other”164. These series are the stages ex-
perienced by those who share the same career. However, the duration, con-
texts and organisation of these stages vary from one individual to another,
and each career thus presents singularities. Although facilitating factors (pre-
vious experience of violence, devotion to friends, etc.) and precipitating fac-
tors (solidarity towards a friend who has been arrested, death of an activist,
the need to go underground to escape prosecution, etc.) are mentioned in
the literature165, they do not all influence people’s careers in the same way.
In our field, the notion of “career” is used to emphasise the time it takes
for “dispositions to”, objective factors and radical thinking to be translated
into real action166. The modification of the cognitive framework and the ac-
quisition of skills that lead a person to violent engagement are gradual and
some authors speak in this regard of “step-by-step radicalisation”167, by “suc-
cessive stages”168.
Schematically, three types of violent careers can be distinguished169.
The vocational career is the result of a decision to oppose inequalities or in-
justices whose existence is no longer tolerated. The accidental career is more
160 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016b, p. 7; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011b, p. 103; O. FILLIEULE,
“Propositions pour une analyse processuelle de l’engagement individuel. Post scriptum”, Re-
vue française de science politique, 2001, 51, p. 199 to 215; M. HAFEZ and C. MULLINS, “The Rad-
icalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extrem-
ism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2015, 38, p. 958 to 975.
161 H. BECKER, op. cit., 1985.
162 R. CLOWARD and L. OHLIN, Delinquency & Opportunity, The Free Press, 1960.
163 H. BECKER, op. cit., 1985.
164 X. DE LARMINAT, “Sociologie de la déviance: des théories du passage à l’acte à la dé-
viance comme processus”, Ressources en Sciences Économiques et Sociales, 2017,
http://ses.ens-lyon.fr/articles/sociologie-de-la-deviance.
165 D. DELLA PORTA, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995.
166 O. FILIEULE, op. cit., 2001.
167 A. COLLOVALD and B. GAÏTI, “Questions sur la radicalisation politique”, La démocratie
aux extrêmes. Sur la radicalisation politique, A. COLLOVALD and B. GAÏTI (eds.), Paris, La dis-
pute, 2006, p. 32.
168 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2012, p. 23.
169 M. FELICES-LUNA, “Déviance et politique: la carrière des femmes au sein des groupes
armés contestataires”, Déviance et Société, 2008, 32, p. 163 to 185.
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circumstantial and random. The actor’s observation of an injustice, for ex-
ample, does not create a precise desire for violent action, but leads to the
gradual and sometimes unconscious inclusion in an environment or a refer-
ential universe that will lead to it. Violent engagement then resembles a
“non-choice” [and] is rather a mechanism, sometimes invisible to the actor,
in which integration into a group of friends or an association, learning in
this or that school or attending [this or that place of worship] induces a
gradual insertion into a militant universe”170. Finally, some careers are due
to constraint. The entry into a violent career is experienced here as an oblig-
ation which may be the result of various sources: the person may think that
his or her survival or that of his or her family is at stake; social pressure may
prove to be such that “inaction would become more costly than the violent
action itself”171; the need to obtain protection from the violent organisation
or the terror it inspires, such as the desire to follow a companion who has
already committed himself or herself to it172.
Regardless of the type of career being considered173, different steps
must be taken for the commitment to become a reality. The first and central
step is meeting the violent group. Entry into an organisation, which is often
clandestine, presupposes that the applicant meets some of its members or
“authorised smugglers” who are likely to introduce him or her into the
group174. The notion of “tutor” or “recruiting agent” must be understood in
the broadest sense: some authors thus point out that in current careers, the
Internet can be considered as a “fictitious tutor”175. The encounter therefore
plays a central role in the career. Thus, the inability to meet one of the nec-
essary contacts can put an end to a budding career. However, despite a
“promising” encounter, a career may stagnate or come to a halt due to fac-
tors specific to the individual or the context (such as the presence of depen-
dent children, the existence of an established job, low self-confidence or low
trust in the violent group)176.
After this first stage, the career continues to be built through the learn-
ing of rules, uses and techniques useful in the violent struggle (e.g. making
explosives, handling weapons, escape techniques, etc.). The individual will
also have more access to “radical” ideological discourses, so that he/she
170 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011a, p. 54. We are then close to Beker’s notion of “commit-
ment by default”, which “occurs through a series of acts, none of which is capital, but which,
taken together, constitute for the actor a series of subsidiary bets on such a scale that the ac-
tor finds himself in a situation where he does not want to lose them”. (H. BECKER, “Notes sur
le concept d’engagement”, Tracés. Revue de Sciences humaines, 2006, 11, p. 188).
171 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011b, p. 104.
172 M. FELICES-LUNA, op. cit., 2008, p. 167 to 169.
173 Contrary to Crettiez (X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016b, p. 104), we believe that these dif-
ferent stages are also fruitful to understand certain careers by constraint.
174 D. MAC ADAM, “Recruitment to High Risk Activism. The case of Freedom Summer”,
American Journal of Sociology, 1986, 92, p. 66; I. SOMMIER, La violence révolutionnaire, Paris,
Presses de sciences po, 2008, p. 88. If the violent organisation is not really clandestine, this
stage of the career is facilitated. (K. CHAIB, “Parcours de militantes”, Le Hezbollah. État des
lieux, S. MERVIN (eds.), Paris, Actes Sud, 2008, p. 293 to 315).
175 A. BOUBEKEUR, “La violence islamiste en Europe: des approches incertaines, un ob-
jet aux enjeux multiples”, Les violences politiques en Europe. Un État des lieux, L. MUCCHIELLI
and X. CRETTIEZ (eds.), Paris La découverte, 2010, p. 31 to 43.
176 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011b, p. 104.
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gradually becomes accustomed to a culture of violence177. The roles played
by the individual in the organisation can gradually evolve from the support
of the follower, to basic logistical or administrative tasks (e.g., name-taker to
rent a flat, information transmitter, tracker, etc.) to the actor responsible for
violent interventions in the field178.
Moreover, during this learning process, a phenomenon of attachment to
and identification with the group occurs: the actor gradually becomes part of
a subculture that he shares with the other members of the group, who are
often confronted with the same difficulties (educational, professional, eco-
nomic, social) as him and with whom he shares a socio-cultural and ideo-
logical background179. This process of identification with the group also
leads the individual to conform his or her behaviour to the group’s expecta-
tions. The priority that guides his behaviour is the recognition and respect of
“significant others”, i.e. those who now matter to him180. This attachment to
group members may be accompanied by a loss of empathy for others181. The
separation between the in group and the out group is experienced as in-
creasingly rigid. This objective of recognition explains why the individual is
ready to sacrifice his relations with his family, to risk prison or to sacrifice
his life and why any turning back is perceived as difficult or even impossi-
ble182. A new identity is constructed within the group, which tends to be-
come exclusive and to veil the previous identity markers183. In the words of
Berger and Luckmann, an “identity alternation”184 occurs, i.e. a radical
change in the world due to a secondary socialisation that breaks completely
with primary socialisation.
2.3.2. The functioning of the violent group, a reinforcing factor
The attractiveness and functioning of the group are important elements
in the radicalisation process. Built on a logic of solidarity, often reinforced
by the clandestine nature of its structure185 and the mutual dependence (emo-
tional, financial, etc.) of its members, the radical group becomes a new fam-
ily for candidates for radicalisation, a tribe that provides a sense of belong-
ing to a “cause” or a “(transnational) movement”186. The core of a cause
177 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2008.
178 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2012, p. 24.
179 According to CRETTIEZ, “the actor becomes cognitively and emotionally in love with
the identity image he has of himself and his entourage”. (X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011b, p. 105).
180 L. VAN CAMPENHOUDT, op. cit., 2017, p. 44 and 45.
181 A. BANDURA, “Mechanisms of moral disengagement”, Origins of Terrorism: Psycholo-
gies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, W. REICH (eds.), New York, Cambridge University
Press, 1990, p. 161 to 191.
182 C. GUIBET LAFAYE, “Engagement radical, extrême ou violent: basculement ou ‘con-
tinuation’ de soi?”, Sens public, 2017, p. 1 to 42; E. GOFFMAN, Encounters: Two studies in the
Sociology of Interaction, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1961; L. VAN CAMPENHOUDT, op.
cit., 2017, p. 45 and 46.
183 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2012, p. 25.
184 P. BERGER and T. LUCKMAN, La construction sociale de la réalité, Paris, Armand Colin,
1986, p. 262.
185 Certain uses of social networks and the Internet facilitate clandestine communica-
tions between members of terrorist groups. (P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit., 2003, p. 162).
186 C. LE THOMAS, “Formation et socialisation: un projet de contre-société”, Le Hezbol-
lah. État des lieux, S. MERVIN (eds.), Paris, Actes Sud, 2008, p. 153.
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shared by all, on the basis of common experiences, makes it possible to re-
spond to an individual’s need for meaning and belonging187 and is likely to
overturn his mental economy. In the name of the cause, the sacrifice of one’s
life (suicide) or that of others (murder) takes on a different meaning and no
longer carries sufficient weight to avoid violence188. An “esprit de corps” is
created in the group, and this in a double sense: an “internalization in the bi-
ological body of the gestures (…) and attitudes constitutive of the group’s
culture (‘way of doing, feeling, thinking’)” and an “externalization of its ways
of being together in a ‘body of specific rules’”189.
Within the group, solidarity is often expressed through the mobilisation
of codes190 and the carrying out of loyalty rituals that testify to a “desire for
exclusive allegiance to the group and submission to its practical impera-
tives”191. This solidarity can increase the radicalisation of the group when
the group feels threatened192. Defending the security of the group is a pow-
erful justification for violent behaviour towards those who would threaten
the group. A tendency to radical violence has more to do with group logic
than with the individual predispositions of its members193. The importance
of this group logic makes it possible to understand Atran’s advice: “forget the
profiles [to] understand the cells (in the sense of links in the group)”194.
Solidarity also increases the radicalisation of the group when it is
caught up in intergroup competition: competing on its own ground with
other organisations with similar aims, the group can take harder action to
show its determination and demonstrate its greater radicalness195. On the
other hand, this solidarity may be called into question when the group is
subject to intra-group competition, while paradoxically producing an identi-
cal radicalisation effect196: some members may seek to instrumentalise vio-
lent action in order to assert their place or acquire a status within the group.
No less than the spirit of solidarity, a competitive dynamic within the group
can therefore encourage the transition to violent acts197.
If the group is small, a conclusion that some authors regularly draw198
is that the internal links within the group are more important than ideolog-
187 C. TORREKENS, op. cit., 2019, p. 117.
188 D. CASONI and L. BRUNET, “Processus d’idéalisation et violence sectaire”, Déviance et
Société, 2005, 29, p. 80.
189 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2012, p. 25.
190 For example, the use of similar clothing, similar tattoos or haircuts, the use of nick-
names and pseudonyms… (C. TORREKENS, op. cit., 2019, p. 118; X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016a, p.
721).
191 Thus, Al-Qaeda is familiar with the practice of “Bayat” which is an “oath of total al-
legiance to the organisation and its leader”. (X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016a, p. 721).
192 C. MAC CAULEY and S. MOSKALENKO, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Path-
ways Toward Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008, 30, p. 415 to 433. This is the
case when a “counter-movement” emerges and its violence is supported by a government.
193 C. MAC CAULEY and S. MOSKALENKO, op. cit., 2008, p. 422.
194 S. ATRAN, “The moral logic and growth of suicide terrorism”, The Washington Quar-
terly, 2006, 29, 2, p. 141.
195 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2011b, p. 107.
196 P. COLLIER and D. HOROWITZ, Destructive generation. Second thoughts about the six-
ties, New York, Summit Books, 1989, p. 147.
197 L. VAN CAMPENHOUDT, op. cit., 2017, p. 49.
198 For example, ATRAN has shown that radicalisation takes place in groups that gener-
ally do not exceed eight people. (S. ATRAN, op. cit., 2006, p. 141).
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ical factors because it is these concrete bonds that provide “emotional and
social support [and promote the] development of a common identity”199.
3. Conclusion
Engaging in a terrorist trajectory is based on the intersection of multi-
ple macro and micro social factors. More general factors, most often refer-
ring to relations of domination at the international level and relations of ex-
clusion or discrimination at the national level, provide a backdrop against
which individual trajectories are constructed.
Some have attempted to construct typologies that make it possible to
identify typical trajectories or “typical profiles” leading to terrorist radicali-
sation. This is based on “ideal-typical” categories reconstructed on the basis
of psychological criteria (“Loners”, “Thrill seekers”, “Identity seekers”, “Moral
crusaders”, etc.)200 or psycho-social criteria (“entrepreneurs”, “dropouts”,
etc.)201 and remains random, as it seems difficult to identify linear sequences
leading to terrorist involvement202. On the other hand, the notions of career
and deviant subculture remain interesting for understanding the gradual en-
try of an individual into a violent group.
III. The challenges of cooperating with the judiciary in matters of terrorism
Before tackling the delicate question of the willingness to collaborate
with the judicial authorities, it seems necessary to first briefly raise the issue
of individuals capable of collaborating usefully with the judicial authorities
(1). Next, it will also be necessary to present the sociological aspects of a no-
tion that is at the heart of collaboration: betrayal (2). Finally, we will be able
to propose some hypotheses on the elements that may influence the terror-
ist’s acceptance or refusal to collaborate (3).
1. Capability of collaborating with the judiciary
In Europe, and under the influence of the European Union among oth-
ers203, many States have increased the number of behaviours labelled as ter-
199 M. SAGEMAN, Understanding terror networks, Philadephia, University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004, p. 135.
200 I. AWAN, “Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media”, Society, 2017, 54,
2, p. 146.
201 P. NESSER, “Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe. Exploring motivational aspects
of recruitment and radicalization”, Understanding violent radicalization: terrorist and jihadist
movements in Europe, M. Ranstorp (eds.), London-New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 91.
202 See P. GIANNETAKIS, “Psicologia del terrorismo”, Comprendere il terrorismo. Spunti in-
terpretativi di analisi e metodologie di contrasto del fenomeno, op. cit., 2019, p. 29. See also E.
DIEU, L. TESTOURI and O. SOREL, “Proposition d’une méthodologie d’évaluation de l’identité en
voie de radicalisation”, Revue internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique et Scien-
tifique, 2019, 72, 4, p. 457 to 483.
203 Framework Decision 2002/475/JAI of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.
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rorist and punishable under criminal law. This increase in terrorist behav-
iour may correspond to an increase in the number of individuals who may
be offered to collaborate with the judiciary to help fight terrorism. Even if
the exercise is oversimplified and overly abstract, we can try to distinguish
some of these figures that are likely to collaborate.
First, if a State’s criminal law so provides, it is possible for an individ-
ual who has committed (or is suspected of having committed) a “common
law” offence to be offered collaboration in exchange for information relating
to a terrorist offence. This case (collaboration of a “non-terrorist”) does not
seem to be a priority since it is only rarely that this type of person has rele-
vant information.
The next figure is that of the non-radicalised terrorist, i.e. an individual
who has committed (or is suspected of having committed) a terrorist offence
that is not characterised by engagement in violence. This figure does exist in
European countries, due to the new terrorist criminal offences introduced in
the legislation of many EU Member States. In the Belgian Penal Code, for
example, there are many non-violent terrorist offences: it is indeed possible
to “finance” a terrorist activity, to “acquire objects likely to cause consider-
able economic loss”, without violence. This figure will not keep our attention
because, while the individuals concerned will probably find it easier to “talk”
than the following figures, they will also have “less to say”.
The figure of the radicalised and isolated terrorist does not seem to us to
be the most interesting either. The scope of such “isolation” is debated in
doctrine204, but in any case, such a characteristic renders the individual in-
capable of collaborating, as he is incapable of betraying anyone (except an
innocent person).
Finally, the figure of the radicalised terrorist who is a member of an or-
ganisation seems to be the one that should be given priority attention. It is
indeed in such a configuration that we find individuals capable of holding
information relevant to the judicial authorities. But before considering the
question of accepting or refusing to collaborate, let us first look at what col-
laboration implies for the person to whom it is offered.
2. Collaboration is a form of treason
Collaboration, when it involves denunciation, is a form of betrayal. A
betrayal implies a rupture and therefore presupposes the pre-existence of a
bond based on trust and loyalty205. Acts of betrayal are of two types: acts re-
lating to the disclosure of information and acts relating to physical or men-
204 Crettiez criticizes the notion of the “lone wolf”. (X. CRETTIEZ, «Interventions de
Xavier Crettiez”, Radicalisation, processus ou basculement?, Paris, Fondation Jean Jaurès,
2016b, p. 7) while Davies attributes more than 70% of the violence committed between 2011
and 2015 by jihadists to isolated individuals. (W.A. DAVIES, “Counterterrorism Effectiveness to
‘Jihadists’ in Western Europe and the United States: We are Losing the War on Terror”, Stud-
ies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2018, 41, p. 281).
205 S. SCHEHR, “Sociologie de la trahison”, Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, 2007, 2,
p. 313 and 314.
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tal subtraction (an “exit”)206. In both cases, there is indeed a rupture: be-
trayal presupposes an “Us”207 and a “Them” as well as a “movement from the
inside to the outside”208. In fact, from the moment a “We” is formed, a cer-
tain number of elements (action, belief, representations…) can no longer be
shared with the outside world. In the case of collaboration, there will always
be a question of a transfer of information and possibly a question of “con-
version” (to non-violence).
Betrayal always presents a triangular configuration: there is the traitor
(“Ego”), the betrayed (group) (“Us”), and the one with whom one makes a
pact or for whom one betrays (“Them”)209. Betrayal involves two friends and
a stranger, one of the friends striking a deal with the stranger. After his be-
trayal, “Ego” will appear as a third party both in the eyes of “Us” and in the
eyes of “Them”210. In the framework of collaboration, “Ego” will sacrifice the
interest of “Us” to its private interest since the negotiation with “Them”
which precedes the betrayal is indeed a bargaining which serves its own in-
terests.
The sensitivity of the “Us” to betrayal varies depending on the context.
In the situation at hand – collaboration following terrorist actions – we are
faced with a contentious context: “Us” (the terrorist group) and “Them” (the
negotiating state or the justice that represents it) are in a friend-foe rela-
tionship. Hostility towards the common enemy strengthens the cohesion of
the members of the “Us” and the demand for loyalty is particularly strong. In
such a context, more acts are likely to be regarded as betrayal (a simple “dis-
tancing” might sometimes suffice), and fantasies of betrayal will also be
more frequent. Paranoia will more easily invite itself into the “Us”. This con-
tentious context will also reinforce the immoral connotation of betrayal
(even if, paradoxically, the latter could be considered as a “necessary evil” by
“Them”). It also makes it more difficult to adopt a neutral position (espe-
cially if the conflict lasts, because sooner or later, anyone who stands in a
position of neutrality will be considered a traitor). Finally, in such a con-
tentious context, the desire to collaborate will be calmed, before the arrest,
by joint surveillance between the members of the “Us” and, after the arrest,
by the fact that it is not a question of helping any third party but the former
enemy.
In the context of terrorism, another contextual element must be taken
into account: the perception of the traitor by another social actor, the “pub-
lic”. In the context of collaboration with the justice system, the traitor will
not be perceived by the public as a “whistle-blower” since the public is un-
206 M. AKERSTRÖM, Betrayal and Betrayers: The Sociology of Treachery, New Brunswick,
Transaction Publishers, 1991.
207 An “Us” can only emerge if there is mutual trust and minimal loyalty; moreover,
this trust and loyalty are standards to be respected within this “We”.
208 S. SCHEHR, op. cit., p. 315.
209 A. PETITAT, Secret et formes sociales, Paris, PUF, 1998; E. POZZI, “Le paradigme du
traitre”, De la trahison, D. SCARFONE (eds.), Paris, PUF, 1999, p. 9.
210 “How can we not despise our agent who is a foreigner who betrays his country,
since our compatriots who betray for the enemy will be considered disgraceful?” (A. DEW-
ERPE, Espion: une anthropologie historique du secret d’État contemporain, Paris, Gallimard,
1994, p. 330, cited by S. SCHEHR, op. cit., 2007, p. 322).
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likely to recognize “good reasons”211 for his actions. The public will generally
believe that the collaborator’s rupture is linked to “bad reasons” and, in the
best case scenario; the collaborator will be supported (discreetly) by the pub-
lic as an occasional ally. In the worst case scenario, it will not be supported
by the public and will be unanimously opposed212. The lack of public sup-
port can therefore also hinder the willingness to collaborate.
For collaboration to be conceivable for “Ego”, its relationship with “Us”
would have to be weakened. Collaboration would therefore presuppose the
initiation of disengagement or de-radicalisation. These two concepts are not
synonymous. Disengagement refers to the idea that a member of the group
leaves or moves away from the group. He distances itself from the other
members of the organisation. De-radicalisation, on the other hand, refers to
the “progressive and evolutionary reduction of a rigid way of thinking, an
absolute and non-negotiable truth, where logic structures the actors’ vision
of the world, who uses violent repertoires of action to make it be heard”213.
It may happen that the collaborator moves away from his or her former
group without this disengagement reflecting a form of de-radicalisation214.
Distancing may be linked to personal interests and does not necessarily im-
ply an awareness of the misuse of violence, a conversion to the democratic
order and a willingness to normalise one’s future behaviour.
3. Some hypotheses on the elements influencing the acceptance or refusal to
collaborate
The main explanatory elements of the terrorist trajectories taken up in
the previous section are repeated here in order to formulate hypotheses on
the chances of success of a proposal for collaboration with the justice sys-
tem. Two preliminary remarks are in order. Firstly, we can only formulate
hypotheses that would have to be confronted with an empirical system in or-
der to be challenged or validated. Secondly, it is important for the reader to
bear in mind the unethical nature of collaboration in order not to end up in
Machiavellian practices aimed at maximising the chances of success of these
collaborations at all costs215.
Having said that, six elements seem to us to have a role to play in the
chances of collaboration in the fight against terrorism. The purpose and cost
211 If good reasons are recognised by the “public”, the rupture made by “Ego” in the
face of “Us” will not be perceived as a betrayal. (S. SCHEHR, op. cit., 2007, p. 321).
212 On this question of public support for the act of treason, the situations of “jihadist”
and “nationalist” terrorists are probably not entirely identical. It is assumed that the Euro-
pean public will more readily regard the former as a “convenient ally” and the latter as “de-
spicable”.
213 B. AININE, T. LINDEMANN, X. CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, op. cit., 2017, p. 10.
214 I. SOMMIER, “Repentir et dissociation: la fin des ‘années de plomb’ en Italie”, Cul-
tures et conflits, 1999, 40, 1, p. 43.
215 We would find it problematic if our scientific work were used by the negotiator to
artificially increase the confidence of the candidate collaborator. This negotiator should not
mobilise political or religious messages that do not correspond to reality (see below) or in-
vent judicial elements to increase pressure on the individual in the context of the “prisoner’s
dilemma” (see below).
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of terrorist action (3.1), the weight of the religious (3.2) and political (3.3) di-
mension in the transition to the terrorist act, the weight of material (3.4)
and/or symbolic (3.5) gains and the role of the bond between the perpetrator
of a terrorist offence and the group which he/she belongs to (3.6).
3.1. The purpose and the cost of terrorist action
What can be the place of negotiation when the aim of terrorist action is
to intimidate a population, to constrain a government or an international or-
ganisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to destabilise
them in their fundamental structures? To answer this question, two types of
terrorist actions can be distinguished.
Some perpetrators of terrorist acts are described as “absolute”216. They
carry out actions they wish to be murderous (bomb attacks, attacks in pub-
lic spaces…). They seek to “advertise” their actions and “get a message
across”: they are prepared to perpetrate violent actions to build another
world in line with their aspirations217. These terrorists (and perhaps part of
the population) define their actions as acts of liberation, rebellion or resis-
tance in the face of a government considered illegitimate218. Such violent ac-
tions are initially in contradiction with a betrayal negotiated for personal
ends and the possibility of negotiation for these “absolute” terrorists seems
practically non-existent. On the one hand, the willingness to “resist” the op-
ponent may, on the activist’s side, make him or her prefer to stay in the con-
flict rather than enter into negotiations with someone perceived as illegiti-
mate, especially if the issue at stake in the negotiation is only personal and
not related to the cause219. On the other hand, on the government side, en-
tering into negotiations with “such individuals” also seems unattractive in
that it would be perceived as an “admission of weakness” and an abandon-
ment of the ideal of equality of all before the law220.
Other perpetrators of terrorist acts, referred to as “contingent”221, act
with the aim of negotiating. Through their instrumental actions (hostage-
taking and kidnappings), they seek to negotiate in order to exchange their
victims for something else: media visibility, the release of activists, a ransom,
216 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, “Négocier avec les terroristes?”, Négociations, 2011, 2,
16, p. 137 and 140.
217 A. SCHMID and A. JONGMAN, Political Terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con-
cepts, data bases, theories and literature, Brunswick, Transaction, 1988, p. 5; L. WEINBERG, A.
PEDAHZUR. and S. HIRSCH-HOEFLER, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Terrorism
and Political Violence, 2004, 16, p. 780.
218 A. PEMBERTON, “Needs of Victims of Terrorism”, Assisting Victims of Terrorism. To-
wards a European Standard of Justice, R. LETSCHERT, I. STAIGER and A. PEMBERTON (eds.), Dor-
drecht, Springer, 2010, p. 127.
219 The cost of agreement may be perceived as higher than the cost of persistent dis-
agreement. (R. BOURQUE and C. THUDEROZ, Sociologie de la négociation, Rennes, Presses uni-
versitaires de Rennes, 2011, p. 21).
220 R. BOURQUE and C. THUDEROZ, op. cit., p. 30. FAURE and ZARTMAN (op. cit., 2011, p.
142) mention a discursive strategy that a government could adopt in order to avoid being ac-
cused as weak if it agrees to negotiate with terrorists: it should state that it only accepts ne-
gotiations with “former terrorists”; the concepts of “collaborators” and “repentant” are then
very useful.
221 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 137.
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political change… 222. These instrumental actions, which are from the outset
part of a logic of negotiation, make it possible to imagine, in the event of ar-
rest, a greater interest on the part of the perpetrator in a negotiation con-
cerning his criminal situation than in the case of “absolute” terrorists. Col-
laboration here could be more fruitful from the point of view of justice, even
if the chances of success remain low and conditional on other factors.
Another (double) distinction proposed by Mc Adam223 proves useful in
analysing the chances of successful negotiation with the justice system. This
distinguishes between low-cost or high-cost radical engagement, “depending
on the time, energy and money involved”224 and low-risk or high-risk radical
engagement, depending on the anticipated physical, social, legal and finan-
cial dangers associated with the engagement. The hypothesis can be formu-
lated that if an individual has devoted an important amount (high cost) of re-
sources to carry out his violent engagement, he might refuse to collaborate
in order not to ruin the high costs to the (free) members of his group prepar-
ing a violent action225. However, a high-cost radical commitment can some-
times end in disappointment or even “burn-out”226, which could then facili-
tate a negotiated betrayal. Sometimes this disappointment and burn-out can
result in the activist behaving unconsciously which lead to his or her ar-
rest227. If an individual has accepted a radical, high-risk commitment, he or
she might also find it easier to accept the criminal risks associated with re-
pression and would therefore not be very interested in the idea of reducing
these risks through collaboration.
Finally, at present, a terrorist act is often defined as an “act of war”228,
implying a martial reaction (militarisation of the reaction, torture…)229.
Such a metaphorical230 (and potentially legal231) qualification of the terrorist
act as an act of war seems to dictate solutions that are more collective
(amnesties, rehabilitation policies) than individual (negotiation-bargain-
222 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 138 and 150.
223 D. MC ADAM, “Recruitment to High Risk Activism. The case of Freedom Summer”,
American Journal of Sociology, 1986, 92, p.67.
224 I. SOMMIER, “Engagement radical, désengagement et déradicalisation. Continuum et
lignes de fracture”, Lien social et Politiques, 2012, 68, p. 19.
225 BATESON was able to show that the more expensive an engagement was, the more
likely the individual is to ignore information that calls him into question (G. BATESON, Vers
une écologie de l’esprit, Paris, Seuil, 1977).
226 J. ROSS and T. GURR, “Why Terrorism Subsides: A comparative Study of Canada and
the United States”, Comparative Politics, 1989, 21, 4, p. 420; M. RIBETTI, “Disengagement and
beyond. A case study of demobilization”, Leaving Terrorism Behind. Individual and Collective
disengagement, T. BJORGO and J. HORGAN (eds.), London and New York, Routledge, 2009, p.
152 to 169.
227 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2012, p. 27.
228 M.-H. GOZZI, op. cit., 2003, p. 53; T. DELPECH, op. cit., 2002, p. 37.
229 J. BURGER, “Terrorism”, Military Law and Law of War Review, 2003, 42, p. 467 to
478.
230 We use the concept of “metaphor” because when we speak of an act of war when
we refer to a terrorist act, we can only refer to a “low intensity” war. (P. GUENIFFEY, op. cit.,
2003, p. 162). Indeed, even the attacks of 11 September 2001 (the bloodiest in the history of
terrorism) are incomparable to the acts of war that Europe experienced in the 20th century.
231 M.-L. CESONI, “Terroriste et combattant: une confusion pernicieuse”, L’effet radicali-
sation et le terrorisme, F. BRION, C. DE VALKENEER and V. FRANCIS (eds.), Brussels, Politeia, 2019,
p. 123 to 154.
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ing)232. Moreover, the war-like reactions of the State (this time we are no
longer in the metaphor but in a very concrete reality) suppress, due to the
death of many potential partners, the possibility of a series of negotiations
for lack of purpose.
3.2. The weight of the religious dimension
When the religious dimension appears important in the radical engage-
ment of a jihadist terrorist, it is necessary to understand the place of religion
in that individual’s life. Interviews with imprisoned jihadists were able to
show that “entry into Islam was mainly in the form of a rupture” in the
sense that these “returns to religion respond to the search for a standardized
and orderly life as one enters adulthood”233. In this religious market, the
Salafist offer is particularly accessible (via the Internet) and makes it possi-
ble to achieve the expected rupture in that it invites to a hyper standardized
life, shaped by the demands of rigour and discipline. Ethical righteousness,
associated with loyalty to the group, is then valued and may explain the low
relevance, in the eyes of the arrested terrorist, of a negotiated proposal of be-
trayal stemming from human justice and associated with a secular State.
Some authors234 conclude (very quickly235) that such a religious ideology
makes people insensitive to punishment, which would be an obstacle to col-
laboration.
When the use of violence is perceived as an obligation to make the di-
vine Word triumph, the terrorist’s abandonment of this violence seems par-
ticularly complicated236. This would be all the truer when the terrorist makes
a link between a religious text and a demand for violence against non-be-
lievers, when he is convinced of the decline of Arab-Muslim civilisation and
fascinated by conspiratorial and eschatological discourse237. However, re-
searchers have been able to show that disengagement can occur in certain
circumstances that weaken the weight of this religious factor. On the one
hand, certain “quietist” or “pietist”238 Salafist discourses can create doubt
about the relevance of the use of violence by terrorists. These speeches call
for an end to the fighting by indicating that it is immoral (the killing of in-
nocents is opposed to the values of Islam) or, more pragmatically, that it is
counterproductive (“What is the point of killing one of theirs if, in return, it
232 S. MULLINS, «Rehabilitation of Islamist Terrorist: Lessons from Criminology», Dy-
namics of Asymmetric Conflict. Pathways toward terrorism and genocide, 2010, 3, 3, p. 162 to
193.
233 B. AININE, T. LINDEMANN, X. CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, op. cit., 2017, p. 62 and 63.
234 R. DUFF, “Notes on Punishment and Terrorism”, American Behavioral Scientist,
2005, 48, p. 758 to 763.
235 H. CARVALHO, “Terrorism, Punishment, And Recognition”, New Criminal Law Re-
view, 2012, 15, p. 345 to 374.
236 F. GLOWACZ, “Mineurs judiciarisés pour participation à des activités d’un groupe ter-
roriste. Analyse des processus et dynamiques de radicalisation”, Revue internationale de crim-
inologie et de police technique et scientifique, 2019, p. 275.
237 B. AININE, T. LINDEMANN, X. CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, op. cit., 2017, p. 81, 92 and 95.
238 S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, “Quitter la violence islamique. Retour sur le phénomène de
désaffiliation djihadiste”, Revue du MAUSS, 2017, 1, 49, p. 119.
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eliminates a thousand of ours?”)239. These ideological reversals – some
speeches sometimes use very harsh words to talk about the fighters (“dogs of
Hell”240) – certainly contribute to reducing the symbolic gains of violent en-
gagement. This shows that the link between Salafism and Jihadism is more
complex than is usually presented241. On the other hand, it has also been
shown that some individuals who joined the Islamic State came back with
much disappointment. Their personal aspirations to help the suffering Mus-
lim population or to live in a climate more in line with their religion were
faced to a reality on the ground made up of infighting, corruption, brutality
against civilians, and arbitrary executions of hostages242. While these ele-
ments may lead to disengagement on the part of some, it is far from certain
that this disengagement is accompanied by a willingness to betray and ne-
gotiate with justice.
3.3. The weight of the political dimension
The political dimension can play an important role in jihadist terrorism
(see above). Many activists want to depict an asymmetrical relationship be-
tween the West and the Arab-Muslim world, denouncing the injustice of a
logic of domination and exploitation unfavorable to the latter. They identify
with a group of individuals perceived as persecuted and threatened, whose
interests must be defended and their suffering even avenged. As a certain
number of exclusions and discriminations are not without foundation, the
negotiation proposal risks being perceived by the potential collaborator as
allowing the injustice denounced to prevail.
Negotiation strategists believe that, in this framework, the negotiator
must “take into account the motivation(s)”243 of the activists. He must show
the terrorist that his voice was heard, that his cause was understood244. The
negotiator’s objective here is not to change the terrorist’s belief system245 but
to make him understand that his “tactical actions are counterproductive”246.
In other words, the negotiator must convince the terrorist that there are bet-
ter ways than violence to achieve his political objective. The negotiator must
make the terrorist aware that his violent actions do not serve his cause and
that what is true for him is also true for his free comrades: denouncing them
makes it possible to put an end to counterproductive tactics and thus to
239 S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, op. cit., 2017, p. 119 and 120.
240 S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, op. cit., 2017, p. 119.
241 B. AININE, T. LINDEMANN, X. CRETTIEZ and R. SÈZE, op. cit., 2017, p. 10, 25, 36, 40, 64,
79 and 80.
242 S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, op. cit., 2017, p. 126.
243 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 139.
244 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 152.
245 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 141.
246 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 142. In order to show that the objec-
tives of the political struggle are inaccessible through violence, the negotiator must avoid
“condescending” attitudes that could lead to a feeling of inferiority. It is to be feared that the
meeting between an arrested person and a magistrate will not facilitate the fulfillment of
these conditions of possibility of negotiation. The presence of a lawyer could restore a sense
of equality between the protagonists and thus be conducive to negotiation.
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make the political cause triumph in the medium term (with, it is true, short-
term collateral damage for the individuals betrayed). If the reasoning can be
understood theoretically, it seems unlikely to us that, in practice, negotiators
will be able to convince many terrorists on this point. Swapping violent ac-
tion for political action is a process that can take “years, even decades”247
and convincing someone who has just been arrested (and often not yet con-
victed) to make the switch and denounce those who persist in violent action
seems unrealistic. It seems to us, in this respect, that individualised denun-
ciation policies are less promising than collective amnesty or rehabilitation
policies248.
3.4. The role of material gains or the chances of a possible bargaining
Individuals for whom material gains have (become) central to violent
engagement (see above the notion of “opportunistic militant”) are likely to
react most positively to proposals for collaboration, as long as they are con-
vinced that this is where the maximisation of their personal interests lies.
This utilitarian calculation, attributed to a rational individual is analysed by
game theory and often illustrated using the “prisoner’s dilemma”249.This
dilemma is presented as follows. Two prisoners are interrogated and:
– if one of them denounces the other and the other does not denounce
him, the one who denounces will have his sentence removed, while the other
will have his sentence increased to the maximum;
– if both denounce, they will both receive a medium sentence (their
guilt is proven but their cooperation with the judicial authorities is taken
into account);
– if neither of them denounces the other, they will both receive a mini-
mal sentence (their guilt for the most serious acts cannot be proven, the
judge can only condemn them for less serious acts for which he has suffi-
cient evidence).
This prisoner’s dilemma is usually illustrated in the form of a table250:
247 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 146.
248 S. MULLINS, op. cit., 2010, p. 162 to 193.
249 N. EBER, Le dilemme du prisonnier, Paris, La Découverte, 2006.
250 This table is borrowed from N. EBER (op. cit., 2006, p. 3).
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In the situation at hand, legislation generally only accepts a reduced
sentence if the statements are “revealing” and bring new information to the
public prosecutor’s office. It is therefore not enough to denounce, but to be
the first to denounce. The previous table would then become:
Does not denounce Denounces
Does not denounce 1 year, 1 year 5 years, 0 years
Denounces 0 years, 5 years 3 years, 3 years
For the negotiator (often the public prosecutor himself251), it is impor-
tant to know whether the individual in front of him is rather “selfish” (and
ready to denounce) or rather “cooperative” (and not ready to denounce).
There is a large body of literature that has attempted to identify the deter-
minants of cooperation. Despite contradictory results, some research shows
that women cooperate more than men252. In terms of personality traits, in-
dividuals who think they are masters of their own destiny, who have consid-
erable self-control and who are sensation-seeking are more cooperative253. If
the two “prisoner-players” have been able to communicate beforehand
(which is possible in the context of terrorist offences), the level of coopera-
tion will increase254. It is therefore important to isolate the person with
whom one wishes to negotiate from the person to be denounced and, in gen-
eral, from any person (co-prisoners) who can convince him or her not to de-
nounce255. If the “prisoner-players” know each other256 (which is always the
case in the situations we are dealing with), they will be more cooperative.
And the more they know each other (presence of a “group spirit”257), the
more this will be the case. If the “prisoner-players” know that denunciation
can lead to a sanction, even an informal one (gossip, ostracism), they adopt
a more cooperative behaviour258.
251 Negotiation strategists favour a “strict application of the principle of separation be-
tween those who negotiate and those who decide” (G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011,
p. 150). In the negotiations of interest to us here, it is often the magistrate of the public pros-
ecutor’s office who negotiates and decides on the criminal advantage granted. It is true that
it also happens that another actor – a judge – intervenes to approve the content of the agree-
ment (see the national reports above).
252 A. ORTMANN and L. TICHY, «Gender differences in the laboratory: evidence from pris-
oner’s dilemma games”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1999, 39, 3, p. 327
to 339.
253 C. BOONE, B. DE BRABANDER and A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, “The impact of personality on
behavior in five prisoner’s dilemma games”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 1999, 20, 3, p.
343 to 377.
254 D. SALLY, “Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: a meta-analysis of ex-
periments from 1958 to 1992”, Rationality and Society, 1995, 7, 1, p. 58 to 92.
255 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 144.
256 D. SALLY, “A general theory of sympathy, mind-reading, and social interaction, with
an application to the Prisoners’s Dilemma”, Social Science Information, 2000, 39, 4, p. 567 to
634.
257 N. EBER, op. cit., 2006, p. 51.
258 E. FEHR and S. GÄCHTER, “Cooperation and punishment in public goods experi-
ments”, The American Economic Review, 2000, 90, 4, p. 980 to 994; D. MASCLET, C. NOUSSAIR,
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For the negotiation-bargaining process to succeed, attention must also
be paid to the relationship of trust between the terrorist and the negotiator.
This relationship produces a sequential dilemma in which the first actor
must show trust and the second must be loyal. The terrorist must trust the
representative of the judicial institution in thinking that his statements will
indeed lead to a reduction of the sentence and the judicial actor must be
loyal and keep his promise of reward. There is also extensive literature on
the elements that can influence levels of trust and loyalty during a negotia-
tion. These include greater loyalty from women259, the impact of the differ-
ence in ethnic origin between the partners260, the personality type of the ne-
gotiators (cynical, manipulative, opportunistic, who believes that the end al-
ways justifies the means)261, or even the existence of social ties between the
two partners262, especially if the second partner (i.e. the one who will have to
be loyal263 after the trusting attitude of the first partner) adopts positive atti-
tudes (smiles) during the interaction264. However, the weight of these factors
in a judicial negotiation remains to be determined.
When the instrumental dimension of the terrorist action is significant,
negotiation is initially facilitated because the stakes are also mainly instru-
mental (reduction of the sentence). However, the scientific conclusions on
the chances of negotiation linked to game theory (often resulting from sim-
plified experiments265) that we have just presented, seem to us to overvalue
the economic rationality of the players266 . In the real world, it is not self-ev-
ident for actors to identify their interests so easily, immersed as they are in
a complex social world in which access to relevant information and the abil-
ity to process it is limited. Moreover, this desire to maximise these interests
probably takes too little account, in our field, of other factors such as the
need for recognition and symbolic gains linked to terrorist action (see be-
low).
S. TUCKER and M.-C. VILLEVAL, “Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary con-
tributions mechanism”, The American Economic Review, 2003, 93, 1, p. 366 to 380.
259 R. CROSSON and N. BUCHAN, “Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evi-
dence from Trust Games”, The American Economic Review, 1999, 89, 2, p. 386 to 391.
260 E. GLAESER, D. LAIBSON, J. SCHEINKMAN and C. SOUTTER, “Measuring trust”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2000, 115, 3, p. 811 to 846. For a different reading, see J. BOUCKAERT
and G. DHAENE, “Inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity: results of an experiment with small busi-
nessmen”, European Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 20, 4, p. 869 to 886.
261 A. GUNNTHORSDOTTIR, K. MCCABE and V. SMITH, “Using the Machiavellianism instru-
ment to predict trustworthiness in bargaining game”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 2002,
23, 1, p. 49 to 66.
262 E. GLAESER, and al., op. cit., 2000.
263 In the configuration we are interested in, it is the magistrate.
264 C. ECKEL and R. WILSON, “The human face of game theory: trust and reciprocity in
sequential games”, Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Re-
search, E. OSTROM and J. WALKER (eds.), New York, Sage, p. 245 to 274. Men seem to be more
influenced than women on this point.
265 Thus, the procedural dimension of action is not taken into account, or only super-
ficially, in these experiments.
266 Certainly, contrary to classical economic theory in which the homo economicus
only acts selfishly, game theory makes it possible to explain the rationality of cooperative be-
haviour.
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3.5. The role of symbolic gains or recognition offered by the judiciary
Violent engagement can provide symbolic benefits to the terrorist (see
above). The latter can obtain an official status (martyr, hero, warrior), he
can strengthen his self-esteem by reinforcing his “actority” (ability to act)
and by fighting a feeling of non-recognition or powerlessness. Powerless-
ness, as a factual and/or perceived reality, plays an important role in the
transition to a terrorist act. Through the recognition it provides, the terror-
ist act is sometimes described as the weapon of the weak trying to compen-
sate for this powerlessness.
Faced with this narcissistic wound that the terrorist act compensates
for, negotiators must, according to some, try to restore the terrorist’s deci-
sion-making capacity by insisting on other ways of taking power267. We have
already mentioned the delicate transition between violent action and legiti-
mate political action (see above). Collaborating with the judiciary would be
another way of regaining power, no longer linked to a political objective but
to the management of one’s own life. The negotiator can insist here on the
fact that the arrested person is not powerless, that he or she can conquer a
real decision-making capacity by denouncing. Here again, the reasoning
seems to encounter serious limitations in practice. The proposal to collabo-
rate with the judiciary is undoubtedly not a very realistic way to increase the
arrested terrorist’s “actority”. Any action does not contribute to strengthen-
ing the feeling of recognition and it is unlikely that the proposal to collabo-
rate with justice will allow “congruence between the self-image we claim for
ourselves or our community of reference and the image that others have of
us”268.
In the longer term (after the enforcement of the sentence), the individ-
ual who enjoyed “hero status” within the violent group might be tempted to
seek the same role (and the symbolic gains associated with it), but this time
as a key player in de-radicalisation. This leads some to see former activists
as key actors in de-radicalisation programmes269: not only is a “repentant” –
not in the sense of a collaborator, but in the sense of a person who has com-
mitted violent acts and has become aware of his or her mistakes – best
placed to shake the certainties of other activists270. But moreover, this role
contributes to restoring its status and reintegrating it into the human bond.
It should also be noted that the attractiveness of symbolic gains may
change over time and that it is interesting for the negotiator to identify pos-
sible changes in the terrorist’s trajectory on this point. Changes in the bio-
graphical trajectory (the individual is getting older, is in a relationship, has
children, has a job…) can change the attractiveness of these symbolic gains.
267 G.-O. FAURE and W. ZARTMAN, op. cit., 2011, p. 147.
268 X. CRETTIEZ, op. cit., 2016a, p. 724; T. LINDEMANN, Causes of War, Colchester, ECPR
Press, 2010, p. 9.
269 D. BOUZAR, op. cit., 2017, p. 69.
270 D. BOUZAR, op. cit., 2017, p. 75; D. BOUZAR and M. MARTIN, «Méthode expérimentale
de déradicalisation: quelles stratégies émotionnelles et cognitives”, Pouvoirs, 2016, 158, 3, p.
91.
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Commitment can be experienced as a sacrifice (daily deprivation, moral
rigour, military discipline, loss of autonomy…) that is increasingly burden-
some271.Testimonies from “returnees” show that the fascination of some peo-
ple for a death as a martyr can be shaken by the experience lived within the
Islamic State: when death presents itself concretely (having seen “brothers
in arms” die), a fear of death can appear and curb the warrior impulse272. If
the negotiator is aware of these changes, he or she will be able to adjust
their arguments in the negotiation. Knowing the state of advancement in the
violent career is important in order to know the level of identification and
attachment to the violent group. The greater the involvement in the career,
the more the disengagement will be perceived as inconceivable or symboli-
cally risky since it destroys the new identity as a member of the group. It is
therefore essential for the negotiator to gather information about the ar-
rested persons in order to conduct the negotiation effectively or, if there are
several arrested persons, to determine with whom the chances of success are
greater.
3.6. The impact of group bonding
The more clandestine the radical group operates, the stronger the de-
pendence on the group. The reduction of the individual’s life to his or her
role in the group limits the possibilities of disengagement. Indeed, in these
groups, emotional tension, solidarity and pressure to conform are particu-
larly important, which encourages a sense of guilt to leave and to betray273.
This is why individual voluntary disengagement is in this case infrequent but
not impossible, since the symbolic attraction to life in the violent group may
be reduced on certain occasions: tensions in the group (lack of loyalty, para-
noid atmosphere), loss of an enviable role, a level of violence considered ex-
cessive…274.
If the group is marked by strong internal competition, one can imagine
that collaboration is more easily accepted in order to oust an internal com-
petitor within the group. If there is strong intergroup competition, it is eas-
ier to imagine the denunciation of members of the competing group (as long
as the individual has useful information on the activities of this other
group).
In any case, in order to hope for collaboration, it will always be neces-
sary to be attentive to the different costs of collaboration for the activist:
costs for the mental integrity of the activist’s self, costs related to the lack of
social perspective, or costs related to the loss of protection from the group.
The collaborative arrangement should therefore possibly be accompanied by
psychological support, credible protection measures and help in building a
new life.
271 S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, op. cit., 2017, p. 128 and 129.
272 D. THOMSON, Les Revenants, 2016, Paris, Seuil.
273 I. SOMMIER, op. cit., 2012, p. 26 and 27.
274 S. MULLINS, op. cit., 2010, p. 165.
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Conclusion
Throughout this text, we have tried to show that radicalness has no
essence but that it is constructed “through a dialectical relationship between
acts that transgress established norms (…) and the reaction to these acts”275.
To be defined as radical, transgressive behaviour must be perceived as sub-
versive to the political or social order. The State is the main guarantor of re-
spect for this political or social order, so its reaction is crucial in drawing
“the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable subversion”276. In the
current context, more and more acts are considered as “terrorist” and lead to
increasingly stronger penal reactions. We have been able to show that the
subversive nature of terrorist action undermines the credibility of collabora-
tive measures: can we expect many betrayals, to the benefit of the State
above all, of those who justify their actions by “overturning existing hierar-
chies and principles of division”277? It appears, however, that where terrorist
action is strongly linked to material gains – this action would then be closer
to certain delinquent behaviour – the criminal reward could probably be
perceived as more attractive.
This work, centred on collaboration and therefore focused on a reac-
tion addressed to an individual, must not completely neglect “collective” re-
actions to terrorist acts. Recent history has shown that the reduction of ter-
rorist acts can be achieved through these collective strategies278. The
chances of successful collective disengagement are greater when there is a
public offer of exit, such as political negotiations leading to an amnesty, or
when the individuals who can benefit from it can then (easily) join socially
and economically structured circles. The reduction in violent terrorist be-
haviour would therefore be linked less to de-radicalisation than to the possi-
bility of alternative “re-engagement”. As for this alternative re-engagement,
regarding the reintegration into more structured environments, it would
seem that there is no equality between all terrorists. The political and inde-
pendence activists of the Years of Lead were probably better off than the
current jihadist activists. While the former was able to benefit from a range
of opportunities offered by environments that were favourable to them, it
would seem that the latter could less easily rely on groups to reintegrate af-
ter their experience. The label of “terrorist” is likely to be a very persistent
stigma. Would States agree to alleviate these difficulties by putting in place
specific reintegration policies themselves? We believe that proposals for col-
laboration specifically aimed at terrorists only respond very imperfectly to
the fundamental social issues raised by these violent actions.
275 L. BONELLI and F. CARRIÉ, La fabrique de la radicalité. Une sociologie des jeunes dji-
hadistes français, Paris, Seuil, 2018, p. 67.
276 L. BONELLI and F. CARRIÉ, op. cit., 2018, p. 67.
277 L. BONELLI and F. CARRIÉ, op. cit., 2018, p. 67.
278 This was the case in Algeria in 1999 when President Bouteflika granted pardons to
2,300 imprisoned Islamist militants. An amnesty policy was also conducted in 2016 in Niger
for some members of Boko Haram. (See S. AMGHAR and K. FALL, op. cit., 2017, p. 121).
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CHAPTER 3
EU CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCES
WITH SPECIAL REGARDS ON TERRORIST OFFENCES
ZLATA -DUR-DEVIĆ, MIRTA KUŠTAN
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. EU competences. – a) Categories of the EU competences. – b)
Principle of proportionality and subsidiarity. – c) EU competences to enact criminal
(procedural) law. – 3. Legal basis for the creation of criminal law. – a) Administrative
measures. – b) Criminal substantive law. – c) Criminal procedural law. – 4. The com-
petence on dealing with terrorism. – a) Internal competences - EU vs. Member States.
– b) Implied powers and the external competences of the EU. – 5. Terrorism and fun-
damental rights. – a) Rights of individuals in criminal procedural law. – b) Existing le-
gal framework on combating terrorism. – 6. Conclusion - possible basis for rewarding
measures to prevent terrorism on the EU level.
1. Introduction
The assignment of the Croatian unit of the project “fight against inter-
national terrorism. discovering european models of rewarding measures to
prevent terrorism (fighter)” was to address the competences assigned to the
union by the treaties and the possible legal basis for future enactment of EU
criminal law and its harmonization with the respect of EU fundamental
principles regarding rewarding measures to prevent terrorism on the EU
level. the Lisbon treaty explicitly determines existence of the EU competence
to enact and harmonize criminal law at supranational level. the art. 82 and
83 TFEU provide a specific basis for such competences. this paper will first
look into the EU competences in general bearing in mind principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality and afterwards provide explanation of the EU
criminal competences in concrete. in the third chapter, possible legal basis
for creation of criminal law on the EU level will be analysed following that,
chapter four provides an explanation of EU criminal competences in field of
terrorism in its internal and external application. protection of fundamental
rights will be discussed in the chapter five. finally, in concluding remarks
and after the proper identification of the range of possibilities accorded by
the treaties possible models for enactment and harmonisation of rewarding
measures to prevent terrorism on the EU level which are also respectful of
the prerogatives and competences of the member states will be outlined.
2. EU competences
Division of competences between the EU and the Member States is es-
tablished in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into the force
in 2009 and led to the European Union replacing and succeeding the Euro-
pean community. The Treaty of Lisbon consists of two distinct treaties, the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU)1. The competencies of the European Union are estab-
lished by primary Union law, which provides the basis for actions of EU in-
stitutions and specific goals. Art. 5 TEU in its paragraphs 1 and 2 establishes
the principle of conferral of competences. This principle determines that the
EU can act only within the limits of competences conferred to it by the
Treaties, otherwise they are retained by the Member States. (Art. 5(2) TEU)
There are three main categories of competences: exclusive, shared, and
supporting competences. The principle of conferral governs the limits to EU
competences, while its use is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.
a) Categories of the EU competences
The competences of the EU transferred to the Union by the Member
States based on the principle of conferral are divided in the following cate-
gories:
1. Exclusive competences are conferred on the Union in specific areas
in which the EU alone can legislate and adopt binding acts. The Member
States can legislate and adopt legally binding acts in these areas only if em-
powered by the Union or when implementing Union acts (Art. 2(1) TFEU).
Based on Art. 3 TFEU the EU has exclusive competence in the following ar-
eas: customs union; the establishing of the competition rules necessary for
the functioning of the internal market; monetary policy for the Member
States whose currency is the euro; the conservation of marine biological re-
sources under the common fisheries policy; common commercial policy.
(Art. 3 TFEU)
2. Shared competence are the ones that the Union shares with the
Member States in specific areas and in those areas, both can legislate and
adopt legally binding acts. However, EU has primacy because Member
States can only exercise competence where the EU does not. Also, the Mem-
ber States shall regain the right to act alone once the EU ceases to exercise
its competence (Art. 2(2) TFEU)2. Shared competence between the EU and
EU Member States applies in the following areas: internal market; social
policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; economic, social and territorial
cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine bi-
ological resources; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-Eu-
ropean networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice. (Art. 4(2)
TFEU). Those areas are listed as principal areas but the Union will share
competence with the Member States everywhere where the Treaties pre-
scribe. Those areas can never relate to the areas referred to in Art. 3 which
1 See more Z. -DUR-DEVIĆ, Lisabonski ugovor: prekretnica u razvoju kaznenog prava u
Europi Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, vol. 15, No. 2/2008, Zagreb, pp. 1077-
1079.
2 Z. -DUR-DEVIĆ, Lisabonski ugovor (n. 1), p. 1081.
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prescribes exclusive competences and Art. 6 which determines supporting
competences (Art. 4(1) TFEU).
When it comes to EU criminal law and the competences that the EU
has in this area, which is the main topic of this paper, they fall under the cat-
egory of shared competences.
3. Supporting competences represent the ones connected to the area in
which the EU can only intervene to support, coordinate, or complement the
action of EU countries without superseding those competences. This means
that the action taken by the EU does not prevent Member States from acting
on their own and the EU cannot harmonise Member States laws and regula-
tions by adopting legally binding acts in these areas. According to Art. 6
TFEU those areas are: protection and improvement of human health; indus-
try; culture; tourism; education, vocational training, youth and sport; civil
protection; administrative cooperation (Art. 6 TFEU).
In addition to the three main categories of EU competences mentioned
above there are also special competences according to Art. 5 TFEU. The EU
can take measures to ensure that Member States coordinate their economic,
social and employment policies at EU level. In particular, this includes defin-
ing guidelines for these policies with the aim of achieving harmony in those
fields all over the EU territory.
b) Principle of proportionality and subsidiarity
The exercise of the Union competences, in areas which do not fall
within its exclusive competence, is restricted by the two fundamental princi-
ples laid down in Art. 5 TEU, namely the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5(3)
TEU) and the principle of proportionality (Art. 5(4) TEU). All legislative pro-
posals and initiatives must comply with those principles. This is specifically
stated in Art. 69 TFEU which directs national parliaments to ensure compli-
ance with those principles. This means that all actions regarding the exercise
of shared or supporting competences of the EU must be in line with those
principles and pass the test imposed by them.
In accordance with the principle of the subsidiarity, the EU legislator
shall act only if the goal pursued cannot “be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States” and it can be “be better achieved at Union level” because of
the effects or the scale of the proposed action. So, the necessity of EU in-
volvement has to be thoroughly scrutinised to ensure the protection of “na-
tional identities” of Member States under Art. 4(2) TEU. The aim is to exer-
cise majoritarian democracy as much as possible, so that decisions and ac-
tions of the EU are connected to the real will of citizens and justified and
legitimate at every level (national, regional or even local)3.
One of the annexes to the Lisbon Treaty, namely Protocol No. 2 on Ap-
plication of Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the
Treaties sets the criteria for applying those principles4. Art. 2 of the Protocol
3 See more Z. -DUR-DEVIĆ, Lisabonski ugovor (n. 1), p. 1082.
4 Protocol No. 2 In the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
(OJ [EU] 2010 No. C 83/206).
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requires the Commission to consult widely before proposing the legislative
acts. Also Art. 7 and 8 of the Protocol enable Member States to express their
opinions regarding the respect of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU leg-
islative process. The other key document for the application of subsidiarity
is Protocol No. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European
Union. It is of great importance due to its empowering effect on the involve-
ment of national Parliaments’ in EU activities. Its aim is not just to encour-
age that EU documents and proposals are forwarded to national Parliaments
for examination before the Council takes a decision but also to ensure
promptness5.
In addition to the principle of subsidiarity, the principle of proportion-
ality also regulates the exercise of powers by the EU. Actions of the Euro-
pean Union must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of
the Treaties. The criteria for applying this principle are also set in Protocol
No. 2.
c) EU competences to enact criminal (procedural) law
The post-Lisbon EU legislative competences as regards criminal law are
more extensive. Matters within the area of freedom security and justice
(AFSJ) fall within “shared competence” between the EU and Member States
according to Art. 4(2)(j) TFEU. Existence of the Union competence to enact
supranational criminal law for achieving a certain goal is determined by pri-
mary Union law in general while interpreting the respective competence pro-
visions6.
In the field of criminal law, the EU only has the competence for mini-
mum harmonization. This means that minimum level of criminalization in
Member States has to be ensured but they can also go further7. Decriminal-
ization, on the other hand, cannot be the aim of the approximation by the
Union8.
As regards EU criminal law the Protocol No. 2 on Application of Prin-
ciples of Subsidiarity and Proportionality is especially important because
national sovereignty of the Member States is intertwined with enaction of
the criminal law9. Regarding EU criminal competences, the principle of pro-
portionality demands that the criminal law sanction can only be the ultima
ratio because of its stigmatizing effect10. Only if less restrictive means are
proven to be ineffective or unavailable a criminal law sanctions can be used.
5 Protocol No. 1 on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, Official
Journal of the European Union, C 202/203.
6 H. SATZGER, International and European Criminal Law, Beck - Hart - Nomos, 2. Au-
flage 2018; p. 65.
7 H. SATZGER, International and European Criminal Law (n. 6), p. 90.
8 R. HEFENDHEL, in B. SCHÜNEMANN (ed.), A programme for European Criminal Justice,
pp. 457 et seq.
9 See SATZGER, KritV 2008, 17, 37; Weber, EuR 2008, 88, 102 et seq.
10 See “A Manifesto on European Criminal Policy” established by the research group
“European Criminal Policy Initiative”, ZIS 4 (2009), 697, et seqq. and EuCLR 1 (2011), 86 et
seqq.
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3. Legal basis for the creation of criminal law
The Area of Freedom Security and Justice is regulated in the Title V of
the TFEU. According to Art. 67(1) TFEU the Union shall constitute an area
of freedom security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and dif-
ferent legal systems and traditions of the Member States. To ensure a high
level of security the Union is obliged to take measures “to prevent and com-
bat crime, racism and xenophobia”, to secure “coordination and cooperation
between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities”,
and to achieve “mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters” if
needed “through the approximation of criminal laws” (Art. 67(3) TFEU).
However, Art. 67 TFEU should not be relied on as a legal basis for creating
criminal law but rather should be understood as lex generalis.
But there are other Articles which establish EU criminal competences
(legal basis) as regards EU criminal substantive and criminal procedural
law, as well as administrative measures. Possible preventive administrative
measures are regulated through Art. 75 TFEU, while mutual recognition, in-
cluding certain harmonisation of criminal procedural law to foster it, and
harmonization of criminal material law are regulated in Art. 82 and 83 TFE.
a) Administrative measures
Firstly, regarding the administrative measures that the EU can take,
Art. 75 TFEU may provide a specific legal basis for measures directed to pre-
vent and combat terrorism and related activities. This gives the EU compe-
tence to adopt measures necessary too “achieve the objectives set out in Art.
67, as regards preventing and combating terrorism and related activities”11.
With regulations, adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative proce-
dure, EU can “define a framework for administrative measures with regard
to capital movements and payments”, e.g., “freezing of funds, financial as-
sets or economic gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal
persons, groups or non-State entities” (Art. 75 TFEU). This enables the adop-
tion for some measures under the scope of Art. 75 for the crimes such fi-
nancing of terrorism which are connected to the aim of the project
FIGHTER. Still, Art. 75 TFEU can be used only for financial sanctions of
preventive nature regarding terrorism.
b) Criminal substantive law
In an area of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension
resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need
to combat them on a common basis Art. 83(1) TFEU provides for the cre-
ation of minimal rules concerning the definition of criminal offenses and
sanctions. The provision gives the EU criminal law competences as regards
“terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women
11 Compare with Art. 215 TFEU. See in that regard CJEU, case C-130/10, European
Parlimant v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472.
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and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money launder-
ing, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and
organised crime” (Art. 83(1) TFEU). Other crimes with cross border dimen-
sions that are considered to be of serious nature can be brought within the
competence of the EU but only if this is decided unanimously by the Coun-
cil after gaining the consent of the European Parliament (Art. 83(1) TFEU).
Those minimal rules can only be created by directives in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure in accordance with Art. 294 TFEU. Such a
proposal is subjected to qualified majority voting in the Council and co-de-
cision of the European parliament is required. In addition to the Commis-
sion, also 1/4 of Member States can initiate the adoption of instruments un-
der Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V TFEU (Art. 76 TFEU).
Art. 83(2) TFEU provides the legal basis to legislative criminal law for
the purposes of approximation and ensuring the effective implementation of
EU policy. Such a competence that is now expressly outlined in the Lisbon
Treaty was developed through CJEU judgments in environmental crime and
ship-source pollution cases. The result of interpretation of those judgments
by the Commission was a criminal law competence when it is necessary to
ensure the effective implementation of other EU policies in an area which
has been subject to harmonisation measures12.
When “approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member
States” is “essential to ensure and the effective implementation of a Union
policy in an area which has been subjected to harmonization measures”, di-
rectives can establish “minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal
offences and sanctions”. Improving the effet utile of the Union policy with
criminal law is the obvious aim of harmonization when it is essential to en-
sure its effective implementation. So, one limitation is hidden in the word
“essential”. The opinion of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) is that
the existence of this condition is satisfied only if there is a serious deficit
concerning enforcement which can only be removed by the threat of a sanc-
tion13. The area in which this competence can be exercised is every area that
was already subjected to harmonization measures by the EU14. Criminal law
approximation cannot be done in the same time as the initial approximation
of the non-criminal law provisions15.
Directives must be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative
procedure16 as was followed for the adoption of harmonization measures in
12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 (Case C 176/03 Commis-
sion v Council), Brussels, 24 November 2005, COM (2005) 583 final/2 and subsequently con-
firmed in the sheep source case and in the Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council
[2009] ECR I-593 (trade disparities).
13 BVerfG, Judgement of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. = BVerfGE 123, 267 = NJW
2009, 2267, 2288, para. 362, “Lissabon”.
14 H. SATZGER, International and European Criminal Law (n. 6), p. 90; see Vedder and
Heintschel von Heinegg-Kretschmer, art. III-271 EVV para. 20.
15 Ibid.
16 Special legislative procedures are not specifically described by TFEU rather they are
defined by treaty articles, for specific policy areas, which contain conditions for their imple-
mentation. The sole legislator is the Council while Parliaments role is limited to consent (e.g.
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question (Art. 83(2) TFEU). The Lisbon Treaty widens EU criminal law com-
petences substantially with the blanket clause in Art. 83(2) TFEU17.
The question whether Art. 83(2) can be the only legal basis for criminal
law directives was answered when Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight
against fraud to the Union´s financial interests by means of criminal law
(PIF Directive) was adopted in July 2017. Even though Commissions pro-
posal named Art. 325(4) TFEU as the adequate legal basis the European Par-
liament was in favor of Art. 83(2) TFEU18 as the correct legal basis for en-
actment of criminal law directives19.
The broad substantive criminal law competence that the EU has ac-
cording to the Art. 83 TFEU is subjected to the emergency brake mecha-
nism. This mechanism was created to govern national sovereignty of the
Member State which was disrupted with the exercise of EU competences in
the criminal law context. Member State may request that a draft directive is
referred to the European Council if there is a danger that the adoption
would “affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system”. As a result,
the ordinary legislative procedure is suspended. This suspension is termi-
nated if “after discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European Council,
within four months of this suspension, refers the draft back to the Coun-
cil”20. In the case of disagreement, a group of at least nine member states
can establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft directive. This
means that a group of Member States that consider instruments provided in
the draft directive acceptable can enhance their cooperation in the police
and criminal justice fields allowing other Member States not to participate21.
In such a case, the authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation re-
ferred to in Art. 20(2) TEU and Art. 329(1) TFEU shall be deemed to be
granted and the provisions on enhanced cooperation shall apply (Art. 83(3)
TFEU).
c) Criminal procedural law
One of the goals of harmonization of EU substantive criminal law un-
der Art. 83 TFEU, as foreseen in the Art. 82(1) TFEU, is to strengthen the op-
eration of mutual recognition. Because of its connection with sovereignty
and national legal systems of Member States regulation and harmonization
of criminal law was always a sensitive area22. The basis for EU criminal pro-
cedural law is the principle of mutual recognition. Harmonization of sub-
stantive criminal law can have a positive impact on mutual recognition be-
regarding EPPO - Art. 86 TFEU) or consultation (e.g. regarding cross-border police opera-
tions - Art. 89 TFEU).
17 See Ambos and Rackow, ZIS 4 (2009), 397, 403.
18 Directive 2017/1371/EU, OJ (EU) 2017 No. L 198/29.
19 Councile Document No. 9024/14 of 29 April 2014; on the current status, see Council
Document No. 5478/17 of 1 February 2017.
20 See Z. -DUR-DEVIĆ, Lisabonski ugovor (n. 1), pp. 1087-1088.
21 Ibid., p. 1088.
22 See, for example, A. ERBEŽNIK, Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law and Funda-
mental Rights - The Necessity for a Sensitive Approach, in The Needed Balances in EU Crim-
inal Law, 2018, pp. 185-212.
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cause when there is similarity as regards substantive criminal rules Member
States develop mutual trust more easily23.
EU procedural criminal policy24 includes EU legislative actions, poli-
cies, strategies, and rules related to the criminal procedure at the EU and
domestic levels. These rules and instructions regulate treatment of suspects
during the apprehension, investigation, and trial, as well as victims’ rights
and judicial institutions involved25. All of that is applicable not only in cases
concerning cross-border crimes but also in purely internal situations as re-
gards 6 directives on procedural rights for suspects and accused persons the
EU has adopted.
Chapter 4 of Title V of the AFSJ (in Art. 82, 85 and 86 TFEU) governs,
inter alia, judicial cooperation between Member States based on mutual
recognition, as well as harmonization of criminal procedure and the estab-
lishment of specific EU bodies in the area of judicial cooperation (Eurojust,
EPPO)26. Three types of competences emerge from these provisions. Firstly,
the EU can adopt instruments to ensure mutual recognition of judgments,
decisions and other measures with a purpose of making transnational crim-
inal cooperation more efficient (Art. 82(1) TFEU)27. Secondly, Art. 82(2)
TFEU enables the harmonization of domestic criminal procedure28. Thirdly,
the Union competences to create and regulate EU criminal enforcement in-
stitutions are prescribed in Art. 85 TFEU (relating to Eurojust) and Art. 86
TFEU (provides for establishing of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office)29.
Because the focus of this paper are EU competences relating to terrorist
criminal offences, the first two competences will now be explained further.
23 See P. ASP, The Procedural Criminal Law Cooperation of the EU, JURIDISKA
FAKULTETENS SKRIFTSERIE NR 84, Faculty of Law, Stockholm University Research Pa-
per No. 6, 27 Feb 2017, pp. 20-23; V. MITSILEGAS, The constitutional implications of mutual
recognition in criminal matters in the EU, Common Market Law Review, Volume 43, Issue 5
(2006), pp. 1279-81; Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament, Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters’ COM
(2000) 495 final, 4; J. OUWERKERK, ‘The Potential of Mutual Recognition as Limit to the Exer-
cise of EU Criminalisation Powers’ [2017] European Criminal Law Review 5.
24 See A. WEYEMBERGH, and I. WIECZOREK, ‘Is There an EU Criminal Policy?’, in R. COL-
SON, and S. FIELD, (eds.), EU Criminal Justice and the Challenges of Legal Diversity (Cambridge
University Press 2016).
25 See H. PACKER, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1963) 113 University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review 1, 2; HOUSE OF LORDS EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, The European Union’s
Policy on Criminal Procedure, 30th Report of Session 2010 - 12, HL Paper 288, pp. 6-8; E.
BAKER, ‘Governing Through Crime - the Case of the European Union’ (2010) 17 European
Journal of Criminology 187, 190-192; J. MONAR, ‘Decision-Making in the Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice’ in A. ARNULL, and D. WINCOTT (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the
European Union (Oxford University Press 2002), pp. 67-70.
26 See C. HARDING, and J. BANACH-GUTIERREZ, ‘The Emergent EU Criminal Policy: Identi-
fying the Species’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 758; S. PEERS, ‘EU Criminal Law and the
Treaty of Lisbon’ 33 European Law Review, pp. 507-508.
27 See TFEU art. 82(1).
28 See S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law: EU Criminal Law, Policing, and
Civil Law 4/e: Volume II: EU Criminal Law, Policing, and Civil Law: 2 (Oxford European
Union Law Library) Hardcover - 24 Mar. 2016, 513 at fn 24; EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, The
European Union’s Policy on Criminal Procedure (n. 25), pp. 14-16, 20-22 for support of this
contestation.
29 See P. ASP, Procedural Criminal Law Cooperation, (n. 23), pp. 18-20.
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In ordinary legislative procedure, on the basis of Art. 82, the EU can
adopt (a) measures to secure recognition of all forms of judgments and ju-
dicial decisions and (b) measures that deal with the conflicts of jurisdiction
between Member States, as well as (c) support the training of the judiciary
and judicial staff and even (d) facilitate cooperation between judicial or
equivalent authorities of the Member States.
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the principle of mutual recognition was in-
corporated into primary European law by Art. 82(1)30. Even though this
principle was first developed for establishment of the internal market as re-
gards free movement of goods (“Cassis de Dijon” logic), when applied to
criminal procedural law it requires from the Member States to recognise in
principle judicial decisions lawfully enacted in another Member State31.
Constrains that national borders impose on judicial cooperation shall be
eased through the principle of mutual recognition32.
In addition, Art. 82(2) TFEU provides as a kind of flanking measure to
mutual recognition the approximation of Member States’ laws and regula-
tions:
a) in matters of mutual admissibility of evidence between Member
States,
b) concerning the rights of individuals in criminal procedure,
c) regarding the rights of victims of crime,
d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council
has identified in advance by a decision. In that case, after it gains the Euro-
pean Parliament’s consent, the Council must act unanimously (Art. 83 (2)
TFEU).
In those areas and only if necessary, to facilitate mutual recognition of
judicial decisions and police cooperation concerning crimes with cross-bor-
der dimension the EU has the competence to establish minimal rules by
means of directives. Those directives have to be adopted in the ordinary leg-
islative procedure. Minimal rules established on the EU level do not prevent
Member States from ensuring a higher level of protection. Approximation on
the basis of art. 82(2) TFEU merely complements the principle of mutual
recognition as we can see from the words: “to extent necessary to facilitate
mutual recognition”. Interference with the national criminal law systems
must always be minimally invasive and because of that the approximation of
criminal procedural law must be ultima ratio33.
Contrary to the para. 2, para. 1 of Art. 82 TFEU does not allow the ap-
proximation of national provisions. Criminal policy can be based on mutual
recognition without approximation. This can be clearly seen from the word-
ing which limits the approximation of the laws of national laws to the areas
referred to in paragraph 2 (and in Art. 83 TFEU as regards criminal mater-
ial law). Moreover, the so-called “emergency break” that protects national
criminal law of the Member States is only applicable to Art. 82(2) TFEU.
30 H. SATZGER, International and European Criminal Law (n. 6), p. 139.
31 See C. BURCHARD, Die Konstitutionalisierung der gegenseitigen Anerkennung, Juris-
tische Abhandlungen, Band 55) (Deutsch) Taschenbuch, Juni 2019, pp. 65 et seqq.
32 STREINZ and SATZGER, art. 82 AEUV, para. 9.
33 H. SATZGER, International and European Criminal Law (n. 6), p. 164.
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4. The competence on dealing with terrorism
a) Internal competences - EU vs. Member States
The Lisbon Treaty, it seems, had a greater impact on the EU’s internal
powers in relation to counterterrorism rather than on external ones, first
and foremost due to the depillarization of the EU’s competences34. Union
role related to internal security is wider. Art. 3(2) TEU implies that funda-
mental objective of the EU is internal security35. Also, the decisions in the
area of justice and home affairs are made according to the “community
method”. A qualified majority vote (QMV) among the Member States is
enough for an act to be adopted in the Council, opposed to the unanimity re-
quired before Lisbon. Moreover, the European Parliament now has a greater
oversight role on these matters and the role of national parliaments has been
strengthened. This division of powers between EU institution is reflected in
the field of internal security and thus as regards counterterrorism. Also, the
jurisdiction of CJEU now covers the area of freedom, security, and justice36
which has a great impact on internal but also external counterterrorism poli-
cies. The CJEU can now press unwilling Member States to implement mea-
sures adopted by the EU37.
Still, the competence on addressing terrorism is divided between Mem-
ber States and the EU. On the one hand, Art. 4(2) TEU stipulates that the
Union shall respect the essential functions of its Member States, including
the safeguarding of national security which is their sole responsibility. Mat-
ters related to national security remain exclusively in the competence of the
Member States despite the importance of establishing the AFSJ. On the
other hand, Art. 3(2) TEU states that the Union shall ensure its citizens an
area of freedom, security and justice by preventing and combating crime.
Also, Art. 67 TFEU specifies the EU competence in the field of criminal law.
Still Member States do have the competence to act outside the scope of EU
law when terrorism is concerned as a matter of national security. In that
case Member States could also argue that they do not have to apply some as-
pects of the Directive 2017/54138 when dealing with matters concerned
purely national.
The CJEU refrains from labelling ‘terrorism’ as a matter of national se-
curity as this would imply a limited competence for the EU in this field. In-
34 T. RENARD, EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions After the Lisbon Treaty,
POLICY BRIEF, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2012, p. 2.
35 “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with ap-
propriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the
prevention and combating of crime”.
36 Exceptions: assessing the validity and proportionality of police operations and mea-
sures taken in the Member States to maintain internal security, see VARA, “The External Di-
mension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Lisbon Treaty,” European Jour-
nal of Law Reform 10, No. 4 (2008), pp. 577-597.
37 J. ARGOMANIZ, “Before and After Lisbon: Legal Implementation as the ‘Achilles Heel’
in EU CounterTerrorism?” European Security 19, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 297-316.
38 Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.
406 SECTION II – CHAPTER 3
stead, it argued that terrorism is threatening ‘international security’ in many
cases39. This clearly illustrates the existence of the shared competence be-
tween the EU and Member States in respect to combating terrorism40.
b) Implied powers and the external competences of the EU
Internal and external security are strongly intertwined, and this reflects
to the internal/external competences of the EU. In its pre-Lisbon case law
the CJEU established that the EU competence to conclude international
agreements may emerge from an express conferral by the Treaty or implic-
itly from i) other provisions of the Treaty and ii) from measures adopted
within the framework of those provisions by EU Institutions41. The Court
also determined that, even in the absence of an express provision, iii) when-
ever EU law creates powers, for EU Institutions, within its internal system
for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the EU has authority to un-
dertake international commitments necessary for the attainment of that ob-
jective42. This is known as the principle of parallelism43.
Post-Lisbon the Union legal personality is explicitly recognised in Art.
47 TEU and this impacted the external projection of the AFSJ in a positive
way44. Issues connected to EU representation in international organizations
and negotiations but also the procedure for concluding international treaties
and agreements with the unification of the international legal status of the
EU is be simplified45. The Lisbon Treaty “does not seek to transform the ex-
ternal AFSJ into an autonomous external policy. The focus is rather on using
external powers to achieve (internal) AFSJ objectives and on integrating an
AFSJ dimension into other external policies”46. The Lisbon Treaty aimed to
codify the CJEU jurisprudence on implied competences in external rela-
tions47. Now Art. 216(1) and 3(2) TFEU regulate the existence and nature of
the EU’s competence to conclude international agreements. Union implied
39 Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission of 3 September 2008, para. 363, and Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10
P Al Aqsa v Council of 15 November 2012, para. 130.
40 M. HENLEY, Q. LIGER, C. MÖLLER, J. EAGER, Y. OVIOSU, M. GUTHEIL, EU and Member
States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes, STUDY for the
LIBE committee, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union (European Parlia-
ment), Policy department C: Citizens´ rights and constitutional affairs, December 2017, pp.
17-18.
41 Council v. Commission (European Road Transport Agreement or ERTA) (22/70)
[1971] ECR 263, para. 16.
42 Opinion 1/76 (Inland Waterways) [1977] ECR 741, para. 3; Opinion 2/91 (ILO Con-
vention) [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 7.
43 R. SCHÜTZE, “Parallel External Powers in the European Community: From Cubist
Perspectives Towards Naturalist Constitutional Principles?” (2004) 23 Yearbook of European
Law 225.
44 J.S. VARA, External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the
Lisbon Treaty, European Journal of Law Reform, vol. X, No. 4, pp. 577-597.
45 T. RENARD, EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions After the Lisbon Treaty,
POLICY BRIEF, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2012, p. 4.
46 S. DE JONG, STERKX, and J. WOUTERS, The EU as a Regional Actor: Terrorism, EU-
GRASP Working Paper No. 9, February 2010, p. 9.
47 PASSOS and MARQUARDT, “International agreements - Competences, procedures and ju-
dicial control”.
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external powers can be exclusive or shared but the conclusion of an agree-
ment must be “necessary” to fulfil the objectives of the Treaty. Whether the
EU has competence to conclude an international agreement at all (albeit ex-
clusively or together with Member States) is determined in Art. 216 (1)
TFEU while exclusiveness of such competence is prescribed in Art. 3 (2)
TFEU48, Considering that new explicit powers were introduced by the Lis-
bon Treaty the necessity of implied external powers developed by the Court´s
case law is under question. EU express external powers now constitute Part
Five of the TFEU49.
Post-Lisbon cases50 reveal that the CJEU may have lowered the re-
quired threshold to trigger supervening exclusivity. In its test, the Court now
consistently refers to a risk of EU law being affected51 rather than to estab-
lishing a finding that EU law is actually affected52. Based on the principle of
conferral, the existence and nature of EU competences are fixed in the
Treaties. But the dynamic aspect of the ERTA doctrine lies in its pre-emptive
effect, barring Member States from exercising a shared competence, reserv-
ing the exercise of this competence (i.e. the power) exclusively to the EU. Re-
garding the jurisdiction of the ECJ on criminal matters, in the new legal
framework, the ECJ’s jurisdictions on criminal matters is the same as that
on any other issue regulated earlier in the former first pillar. The European
Commission is entitled to bring an action against a Member State that does
not exercise its duty to implement EU law. Even more important is unlim-
ited competence of the ECJ to interpret the legal acts concerning criminal
matters.
A watch dog of the EU acting externally is the European Parliament. It
can approve or refuse any international agreement in the field of justice and
home affairs53 or ask for a preliminary CJEU opinion54. The establishment of
48 See P. CRAIG, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010, p. 399.
49 Part Five consists of the Common Commercial Policy (Art. 206 and 207 TFEU); de-
velopment cooperation (Art. 208 to 211 TFEU); economic, financial and technical coopera-
tion with third countries (Art. 212-213 TFEU); humanitarian aid (Art. 214 TFEU); restrictive
measures (Art. 215 TFEU); association (Art. 217 TFEU); the external dimension of monetary
policy (Art. 219 TFEU); relations with international organisations (Art. 220 TFEU); and the
solidarity clause (Art. 222 TFEU).
50 Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114, para 124; Case C-114/12, Commis-
sion v. Council (Neighbouring Rights), para 82; Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 16.; Opin-
ion 1/13, The Hague Convention, para 70; Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, para 65;
Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, paras. 102-104.
51 Case C-66/13, Green Network, para 29; Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, para
71; Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, para 68; Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, para 105;
Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 180.
52 M. CHEMON, Implied exclusive powers in the ECJ’s post-Lisbon jurisprudence: The
continued development of the ETRA doctrine in Common Market Law Review 55: 1101-
1142, 2018, Kluwer Law International, UK, 2018, p. 1133.
53 For example, the European Parliament opposed the conclusion of the EU-U.S. Fi-
nancial Messaging Data Agreement which aim was to improve efficiency of following the
money related to terrorist activities or groups (11. February 2010). But if finally gave its con-
sent to the improved Agreement on 8 July 2010.
See also F. TRAUNER, The Internal-External Security Nexus: More Coherence Under Lis-
bon?, ISS Occasional Paper No. 89, March 2011.
54 See, CJEU, opinion 1/15.
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the European External Action Service55 is one of the most significant insti-
tutional innovation of the Lisbon Treaty that will influence fight against ter-
rorism as well the future role of the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator.
In connection with terrorist offences, it is important to mention the
Solidarity Clause prescribed in Art. 222 TFEU. It establishes the obligation
of Member States to act jointly if any of them is the object of a terrorist at-
tack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster while the Union must
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal to prevent crime, protect human
rights and provide all the possible assistance. In that regard it provides for a
wide range of possibilities of counterterrorism actions, both on the preven-
tion side and on the response side56. This is also a clear legal basis for an ex-
ternal action because it complements the Member States’ external commit-
ment under Art. 42(7) TEU which is known as the mutual assistance
clause57. Measures can be taken outside the EU territory but also inside the
EU, including with military means, but the Council Decision (2014/415/EU)
of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union
of the solidarity clause58, which aim was to establish the mechanisms of EU
action in crisis situations, has to be taken into account59. The Solidarity
Clause itself can be seen as basis for ‘enabling’ the right to intervene in an-
other Member State60. Member States are obliged to act in accordance with
the principles of subsidiarity, necessity and proportionality and the Union
must respect international law (see Art. 3 para. 5 TEU)61. Still, the use of a
specific EU instrument (e. g., such as ATLAS62) is not mandatory neither on
the basis of the Council Decision (2014/415/EU) nor Art. 222 TFEU. Even
though the Recital 5 of Council Decision (2014/415/EU) (which is the same
55 Its task is to bring together various instruments, services, and agencies that are deal-
ing with diplomacy, defense, and development under the authority of the High Representa-
tive which “shall conduct” the EU’s common foreign and security policy; and as one of the vi-
cepresidents of the European Commission, he/she “shall ensure the consistency” of the EU’s
external action (Art. 18 TEU); see more T. RENARD, EU Counterterrorism Policies and Insti-
tutions After the Lisbon Treaty, POLICY BRIEF, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooper-
ation, September 2012, p. 8.
56 T. RENARD, EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions After the Lisbon Treaty,
POLICY BRIEF, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2012, p. 3.
57 Art. 42 TEU - 7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory,
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the
means in their power, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member
States.
58 Council decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by
the Union of the solidarity clause (2014/415/EU).
59 In case of a military response, the decision must be taken at unanimity among the
member states, whereas in other cases (e.g., judicial or police), a qualified majority suffices.
60 A.-M. MARTINO, The Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses - Legal and Political
Challenges of an Integrated EU Security System, Frankfurt a.M., 2014, p. 78.
61 A.-M. MARTINO, The “Solidarity Clause” of the European Union - dead letter or en-
abling act? SIAK-Journal - Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis (2),
2015, p. 68.
62 ATLAS was formally established by ‘Council Decision 2008/617/JHA of 23 June 2008
on the improvement of cooperation between the special intervention units of the Member
States of the European Union in crisis situations’ (Official Journal of the European Union L
210/73, August 6, 2008).
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as the Article 222 (1) TFEU) states that “the solidarity clause calls for the
Union to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal” there is no restriction
to which EU instrument can be used63. The Council Decision lists as “rele-
vant instruments” measures (e. g. EU Internal Security Strategy, the Euro-
pean Union Civil Protection Mechanism64 and “structures developed in the
framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy”) but there is no ex-
clusion of usage of other instruments available to Union (e.g., European
Gendarmerie Force65)66. However, application of any instrument depends
solely on decision of the Member States and can use the most appropriate
means necessary depending on the situation disregarding what measures
Union adopted67.
5. Terrorism and fundamental rights
Terrorism is one of most heinous crimes. It aims at destructing democ-
racy and rule of law while generating fear and diminishing human rights,
most notably the rights to life, liberty and physical integrity. Still, we have to
bear in mind that the legislation on combating terrorism can by itself also
pose challenges to fundamental rights. Most of modern terrorism is based
on some radical religious beliefs. One of the problems that immediately
raises concern is a risk of counter-terrorism legislation requiring mass col-
lection of data68 or to profile potential suspects based on their religious be-
liefs which would lead to the violation of the right to non-discrimination69.
All persons have to be protected against unlawful or arbitrary interfer-
ence with their liberty70. Lawful detention of terrorist suspects is very im-
portant and judicial scrutiny has to be provided. Member States must re-
frain from detaining the suspects with the aim of prevention as this could in-
terfere with their right to liberty and bring the success of the whole criminal
procedure into question.
We are faced with an extensive, even unprecedented technological leap.
In that regard the main challenge is to establish adequate moral and legal
boundaries to what is technologically possible. Technology represents the ex-
63 A.-M. MARTINO, The “Solidarity Clause” of the European Union - dead letter or en-
abling act? (no 61).
64 Set up in 2001 “to enable coordinated assistance from the participating states to vic-
tims of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and elsewhere” - European Commission,
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, ‘EU Civil Protection Mechanism’, http://ec.europa.eu/
echo/en/what/civil-protection/mechanism.
65 EUROGENDFOR “is a multinational initiative of six EU Member States - France,
Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain - established by treaty with the aim to
strengthen international crisis management capacities and contribute to the development of
the Common Security and Defense Policy”, http://www.eurogendfor.org/organization/what-is-
eurogendfor). It was established by the Treaty of Velsen in 2007 and is composed of “multi-
national police force with military status” (Article 3 [a] Treaty of Velsen.
66 A.-M. MARTINO, The “Solidarity Clause” of the European Union - dead letter or en-
abling act? (no 61).
67 A.-M. MARTINO, The Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses (no 60), p. 76.
68 See, for example, opinion 1/15, supra.
69 Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
70 Art. 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
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tension of our minds as we are more and more dependent on it. It is like and
upgraded versions of our diaries, more intimate while addictive. Surveil-
lance of communication data today can be more much more intrusive than
in the past, and a full-blown surveillance state is technically possible. Data
can be collected quickly and in great detail on a large scale. This can lead to
a reversal of the presumption of innocence71 since individuals may turn
more easily to suspects72. Also, individuals that are only suspects or ‘persons
of interest’ in relation to terrorism or related crimes might be not even
aware of such surveillance which means that their right to an effective rem-
edy might be denied73.
Possible violations of the right to privacy and data protection74 are es-
pecially problematic regarding the state powers to access traffic and location
data. Member States increasingly rely on indiscriminate data retention and
access regimes that could interfere with the rights citizens beyond merely
suspects75.
Some anti-terrorist legislation may also conflict with the rights to free-
dom of expression and assembly76 when trying to combat and prevent ter-
rorist offences, especially public provocation to commit a terrorist offence77
and recruitment for terrorism78. E. g. Provisional agreement on a Draft Reg-
ulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online reached
between the Council Presidency and the European Parliament in December
202079 was initially subject to lot of criticism regarding the broad content of
terrorist term.
Counter-terror legislation may also conflict with a range of other rights.
For example, Germany extended investigative measures to minors which can
undermine the protection of the child’s rights. Several Member states pro-
hibited full face veils due to an alleged public security threat that can be re-
lated to the right to religion80. Also, several Member States allow deportation
71 Art. 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
72 V. MITSILEGAS, ‘The Value of Privacy in an Era of Security: Embedding Constitutional
Limits on Pre-emptive Surveillance’, International Political Sociology, vol. 8, Issue 1, March
2014.
73 Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
74 Art. 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; The European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) only stipulates the right to privacy while case law extends the con-
cept of privacy to data protection.
75 This has been considered a concern in joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 which an-
nulled the Data Retention Directive. Note that the Directive has been adopted in the context
of the London and Madrid bombings but applies not only with terror offences but also seri-
ous crimes. See more Court of Justice of European Union: Judgment of 8 April 2014 (Euro-
pean Commission v Hungary, Case C-288/12), Judgement of 21 December 2016 (Tele2
Sverige/Watson, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15), Judgment of 6 October 2020 (La
Quadrature du Net and Others v Premier ministre and Others, Joined Cases C-511/18, C-
512/18 and C-520/18).
76 Art. 11 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
77 Art. 5, Directive 2017/541.
78 Art. 6, Directive 2017/541.
79 Council of the EU, Press release: Terrorist content online: Council presidency and
European Parliament reach provisional agreement, December 2020, https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 2020/12/10/terrorist-content-online-council-presidency-and-
european-parliament-reach-provisional-agreement/.
80 See also, ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France, a. No. 43835/11.
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of terror suspects and in that way make the right to asylum unsecure81. To
add on, there are problems of extrajudicial renditions in connection with
“transportation and unlawful detention of prisoners and EU law which chal-
lenge the competence of EU institutions and/or their obligation to act”82,83.
This can result in serious human rights violations such as prohibition of tor-
ture, right to liberty, defence rights and other fair trial rights that are rele-
vant in area of freedom, security and justice84.
The EU Directive 2017/541 on Combatting Terrorism, the most impor-
tant directive regulating this domain, raised many human rights concerns
and was highly criticised regarding compatibility with the principle of legal-
ity and its clarity, its foreseeability and non-retroactivity but also concerning
the rights to privacy, liberty and fair trial. The main principle of criminal law
that individuals can only be liable for their own culpable conduct and intent
is undermined with this Directive especially regarding some preparatory acts
e. g. where liability can be based even in absence of proof that action created
any kind of foreseeable danger or had any effect or in situations where the
intent is not required for establishing contribution to terrorist acts. Also, pri-
vate and family life, assembly, association, expression, the freedom of move-
ment and many other rights can be severely restricted with different ways
the Directive is implemented85.
a) Rights of individuals in criminal procedural law
Firstly, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Art. 47 to 49 protects
the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, presumption of innocence
and right of defence and principles of legality and proportionality of crimi-
nal offences and penalties. Other than the Charter of Fundamental Rights
there is a great importance of the “Suspects’ Rights Package” which is ap-
plicable to suspects of all crimes86. In that regrad Art. 82(2), subparagraph 2,
point (b), TFEU provides a legal basis for minimum harmonization of sus-
81 M. HENLEY, Q. LIGER, C. MÖLLER, J. EAGER, Y. OVIOSU, M. GUTHEIL, EU and Member
States’ policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes, STUDY for the
LIBE committee, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union (European Parlia-
ment), Policy department C: Citizens’ rights and constitutional affairs, December 2017, pp.
22-23.
82 S. CARRERA, E. ,GUILD, J.S. DA SILVA, A. WIESBROCK, The results of inquiries into the
CIA’s programme of extraordinary rendition and secret prisons in European states in light of
the new legal framework following the Lisbon Treaty, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights
and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, 2012, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stud-
ies.
83 See also, ECtHR, EL-MASRI v. The former Yugoslav Republic od Macedonia, a. No.
39630/09.
84 Z. -DUR-DEVIĆ, The Directive on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceed-
ings: Filling a Human Rights Gap in the European Union Legal Order, published in the peer
reviewed conference proceedings book “European Criminal Procedure Law in Service of Pro-
tection of European Union Financial Interests: State of Play, and Challenges”, Zagreb Uni-
versity Press, February 2016, pp. 11-12.
85 K. BABICKÁ, EU Counter-terrorism Directive 2017/541: impact on human rights and
way forward at EU level, November 2020., http://opiniojuris.org/2020/11/20/eu-counter-terror-
ism-directive-2017-541-impact-on-human-rights-and-way-forward-at-eu-level/.
86 European Commission, Rights of suspects and accused, https://ec.europa.eu/info/
policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/rights-suspects-and-accused_en.
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pects´ rights87. Still, some of the Member States are not signatories in all of
the documents due to opt-outs88.
The “Suspects’ Rights Package” includes:
1. Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in
criminal proceedings ensures the right to interpretation and translation. It
applies across the EU since 27 October 2015 and ensures that the suspect or
accused understands his current situations and undergoing actions that in-
clude him/her.
2. Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal pro-
ceedings ensures the right of information about his or her rights and
charges. The person must get prompt information about the accusation and
his/her rights or, if charged, information necessary for the preparation of the
defence. It applies across the EU since 2 June 2014.
3. Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused per-
sons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest
warrant proceedings ensures the right to legal aid. Legal aid and legal advice
must be given to the suspect or accused as early as possible in the criminal
proceedings by an adequate legal counsel.
4. Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal
proceedings and in European Arrest Warrant proceedings, and on the right
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communi-
cate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of lib-
erty ensures the right to have a lawyer, the right to provide to a third-party
information of the deprivation of liberty and the right to communicate. This
applies across the EU since 27 November 2016.
5. Directive (EU) 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who
are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings ensures the special
safeguards for suspected of accused children because of their special vulner-
ability.
6. Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of
the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in
criminal proceeding ensures he right to be presumed innocent and to be pre-
sent at trial. “Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that
suspects and accused persons are not presented as being guilty, in court or
in public, through the use of measures of physical restraint”.
b) Existing legal framework on combating terrorism
One of the most important policy documents on terrorism is the EU
Council Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in December 200589. Its aims
87 See Hilf GRABITZ, Nettesheim-Vogel, Eisele, art. 82 AEUV paras 73, 88.
88 Denmark opted out of all Directives; Ireland and the UK opted out of all but Direc-
tive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the
right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ L 280, 26.10.2010, pp. 1-7
and Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on
the right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142, 1.6.2012, pp. 1-10.
89 Council of Ministers, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Document
number 14469/4/05.
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to: PREVENT committing terrorism and future recruitment for the purpose
of committing terrorism; PROTECT innocent; PURSUE investigation and
punishment of criminal acts of terrorism, disable planning, traveling and
funding for the purpose of committing terrorism; and RESPOND in a coor-
dinated way to terrorist threats and crimes90.
Furthermore, in 2015 the European Commission adopted the “Euro-
pean Agenda on Security”. Agenda suggest that tackling terrorism and pre-
venting radicalisation is of the great importance91. The principle actions
serve to define and criminalise terrorist offences, prevent radicalisation and
the spreading of terrorist propaganda and to cut terrorists’ access to the
means to perpetrate attacks (funds, firearms, explosives, etc.)92. New
Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond
was adopted in December 2020 and aims to enhance cooperation at EU
level, further develop policy and operational gaps and available instruments
to better anticipate, prevent, protect and respond to terrorism93.
Core legislation criminalising terrorism in the EU is Directive (EU)
2017/541 on combating terrorism adopted on 15 March 201794. The aim of
the Directive is to harmonise the definitions of terrorist offences which will
be the basis for the cooperation and information exchange between Member
States. New criminal offences are prescribed – terrorist financing and train-
ing, as well as traveling for terrorism. The victims of crimes related to ter-
rorism must be insured with specialist support services and help immedi-
ately after the attack so that any additional suffering is avoided. The Direc-
tive strengthens the Member States’ criminal justice approach to terrorism.
Other important documents fall into the two groups:
a. Data processing regimes where data is collected or misappropriated
to combat terrorism:
1. Schengen Information System II (SIS II)95
2. Passenger Name Records (PNR) (including both the EU PNR Direc-
tive and international PNR regimes with the US and Australia)96
90 European commission, Counter Terrorism and radicalisation https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/counter-terrorism_en.
91 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Euro-
pean Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 final.
92 Ibid., 93.
93 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Counter-
Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond, COM (2020) 795 final.
94 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.
95 As laid down in Regulation (EC) No. 1987/2006; Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and
Regulation (EC) No. 1986/2006.
96 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 132-149.
See also Opinion of the Court (Grand Chamber) 1/15 of 26 July 2017 and the issue of
preliminary questions to the CJEU on the PNR Directive (Belgian Constitutional Court
https://www.const-court.be/public/e/ 2019/2019-135e-info.pdf, Slovenian Constitutional Court,
German Court - Administrative Court of Wiesbaden (https://eucrim.eu/news/german-court-
asks-cjeu-about-compatibility-pnr-legislation/) whether the EU PNR Directive and imple-
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3. Eurodac97
4. Visa Information System (VIS)98
5. Advanced Passenger Information Directive (API)99
6. The annulled Directive 2006/24/EC (Data Retention Directive)100
b. Criminalising terrorist financing:
1. EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP)101
2. Anti-Money Laundering Directive102
3. The 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive103
4. Asset Freezing (Council Regulation No. 881/2002)
6. Conclusion - possible basis for rewarding measures to prevent terrorism
on the EU level
As already stated, terrorist crimes today impose one of the most serious
treats not only to the European Union but to the whole world. After a short
analysis of the current legislation regarding terrorism while having in mind
general competences of the EU in the field of criminal law it is obvious that
the EU institutions mostly act in this field by adopting directives using Art.
82 and 83 of the TFEU. Still, protection of national sovereignty is and will be
in the hands of national authorities. The EU criminal competences are
shared between EU and the Member States, so when regulating terrorist of-
fences, one has to respect the delimitation of prerogatives and competences
between the EU and the Member States. In addition, Art. 75 provides legal
basis for adoption of some administrative measures related to terrorism.
Bearing all of this in mind, there are two possible legal bases for estab-
lishment and harmonisation of rewarding measures related to the perpetra-
mented laws are compatible with Union law, in particular the Charter of Fundamental
Rights).
97 Regulation (EU) No. 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
June 2013, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 1-30.
98 Council Decision 2004/512/EC of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information Sys-
tem (VIS), OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, pp. 5-7.
99 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to com-
municate passenger data, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, pp. 24-27.
100 The Data Retention Directive was annulled by the CJEU in 2014. However, several
Member States still have data retention regimes in place. In addition, the Estonian govern-
ment announced its intention to restart discussions on data retention on a technical and po-
litical level during its Presidency (see Estonian Presidency, The Estonian Presidency Pro-
gramme for the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA), 2017). Available at: https://www.eu
2017.ee/sites/default/files/2017-07/EU2017EE%20JHA%20Programme_0.pdf.
101 Council Decision of 28 June 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing
and transfer of financial messaging data from the European Union to the United States for
the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, pp. 1-2.
102 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laun-
dering or terrorist financing, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73-117.
103 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May
2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives
2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43-74.
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tors of terrorist offences without overstepping and diminishing the Member
State competences. One provides for adoption of administrative measures
under the scope of Art. 75 for the crimes such financing of terrorism, but
these measures can only be utilized in a form of financial sanctions of pre-
ventive nature regarding terrorism. The other basis is Art. 82 which provides
for adoption of criminal procedural measures and has a wither scope. Two
logical possibilities arise based on Art. 82:
Firstly, there is a possibility of enacting a new directive with a general
scope. This means that all the offences would be included and rewarding
measures would be harmonized for the main purpose of preventing any
criminal act. This would have a general dimension applicable not only to the
crimes related to terrorism, but it would instead open up a way to deal with
a wider scope of perpetrators of other serious crimes.
Secondly, the scope of Directive 541/2017/EU is already limited to ter-
rorism. This gives the possibility of amendment which produces further de-
velopment of the rewarding measures directly connected to terrorist crimes
already existing in the Art. 16 of the Directive 541/2017. Consensus between
the Member States is always hard to reach when enacting EU criminal law
rules because of the intrusion in their sovereignty and national culture. If
the enactment of the new rules is limited only to the rewarding measures for
the perpetrators of the terrorist offences the consensus will be easier to
reach.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECTS
SILVIA ALLEGREZZA, VALENTINA COVOLO, ELENA MILITELLO, LEONARDO ROMANÒ
SUMMARY: 1. Setting the scene: introduction, methods, and purpose of the report. – 2. The
Gordian knot of mandatory v discretionary prosecution and other negotiations. –
3. Conditions for the applicability of rewarding measures. – 3.1. Degree of severity of
the offences committed. – 3.2. Proper/authentic repenting. – 3.3. Moral and material
interest shown in the victims of the crime. – 3.4. True and useful information provided.
Voluntary disclosure and time limits. – 4. Relevance of the timely occurrence of the
collaboration: pre- and post-sentencing. – 4.1. Reduced sentencing. – 4.2. Post-sen-
tencing. – 5. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations) in exchange for rewarding measures. – 6. Conclusions.
1. Setting the scene: introduction, methods, and purpose of the report
The present report focuses on comparing rewarding measures for col-
laborators of justice in the field of terrorism offences in seven selected Mem-
ber States of the European Union. The purpose of this specific report within
the FIGHTER project is to compare the procedural aspects of rewarding
measures to combat terrorism in the selected national legislations: namely,
Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain.
This report aimed at describing national measures having in mind the
development of a potential EU blueprint of rewarding measures in the field
of anti-terrorism. In this light, we adopted a comparative law approach
based on the commonalities and divergences narrated in the reports.
Data are extracted from seven national reports providing a multifold
account on such legislation, based upon the questionnaire drafted by the
main unit.
The EU Directive 2017/541 on combatting terrorism do not provide any
indication on procedural requirements. Article 16 indicates the mere possi-
bility for the Member States to reduce the penalty of the offender who “pro-
vides the administrative or judicial authorities with information which they
would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to: (i) prevent or
mitigate the effects of the offence; (ii) identify or bring to justice the other
offenders; (iii) find evidence; or (iv) prevent further offences referred to in
Articles 3 to 12 and 14 (of the aforementioned Directive”. The laconic provi-
sion only refers to the impact of the information obtained on the main pro-
ceedings but it does not allow a comprehensive analysis of national systems
in detecting the larger group of rewarding measures.
To this aim, a working definition of the meaning of ‘collaboration’ is
needed in order to identify the ‘collaborator’ and the related procedural
statute. This delicate task is aimed at defining the procedural consequences
of qualifying the offender as ‘collaborator’ in a double dimension: in her own
proceedings and in the proceedings in which her statements should be used.
Collaborating with prosecutorial authorities generally means providing
the necessary information in view of the dismantling of a criminal organiza-
tion. The difference with an ordinary witness lies in the fact that a collabo-
rator, “repentant” or “leniency witness”1, was a former co-conspirator or an
effective member of the organization. As in other instances of organized
crime, the strength of a terrorist organization lies in the relationship of trust
and mistrust built among the individuals cooperating to reach one or more
criminal goals. Therefore, the State has the possibility to offer a way out to
collaborating members of the organization through rewarding measures, en-
abling prosecutors to gain insight into criminal activities. This practice
leaves unprejudiced any in-depth analysis into the existence of a proper in-
ternal remorse of conscience within the accused, at least in modern, laically
oriented systems based on the rule of law. However, the authenticity of the
collaboration might be inquired.
The current legal picture at national level seems to be strongly influ-
enced by supranational legislation and related duties to implement it. How-
ever, the impact on national law – including rules of criminal procedure –
depends upon the country’s criminological background in terms of presence
and dimension of certain criminal phenomena such as organised crime and
terrorism.
From a historical point of view, different approaches emerge, depend-
ing on whether or not the Member State has a specific history with either
national or international terrorism. The impact of international and supra-
national provisions on the development of terrorism norms was especially
strong on those countries without a prior experience of domestic terrorism
or organized crime. On the contrary, those same international and suprana-
tional instruments were influenced in their drafting by countries with a spe-
cific experience in countering this type of phenomena2.
The mechanisms and tools for rewarding are still at a national level and
not tantamount to a full-fledged European rewarding system, which would
require cooperation among the different legal systems aimed at a common
final result. This is in contrast with an exclusively national perspective, often
still defended in some instances by legislators3, despite the blatant need for
a harmonized and transnational approach in several investigations in the
field of terrorism.
The drafting exercise highlighted several obstacles in pursuing a har-
monized effort toward an EU common framework on procedural require-
ments applicable to rewarding measures.
1 Germany, Section I, Chapter 5, § 2.2 ff.
2 E.g. Italy: Section I, Chapter 1, § 1 (historical part).
3 See e.g. the case of the Luxembourg concept of the transfer of jurisdiction; Luxem-
bourg, Section I, Chapter 6, § 2.2.1.
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First, there is an undeniable issue linked to the use of different legal
lexicons, amplified by the lack of a single, all-encompassing term to define
rewarding measures and many aspects of criminal procedure throughout
Europe4.
The second systemic obstacle is related to the huge differences among
EU member States on prosecutorial powers. The cohabitation, among Euro-
pean criminal procedures, of systems of mandatory and discretional prose-
cution increases the difficulties in designing a common framework.
The existence of an extremely wide deformalized zone in countries
characterized by the principle of discretion in State Prosecutors’ actions has
a strong impact. There, a whole part of criminal procedure does not follow
strict rules in granting dismissals and leniency measures may rely on an en-
tirely deformalized procedure linked to the prosecutorial discretion. This
can be seen as a rewarding measure in cases of accused subjects collaborat-
ing with the investigating and prosecuting authorities5. National policies
emerge as hardly harmonizable if some States allow their prosecutors to dis-
cretionally dismiss charges against collaborators and others are forced to
prosecute in force of the principle of mandatory prosecution.
A third obstacle refers to methodology and it is linked to the difficulty
to draw a distinction between substantive criminal law and criminal proce-
dure in the field of rewarding measures.
In the drafting of this report, we extrapolated data which could be of
interest for the procedural report. According to the layout chosen by the co-
ordinator and the analysis based on the structure of questionnaire, we fo-
cussed our efforts on two subparagraphs dedicated to procedural measures,
specifically those on the conditions for the application of the measures and
on the conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of
declarations).
One might consider that the fine line between substantive and proce-
dural criminal law in this field is hard to draw and often fades into a grey
area. This is apparent if only one considers that, in several Member States,
the substantive criminal law difference between an excuse (exonerating the
accused) and an attenuating circumstance (granting a reduced sentence but
without exonerating the accused) lies on whether collaboration occurred be-
fore or after a prosecution was initiated.
Setting aside substantive criminal law implications on procedural as-
pects, the issues relating to criminal procedure that have been selected and
will be analysed in the following are: the rewarding measures in different
criminal procedure phases (investigation, trial, post-sentencing); the condi-
tions for applicability of rewarding measures; and the probative value of in-
formation obtained in exchange for rewarding measures.
4 For this reason, in this report, several terms, especially key words, are referred to in
the original language used in the national system, rather than attempting a flattening Eng-
lish translation: e.g. Discharge - dismissal - non-lieu.
5 In Belgium, for example, prosecutorial choices are based on vague criteria of neces-
sity, proportionality, subsidiarity; Belgium, Section I, Chapter 2, § 2.1.4.
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2. The Gordian knot of mandatory v discretionary prosecution and other ne-
gotiations
The first and foremost phase of a criminal investigation which might be
relevant in terms of rewarding subjects who are accused of terrorism-related
offences is undeniably the preliminary investigation phase. As we will see
later on, the trial phase is often more concerned with debates on substantive
criminal law tools such as the choice between excuses and attenuating cir-
cumstances. We will later focus on the post-sentencing phase, when a con-
victed person may decide to initiate a collaboration with public authorities.
As highlighted above, the main diverging point between different legal
systems in the field of criminal procedure lies in the juxtaposition between
mandatory and discretionary prosecution.
In the first type of systems, prosecutors’ leeway in closing an investiga-
tion is extremely rigid. They have to opt to charge the accused with a crime
anytime there is sufficient evidence to deem the notitia criminis (the infor-
mation that a crime has been perpetrated) valid, regardless of any consider-
ation on the “opportunity” of such prosecution. Among the considered MS,
those adopting a mandatory prosecution principle seem to be: Italy, pur-
suant to Article 112 of its Constitution, which has a uniquely strong per-
spective on mandatory prosecution; Spain, according to Article 105 of its
Code of Criminal Procedure; Croatia (with an exception in Article 206d of its
Code of Criminal Procedure).
Instead, in the second type of systems, State Prosecutors enjoy wide
discretion as to whether drop a case or prosecute a criminal offence, based
on the principle of opportunity. The principle of opportunity seems to be
adopted, among the selected Member States, by: Belgium, according to Arti-
cle 28-quater of the Criminal Code; Germany, which adopts the Legalität-
sprinzip ex art. 152 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung
or StPO), but later leaves one wondering whether there is a public interest
for the prosecution in the actual case under consideration in Article 153;
France and Luxembourg, respectively pursuant to Articles 40 and 23 of their
Codes of Criminal Procedure.
In the latter systems, an explicit provision of procedural rules on how
to deal with collaborators of justice and on how to reward them is much less
needed than in MS adopting a mandatory prosecution approach, often
linked to a strict interpretation of the legality and equality principles. In fact,
a one-sided dismissal of the case before charges are brought based on the
will of the prosecution is always possible, and represents the first and the
most common form of rewarding measure, though informal6. The possibility
to modulate prosecutorial power offers an unique opportunity for national
prosecutors to opt for a tailor-made solution of the specific case: renounce
sic et simpliciter to prosecute to collaborator or rather cooperate with other
MS in case of transnational cases, leaving to other countries the choice on
rewarding measures. The obvious consequences of this setting are less need
for formalized rules on rewarding measures and
6 See Luxembourg, cit., § 2.2.1.
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(ii) less data on concrete exercise of this power because the deformal-
ized procedures leave no record or are kept confidential among prosecutor-
ial authorities. However, such decision is never final, as it is always possible
for the State Prosecutor to reopen the case at a future time, if the informa-
tion provided is revealed to be false.
Instead, where prosecution is mandatory whenever the commission of
a crime emerges, as is the case of Italy, formal mechanisms to avoid, divert
or reduce prosecution need be provided for in legislative provisions.
Discretionary prosecutorial powers are not limited to the basic choice
to either prosecute or dismiss the case. Other interesting instruments that
can be employed in the different scenarios, though always within the inves-
tigation stage, go beyond a mere dismissal.
Another tool in the hands of prosecutors of certain MS is the possibil-
ity to requalify or even decriminalize cases based on a series of criteria, in-
cluding collaborating with investigating authorities7. The rationale behind
this choice is to provide prosecutors with an additional instrument to review
their initial investigatory findings over time with flexibility and common
sense. However, in the context of collaboration between the accused and the
prosecuting authorities, the possibility to bargain on charges is discretionary
in its essence.
Additionally, the peculiar situation of Luxembourg, a small State with
little to none investigations for terrorism-related crimes (except, perhaps,
those related to terrorism financing and money laundering instances), led
them to devise the possibility of a so-called “transfer of jurisdiction”. This al-
lows them to transfer the transnational case to another Member State with
more expertise in fighting terrorism and/or where the biggest bulk of infor-
mation is located if it is somehow linked to that same criminal offence ac-
cording to the different linking criteria8.
Plea agreements represent another option available during the investi-
gation phase, and also well into the early stages of trials. These legal instru-
ments are applicable to the less serious offences tied to terrorism, due to the
existence of rigid seriousness limits in most European legislations. They
emerge out of ordinary criminal procedure, where they have been gradually
introduced through transplants from the Anglo-American tradition. Such ex-
amples, with striking divergences, include the Spanish tool of conformidad
(Articles 655, 787 of the Criminal Procedure Rules)9; the Italian patteggia-
mento or “applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti”, i.e. imposing a sen-
tence upon request of the parties (Article 444 ff. of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure); in Croatia, the judgment based on the agreement of the parties, po-
tentially including a partial procedural immunity of witnesses ex Article
362(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA)10; the French plaider-coupable
7 In French-inspired systems, with a three-fold distinction among criminal offences
(contraventions, délits, crimes), one needs to distinguish between ‘décriminalisation’ (dealt
with, in the Luxembourg Code of Criminal Procedure, in Art. 132 Ccp) and ‘décorrectionali-
sation’ (separately dealt with in Art. 132-1 Ccp); ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 Spain, Section I, Chapter 7, § 2.2.1.
10 Croatia, Section I, Chapter 3, § 1.2.2.
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(Articles 495-7 ff. of the Code of Criminal Procedure); the German Ab-
sprachen (§ 257c of the German Code of Criminal Procedure); Belgian plea
agreements ex art. 216-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure; the Luxem-
bourgish “jugement sur accord” (Articles 563 ff.).
Even though negotiating tools in criminal justice were not conceived
aiming at terrorism cases nor to potential collaborative practices in this do-
main, they perfectly fit the scope of alleviating the sanction for minor of-
fences related to terrorism, especially when those practices are allowed from
the very beginning of the investigation and do not require the validation of a
judge.
Rewarding measures that are applicable during the trial phase – i.e.
once the person has been charged with a crime-, are mostly related to sub-
stantive criminal law11. Nevertheless, there are interesting procedural impli-
cations of those measures that we will briefly analyse.
Repentants might be rewarded with excuses or attenuating circum-
stances. While excuses totally exonerate the accused, attenuating circum-
stances only grant her or him a reduced sentence and are applied in the sen-
tencing phase of trials.
3. Conditions for the applicability of rewarding measures
This third section examines what is necessary for a collaborating of-
fender in proceedings for terrorist crimes to be granted rewarding measures,
not in terms of the type of rewarding measure (again, this issue relates more
to a substantive law approach) but more as concerns conditions for any re-
warding measure to be applied in each actual case.
From an overview of the Member States under consideration, it seems
that four classes of criteria can be identified by bringing together the differ-
ent national legislations, aiming to draft a comparative scheme: the degree
of severity of the offences committed (3.1); the moral and material interest
shown by the repentant towards the victims of the crime (3.2); the ascer-
tainment of a proper or authentic repenting (3.3) and, above all, the truth-
fulness and usefulness of the information provided by the repentant (3.4).
3.1. Degree of severity of the offences committed
First of all, our comparative analysis reveals divergent approaches to
the controversial issue regarding the seriousness of offences committed by
the repentant. In fact, on the one hand we have countries where the applic-
ability of rewarding legislation is merely limited to terrorist or subversive of-
fences, without any mention to seriousness limits. On the other hand, how-
ever, some national legislators introduced general rewarding provisions,
whereby applicability of rewarding measures requires the offence committed
by the repentant to fulfill certain procedural conditions depending on its de-
11 See M. CANCIO MELIÁ, S. OUBIÑA BARBELLA, Substantial Law Issues: Selected Problems
(Section II, Chapter 5).
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gree of seriousness. Thus, in some legislations, such as Belgium and Croatia,
the punishment prescribed for the criminal offence committed by the col-
laborator must be lower than that prescribed for the offence in respect of
which s/he is testifying12. Moreover, the degree of severity of the acts com-
mitted by the collaborator may become relevant also in determining how far
the penalty can be reduced, as the more serious the offences are, the more
sentence reduction must be limited13. In German legislation, the repentant is
required to have committed an offence that is punishable by an “increased
minimum sentence of imprisonment” or a “life sentence of imprisonment”14.
Finally, it is also interesting to notice that some national legislations set
out certain conditions concerning the seriousness of the offence on which the
repentant provides information. In certain countries, such as Germany and
Belgium, rewarding measures can only be applied if information regarding a
predetermined catalogue of serious criminal offences is disclosed: this cata-
logue is usually given by reference to procedural provisions that originally
aimed to determine offences for which phone taping is authorised15.
The table below illustrates different conditions that the offence com-
mitted by the repentant needs to fulfill for the purpose of applying reward-
ing measures.
12 See Croatia, cit., § 2.2 ff. See also Belgium, cit., § 2 ff.
13 See ivi, § 2.2.1.3.
14 See Germany, cit., § 3.2.1.1.
15 See Belgium, , cit., § 2.1. See also Germany, cit., § 3.2.1.2.
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IT Applicable to the most serious crimes (at post-sentencing stage, rele-
vance of the crime the “repentant” committed + criminal attitude will
be considered).
D Limited to serious crimes.
E All of the felonies under Chapter VII of Title XXII of Book II entitled
“On terrorist organisations and groups and on felonies of terrorism”.
HR The punishment prescribed for the criminal offence for which the wit-
ness would not be prosecuted must be less than that prescribed for the
offense in respect of which s/he is testifying, and must not be punish-
able with imprisonment of ten years or more – Article 286(4) CPA.
BE The principle of proportionality does not authorise collaboration if the
offence committed by the informant is more serious than the crime
informed upon.
The more serious the offences are, the more sentence reduction must
be limited.
LU Reward measures do not have a general nature but are applicable only
to specific offences: organized crime and terrorism.
F Applicable to serious offences against the person (Book II of the Crim-
inal Code), to serious offences of damage to property (Book III) and to
offences against the Nation, the State and public peace (Book IV).
3.2. Proper/authentic repenting
The second procedural condition that is normally taken into account
for the purpose of granting rewards is the ascertainment of a proper or au-
thentic repentance. From a comparative analysis of the relevant jurisdic-
tions, what emerges is that an authentic repenting – at least in its ideologi-
cal and subjective meaning – is almost never deemed necessary for a collab-
orating subject in proceedings for terrorism crimes to be granted rewarding
measures. This means that the inner sphere of the repentant and the adher-
ence to the values expressed by the institutional and legal framework are not
relevant for the purposes of granting benefits16.
On the contrary, and according to a more objective understanding of re-
pentance, most national legislations subject the applicability of rewarding
measures in the field of terrorism to distinct conditions depending on be-
haviours of the repentant that are indicative of the unequivocal willingness
of the repentant to actively cooperate with the legal process and to abandon
the terrorist goals. In this light, the most common indicators taken into ac-
count to opt for a reduced sentence are the analysis of whether the choice to
cooperate with the legal process came from a voluntary behaviour of the re-
pentant – i.e. without any form of external compulsion17; the full confession
of criminal activities as the principal obligation in order to benefit from the
reward18; the disengagement or dissociation of the collaborator, that is to say
the reversibility of the severing of ties with criminal organizations and the
definitive renounce to the terrorist or subversive goals19.
In sum, the idea of proper repentance that emerges from the above-
mentioned conditions is merely utilitarian and objective, and it aims at as-
sessing those tangible and positive collaborative behaviours that are indica-
tive of the repentant’s willingness to usefully cooperate with the legal process
in an antithetical way to the collaborating subject’s continuity in the terror-
ist organization.
The table below illustrates indices of repentance which are deemed
necessary for the purpose of granting reward measures.
16 See Italy, cit., § 1.3.3 ff.
17 See Germany, cit., § 3.2.1.4.
18 This is the case for Italy, Germany and Spain, where the repentant is obliged not
only to disclose information about offences committed by a third party, but also about all
crimes committed by himself; however, it is not necessary to confess crimes that are com-
pletely unrelated to terrorism and subversion, as only the terrorist experience of the offender
can be considered pertinent and relevant. See Italy, cit., § 1.3.2. See Germany, cit., § 3.2.1.3.
See Spain, cit., § 2.1.
19 See Spain, ivi, § 2.1. See Italy, cit., § 1.3.4.
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IT Full confession of all crimes (but what crimes?
Only terrorism-related).
Disengagement.
Case law: no need to enquire on “the inner sphere
of the repentant” v. “proof of moral redemption, a
critical review of the offender’s past life and an as-
piration to social reintegration”.
Artt. 2-3 
L. 304/1982
3.3. Moral and material interest shown in the victims of the crime
Adopting a balanced approach in between objective and subjective
meanings of “repentance”, some national legislations also seem to take into
account the moral and material interest shown by the repentant in the val-
ues which have been breached by the commission of the crime and, more
specifically, in the victims of the crime. As regards the assessment of the re-
quirements to grant conditional release, Italian case law sometimes takes
into account victims of terrorism and the interest shown by the collaborator
in the ethical and social values that have been breached and in the victims
of the crime, as well as the restoration of its damages and consequences and
the assistance, altruism and solidarity shown20. Moreover, as regards for in-
stance the Belgian rewarding system, the obligation to compensate for dam-
ages caused is supplemented by a provision stipulating that the promise
made to an individual who does not compensate for damages can be re-
voked21 However, even though victims’ failure to forgive is almost never an
obstacle to granting rewarding measures, the effects of the offence on the
latter may constitute an important element in determining how far the
penalty can be reduced, as stated in the German legislation22. Conversely, in
Croatia there is a general duty to previously obtain the consent of the victim
before reaching a plea agreement in serious crimes23. Most notably, the ac-
knowledgement of the facts and the victims’ reparation have recently ac-
quired a significant importance within the Spanish Restorative meetings ex-
perience, which, though initially conceived as entailing purely personal con-
sequences for the parties (i.e. meetings between victim and perpetrator),
20 See Italy, cit., § 1.3.5.1.
21 See Belgium, cit., §  2.3.2.
22 See Germany, cit., § 3.2.1 ff.
23 See Croatia, cit., § 2.2.1.
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D Voluntary (no external compulsion) disclosure of
information about an offence under Section 100a
para. 2 StPO.
Section 46b StGB
LU No requirement to “renounce to future criminal
or terrorist activities”.
E Double requirement: voluntary quitting (renounce
to the goals) + confession.
Art. 579-bis, III
C.p.
HR Factual and credible testimony, tell the truth, not
withhold any information known to him/her
about the criminal offence of which s/he is testify-
ing and the perpetrator of that offence.
Art. 286(3) CPA
F No general obligation on the person enjoying the
status of repentant applies, but certain obligations
may be imposed as part of the protection mecha-
nism provided for by the law.
Artt. 706-63-1 CCP
3.4. True and useful information provided. Voluntary disclosure and time lim-
its
Last but not least, the most common indicators taken into account to
opt for a reduced sentence is the assessment of the quality and quantity of
the information provided by the repentant. To this aim, it is paramount that
the informative statements provided by the repentant are proved to be com-
informally started to have an impact on the granting of permits, the lower-
ing of the penalty and the granting of probation24.
Most jurisdictions provide more or less articulated systems of protec-
tion of endangered witnesses. It often appears that these persons are in seri-
ous and current danger due to the collaborative conduct in relation to cer-
tain crimes, including those committed for the purposes of terrorism. How-
ever, some witness protection laws come with important deficiencies. For
instance, the Spanish legislation proves to be inadequate and obsolete inso-
far that it does not cover co-defendants25.
The table below illustrates the relevance attributed by each Member
State to interests and values which are safeguarded or sacrificed by collabo-
ration for the purpose of granting rewarding measures.
24 See Spain, cit., § 2 ff.
25 See ivi, § 2.8.
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IT For conditional release: interest shown in the ethical and social values
that have been breached and in the victims of the crime, as well as the
restoration of its damages and consequences and the assistance, altru-
ism and solidarity shown.
No need for forgiving by victims.
D General duty, when deciding on the exact severity of the penalty, to
take into account the effects of the offence on the victim (Sec. 46
StGB).
BE Obligation to provide compensation to victim (Art. 216/2 c.p.p.) (fail-
ure to do so might constitute a ground for revocation)
HR Consent of the victim needed for plea deals in serious crimes.
Protection for endangered witnesses.
E Inadequate/obsolete witness protection law (does not cover co-defen-
dants).
Restorative meetings experience – informally started to have an im-
pact on the granting of permits, the lowering of the penalty and the
granting of probation.
LU No witness protection program. Possible to ask for other MS’ cooper-
ation if relocation is needed. No case law.
plete, true and useful. More specifically, within the criminal justice system,
the quality of information obtained through rewarding mechanisms might
carry a twofold meaning: on the one hand, they might be useful in discover-
ing and prosecuting other serious offences whose existence was previously
unknown to the investigating authority; on the other hand, they can be used
to prove in full or in part other crimes whose investigations and/or trials
were already ongoing. Moreover, most national legislations also provide for
some consequences in case the information turns out to be reticent or false.
In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between two cases. On the one
hand, if the repentant has been granted early dismissal, s/he will remain un-
der the risk that a new case can be opened if hints of falsehood in the state-
ments later emerge. On the other hand, when the case has been closed with
a final judgment, if there is no explicit ground for revocation, the repentant
will be safe from any subsequent governmental check. There might also be a
different case if the information was not useful in a prosecution but the fault
of this lack of usefulness could not be placed upon the repentant (generally
because she or he was a low-ranked member of the criminal organization
and/or the criminal structure was a rigidly compartmentalized one). Most of
the developments in case law – particularly in the Italian one26 – indicate
that the contribution could be acknowledged, even just to help in deradical-
ization and disengagement processes.
The table below illustrates how each Member State defines the type of
contribution they require of repentants and whether there is a formal
chance to revoke the rewarding privileges, should it later emerge that the in-
formation provided was forged or simply incorrect.
26 See Italy, cit., § 1.3.3.
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IT Evidence that the author, after having voluntarily
prevented the event (even without dissociating),
must provide to the authority to reconstruct the
fact and to identify any accomplices (decisive,
complete, and truthful).
Duty to sign the minutes of declarations.
Possibility for revocation of rewarding measures
in case the information turns out to be false or






DE It must be a useful contribution to the investiga-
tion.
Possible revocation.
S. 164 para. 
3 StGB
BE Information on an offence listed in article 90-ter,
§ 2-4 c.p.p. which has to be suitable in order to
achieve “disclosure of the truth”. Collaboration
must be indispensable to impart criminal justice.
Possibility for revocation of rewarding measures.
Art. 216/1 c.p.p.
4. Relevance of the timely occurrence of the collaboration: pre- and post-sen-
tencing
4.1. Reduced sentencing
Even though it can be generally said that the assessment of the truth-
fulness and usefulness of information disclosed by the repentant is a proce-
dural condition common to all relevant jurisdictions and, consequently, may
be very easy to harmonise, nonetheless it may produce unwanted conse-
quences in terms of temporal sequence of different criminal proceedings
linked by the existence of declarations coming from a repentant. As already
mentioned, in the trial phase, before sentencing occurs, the contribution of
the repentants’ declarations and admissions, as well as implications of other
subjects, will have to be proved, in terms of their use in other proceedings.
However, the proceeding in which the repentant is to be sentenced often
comes to a conclusion much earlier than those other proceedings in which
her or his declarations may be used as evidence against someone else. So,
there is an ex ante judgment in the absence of an effective assessment of the
usefulness and truthfulness of those statements. A suggestion for the legisla-
tors for a more efficient tool might be a suspension of her or his sentencing,
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HR In order to obtain witness immunity, a person
must state that s/he will testify in criminal pro-
ceedings as a witness and that s/he will not with-
hold any relevant information.
LU Duty to provide to the authorities information ei-
ther on the existence of acts preparing the com-
mission of the offences related to terrorism listed
in the said provision, or on the identity of the au-
thors of those acts; or of the existence of the
group and, at the same time, the names of its
leaders or deputies.
No formal possibility for revocation.
Art. 135-7, 135-8
c.p.
E Collaborated actively with the authorities to prevent
the felony taking place or effectively aids the obtain-
ing of decisive evidence to identify or capture the
others who are responsible, or to prevent the ac-
tion or development of the terrorist organisations
or groups to which he has belonged, or with
which he has collaborated (risk of applicability




F No explicit ground for revocation.
under several conditions, including a later check of the use of the declara-
tions in the other proceedings.
4.2. Post-sentencing
When it comes to the post-sentencing phase, several tools have been
put up in order to deal with the possibility that a subject who has already
been convicted might decide to start testifying against her/his former co-con-
spirators and/or fellow members of criminal organizations. Rewarding mea-
sures including the tempting opportunity to obtain a reduction of the sen-
tence or a special conditional release (on parole) after the conviction oc-
curred27. Whenever this decision is made during a prison stay, the repentant
is informally referred to as “prison snitch”, often conveying to the prosecu-
tion information about what the convict learns within the prison itself (not
only about her/his previous criminal activities).
Notoriously, the post-conviction behaviour, including collaboration
with public authorities, is taken into account within a whole series of be-
havioural assessments, from licences to reward permits, to alternative forms
of detention to semi-freedom or even parole and conditional release28.
The table below illustrates the wide array of potential post-sentencing
benefits in the several Member States:
27 E.g. Croatia, cit., § 2.2.3.
28 Italy, cit., § 1.3.5; Germany, cit., § 3.2.2.2.
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IT Cumulation of sentences for terrorist offences.
Granting of special conditional release.
Prison benefits and alternatives to detention
(double track: D.L. 152/1991 and 306/1992).







Art. 9, III, ibidem.
D Protection for convicts deciding to testify. Section 57 StGB
BE Possibility for prosecutors to promise the sus-
pension of the execution.
Art. 216/6 c.p.p.
HR Reduction of sentence32
Possibility for release the person on parole be-
yond the time limits that are prescribed by a spe-
cial legislation.
Artt. 37(1) - 43(5)






5. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations) in exchange for rewarding measures
The third section of this report focuses on the probative value of decla-
rations and statements made by repentants in exchange for rewarding mea-
sures (be they the reason of the dismissal, excuses or attenuating/mitigating
circumstances). This analysis, based on the structure of the questionnaire,
identifies the counter line of the use of information obtained through re-
warding measures in other criminal proceedings.
To this aim, we distinguished between two cases, namely the case in
which the repentant is treated as an informant and that in which s/he is
treated as a witness. On the one hand, if the repentant is treated as an infor-
mant, the probative value of the information gathered through repentants is
often limited, whose declarations are merely informative and cannot be di-
rectly used in the evidence-gathering phase of the proceedings. Among the
instances emerging from the Member States’ reports of cases where repen-
tants are treated as informants, it is interesting to note that both Belgium
and Luxembourg provide for the formal possibility to take into account in-
formation obtained by informants (referred to as “indic”), whose identity is
not recorded or disclosed in the case file and whose hints cannot be used in
any formal way but only as a way to direct the action of the investigative
agencies29. In the Italian context, Art. 16-quater D.L. 8/1991 provides that all
declarations by a single repentant must be made within a 180-day timeframe
from the moment where the subject showed a willingness to collaborate.
Statements made by the repentant after this deadline (and the minutes of
the declarations related thereto) are to be kept secret, and not used in formal
proceedings. However, those statements are not subject to a pathological
prohibition (inutilizzabilità), and can still be used during preliminary inves-
29 Belgium, cit., cit., § 2.6; Luxembourg, cit., § 2.6.
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E Suspension of the penalty imposed as well as the
granting of probation require the convict to show
unequivocal signs of having abandoned the ends
and means of the terrorist activity and has also ac-
tively collaborated with the authorities.
Pardon: suspend totally or partially the penalties
imposed by final judgement, to those convicted of








LU Relevance in the behavioural assessment on
prison benefits.
F Provides that an exceptional post-sentencing re-
duction of sentence.
Art. 721-3 c.p.p.
tigations, in the preliminary hearing, and in those trials based on investiga-
tive materials (such as the “giudizio abbreviato”, abbreviated trial)30.
On the contrary, if repentants are treated as witnesses, or a form thereof,
the especially low credibility features of these subjects mandates an added
level of precaution, usually in the form of compliance with two procedural
conditions. Among the conditions that States place upon the use of declara-
tions obtained from the collaboration of a former member of a terrorism or-
ganization are the prohibition to use them as sole evidence, and the need for
those declarations to be backed by other sources of evidence. Statements im-
plicating other subjects made in exchange for any form of reward can only be
used as evidence jointly with external supporting evidence and never on their
own. Repentants are at risk of producing confessions and declarations to the
sole end of obtaining a reward and, as such, are under a “relative presump-
tion of unreliability” and require a “search for external feedback”31.
In the table below are listed the precautions taken in each considered
Member State to reduce the risk of false implications and, as a consequence,
wrongful convictions.
30 Italy, cit., § 2.7.
31 Ibidem.
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IT Cannot be used on its own to convict someone:
“statements made by any defendant for the same
offence for which proceedings are being carried
out or for related or connected offences are as-




D declarations of the repentant made during the
investigation process accusing another person
do not automatically count as evidence in the
main hearing.
Section 250 StPO
BE Conviction can never be based solely, or to a sig-
nificant extent, on testimony given under com-
plete anonymity.
The system of witnesses/collaborators as repen-
tants for organized crime cases (in exchange for
financial assistance) was approved by ECtHR in




HR Need for corroboration for witness immunity/




E Corroboration standard. Overcoming of the suf-
ficiency of co-defendants’ declarations: Constitu-
tional Court’s judgement STC 153/1997, of the
29th of September 1997.
Case law
6. Conclusions
From a comparison of the six national reports, it emerges that there are
persistent and deep divergences in national criminal justice systems, even
among Member States of the EU.
Firstly, it is undeniable that there are different rules depending on
whether or not the Member State has a specific history with either national
(e.g. Italy, Germany, Spain) or international (e.g. Belgium, France, Croatia)
terrorism. At the same time, there are still countries (e.g. Luxembourg) with
little to no case law, which have been implementing supranational obliga-
tions and duties to criminalize certain conducts without perceiving the ur-
gency other countries, hit by terrorist attacks, cannot forget.
At the same time, it appears extremely hard to harmonize these norms
among countries with discretionary and mandatory prosecution. In fact,
countries whose criminal justice systems are based on the principle of op-
portunity wield discretionary dismissals more as one-size-fits-all measures
and require less precise legislative interventions.
However, some similarities also emerge, leading to potentially harmo-
nizable aspects. This is particularly apparent when it comes to the probative
value of repentants’ declarations: indeed, there is a rule of evidence in most
Member States, in compliance with ECHR’s case law, stating that those
statements require external corroboration from other sources of evidence.
The structural differences in different legal systems cannot be solved
through a partial harmonization, especially if one considers that the crimi-
nal procedure choice between a mandatory prosecution system and a dis-
cretionary one is highly political, based on utilitaristic conceptions of crimi-
nal justice and rooted in national history. This mandates a cautious and pes-
simistic overlook of the need and sense of harmonization attempts in this
field. An elastic approach, able to blend in the different contexts without cul-
tural clashes, will therefore be needed when dealing with transnational in-
vestigations expanding over several jurisdictions. That could be the case, in
the French-inspired systems, of a transformation from a more serious type
32 Luxembourg, cit., § 2.6.
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LU Status of witness or defendant in criminal pro-
ceedings: lack of specific provisions. General rules
governing the admissibility and assessment of ev-
idence: statements made by a co-defendant can-
not form the sole and decisive evidence of convic-
tion; no anonymous testimony32.
Case law
F If the statements merely corroborate other evi-
dence of the guilt of the persons charged, they
may be taken into consideration by the investigat-
ing or trial courts, in accordance with the princi-
ple of freedom of evidence.
of criminal offence to a less serious one (décriminalisation or décorrectional-
isation). This tool was typically considered rewarding as much as when it
came to discretionally choosing whether or not to bring charges at all.
Another tool, employed by Luxembourg, is the transfer of jurisdiction,
bringing the prosecution abroad and away from the Member State in which
the investigation was first noted down in a criminal complaint. This is a par-
tially useful empirical measure since the proceedings might continue else-
where, in another country, if only the internal communication system be-
tween different Member States better served the needs of European and
transnational criminal justice. This is a typical case of a doubt on the mean-
ing of “rewarding”, and specifically on whether it is limited to a single na-
tional system or, rather, whether one should consider the peculiar situation
of supranational coordination to assess the “degree of overall rewards”.
A further suggestion for the legislators for a more efficient tool in terms
of reduced sentencing might be a suspension of her or his sentencing, under
several conditions, including a later check of the use of the declarations in
the other proceedings.
The sole threshold that can never be surpassed in the fight against any
type of crime is the ne bis in idem principle, with a single trial and a single
conviction, balancing all different interests at stake through the use of post-
sentencing techniques as clearing houses, even in the case of more than one
conviction to be implemented against a single person.
A last remark concerns the difference in approaching the rewarding
measures in terms of high level of formalisation of the related procedures –
such as Germany or Italy in which the procedural rules govern the type, the
time and the quality of the statements – versus systems where the law is al-
most silent on procedural aspects – e.g. Spain or Luxembourg. Therefore,
prosecutorial and judicial authorities enjoy a wide discretion in assessing
the applicability of the aforementioned measures. This divergent approach
makes more difficult to imagine an EU blueprint triggering a higher level of
harmonization.
433COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECTS

CHAPTER 5
SUBSTANTIAL LAW ISSUES: SELECTED PROBLEMS*
MANUEL CANCIO MELIÁ, SABELA OUBIÑA BARBOLLA
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction: fundamental starting points. – 2. Selected substantial law aspects.
– 3. Conclusions and provisional assessment. – 4. Compliance with the harmonization
standard.
1. Introduction: fundamental starting points
It might be useful to identify, as the framework for more specific con-
sideration of the different single issues, some of the fundamental starting
points that differ in the different Member States (MS) subject to analysis:
a) Foundations of the institution
The conflict entailed in the whole area of rewarding measures (as al-
ready pointed out in their Report II by the L-Team), this is, between justice
to be made – normative approach – for the offenses the repentant may have
committed and the need to combat effectively terrorism – utilitarian ap-
proach –) has been solved in all examined member states, expressly or im-
plicitly, in principle, in favour of the utilitarian/pragmatic approach (goals:
prevention of further harm or to bring to justice the [other] perpetrators of
terrorist crimes) which is the fundamental ground and rationale of estab-
lishing rewarding measures (as whereas 21 and 24 of Directive [EU]
541/2017 [the Directive] expressly state: “combat terrorism effectively”).
As we know, the design of Art. 16 of the Directive implies that this goal
can be achieved by the MS standing on two pillars: in order to see his
penalty mitigated, the offender has to
i) “renounce” terrorism: D: “lossagen”, F: “renoncer”; E: “abandonar”; I:
“rinunciare”) (Art. 16 a)
and
ii) furnish (new/relevant) information, which can be done in two forms:
– internal (punitive) collaboration related to an offense already com-
mitted: information
* Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Manuel Cancio Meliá, full professor of Criminal Law, Prof. Dr.
Sabela Oubiña Barbolla, associate professor of Procedural Law, both Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid.
to mitigate or prevent effects of the offense (Art. 16 b) I);
to bring to justice other offenders (Art. 16 b) II) or
to find evidence (Art. 16 b) III);
or
– external (preventive) collaboration to prevent further crimes of ter-
rorism (Art. 16 b) IV).
This reward mechanism obviously stands in the tradition of similar
provisions that have been implemented in many jurisdictions – especially in
I – for offences related to organised crime.
However, it is not clear whether these utilitarian reasons work in the
same way they do in organized crime, an issue that needs to be addressed
since in some MS the tools for the rewarding measures related to terrorism
crimes stem from earlier regulations drafted for organized crime.
Especially, we should consider that due to the ideological nature of ter-
rorist activities (perpetrators consider themselves to be complying with a
moral duty when entering terrorist activity), and as the Italian example in
the 1980 years show, any public disengagement of the terrorist activity poses
a severe threat to the internal cohesion of ideology-driven organizations as
terrorist groups are, on one hand, and offer a theoretical approach to the
specific wrongfulness of terrorist crimes (the so-called “political” or “expres-
sive” element of terrorism), on the other.
In this line of thought, it is to be stressed that from the beginning it
seems clear, even sharing a completely utilitarian approach for both areas
when it comes to rewarding measures, that this approach must be specific
for terrorism, as the phenomenon of terrorism – although it is a collective
context in both cases – is qualitatively different from organised crime.
On a theoretical level, we should consider that certain elements of the
offender’s crime – the “attack on the democracy and the rule of law” –
(whereas 2 Directive and an express element in some national legal defini-
tions of terrorism), that is, the expressive, political and factual meaning of
future menace to the State and its citizens, vanishes as terrorist offenders
abjure their activity (especially important is the experience in I, whose regu-
lation in the 1980 – and its rich case law – years explicitly targeted dissoci-
ated individuals, Saulus-Paulus cases). In this line, the (mandatory) element
of “renouncement” implies this as a starting point, even if the Directive does
not include means of deradicalization –an omission that has been a target of
criticism – in its framework. It is obvious that other elements of the com-
mitted offences remain unaltered: the harm done to individuals, which of
course does not weaken with a change of mind of the offender. But it also
seems clear that, for instance, a no longer existing terrorist organization
poses different problems to sentence enforcement than an currently acting
terrorist group.
However, from this point of view, the tendency of some MS to allow an
important participation of victims in proceedings (including the enforce-
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ment stage, as in E, I) could prove a serious obstacle to the function of re-
warding measures.
b) Historical and political context
Beyond this general utilitarian starting point, there has been a com-
pletely different evolution and origin of the rewarding measures regarding
terrorist offences in the concerned states: in some cases, rewarding mea-
sures stem from experience in combating (common) organised crime, or
simply resort to traditional rewarding means – created in completely differ-
ent historical circumstances –. In others, the existing rewarding measures
are due to a specific traumatic terrorism activity (this is the case of B (for-
mer regulation), D, E, F, I). Finally, in some MS, the regulation is a direct
consequence of the EU harmonization process, as they fortunately lack prac-
tical experience with terrorist activity, at least in recent times (B: new regu-
lation; HR; L).
These different paths have led to different types of regulation. These
differences should be tracked in detail. The situation is completely different
regarding the public debate on rewarding measures: from MS where this is
completely out of politics, a technical debate and question (for instance, this
seems to be the case in L; HR) to countries where this problem is at the very
heart of a harsh political conflict (as in E).
c) Practical application
An important difficulty for any assessment of the different options in
the concerned MS arises from the fact that there is no or very little case law.
This implies an enormous difficulty to come really to know what the real
scope of the respective regulation is.
The national reports show that the only relevant body of case law in the
concerned MS is the one produced in I 1980-2000, related to past terrorist
organizations (especially, the Brigate Rosse), which were part of a very dif-
ferent “wave” of terrorist activity in their ideological, geographic, and oper-
ational characteristics. However, even in I there is no recent case law; in
most MS there is little or no case law (B [regarding current legislation
drafted in 2018]; F; E; HR).
d) Need for a comprehensive analysis
As already pointed out by the Report II of the L-team on procedural as-
pects, it is very difficult to measure what the real situation in the MS is with-
out considering different levels and features of practice of rewarding mea-
sures.
Therefore, we have to distinguish first between tools located in sub-
stantial, procedural (investigation and pre-trial proceedings) and peniten-
tiary law, and, perhaps more important, between overt and somehow clan-
destine practices, especially, when the negotiation prior to court proceedings
is located in the realm of “private” activities of the prosecutor’s office. This
is especially difficult to see in the case of informal agreements on charges or
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prosecution that could take place in any given procedural system (whether
there is a legality principle system or an opportunity system on prosecution).
Of course, the latter “clandestine” actions are especially difficult to
track when they take place (as it is often the case) even in a prior stage, be-
fore the prosecutor’s office is involved: in the hazy mist of intelligence, be it
more openly by the internal intelligence (for instance: D with its V-Leute-sys-
tem) or completely out of public survey (as e.g. in E, where there is no or-
ganizational separation between military and police and internal and exter-
nal intelligence services, all activity being concentrated in the Centro Na-
cional de Inteligencia).
Secondly, it would be necessary to identify clearly the real weight of re-
warding practices both in general institutions (as it is the case, for instance,
especially in D) and specific tools designed for terrorism cases.
In any case, it seems clear that an approach to the real situation de-
mands this thorough multi-level analysis, as there are evident functional
equivalents between different stages.
This can be seen, for instance, in the example of I and E. In both MS,
certain general legal possibilities in penitentiary law are used in a post-sen-
tencing stage to counter strong restrictions of substantial or procedural law
(this happens because of political reasons: in E, because these measures are
the only way to “normalize” enforcement conditions that stem from a very
restrictive substantial and procedural regulation, as any sign of some kind of
“benevolence” towards terrorist perpetrators is immediately thrown into
public debate depicting the executive that acts in this line as weak or even
accomplice of the terrorists).
In the following, some selected substantial law issues will be addressed
to try to compare the situation in the different jurisdictions depicted in the
national reports (2.). On this basis, some concluding remarks and provi-
sional assessments can be formulated (3.).
2. Selected substantial law aspects
a) Eligible offences
The scope of the eligible offenses for any rewarding measures depends
on the regulation being terrorism-specific or more general (see infra, e); MS
with measures restricted to terrorism will identify coherently terrorism of-
fenses as eligible ones.
This implies that there will be huge differences in the MS depending on
how the circle of specific terrorism offences has been drawn in the respec-
tive Code (and as long as the obligation to consider them “terrorist” offences
established in art. 3, 14 of the Directive has not been met yet): from regula-
tions as the one in E, where almost all severe offenses of the special part of
the code can be “terrorised”, that is, conceived as (aggravated) terrorism of-
fenses, to MS where this legal label (“terrorism offence”) is restricted to or-
ganization crimes (in the German terminology: offences that consist of hav-
ing a certain relationship to a terrorist organization, i.e., membership or col-
laboration offences), as is the case in D.
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MS with an approach that includes the use of general institutions for of
rewarding measures present of course a broader scope.
The regulation in B lists a numerus clausus (held to be much too broad
by the Focus Group) of severe crimes; also D, with an application of general
measures in sentencing, lists a series of serious offenses;
b) Types of collaboration
Departing from the distinction in art. 16 Directive between internal
(punitive) and external (preventive) forms of collaboration, the reports show
that all MS incorporate both forms (with different requirements, though: see
infra, d).
c) Relationship between the repentant’s offense and the offense on
which collaboration takes place
Some MS do not specify any requirements on this relationship besides
that they have to be terrorist offenses (E, L, HR).
Other MS require expressly a proportionality analysis of both offenses
(B), the existence of some relationship of the offense on which the informa-
tion is given to the own offense of the repentant (D), that both offenses are
“related and of the same nature” (F) and that they were committed for the
same “purpose” (I).
d) Requirements for the information furnished by collaboration
The requirements regarding the quality of the information the repen-
tant provides are different in formulation, but converge in the information
being truthful, relevant and effective: in B’s regulation, the information has
to be “significant, revealing, truthful and complete”; in D, that it constitutes
a “substantial contribution to discovery” or leads to the completion of the of-
fense to be averted, and is given “voluntarily and timely”; in E, “decisive”, ef-
fective and complete (as to the offenses committed by the repentant).
e) Specific or general regulation
Most MS establish a specific collaboration regulation for terrorism of-
fenses (E, F, L, HR); in D, there is a mixed model, since general rules for sen-
tencing are combined with terrorism-specific provisions (limited to selected
offenses).
f) Scope of the consequences of collaboration: mitigation or exemption
E only provides for mitigation (which however can imply that e.g. in of-
fenses of membership of or collaboration with a terrorist organization the
resulting penalty in cases of sentence reduction would not imply necessarily
an effective prison term); also, HR’s regulation only covers mitigation (which
is esteemed to be almost impossible in practice by the national report).
D allows exemption only for the crime of membership in/collaboration
with a terrorist organization (up to a penalty of three years of prison term);
F establishes the possibility of exemption before prosecution takes place (in-
cluding organization offenses); I allows exemption if especially high require-
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ments on the quality and effects of the information are met; L’s regulation
has both possibilities before and after prosecution.
g) Renouncement requirement
D, F, L do not require that the repentant has renounced his or her ter-
rorist activity (although for the specific exemption rules regarding organiza-
tional offenses it is necessary that the repentant presents an effort to prevent
the continued existence of the organization); B, HR establish that the repen-
tant must not be a recidivist offender; E, I, HR require renouncement of the
collaborator, with different degrees of intensity (including E the option that
the repentant contributes to hinder not only the activities of the terrorist col-
lective, but also its “development”).
3. Conclusions and provisional assessment
a) General issues
aa) There are, as is well known in legal scholarship (and some national
reports reflect, see especially the D report), a whole battery of lines of gen-
eral or fundamental criticism on rewarding institutions based on arguments
related to the rule of law, regarding the culpability principle, the principle of
equality, and the effects of their function on the nemo tenetur-axiom that
bars any pressure towards self-incrimination.
However, it must be stressed that these criticisms might present them-
selves in a different way in the area of terrorism offences, where the aban-
donment of a terrorist ideology (“renouncement”) could imply a retrospec-
tive reduction of the expressive (political) contents of the wrongfulness of
the crime committed (if no personal harm was done), as e.g. the exemption
rule only for membership activities in D shows (or other general processes of
collective de-escalation as the one led by the UK after the 1998 Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland might imply).
bb) A general difficulty in assessing the quality of harmonization pro-
vided by Art. 16 of the Directive lies in the piecemeal approach typical of UE
criminal law harmonization: a certain criminalization standard or, as it is
here the case, the possibility of a mitigation is established, and launched on
the national legislators. But this is done without a proper prior analysis of
the situation in every jurisdiction (and without a proper follow up to the im-
plementation of the harmonization rules). This means that the house is be-
ing built beginning by the roof, as it is very difficult to grasp what the real
effects of such measures in every national system are if procedural, sentenc-
ing and penitentiary law are brushed under the carpet and there is only a
(fragmentary) focus on substantial law.
cc) Especially interesting seems in this context the problem – which has
been out of the central focus of our approach – of the coordination of re-
warding measures with the general institution of withdrawal/voluntary
abandonment in the MS’s legislations, in particular regarding organization
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offenses (membership and collaboration; here there is a practice in some
MS, e.g. in E and HR, not to use this institution in terrorism offenses; some
national reports – for instance, F – stress that the practice of withdrawal in
this area is very unclear; in I, some specific regulations were deemed to be
special cases of withdrawal).
dd) An important field of the current wave of terrorism, especially in
the EU, is the activity of isolated perpetrators without real organizational
ties to a terrorist organization (so-called “lone wolves”). The design of Art.
16, requiring renouncement and information (or, in other words, the ab-
sence of a substantial law approach to de-radicalization) excludes this im-
portant group of offenders.
4. Compliance with the harmonization standard
aa) In general, it can be said that the national regulations are in line
with the model designed by the Directive regarding the eligible offences, the
relationship between the offences committed by the repentant and the ones
on which he informs, the requirements on the nature and quality of the in-
formation provided by the offender, and the option for mitigation and/or ex-
emption (Art. 16 does in our opinion not bar the possibility of the latter).
However, the intensity of the requirements may lead to a situation where the
regulation complies formally with the Directive, but the requirements make
it virtually impossible to come to be effectively applied (this is the case of
Spain: surrender + complete confession + renouncement + broad informa-
tion).
bb) But the absence of the requirement of renouncement/abandonment
of the terrorist activity, as pointed out in some national reports, seems a ma-
jor failure to comply with the standard set by Art. 16, in our opinion. It is
true that we are dealing with a facultative harmonization standard. But
when engaged in introducing such a regulation, it seems that this element –
as said before: essential to the area of terrorism because of its ideological
bias – is an basic element of the model of rewarding measures designed by
the Directive. To comply with it, national legislations need to incorporate
this element (the L report offers a different interpretation of the scope of the
harmonization obligation and holds that compliance is possible even with-
out the renouncement element).
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SECTION III
A “EUROPEAN MODEL” OF REWARDING MEASURES

CHAPTER 1
A MODEL OF REWARD MEASURES
LUDOVICO BIN
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Feasibility. – 3. Brief summary of the comparative analysis. –
4. Preliminary considerations for a common model of reward measures. – 4.1. The rel-
evance of judicial cooperation potential issues. – 4.2. Limits of EU law and the need for
‘substantial’ approximation. – 5. Searching for a “minimum common” measure. – 5.1.
The transversal effect of penalty-excluding measures. – 5.2. Added ‘communicative’
value for those States in which prosecution is discretionary. – 6. Conditions for appli-
cation of the minimum common measure. – 6.1. Insufficiency of the current “state of
the art”. – 6.2. The inopportunity of ‘dissociation’. – 6.3. ‘Utility’ of the information pro-
vided: a first need for differentiation. – 6.4. Timeliness of collaboration: a second need
for differentiation. – 6.5. Proposal draft. – 7. Model of reward measures in the post-
sentencing phase. – 7.1. Preliminary remarks. – 7.2. Overview on the current national
reward legislations in the post-sentencing phase. – 7.3. Common aims and features of
the currently existing terrorism-specific post-conviction measures (for cooperators not
taking part to deradicalization programmes). – 7.4. Proposal draft.
1. Introduction
The creation of a model of reward measures to be transposed in all na-
tional legislations in order to set up an effective strategy complementary to
the traditional repressive one as well as favouring, by virtue of the approxi-
mation, judicial cooperation between authorities belonging to different
Member States, required a deep preparatory analysis.
Accordingly, during phase II of the research, a comprehensive analysis
of the common features and main differences between national legislations
constituted a first inevitable step. Such an analysis, whose object was repre-
sented by the questionnaires completed by all units during phase I of the
project, has been carried out by the Spanish unit for the substantive law as-
pects and by the Luxembourgish unit for what concerns the procedural as-
pects. Secondly, European law limits and criminological peculiarities had to
necessarily be taken into account, in order to grant feasibility and efficiency
to the model: these tasks have been carried out, respectively, by the Croatian
unit, which provided for a deep analysis of the EU criminal law compe-
tences, and by the Belgian unit, which thoroughly examined the socio-crim-
inological aspects of the potential subjects of the measures here at stake, i.e.
modern jihadist terrorists.
Upon the findings of the research carried out by the units of Belgium,
Croatia, Luxembourg and Spain it is now possible to draw some conclusions
and draft a proposal.
2. Feasibility
As mentioned, an important premise of this research, since its original
draft, has been the assessment of the concrete feasibility of any proposal re-
garding the exploitation of reward measures.
Given the harsh debate occurred in those States in which reward legis-
lation has firstly been resorted to (namely Italy and Germany) and the ethi-
cal dilemma that negotiation with terrorist evidently brings with, a first ob-
stacle to be addressed was represented by the possible political opposition to
such type of strategy, following the notorious American catchphrase “We
don’t negotiate with terrorists!”; and this even more considering the major
role of national Parliaments in the current “post-Lisbon” EU legislation pro-
cedures on the matter1. Furthermore, the reward strategy so far applied was
targeted to subjects different from those of the present days: modern jihadist
terrorists do significantly differ from the strictly political ones of the “Years
of Lead”. Therefore, the sensibility and vulnerability of such new targets
needed to be ascertained before any proposal could be forwarded.
With respect to the first issue, it has been noted that the conflict be-
tween the “justice to be made approach” and the “utilitarian approach”, i.e.
between the need to grant a just punishment to such despicable offences and
the need to effectively contrast terrorism, has somehow been resolved in all
States analysed, expressly or implicitly, in favour of the latter approach2, as
demonstrated by their adoption also in those States in which the former ‘na-
tional terrorism’ was not experienced3. Indeed, although many States pro-
vide for reward measures not specifically targeted on terrorism, terrorism-
related offences always fall within their scope4. Moreover, while the EU
seems to possess the necessary competences to legislate on the matter5, re-
ward legislation does not seem to produce the same conflicts with funda-
mental human rights produced by the repressive counter-terrorism legisla-
tion6.
With respect to the second issue, an in-depth analysis has been con-
ducted on the peculiar features of modern terrorists7, whose aim could of
course not be that of guaranteeing a full certainty of the concrete effective-
ness of reward legislation but rather eliminate the full certainty of its inef-
fectiveness. Notwithstanding the increased difficulty to treat with some
types of modern terrorists, and although it could be maintained that a more
effective solution would consist in collective measures such amnesties in-
stead of individual negotiation8 (whose outline falls however outside the
scope of this research), many factors have been traced that might make the
terrorist offender much inclined to cooperate (e.g.: disappointment for the
1 See Section II, Ch. 3, § 4a.
2 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1a.
3 See e.g. Section I, Ch. 6, § 3; Section I, Ch. 2, § I.1.
4 See Section II, Ch. 4, § 3.1.
5 See Section II, Ch. 5, §§ 4a, 6; see also Section II, Ch. 1C, § 2.
6 For an overview, see Section II, Ch. 5, § 5.
7 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.2.
8 See Section II, Ch. 2, §§ III.3.1, III.3.3, Conclusion.
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actual behaviour of other members) and both material and symbolic gains
to which he/she might be sensible to; moreover, negotiation has been deeply
studied through the years and many ‘tactics’ have been by now developed9.
3. Brief summary of the comparative analysis
While the very concept of terrorism is not univocal nor uncontrover-
sial10, also the field of reward legislation is characterized by the «use of dif-
ferent legal lexicons, amplified by the lack of a single, all-encompassing term
to define rewarding measures»11. In this restricted sector, however, unlike
that of traditional repressive criminal provisions, harmonization has not
been convincingly pursued: there are in fact several differences and only few
similarities in the current reward legislation on terrorism in the EU Mem-
bers States. Such differences may be broken down in different categories:
according to their ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ nature, to the procedural
phase in which they come into play, to the type and degree of reward, to the
conditions for their application.
The first differentiation, however, appears to be not so satisfying, as –
apart from the difficulties in tracing a clear-cut line between these two “na-
tures” – only those measures that may be enrolled in the pre-trial phase do
actually possess a clear procedural nature, while the others generally regard
the sanction and therefore enjoy a fully substantive nature12. Furthermore,
Directive 541/2017/EU does not provide for any procedural provision. Hence,
given that the procedural or substantive nature of a measure does not pro-
duce here any relevant consequence (unlike as for the issue of the choice of
the proper legal basis to use in case a further harmonisation will be pursued),
a greater attention will be paid to the effects that such measures produce.
Leaving for the moment unaddressed the post-conviction phase (which
will be further elaborated infra, § 7.2), where differences are even higher,
what clearly emerged from the analysis is that the main difference most of
all dividing the legal systems examined consists in the mandatory or discre-
tionary nature of prosecution: in some States (notably Belgium, France,
Luxembourg and Germany) discretionary prosecution allows a significantly
wider possibility to cooperate with the perpetrators, allowing actual “negoti-
ations” which range from the re-qualification of the fact to the charge dis-
missal, without a full control by the judge, including also the possibility to
transfer the jurisdiction to another State; in other States the judicial control
may never be diverted and the concession of a reward measure is condi-
tioned to the satisfaction of some formal requirements. Furthermore, among
the latter, not all Member States allow for forms of extinction of the penalty,
limiting the possibilities to a reduction of its entity or to other benefits in the
phase of penalty execution13.
9 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.3.3.
10 See Section II, Ch. 2, § I.1.1.
11 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1.
12 See Ibidem.
13 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 2.
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Besides the “type” of measures, huge discrepancies characterize also
the conditions for their application: although all legislations require similar
conditions for what concerns the quality of the information that the collabo-
rator must supply to the authorities – which shall always be truthful, rele-
vant and effective14 – only some States require dissociation15, whereas some
States require the actual dismantlement of the whole terrorist organization16
or a high number of cumulative requirements17. Moreover, some States are
concerned about the dangerousness of the offender18 and take into greater
consideration the role of the victims19.
Relevant differences also regard the scope of the measures, which are
not always specifically targeted to terrorist offenders but extend to all (or
many other) crimes. In addition, some States do provide only for specific
terrorist-related offences, while other States provide for aggravating circum-
stances able to “transform” any common crime in a terrorist-offence; and
this produces a notable disparity considering that in some States only some
selected terrorist offences may be eligible for the application of provisions
on collaboration20.
Lastly, although almost all legislation in which reward measures are
provided for do not differentiate between “internal” (i.e. in relation to the of-
fence for which the collaborator is prosecuted) and “external” (i.e. in rela-
tion to other offences) cooperation, but do encompass both forms, only
some States require a further analysis in cases of external cooperation,
aimed at assessing the proportionality between the offence for which coop-
eration is supplied and the offence committed and on which the reward shall
produce its effects21.
4. Preliminary considerations for a common model of reward measures
4.1. The relevance of judicial cooperation potential issues
A first preliminary remark to be taken into account before examining
what model of reward measures should be spread between all Member
States regards the “purpose” that must be taken into account: the measures
should in fact be modelled keeping in mind the necessity to facilitate judicial
cooperation between authorities of different Member States. However, this
does not mean that only actual transnational facts – i.e. facts that have been
committed in the soil of more than one Member State – shall be addressed,
while facts fully committed on a purely national territory should be devoid
of relevance22.
14 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 2d; Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.2.
15 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 2g.
16 See Section I, Ch. 3, § 3.3.2.
17 See Section I, Ch. 7, § 2.1.
18 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.1.
19 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.3.
20 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.1; Section II, Ch. 5, § 4aa.
21 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.1.
22 The question of the importance of a fostered transnational judicial cooperation
across the EU in the field of reward legislation will here not be further examined, but rather
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Notwithstanding the fact that the resort to EU legislation for the har-
monization of the national criminal legislation seems to be justified only
among cases of cross-border dimension, it is nonetheless to be noted that
this “dimension” in relation to which art. 83 TFEU allows criminal law ap-
proximation is defined by that very disposition as «resulting from the nature
or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a com-
mon basis». Accordingly, and as already maintained23, art. 83 TFEU does not
only refer to crimes that are committed in more than one “national soil” but
could also encompass those cases whose perpetration has been carried out
in a single country, as long as they may be reconnected to a common threat
(or fight) such as ‘modern’ terrorism24, whose transnational dimension is not
generally due to the modalities of factual commissions but primarily to the
preparatory acts25.
Indeed, the very concept of approximation in the criminal law sector is
arguably justifiable only inasmuch as it does effectively foster judicial coop-
eration. Outlining a model without considering such fundamental aspect
would instead lead to concede a considerably wide margin of appreciation to
the Member States, because of the disparities already existing in the indi-
vidual criminal law systems – e.g., and above all, the mandatory/discre-
tionary prosecution – which obviously require different types of measures.
This is the evident reason why art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU has been fea-
tured as only optional; however, such a model of reward legislation risks in-
creasing national disparities instead of reducing them26.
Hence, the necessity to ensure a smoother and more effective judicial
cooperation requires a model of reward legislation non-optional and aimed
at overcoming the many differences that inevitably characterize the different
national legal systems.
4.2. Limits of EU law and the need for ‘substantial’ approximation
On this perspective, the most relevant issues for judicial cooperation
would evidently derive from the profound differences currently existing for
what concerns mandatory or discretionary prosecution. Secondly, among
the legal system in which prosecution is mandatory, also the difference be-
tween mere reduction and full exclusion of the penalty, as well as the differ-
taken for granted, as the whole research has been justified upon it during the proposal draft.
On the fundamental importance of cooperation between different national offices and forces
in Italy during the fight against the national terrorism of the Years of Lead cf. Section I, Ch.
1A, § 1 (and, for what concerns the fight against modern terrorism, § 4).
23 See Valsamis MITSILEGAS, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon: Rights, Trust and the Trans-
formation of Justice in Europe, Hart Publishing, 2016, Chapter 3; Petter ASP, The Substan-
tive Criminal Law Competence of the EU, Jure, 2013; Hester HERLIN-KARNELL, EU Compe-
tence in Criminal Law after Lisbon, in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout, & Stefanie Ripley
(eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford, 2012, Chapter 16.
24 Which is indeed listed among the key areas of the European Agenda on Security. On
the European and not-merely-national relevance of terrorism see Section II, Ch. 5, § 4a.
25 On the typically transnational nature of modern terrorism cf. Section II, Ch. 2, §
I.2.2. For a concrete overview in the Italian experience see Section I, Ch. 1B, § 2.
26 See Section II, Ch. 1B, § 4.1. On the “blatant need” for a much more harmonized
and transnational approach to terrorism investigation see Section II, Ch. 5, § 1.
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ences in the conditions for application of the measures do increase the risk
of a refusal to the cooperation request: the authorities of a State in which a
less-favourable measure is consented could refuse to cooperate with the au-
thorities of a State in which the suspect could be acquitted without even be-
ing brought before a judge, because the national law would instead require
a conviction; and, on the opposite, the authorities of a State in which prose-
cution is discretionary could refuse to cooperate with the authorities of a
State in which the suspect would be inevitably convicted, because this would
involve a less efficient ‘negotiation’.
However, although the best solution would arguably consist in aligning
all national legislation to the most beneficial measure already existing – i.e.
the possibility to concede a dismissal already in the phase of preliminary in-
vestigation, by decision of the sole prosecutor – it must be noted that
mandatory/discretionary prosecution depends on the outset of the single na-
tional legal system and is not disputable by EU law. Imposing a change upon
the general rules of criminal prosecution goes far beyond the EU compe-
tences and is therefore not a pursuable option.
Therefore, given these irreducible – at least on the short/medium term
– disparities, the search for a minimum set of measures that could be im-
plemented in all Member State should be pursued keeping in mind the “sub-
stantial goal” of approximating the reward system, at the expense of the “for-
mal equality” between the measures which grant such rewards: what is nec-
essary is to provide for measures that do allow to reach the same effects,
although they will be obtained through different ‘formal’ paths, according to
the peculiarities of each national legal system.
5. Searching for a “minimum common” measure
5.1. The transversal effect of penalty-excluding measures
From the comparative analysis – and indeed at its basis, given the
structure of the questionnaire distributed to the units27 – emerges a clear dif-
ferentiation of the currently existing measures according to the stage of the
criminal proceeding.
As already noted, the most relevant differences between legal systems
arise in the pre-trial phase. Here, the rewards mainly consist in the choice of
the prosecutor to dismiss the case or reformulate the accuse under a differ-
ent, more lenient offence28. On the opposite, in those States in which prose-
cution is mandatory, the rewards take generally place “inside” a plea agree-
ment (although such tool is generally limited to less serious offences and the
judge usually needs to approve it29). Although a comprehensive analysis
would imply a deeper consideration of the role of secret services in States
where prosecution is mandatory, on the grounds that secret services could to
27 The questionnaire structure generally coincides with the summaries of the Chapters
of Section I.
28 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 2.
29 Ibidem.
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some extent manage a negotiation without being subject to any jurisdic-
tional control30, this seems to be incapable of putting the two types of sys-
tems at the same level: secret services do not always nor everywhere enjoy
freedom of action31 and such a solution would evidently not cover those
cases in which cooperation starts after the prosecutor has initiated the in-
vestigations.
At the sentencing stage, the differences are less marked, as the types of
measures are generally twofold: an extenuating circumstance or a ground
for exclusion of the penalty. Besides the different requisites for “accessing”
the measures – which require a further and deeper analysis – the “typologi-
cal” differences here only reside on the possibility to reach an acquittal or
not.
As already mentioned, the measures operating in the pre-trial phase ar-
guably possess a procedural nature; but they also produce a substantive ef-
fect: the requalification of the fact produces a decreasing of the penalty,
while the case dismissal ends up in excluding it all along.
Such “nominalistic” considerations partly work also the other way
around and highlight an important consequence. Among the measures that
have so far been ‘placed’ in the sentencing phase there is in fact a pivotal dif-
ference between those that do attenuate the penalty and those that allow for
its full exclusion: while the first possess only a substantive effect – that on
the final penalty – the second do also produce transverse procedural effects.
A cause that excludes the penalty does indeed affect the criminal pro-
ceeding to a much greater extent with respect to a mere attenuating circum-
stance, insofar as it generally precludes the very continuation of the pro-
ceeding. When a cause of exclusion of the penalty applies, the proceeding
generally stops and the case is dismissed, even – and foremost – in those le-
gal systems in which prosecution is mandatory. In such systems, the extin-
guishing effect rises as soon as the conditions are met, and this could be at
the end of the proceeding but also at its very beginning. Hence, by virtue of
this measure the dismissal of the case could be obtained by the prosecutor
also in the pre-trial phase, and although a control by the judge in such cases
is generally inescapable, it would most likely amount to a regularity check
by a magistrate in strict contact with the investigation, that would presum-
ably most often not bar this possibility: if the request is accepted, it would
formally produce the involvement of the judge, but the effect would substan-
tially be the same of a case-dismissal due to the discretionary decision of the
prosecutor.
Therefore, while it may be argued that art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU
already allows for measures aimed at reducing or even eliminating the
penalty32 – and keeping in mind the facultative nature of such provision –
the minimum common reward measure able to overcome the unmatchable
formal differences and reach a substantive approximation of the Member
States legislation, thus favouring judicial cooperation without requiring re-
30 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1d.
31 See e.g. the case of Italy: Section I, Ch. 1A, § 1.
32 See Section II, Ch. 1B, § 3.2.2; Section II, Ch. 5, § 4aa.
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forms that clearly fall outside the scope of EU competences, consists in a
cause of exclusion of the penalty for the collaborator.
5.2. Added ‘communicative’ value for those States in which prosecution is dis-
cretionary
The mandatory implementation of a cause for exclusion of the penalty
for terrorist offenders intending to cooperate would not only produce posi-
tive effects on those Member States in which prosecution is mandatory –
which would indeed enjoy the possibility to bar the proceeding at the pre-
trial stage in a sufficiently similar way – but also in those in which prosecu-
tion is discretionary.
Here, in truth, such legislatively provided measure would probably be
doomed to scarce practical application, since the prosecutor would enjoy ex-
tremely wide deformalized procedures33. However, the very existence of such
measures in the written legislation would have an indisputable ‘communica-
tive’ effect, inasmuch as it would let perpetrators know of the possibility to
benefit of such measures in case they decide to cooperate, even prior to be-
ing arrested and approached by the investigators. Instead of being a mere
possibility that the prosecutor may or may not propose or exercise, a leg-
islatively provided cause for exclusion of the punishment would indeed en-
sure a greater legal certainty: if not even an actual right to obtain the re-
ward, the perpetrator would at least unequivocally be granted that his/her
collaboration will be taken into consideration. In fact, in case the prosecutor
shall not deem the information provided sufficiently relevant and therefore
initiate the trial phase, the existence of legislative measures would nonethe-
less ensure a further assessment by a judge.
6. Conditions for application of the minimum common measure
6.1. Insufficiency of the current “state of the art”
As stated by the Spanish unit, national legislations seem to be in line
with art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU – and therefore homogeneous – for
what concerns many aspects (although the concrete structure of these as-
pects in a given legislation may lead to substantial disparities)34: although
reward measures are not always specifically tailored to terrorist offences,
those listed by the mentioned Directive always fall within the scope of re-
ward legislation; both the offence(s) committed and other terrorism-related
ones may be object of cooperation; and the requirements on the nature and
quality of the information provided is similar in all legislations.
However, besides the differences in the formal shape of other measures
not falling within the scope of art. 16 (discretionary dismissal vs. plea agree-
ments or cases of exclusion of the penalty; requalification vs. extenuating
33 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1.
34 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 4aa.
452 SECTION III – CHAPTER 1
circumstances, etc.), the current formulation of art. 16 does not clearly allow
for exclusion of the penalty; moreover, national reward legislations also still
differ for what concerns the requirement of ‘renouncement’ of the terrorist
activity: some Member States do not in fact currently require such element
(thus arguably embodying a major failure to comply with art. 16)35. Since
this element represents not only a requirement embodied in art. 16 – whose
transposition seems therefore mandatory for those States in which a miti-
gating circumstance is provided for terrorism-related offences – but also a
common feature of the most experienced legislations36, its necessity will be
further analysed.
6.2. The inopportunity of ‘dissociation’
Dissociation as a compulsory requirement for accessing a reward mea-
sure has characterized many counter-terrorism reward legislations37. The ex-
pansion of reward legislation outside the field of terrorism – especially to-
wards that of organized crime38, even though in some States the process has
been reversed39 – has however generally left behind such requirement.
The reason for the important role played by dissociation against the
terrorist menace in the past years lies in fact in the peculiar nature of ter-
rorist offenders, which is not present in other forms of crime. Arguably, ter-
rorism is qualitatively different from other forms of organized crime be-
cause terrorist offenders consider their activities to be complying with a
moral duty which is not comparable with the bond of any other kind orga-
nization40: the phenomenon of the s.c. lone wolves, acting on their own with-
out any real ‘human’ contact with the organization other than the common
moral purpose represents an indisputable example, not existing in other
criminal organizations. Furthermore, dissociation was also justified on a
much more theoretical level: the particular threat to “democracy and the
rule of law” derived from terrorist offences, which contributes to legitimize
a portion of the total penalty, vanishes as terrorist offenders abjure their ac-
tivity: «it is obvious that other elements of the committed offences remain
unaltered: the harm done to individuals, which of course does not weaken
with a change of mind of the offender. But it also seems clear that, for in-
stance, a no longer existing terrorist organization poses different problems
to sentence enforcement than a currently acting terrorist group»41.
Thus, on a theoretical perspective, the ideological nature of terrorist of-
fences42 should arguably make any public disengagement or dissociation a
35 Ibidem.
36 See Section I, Ch. 7, § 2.1; Section I, Ch. 1, § 1.2.
37 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1a.
38 See Section I, Ch. 1A, § 4.
39 But on the basis of supranational acts that were strongly conditioned by the
counter terrorism legislation already existing in the other Member States: see Section II, Ch.
5, § 1.
40 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1a.
41 See Ibidem.
42 See Section II, Ch. 2, § I.1.2.
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severe threat to the internal cohesion of such ideology-driven organiza-
tions43; and even more considering that modern terrorism consists of not
only a political, but also of a religious ideology44. Moreover, radicalization
often presupposes the entrance into a group whose strength is built on a
logic of solidarity45, which boosts the whole process: the link of mutual de-
pendence does not only strengthen the bonds within the group members,
but also the tendency to radical violence46; plus, often family bonds also play
a pivotal role47. Although the stronger these bonds are the less inclined to co-
operate the offender will be48, if negotiation is successful the consequent dis-
sociation could perhaps weaken and deteriorate all the other still-existing
bonds that are built in a similar way. The difficulties reside in convincing the
offender, and obviously grow according to his/her degree of radicalization49;
but cooperation is not impossible even in cases of persons previously dis-
posed to their own sacrifice50, and the outcome might be considerable51,
while reverse risk of strengthening other groups through the ‘intergroup
competition’ logic does not seem decisive, as it may also work the other way
around52.
However, there are good reasons that suggest not to subordinate the ac-
cess to reward measures to an actual “dissociation requisite” in this peculiar
field of terrorism.
First and foremost, requesting for dissociation would probably prove to
be counter effective, as it would most likely ingenerate a further perception
of being discriminated not only among the arrested, but also with regard to
all those who are even not yet fully radicalised: as it has been stressed out,
the feeling of Islamic cultures being crushed by the occidental society is in-
stead one of the main causes of radicalization53; this way, a legal provision
imposing dissociation to all those who wish to cooperate would probably be
perceived as a evidence that the State(s) aim at prevail upon enemy cul-
tures54. The risk is that such an imposition, accompanied by the “blackmail
logic” surrounding the reward measures, would not be seen as part of a con-
ciliatory and far-reaching strategy but just like a part of the old mere repres-
sive one, thus contributing to «reinforce the war logic that the terrorist strat-
egy aims to create, potentially fuelling recruitment channels it wants to fight
against»55.
43 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 1a.
44 See Section II, Ch. 2, § I.2.2, in which a political nature is also recognized to ‘jihadist
terrorism’, and Section II, Ch. 2, § II.1 er seq., in which such ideology is broken down as well
as the main reasons behind radicalisation. Cf. also Section II, Ch. 2, § II.2.2.2.
45 See Section II, Ch. 2, § II.2.3.2.
46 Ibidem.
47 See Section II, Ch. 2, § II.2.2.2; Section I, Ch. 1B, § 7. However, families may also
represent an obstacle or something to replace with the terrorist group: see Section II, Ch. 2,
§ II.2.3.2.
48 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.3.6.
49 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.3.1.
50 Cf. the case reported by Section I, Ch. 1B, § 3.
51 Cf. again Section I, Ch. 1B, passim.
52 See Section II, Ch. 2, §§ II.2.3.2; III.3.6.
53 See Section II, Ch. 2, § II.1.3.
54 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.3.3.
55 See Section II, Ch. 2, § I.1.2.
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Moreover, while disengagement/dissociation from a group and deradi-
calization are not synonyms56, the first is a part of and presupposes the ini-
tiation of the latter, which consist of a complex medium/long-term process
that requires specific competences – not usually at disposal of police officers
or magistrates – and cannot reasonably reach its goal before the sentencing:
a process of conversion to less violent and radical ideas is indeed likely to
take years57. Requiring such a significant part of the process to happen al-
ready during the trial or even at the pre-trial stage would therefore most
likely prove to be unrealistic and useless (as well as probably counter-effec-
tive). Dissociation should rather be considered in the post-trial-phase, where
the deradicalization process is likely to take place with the due time and
competence, without giving the impression of aiming at imposing a sudden
change in the terrorist’s belief system.
Lastly, an exclusion of dissociation from the reward pre-conditions
does not seem to produce real negative effects. Dissociation usually consists
in a concrete behaviour which is incompatible with a continuative loyalty to
the terrorist group: a tangible betrayal. No full inner repentance and accep-
tance of the values expressed by the institutional and legal framework (sub-
jective conception) is required in any national legislation, an objective con-
ception being much more adopted58: indeed, the betrayal usually already
consists in the very supply of relevant information59. Since providing for in-
formation represents the minimum indefectible threshold among the re-
quirements for the application of a reward measure, some States also jointly
demand for other complementary activities such as a full confession of the
crimes committed or the spontaneousness of the will to cooperate, while
only few require for a formal statement of dissociation60. While full confes-
sion – although “full disclosure” seems more appropriate – is likely to pro-
duce a tangible advantage at least for a first evaluation on the reliability of
the repentant and of the information provided, dissociation would instead
not compensate its risks with any tangible utility.
The most useful “place” in which to collocate dissociation seems there-
fore that of the execution phase, where the actual initiation of a deradical-
ization process could – and should – be followed, enhanced and controlled
by competent experts. Notwithstanding the fact that fostering the undertak-
ing of such processes is a priority at the European level, as well as the fact
that deradicalization should somehow “award” to the undertaker at least
penitentiary benefits, drafting reward legislation on the matter would re-
quire further detailed and comparative inquiries on deradicalization strate-
gies, which fall out of the scope of this research (see melius infra, § 7).
Lastly, a strict term departing from the commission of the offence and
beyond which no cooperation would be possible does not seem useful here:
56 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.2.2.
57 See Section II, Ch. 2, § III.3.2.
58 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.2.
59 See Section I, Ch. 2a, § III.2.
60 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.2.
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although some reward legislation did resort to such discipline61, the context
and the reasons behind this choice were too peculiar to be generalized and
would not adapt to the above-mentioned criminological peculiarities of this
sector, in which cooperation is likely to be initiated – without becoming use-
less – after quite some time. Furthermore, no “voluntary” requirement – in-
tended as a request to cooperate arrived before the arrest – shall be main-
tained as necessary, insofar as it would significantly and unreasonably cut
out the chances to cooperate for all those who did not surrender, thus
strongly limiting the effectiveness of the whole strategy with no tangible
trade-offs.
6.3. ‘Utility’ of the information provided: a first need for differentiation
For what concerns the “minimum” indefectible element that shall be re-
quested for the concession of the reward, i.e. the supply of relevant informa-
tion, it has already been illustrated that all legislations seem to use similar
criteria in order to evaluate the utility of the information supplied, which
should – in sum – be true and useful62. However, for what concerns the cri-
teria in order to ascertain the ‘usefulness’ of the information supplied, diver-
sities arise and only some Member States adopt the same standard provided
for by art. 16, which only accepts information that the authorities “would
not otherwise have been able to obtain”.
These differences highlight a fundamental basic question: whether co-
operation shall be driven by a pure utilitarian logic63 or spaces for sole rein-
tegration purposes are also admissible. In other words, the logic of art. 16
gives no chances to the offender willing to cooperate, but devoid of relevant
information, or maybe even in possession of relevant information but
‘beaten on time’ by another offender who possesses the same information.
In this perspective, allowing access to reward measures only to those
who can provide the authorities with information that could not be obtained
otherwise amounts to a condition that would not only require a quite diffi-
cult assessment by the authorities, but would also exclude from any form of
cooperation people that might be willing to do so. Although the information
they would provide might not be of extreme importance, they might still be
useful to corroborate information provided by other subjects. Moreover, it
must be considered that by virtue of the modern ‘ways of radicalisation’,
which exploits much more than ever the means of internet, social networks
and private messaging platforms, also the s.c. lone wolves might have some-
thing to offer in terms of investigative utility64, even though not necessarily
targeted to specific offences. Accessing specific social platforms from the in-
side could prove to be a quite useful tool of investigation, whose success
does however not depend on the aspiring collaborator.
61 Such discipline was originally established in Italy: see Section I, Ch. 1, § 2.7.
62 Cf. supra, § 3.
63 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.2.
64 Cf. Section I, Ch. 1B, § 7.
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Furthermore, it must be considered that not only the information pro-
vided, but also the harmfulness of the offence committed by the cooperator
may significantly vary from case to case (e.g., from mere financing or re-
cruitment to actual attacks). A certain proportionality must be granted: as
mentioned, some States provide for a legislative bond, according to which
the reward may be granted only as long as the offence committed is less se-
rious than the one in relation to which cooperation is supplied. However,
such limit does not seem to be advisable, because an evaluation in abstracto
(less relevant offence = irrelevant information) risks to produce undesirable
consequences, inasmuch as it would most likely deprive of any possibility to
access the reward those who committed serious offences but could anyhow
furnish relevant information on other less serious, but still serious of-
fences65. Proportionality should therefore be requested, but not presumed.
Lastly, in case the offender totally fails to provide information, no mit-
igation should be granted: not only for utilitarian (no actual gain deriving
from the reward) but also for ‘realistic’ reasons (risk that the offender retains
information he/she actually possesses). In this case, as for all other offend-
ers, reintegration might still be pursuable in the post-sentencing phase,
through penitentiary benefits (see infra, § 7).
6.4. Timeliness of collaboration: a second need for differentiation
A second issue regards the time in which collaboration takes place:
while the early dismissal of the case due to information provided during the
pre-trial phase does generally not preclude the reopening of the case if the
information proves to be useless or false, when collaboration takes place
during the trial phase, as it has been noted66, no suspension mechanisms are
generally provided for. Considering that usually the proceeding brought
against the collaborator comes to an end before those against the persons re-
garded by the information provided, there is a high risk that false or useless
information in this phase will provoke an unjust acquittal or reduced sen-
tence without any further possibility to reopen the case, in the light of the ne
bis in idem principle (the only possibility would be to proceed for the differ-
ent offence of false testimony, which would however hardly compensate the
penalty ‘escaped’)67.
In this view, allowing the offender to benefit from a full penalty exemp-
tion would produce highly undesirable effects, as the offender would be in-
duced to postpone the collaboration after the trial started and even to sup-
ply false information so as to obtain an unjust and irreparable acquittal. On
the other hand, excluding those who truly could not cooperate before the
trial started seems unreasonable, primarily in those cases in which the co-
operator acquired the knowledge he/she wants to share with the authorities
only at a later stage: therefore, exemption should not be simply excluded af-
65 Such risk exists for instance in Belgium: see Section I, Ch. 2, § 2.1.4.
66 See Section II, Ch. 5, § 3.4.
67 See e.g. Section I, Ch. 5, § 3.2.4.1.
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ter the end of the pre-trial stage, a mixed system being preferable, as long as
the risks are compensated by specific countermeasures such as the suspen-
sion of the trial.
6.5. Proposal draft
All the considerations above seem to indicate that a unique measure
would be unable to address the different possible situations and therefore in-
appropriate or even counter effective. A differentiated model seems instead
necessary.
A first differentiation shall be performed for what concerns the utility
of the information provided: giving the same reward to those who provide
for relevant information and those who don’t is evidently dangerous, since
the offender will be induced to retain relevant information or to supply
false/irrelevant ones. On the other hand, depriving the latter of any possibil-
ity to cooperate seems despicable inasmuch as it would bar an important
step maybe not for investigations, but at least for the deradicalization/rein-
tegration process on an individual perspective and for the consequent weak-
ening the cohesion of terrorist groups on a general perspective. Accordingly,
penalty exemption should be conceded only in cases in which the relevance
of the information provided is of the most important kind, while other rele-
vant information should only consent a mitigation.
The relevance of information could be shaped following the current for-
mulation of art. 16, which draws the possible types of suppliable informa-
tion. In this perspective, helping authorities to find evidence and/or identify
or bring to justice other offenders seems to be of such relevance as to justify
only a mitigation of the penalty, while preventing or mitigating the effects of
the offence or the commission of other offences (referred to in Articles 3 to
12 and 14, i.e. terrorism-related) could deserve the higher reward, according
to their concrete relevance: preventing a minor offence or mitigating its
scarcely damaging effects should not allow the exemption, while preventing
or mitigating serious effects or further offence may be a fair trade.
In brief:
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Type of information Reward




prevent or mitigate the effects 
of the offence
mitigation/exemption
prevent further offences referred 
to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14
mitigation/exemption
Of course, the choice between mitigation and exemption will have to be
evaluated in concreto, by the prosecutor and/or the judge, since setting up a
in abstracto list of information that may grant the exemption seems unrea-
sonable and unrealistic; indeed, a concrete assessment would invariably be
inescapable also for establishing the quantum of the mitigation. However, a
sort of internal limit to the measure at stake should be displace already at
the abstract level in order to avoid possible “blackmails” from the offender.
In fact, giving him/her the possibility to obtain the exclusion of the penalty
in case the information provided is directed at preventing the commission of
an offence without any further limits would mean that the offender will be
inclined to cooperate only as longs a full penalty exemption is granted, even
in cases where the offence committed is more grievous than the one for
which he/she is being prosecuted. In this perspective, limiting the penalty ex-
emption to a strict in abstracto proportionality would have the effect of en-
suring a certain proportion between cooperation and reward without the un-
reasonable consequence of excluding some offenders – namely, those who
possess information on less grievous crimes – from the scope of application
of the measure.
Moreover, a second differentiation should regard the moment in which
cooperation is sought/accepted by the offender: given the much more rele-
vant effects produced by a measure conceded once the trial has officially
started, the offender should be prevented from ‘waiting’ this moment before
cooperating and rather induced to cooperate in the pre-trial phase. The risk
that false/irrelevant information is provided during the trial phase is even
more remarkable by virtue of the above-mentioned inescapable necessity to
assess their concrete relevance, jointly with the already mentioned general
absence of mechanisms of suspension of the proceeding.
Therefore, the ground for exclusion of the penalty referred to in § 5
should be granted only insofar as the offender could not provide the author-
ities with it in the pre-trial phase; and the burden of proof should be posed
on the offender. Preventing the penalty exemption if the collaborator fails to
prove that the information provided during the trial phase could not be pri-
orly provided (e.g. because known only at a later stage) should sufficiently
contain the risk of ‘clockwork’ confessions without demanding the authori-
ties from excessive burdens.
Lastly, given that the risks do not only regard the timeliness of the col-
laboration, but also the truth of the information provided, even in case the
offender manages to prove the prior impossibility to collaborate with the au-
thorities, it is highly advisable to provide for a mechanism of suspension of
the proceeding aimed at consenting the judge to evaluate if the information
was as true and relevant as promised, in order to avoid the possible back-
drops connected to the exemption in the trial stage (see above).
In conclusion, the reward measures concerning pre-trial and trial
phases that should be implemented in all Member States could be drafted as
follows:
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Art. X
Penalty mitigation and exemption
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the
penalty for terrorism related offences may be reduced if the offender:
1) fully discloses the facts related to the committed or attempted of-
fence(s);
2) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with informa-
tion, helping to:
a) identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
b) find evidence;
c) prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
d) prevent further offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that in
cases under § 1, 2), c) and d), the penalty may be excluded if the informa-
tion is of particular relevance and has been provided during the pre-trial
phase or if the offender successfully proves that it could not be provided
prior to the trial initiation. In such a case, the trial shall be suspended un-
til the relevance of the information is concretely evaluable.
3. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that if
the information provided falls under § 1, 2), d), and the offence for which
information is provided is less serious than the offence for which the of-
fender is being prosecuted, no penalty exemption may be conceded.
7. Model of reward measures in the post-sentencing phase
7.1. Preliminary remarks
Before examining how to address offenders that formulate their wish to
cooperate only during the post-conviction stage, a first difference must be
traced between those who already possessed the information they wish to
share with the authorities and those who obtained information only during
the penalty enforcement. In the first case, in fact, reward legislation cannot
be as “rewarding” as it would be if cooperation was sought and performed at
a prior stage; otherwise, the offender would not be provided with any moti-
vation to promptly seek cooperation. In the second case, cooperation would
theoretically need to be treated without excluding any benefit; this possibil-
ity would be compensated by the fact that information of such utility as to
justify a strong reduction or even the exclusion of the penalty would hardly
be obtainable from a detained prisoner.
Moreover, as already mentioned, post-conviction represents the phase
in which deradicalization programmes should be proposed to the convicted
and concretely developed; however, to date, such programmes are far from
being uniform in the Member States legislations. Since they do not just de-
pend on a technical-juridical intervention in the post-sentencing criminal
procedure national laws, but require a further, comprehensive and in-depth
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analysis embracing not only jurists, but primarily sociologists, “islamolo-
gists”, etc., modelling reward legislation in such phase cannot currently be
pursued with reference to persons that joined deradicalization programmes.
A need for a further comparative and multi-disciplinary inquiry is here ab-
solutely necessary before drawing any common measure and is therefore
strongly advisable.
What could be pursued, however, is a double-track structured reward
legislation, which would treat separately convicted offenders that already
joined the mentioned programmes and those who did not. The advantages of
this division would go far beyond the immediate obtaining of a discipline
that could partly cover the above-mentioned lack of knowledge: while it
would make possible to obtain information also from subjects who do not
want to join any programme, it would also comply with the strategy of not
imposing any mandatory change of mind to the offender. Such imposition,
as already stressed out, would in fact probably enhance the risk that radi-
calised or radicalization-undergoing people would perceive the State(s) as a
dominating culture trying to oppress other cultures: thus, a radicalisation-
fostering factor. Moreover, allowing perpetrators to cooperate even without
imposing deradicalization could prove not only to be successful on this gen-
eral-communicative level, but also to be an effective “intermediate step” for
those who are still not ready to accept deradicalization; such a less-disrup-
tive approach could indeed even prove to be highly useful for creating a con-
nection between the offender and the State, that might induce the convicted
to reconsider his/her refusal at a later time.
7.2. Overview on the current national reward legislations in the post-sentenc-
ing phase
Leaving for the above illustrated reasons still untreated the “track” re-
garding the convicted willing to access deradicalization programmes – to
which the following measures could of course temporarily be extended – the
proposal would now address the “track” concerning offenders that do not
want to join such programmes.
A comparative overview of reward legislation on this phase shows a
much more differentiated approach in the observed Member States legisla-
tion compared to the other phases. Only very few States do provide for spe-
cific terrorism-targeted discipline, while in most legislation terrorist offend-
ers are treated according to the general discipline applicable to all crimes.
This produces a first notable disparity, insofar general post-sentencing bene-
fits are usually outlined as actual benefits for the cooperator, while where
terrorist offenders are specifically treated – namely in Italy68 and Spain
(where, however, use of pardon has often been resorted to)69 – the strategy
works the other way around. Terrorists who (did not and) still do not wish
to cooperate receive a way more disadvantageous treatment than the normal
68 See Section I, Ch. 1, § 2.3.
69 See Section I, Ch. 7, § 2.2.3.
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standard: they are excluded from parole institutes or work permits and
might even be subjected to the s.c. “hard prison”.
On the other hand, while in Luxembourg no specific measures are pro-
vided for (cooperation could only be taken into consideration as a general
favourable circumstance)70, in France terrorists willing to cooperate at this
stage may be awarded with a mitigation up to one third of the penalty71,
while in Croatia and Germany the case may be reopened and the cooperator
may be granted even with the exclusion of the penalty72. In Belgium, it has
been discussed if the Prosecutor could extend his/her discretion even to the
opportunity to enforce or not the penalty, but the response is generally neg-
ative; however, penitentiary benefits related to modalities and place of exe-
cution may be granted73.
Hence, national legislations on post-sentencing reward measures ap-
pear to be quite dishomogeneous, oscillating from the mere non-application
of unfavourable measures to the actual mitigation or even exclusion of the
penalty. Hence, considering that judicial cooperation may be (and often is)
requested also after conviction and that in any case the illustrated notable
disparity risks to favour the s.c. forum shopping, a need for harmonization is
here particularly noticeable.
7.3. Common aims and features of the currently existing terrorism-specific
post-conviction measures (for cooperators not taking part to deradicaliza-
tion programmes)
Although the large part of national legislations seems to just apply gen-
eral rules not specifically designed for terrorist offenders but directly de-
pending on their general systems of sentence enforcement, the approxima-
tion in this sector shall not aim at changing their general systems: such op-
eration would in fact evidently involve a huge series of reforms clearly
exceeding the purpose of the fight against terrorism. Instead, keeping in
mind that judicial cooperation does not require formal identity of provisions
but a substantial assimilability, what seems much more feasible and efficient
is fixing a functional objective that all Member States should be asked to
reach adjusting their systems without having to go through general complex
reforms; a functional objective that incarnates the main rationale to which
the few currently existing terrorism-specific post-conviction measures are
inspired, so that each Member State, although via formally different con-
crete implementations, could put in place disciplines that are substantially
similar.
In this perspective, it appears that both Spanish and Italian disciplines
are aimed at two complementary goals. First, inasmuch as they both provide
for harsher measures compared to other ‘common’ perpetrators in case the
terrorist offender did not cooperate, they clearly aim at an aggressive induc-
70 See Section I, Ch. 6, § 2.2.3.
71 See Section I, Ch. 4, § 2.2.3.
72 See Section I, Ch. 3, § 2.2.3; Section I, Ch. 5, § 3.2.2.2.
73 See Section I, Ch. 2, § 2.2.2.
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tion to do so, trying to break the convicted resistance through the enhanced
heaviness of the penalty. Exclusion from parole institutes and work permits,
as well as the possibility to harden detention conditions, do represent the
other face of reward legislation: if the promise of an actual reward did not
convince the offender, the State tries to promise the removal of a disadvan-
tage that all other prisoners are not subjected to. This way, reward legisla-
tion is exploited to its very end.
The second aim emerging from the mentioned disciplines resides in the
restraining of the offenders still-existing dangerousness. The inapplicability
of any post-conviction measure somehow involving freedom (sentence sus-
pension or probation) is clearly oriented to this purpose, as well as all mea-
sures restricting any possible communication with other people, not only
outside but even inside the prison. As it has been stressed out, a conviction
for terrorism-related crimes establishes an absolute presumption of danger-
ousness that may be overcome only if the convicted accepts cooperation74.
Such a strategy, insofar as it involves a considerably enhanced heavi-
ness of the sanctions imposed on the offender(s), may of course be consid-
ered legitimate and rationally justified only as long as the two complemen-
tary aims are actually pursuable. In this perspective, Italy’s legislation al-
ready provides for an equiparation between those who decide to cooperate
only at this stage and those who could not cooperate because they did not
dispose of any useful information, if they were subjected to mitigating cir-
cumstances related to minor roles in the committed offence or to the
restoration of the damage produced and show no still-existing link with the
criminal organization75: in this case, no dangerousness presumption could
reasonably be held still and thus no post-conviction penalty hardening may
be imposed. Although the reference to specific mitigating circumstances
could prove to hardly be adaptable to all different legal systems, the concept
behind the provision seems to be reasonable, inasmuch as it aims at defin-
ing elements able to overcome the presumption of dangerousness, and
should therefore be taken into account.
Lastly, it must be noted that the above illustrated measures would fully
comply with the need – illustrated under § 7.1. – for attenuating the “re-
wards” for those who cooperate only after the conviction and with the need
– illustrated under § 6.3 – to avoid the total exclusion of those not unwilling
but objectively unable to cooperate.
7.4. Proposal draft
In light of the previous findings, the approximation of national reward
legislations in the post-conviction phase should not indicate specific detailed
measures but rather fix a functional objective to be pursued, leaving the
Member States free to choose how to concretely satisfy it: the substantial
similarity of the uniformed national legislations will plausibly suffice to
74 See Section I, Ch. 1, § 2.3.
75 Art. 4-bis of law 354/1975; see further Section I, Ch. 1, § 2.3.
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overcome the impossibility to spread the same exact measures in all the dif-
ferent legal systems and the consequential inevitable formal differences that
will emerge in the concrete implementation.
This functional objective should be built upon the pursuit of the two
above illustrated complementary goals that animate the only currently-exist-
ing terrorism-specific post-conviction measures. Accordingly, the European
request for harmonization in this sector could be drafted as follows:
Art. Y
Post-conviction measures
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
the penalty for terrorism related offences is concretely enforced in such a
way as to limit the dangerousness of the convicted, excluding the enjoy-
ment of measures involving access to freedom and, in the most grievous
cases, contacts with other people, outside or even inside the place of de-
tention.
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
the measures adopted pursuant to § 1 are not applicable if:
a. the convicted cooperates with the authorities in such a way as to
fall within the scope of Art. X, § 1;
b. the following conditions are cumulatively met:
i. cooperation is impossible or irrelevant due to limited participation
in the criminal act, ascertained in the conviction or, in any case, in light
of the ascertainment of the facts and responsibilities established by irrev-
ocable judgements.
ii. there are sufficient and certain elements attesting that no links
with terrorist organizations are still existing.
Such a disposition will supply a general rule applicable to all terrorist
offenders, leaving the EU and the Members States free to add in the future a
derogation specifically designed for those who intended to join deradicaliza-
tion programmes; a derogation whose discipline should be deeply examined
and possibly drafted at the EU level.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPLOITING ART. 16 OF DIRECTIVE 2017/541/EU
LUDOVICO BIN, FRANCESCO ROSSI
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Brief summary of the previous findings: the proposed model
of reward measures and its comparison with Art. 16. – 3. The possible natures of art.
16 and their consequences. – 3.1. Art. 16 as a flexible provision. – 3.2. Art. 16 as a strict
limit and its possible derogations. – 3.3. The inopportunity of extending the model
beyond modern terrorism - related offences. The resulting inadequacy of a Directive
under art. 82 TFEU as the tool for a future binding model of reward measures. – 3.4.
The impracticability of a derogation justified on judicial cooperation. – 4. The need for
a tailored intervention and the possibility to amend Art. 16.
1. Introduction
In the previous pages a model of reward measures, whose transposition
should be imposed to all Member States, has been drafted, and the possibil-
ities currently conceded by art. 16 of Directive 2017/541/EU have been ex-
amined. The last step of the research consists in the merge of these findings:
the in abstracto results regarding art. 16 will be applied to the concrete mea-
sures embodied in the model, in order to ascertain to what extent art. 16
currently allows to implement the drafted model even without any further
EU legislative act. Should the implementation result possible, a second
analysis will focus on the redaction of some guidelines aimed at facilitating
such operation in the examined Member States, according to the peculiari-
ties of the individual legal systems.
2. Brief summary of the previous findings: the proposed model of reward
measures and its comparison with Art. 16
The model of reward measures drafted in Section II is composed of two
main sets of measures: one operating in the trial and sometimes also in the
pre-trial phase, whereas the other one operating in the post-sentencing phase.
The first set of measures, consisting in a mitigating circumstance that
may, in some cases, be converted to a cause of exclusion of the penalty, par-
tially overlaps the measures embodied in art. 16. However, although exclu-
sion of the penalty may to some extent be maintained as complying with art.
16, their scope of application significantly differs. First, while the types of in-
formation to provide are the same, unlike art. 16 the model does not require
that the information itself could not be obtained otherwise; moreover, art. 16
requires renunciation as an inescapable condition for the application of the
measure, which the proposed model does not require; in both cases, there-
fore, the model sets more favorable conditions to the aspiring cooperator.
The model sets however also a more restrictive condition inasmuch as it re-
quires a full disclosure of the committed facts for which the proceeding or
the investigation is brought on.
For what concerns the post-sentencing measures, the model proposes
differentiated sets of measures, depending on whether the convicted initiates
deradicalization/reintegration programmes or not; in the first case, further
studies are needed, and therefore no model has been drafted; in the second
case, a reverse reward logic has been displaced, consisting in the menace of
harder conditions than normal in the penalty enforcement if the convicted
still refuses to cooperate.
In this regard art. 16 does not mention any measure related to penalty
enforcement, thus making “more favorable” any possible reward measure;
however, peculiar dispositions related to this phase are neither embodied in
the rest of Directive 2017/541/EU, which means that the already existing na-
tional legislation shall be applied unaffectedly. Therefore, since the reward
here does not provide for an actual benefit compared to the penalty enforce-
ment standards applicable to the other forms of crime, but rather for the
mere elimination of modalities that are more grievous than those estab-
lished by the Directive, it cannot be maintained that the reward measures at
stake attenuate the criminal obligations set forth by the Directive. Hence, no
issues related to the restricted scope of art. 16 come here into play, the im-
plementation at the national level of the reward measures proposed for the
post-sentencing phase being consequently legitimate.
Upon conclusion, it may be maintained that only the reward measures
proposed for the trial and pre-trial phase may raise issues of compatibility
with art. 16 and with the obligations set forth by Directive 2017/541/EU, the
current admissibility of such measures depending on the “nature” of art. 16.
3. The possible natures of art. 16 and their consequences
3.1. Art. 16 as a flexible provision
As argued in Section II1, art. 16 may be intended either as directly
equiparable to the “minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal of-
fences and sanctions” referred to by art. 83 TFEU, or as a sort of “internal
limit” to such minimum rules, that is to say to the other dispositions of Di-
rective 2017/541/EU.
The first interpretation would allow any more favorable condition to
the aspiring cooperator: therefore, any reward measure which guarantees
more favorable conditions or greater benefits would be admissible. However,
far from being directly derivable from the law, such an interpretation would
1 See also Introduction to a european project for «rewarding measures» to prevent terror-
ism, §§ 2, 7, 9.
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necessarily be based upon theoretical and teleological grounds whose ratio-
nale resides in the need for conceding the exemption from penalty to “sec-
ondary” offenders wishing to cooperate, because the entire system of
counter-terrorism repressive criminal law is based on presumptions of dan-
gerousness connected to the mere intentions of the authors, rather than to
the facts committed.
In this perspective, the possibility to award the penalty exemption to
such types of offenders is what prevents the whole system from violating
fundamental rights. Therefore, this interpretation would include a reduction
to zero of the penalty in the scope of mitigation2; however, this reasoning
seems to affect only the type of benefit for the cooperator, without involving
the conditions for the application of the reward. The interpretation accord-
ing to which art. 16 does not fix strict and inescapable limits seems to justify
the interpretation of mitigation as allowing also the exemption of the penalty:
this does not seem to require any legislative modification in the national law.
3.2. Art. 16 as a strict limit and its possible derogations
According to the second interpretation, art. 16 would rather represent a
strict limit to the criminalization obligation set forth by the Directive. This
would mean that any national provision eventually diminishing the unfavor-
able effects set forth by the minimum norms of the Directive would infringe
the obligation contained therein. In this perspective, art. 16 carves a narrow
space for national provisions whose effect – a mitigation of the penalty –
goes to the benefit of the suspect/accused: as a result, national laws may pro-
vide for dispositions with favorable effect to the accused only insofar as they
comply with the strict requirements embodied in art. 16, while more favor-
able dispositions, exceeding the scope of art. 16, would infringe the general
obligation set forth by the Directive. Hence, the proposed model – for what
concerns the measure regarding the trial and pre-trial phase – would comply
with the Directive only where it poses a more restrictive condition, i.e. where
it requires a full confession from the aspiring cooperator. On the other hand,
where it requires less strict conditions – namely, no renunciation and no ne-
cessity that the information could not be obtained otherwise by the authori-
ties – the proposed measures would exceed the scope of art. 16 in a more fa-
vorable way, thus colliding with the obligations set forth by the Directive.
Nonetheless, cases in which the strict scope of art. 16 could be dero-
gated from have been investigated. First, it has been noted that a derogation
from EU legislation may be justified by the necessity to avoid a violation of
human rights or other EU fundamental principles. In this regard, while no
human rights violations are seemingly involved, it may be argued that a
derogation could here be justified in order to overcome the disparities in the
national terrorism-related reward legislations, whose impact on judicial co-
operation is one of the main reasons that justified this whole research:
2 See Introduction to a european project for «rewarding measures» to prevent terrorism,
§ 9.
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should art. 16 be recognized as a limit to the approximation of national re-
ward legislations, and therefore to judicial cooperation, a derogation could
hence be justified. Secondly, it has been noted that Directive 2017/541/EU
only contains obligations referring to the restricted area of counter-terror-
ism; therefore, any reward legislation not specifically addressing this matter,
but of a general relevance, could not be maintained per se colliding with the
Directive (unless of course it is deemed to concretely frustrate the effective-
ness and dissuasiveness of the counter-terrorism criminal legislation).
Hence, a further analysis of these two possible paths which would al-
low for an immediate possibility to transpose at the national level the pro-
posed model of reward measures shall be carried out.
3.3. The inopportunity of extending the model beyond modern terrorism - re-
lated offences. The resulting inadequacy of a Directive under art. 82 TFEU
as the tool for a future binding model of reward measures
Notwithstanding the abstract possibility to resort to a general national
law aimed at extending the measures proposed to all forms of crime, such a
solution seems not a viable option because of the peculiarities of the reward
model.
In fact, although the application at the national level of the reward
measures proposed does not amount to a per se illegitimate nor unfeasible
operation, and notwithstanding the fact that reward legislation has been tra-
ditionally extended to many forms of crime, two main reasons seem to hin-
der such a solution.
First, the model has been outlined on the basis of a thorough analysis
of contemporary (so-called ‘jihadi’) terrorism, aimed at highlighting the
shortcomings and room for manoeuvre of rewarding policies with respect to
the specific type of offenders and crimes that are tackled3. Moreover, the re-
search findings have also been discussed – during the 2nd Italian Focus
Group4 – with skilled academics (namely, amongst sociologists of Islam5 and
lawyers6) and practitioners (notably, from the head of state police7) in the
fields of prevention of radicalization and terrorism and of deradicalization
in prison8. The goal of this debate was to understand what actually works as
well as what yet needs to be changed in the cross-disciplinary and inter-
agency operational approach towards disengagement, deradicalization and
cooperation of terrorist offenders with administrative and judicial authori-
3 See for instance the specific criminological analysis in Section II, Ch. 2.
4 Poster and agenda of the event are available at www.fighter-project.eu.
5 Dr Mohammed Khalid Rhazzali (University of Padua).
6 Dr Laura Sabrina Martucci (University of Bari).
7 Alessandra Lanzetti (Vice Questore Aggiunto, Polizia di Stato) and her professional ex-
perience with deradicalisation programmes for minors convicted for terrorist offences: see
her case study ‘Le strategie di contrasto alla radicalizzazione violenta: il caso studio’, Osser-
vatorio ReaCt 2021, 25 February 2021 [https://www.startinsight.eu/react2021-caso-studio-
lanzetti-it/].
8 See the research & training project PriMED (Prevenzione e interazione nello spazio
Trans-Mediterraneo), funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research [https://primed-
miur.it/].
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ties9. This approach adds value to the research, which bases its legal findings
also on valuable empirical and professional knowledge. Consistently, al-
though the crossroads of the phenomenon at hand and other forms of (also
organised) crime shall be further investigated10, the need to tackle contem-
porary terrorism by means of measures tailored on both its manifold roots
and the single terrorist trajectories seems to require adjustments and rules
that might not work for different offenders and areas of crime.
Such a tailored analysis had a notable impact on the model. Dissocia-
tion, which was a pivotal feature of the reward legislation displaced against
national terrorism, has not been inserted in the model, due to the peculiari-
ties of the modern jihadi terrorists11. The types of information whose supply
could grant access to the reward have also been selected taking into account
this peculiar sector: supplying information about the accomplices has all an-
other “appeal” when it comes to other criminal offences where the accom-
plices do not resemble as dangerous as terrorist offenders do.
These remarks highlight a second issue: in order to be maintained as an
actual terrorism-unrelated discipline, the extended reward measures should
address all crimes in a general way and not only few areas to be added beside
terrorist offences. The derogation here at stake is in fact justifiable only inas-
much as it incarnates a general feature of the national legal system, whose
modifications would fall outside the current EU competences. Therefore, its
justifiability appears to be directly proportional to the broadness of its scope;
but this would mean extending reward measures to criminal offences such as
(terrorist-unrelated) homicide, theft, extortion, etc.: offences for which re-
ward legislation is unmotivated and arguably unreasonable.
Hence, extending the applicability of the proposed reward measures to
other types of offences would not only be inopportune but also potentially
unjustified or even counter effective.
The above findings do also apply to the different issue of the legal basis
to use for a future EU legislative act. In fact, Directives under art. 82 TFEU
have so far been used for general reforms on EU procedural rights in crimi-
nal matters (‘ABC Directives’)12.
Accordingly, the possible choice of a crosscutting EU Directive on re-
warding measures under Article 82 TFEU should be scrutinized carefully.
3.4. The impracticability of a derogation justified on judicial cooperation
A derogation justified on the need not to hinder judicial cooperation
seems also to be a non-viable option. As already stressed out13, a derogation
9 See Section III, Ch. 1, § 6.1.
10 On tre ‘crime-terror nexus’, see Peng WANG, ‘The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transforma-
tion, Alliance, Convergence’, Asian Social Science, vol. 6, No. 6, 2010, 11-20; Tamara
MAKARENKO, & Michael MESQUITA, ‘Categorising the crime-terror nexus in the European
Union’, Global Crime, vol. 15, Iss. 3-4, 259-274.
11 See Section III, Ch. 1, § 6.2.
12 See Silvia Allegrezza, Valentina COVOLO (eds.), Effective Defence Rights in Criminal
Proceedings: A European and Comparative Studies on Judicial Remedies, Wolters Kluwer -
Cedam, 2018.
13 Cf. Section II, Ch. 1C, § 6.
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from the tight limits imposed by art. 16 aimed at allowing Member States to
introduce measures exceeding its scope cannot be justified under the neces-
sity of avoiding possible obstacles to judicial cooperation produced by that
very disposition, since such obstacles would derive from its facultative na-
ture, which cannot be overcome anyhow by the model  proposed. In other
words, until any transposition of reward measures will have to “go through”
art. 16, approximation in this field will never be ensured, because of its op-
tional nature, that would leave open the possibility not to transpose the
model.
Therefore, a derogation from the scope of art. 16 would never be able
to grant an approximation, whose achievement is indeed what would facili-
tate judicial cooperation.
4. The need for a tailored intervention and the possibility to amend Art. 16
Conversely, a new short Directive based on Article 83 TFEU could be
the most convenient way forward in the short term. This Directive could
provide clarification (in the recital and in a first Title ‘Subject matter and
definitions’, as this is a settled legislative practice at the EU level) on the
definition of the terminology employed therein and import the model of
rewarding measure outlined at the outcome of the research, setting forth
its minimum rules as legally binding14. Thus, Article 16 of Directive
541/2017/EU would be amended and a new deadline for transposition of the
shared model of rewarding measures in the criminal justice systems of the
Member States would be set. To this effect, the choice of Article 83 TFEU
also appears more consistent to the past exercises of the EU criminal law
competence from the Maastricht Treaty onwards and thus politically sus-
tainable for the EU negotiations and the current institutional balances. An-
other way forward, in order to address both the aforementioned issues and
the need of improving mutual trust, mutual recognition and judicial cooper-
ation, would be to resort to Articles 83 and 82 jointly, thus following the
footsteps of Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instru-
mentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union15. On the long run,
as it was again the case of the evolution of the EU legal framework on freez-
ing and confiscation16, more settled experience and practices in this field
could pave the way for the issuing of a more ambitious proposal for the
adoption of another EU instrument fully centered on mutual trust, mutual
recognition and judicial cooperation in the field of rewarding measures
based on Article 82 TFEU.
14 See Section III, Ch. 1, § 6.5.
15 Of 3 April 2014, L 127/39.
16 Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 No-
vember 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders [L 303/1].
See Alessandro BERNARDI (ed.), FRANCESCO ROSSI (coord.), Improving Confiscation Procedures
in the European Union, Jovene, Naples, 2019.
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